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2ABSTRACT
Singapore is a successful example of a growth-oriented, interventionist, capitalist state. 
For four decades the government resolutely promoted economic development by fos­
tering key elements which it considered conducive to growth.
Economists, sociologists and political scientists have analysed the contribution 
that these and other elements have made to Singapore’s economic development. How­
ever no one seems to have contemplated the role that law might have played.
This study seeks to fill that gap. It draws on theory from the 1960s’ law and de­
velopment movement, which purportedly died in the 1970s but was revived as the law 
and economics movement in the 1980s by agencies like the World Bank and the IMF. 
After the collapse of Soviet communism, revival of the movement accelerated as many 
sought to assert ascendancy of the market over the state using the rule of law as a cata­
lyst.
My thesis is that Singapore’s experience contradicts crucial predictions of law 
and development theory, whether in its old or its reincarnated guise.
Many Singapore laws have diverged from their English roots to form an 
autochthonous body of rules which is more situational, opportunistic, regulatory, ho­
listic and communitarian than the rights-based, individualistic model of the West. 
Their nature is ‘westemistic’ and syncretistic, but Singapore laws are not converging 
with those of the West as a result of economic development, as the theory predicted. 
Finally, the study speculates on whether Singapore’s experience has more relevance 
for late-industrialising countries than the experience of European and American de­
mocracies whose industrialisation spanned centuries rather than decades.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
2 0
These newly developing nations need our help - not only our money and 
machines and food, but also the great capital o f  knowledge accumulated 
by our professions. . . .  [T] he young nations need teachers from  the West by 
the hundreds and thousands - law teachers, professors o f  government, re­
search assistants. We must not miss out on this opportunity fo r  service - 
fo r  participation in the long creative period ahead o f  legal development in 
over ha lf the world.
Supreme Court Judge Douglas,
Douglas W (1962) Lawyers o f the Peace Corps (1962) 48 ABAJ  909-10.
[A] great deal o f  attention is being given to what members o f  [the US] Con­
gress, ..., have termed ‘strategic’ research issues, including, in particular, 
the role o f  law in democratization and the development o f  free markets in 
developing countries.
Editorial [1994] 28 Law & Society Review  189
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1.1 Purpose and Relevance of the Study
Few can doubt that Singapore is a successful example of a growth-oriented, in­
terventionist, capitalist state. Even the World Bank (1993; 1996; 1997) acknowledges 
this fact. For four decades the Singapore government resolutely promoted economic de­
velopment by:
Providing selected free market access;
Establishing and maintaining efficient infrastructure;
Orchestrating and investing in key export-led sectors of the economy;
Disciplining and educating the work force;
Creating an ideology and delivering social justice and tangible benefits that secure the acquies­
cence of the people to the activities of the state and its elite bureaucrats. 1
This study examines the role of law in the mix that enabled Singapore’s rapid sustained 
economic growth from 1959 to 1999.
The purpose of this study is to discover whether key law and development (LAD) 
predictions about the relationship between law and economic development proved viable 
in the practice of economic development in Singapore from 1959 to 1999. Purists may 
argue that, as discussed at 1.3.2 below, there appears to be no rigorous theory of LAD. 
However there is an abundance of rhetoric, which is made compelling by the status of
some LAD protagonists like the World Bank^ and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Some of this rhetoric inform this study’s analytic platform (see 1.2,1.3 infra).
1 The content of the mix is synthesised from the work of economists, development theorists 
and other commentators. I am particularly indebted to Hafiz Mirza (1986), Tan Chwee Huat 
(1989), Tan Kong Yam (1995), Hanna et al (1996), Huff (1997) and the World Bank (1993,1997).
2 See, for instance, World Bank Helps Pioneer Judicial Reform in Peru, World Bank Group 
News Release No 98/1555/LAC on the World Bank website: www.worldbank.org:.
In the 1990s Peru's economy responded vigorously to a well-grounded economic re­
form program,... But it is an accepted fact that the weakness of the judicial system has 
been an obstacle to that growth, discouraging investors and innovative economic ac­
tivities while contributing to a general sense of insecurity (my italics).
Furthermore, the new rhetoric claims that the rule of law is crucial for economic growth, see: 
World Bank (1996) World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, chapter 3: Property 
Rights and Enterprise Reform, and chapter 5: Legal Institutions and the Rule of Law.
The World Bank and the IMF are two of three institutions set up under the United Nations' 
Bretton Woods negotiations during World War 2. (The third institution, the GATT, became the 
WTO: World Trade Organisation in 1994). The Bank's Articles of Agreement were finalised in 
July 1944. For an insightful discussion of the World Bank, see Fatouros (1977). For a World Bank 
moderated introduction, see Shihata (1991). The World Bank Group includes the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, which is the oldest institution), the Interna­
tional Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association (IDA), the Interna­
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency. In this study, the term World Bank covers particularly IBRD, IFC and IDA.
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Having become a newly industrialised country (NIC) by about 1973, one might 
imagine that Singapore’s experience could have some significance for economic devel­
opment theory, and that it provides an excellent opportunity to test some popular LAD 
claims. However, so far, this has not been the case. LAD scholars seem to have been 
concerned with their own fairly narrowly defined agenda. Until recently, their focus was 
on specific problems, which they tend to view in relation to only three types of develop­
ing countries: the devastatingly poor ones (mostly in Africa); those burdened by foreign 
debts (mostly in South America); and those in transition from communism (mostly in 
Eastern Europe). They seem to be preoccupied with investigating what went wrong, 
rather than what went right. Thus few if any LAD studies have considered the Singapore 
experience, where none of the three situations applied.3
Even if that hurdle is surmounted, others emerge. Some scholars claim that Sin­
gapore is too special or too small for its experience to be of general significance (Wade 
1990). To my mind, that claim is ill-conceived and arrogant. By ‘too special’, scholars 
seem to mean that Singapore did not take off from an agrarian society; implying that the 
less important is agriculture, the easier it is for a nation to attain high growth rates of 
GDP (Little 1982, 450). This is not the place to pursue that debate. However, one im­
portant recent case should urge scholars to reconsider the idea: Compared with Russia, 
China must be recognised as the more agrarian society. Yet in recent history, China’s 
rapid growth rates of GDP have outpaced Russia’s mightily (Nolan 1995).
It has also been said that Singapore’s position as a staple port gave it a unique 
advantage which other developing nations do not have. Viewed in this way, every coun­
try is unique. A more relevant shared experience of many new nations is their colonial 
past. Each geographic area was colonised for the particular benefit (usually economic) 
perceived by the coloniser. Singapore’s was clearly based on its natural harbour and geo­
graphic location. Other countries had mineable ores, oil or other resources; many also 
had an abundance of unskilled labour. The crux for any law and economic development 
study thus becomes an inquiry into how each new nation took charge of its resources, 
and transformed them into national assets to create competitive advantage once the colo­
nisers had withdrawn from their governing, largely exploitative roles.
For an introduction to the IMF, see Chatterjee in Fox, ed. (1992), Cutajar in Ghai et al (1987).
3 An exception is the Asian Development Bank's study by Pistor & Wellons (1999). However, 
Singapore was not included.
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Secondly, the idea that Singapore is too small is arrogance which denies the fact 
that viable city-states existed, e.g., in ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy. Currently 87 
of the world’s 193 nation-states have populations of under 5 million each; and 58 of 
these have fewer than 2.5 million each {Economist 3 January 1998, 63). It seems obvious 
that Singapore’s experience would be more relevant for other small nations than the ex­
perience of the USA with its 267 million or the UK with 60 million^. Besides, the old 
preference for small states was only transformed by greed and political expediency dur­
ing the 19th century rash of national take-overs and mergers (Italy was unified in 1861; 
Germany by 1871), and by colonial empire-building of Britain, France, Holland and so 
on. In 1914, at the outbreak of World War 1, there were only 62 independent countries in 
the world, against today’s 193. The new post-World War 2 proliferation of small nation 
states is due to (a) the colonial powers divesting themselves of their colonies; (b) the 
collapse of the Soviet Union; and (c) the impact of technology and the spread of democ­
racy or other participatory forms of government. Moreover, in the context of the British 
Commonwealth, the majority of its 54 nations are small; 22 of them have populations of 
fewer than 1 million {id).
Small states share at least one common burden: they lack the advantages of scale. 
Singapore’s experience might be relevant for showing possible ways of coping with this 
disability, and for taking charge of post-colonial economic development in the context of
an English common law heritage.^
But the fact remains, until now, most studies have focused on the political econ­
omy of Singapore’s success (Huff 1997; Rodan 1989), sometimes analysing its social 
costs (Tremewan 1994) or the role played by information technology (Hanna et al 1996), 
by multinationals (Mirza 1986) or government (Low 1998), but nearly always ignoring 
the role of law. Philip Pillai (1983) and Andrew Phang (1990) are exceptions. Pillai’s 
study considers legal importation of what he calls state enterprise law, while Phang’s 
legal treatise also incorporates socio-economic development aspects. At p 5 he asserts: 
‘the development of the Singapore legal system has been heavily dependent upon its 
wider socio-economic as well as political context’ (my italics). I agree with this, how­
ever, my own study critiques aspects of Pillai’s and Phang’s studies.
4 For interesting insights into the idea of miniature nations as symbols of the future, see Alesina 
A & Spolare E (1997).
5 For studies of small economies, see, e.g.Vital D (1971); Lewis V, ed (1976); UNCTAD (1974).
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Others have focused on substantive areas of Singapore law and considered, al­
most incidentally, how law has impacted on narrow aspects of the republic’s develop­
ment. For instance, Christudason (1994 unpublished PhD thesis, London) examines the 
rationale behind the development of Singapore’s land law. She concludes inter alia that 
the role of the Housing and Development Board, a statutory arm of the Ministry of Na­
tional Development (which she calls ‘the architect of modem Singapore’) goes far be­
yond providing affordable public housing and serves also as a medium for social engi­
neering (at 363). Similarly, Mohan’s study of the control of corruption in Singapore 
(1988 unpublished PhD thesis, London) posits that Singapore’s level of development 
made possible the availability of resources to combat corruption. He leaves untouched 
the impact that curbing corruption might have had on Singapore’s economic develop­
ment. Again, neither explicitly examines the role of law in Singapore’s economic devel­
opment. That is the purpose of this study.
This study investigates the nature of the relationship between law and economic 
development in Singapore. It seeks to uncover the role that law might have played in 
transforming Singapore from being a modestly successful colonial entrepot in 1959, 
when it won self-rule from the British, to modem Singapore, which in 1995 was among 
the 20 richest nations in the world. With a 1995 per capita GNP of US$24,800, it was 
ahead of its past colonial master whose was only US$18,700 (World Bank Atlas 1997). 
By 1990, with a population of about three million, Singapore was the world’s 13th larg­
est exporter of commercial services, and ranked 18th in exports of merchandise or three 
times the merchandise exports of the whole of India (GATT 1990/91 vol 2, 3-4).
The 1960s’ law and development (LAD) paradigm forms the framework in which 
this study is conducted. Although presumed dead in the 1970s (Trubek & Galanter 
1974), LAD regained poignancy as it was revitalised and globalised in the 1980s and 
‘90s by the World Bank (Shihata 1991,1995), the IMF and other supranational agencies.
My thesis is that Singapore’s experience has disproved the two core LAD predic­
tions: One, only the Western notion of the rule of law can secure sustainable economic 
growth. Two, the laws of developing countries will converge with, and become like, 
those of the West, as a result of economic development. The study shows that Singapore 
has experienced sustainable growth without adopting crucial aspects of the rule of law. 
Moreover, far from converging with laws of the West, many Singapore laws have di­
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verged to form an autochthonous body of rules in response to the government’s strategic 
intent and the nation’s unique mix of socio-cultural, economic and political imperatives.
The study concludes that law in the developmental state of Singapore diverged 
from its roots and has become more situational, regulatory, communitarian and holistic 
in nature than the rights-based, individualistic model of the West. However, at the turn of 
the millennium a new species of supranational laws is set to change this conclusion. 
Global laws such as those designed to protect intellectual property rights (chapter 8) will 
be imposed on all nations that wish to participate in world trade. Thus, at least on paper, 
such laws will converge with those of the West, even though such convergence is not 
occurring as an inevitable result of economic development as LAD theory requires.
Although this study does not suggest direct emulation of Singapore, it speculates 
on whether Singapore’s experience has more relevance for late-industrialising nations 
than the experiences of European and American democracies, whose industrialisation 
spanned centuries rather than decades.
There is now a dearth of LAD studies about Singapore but that situation might 
change. As pundits proclaim the demise of the Asian miracle because of the 1997-99 re­
gional setback, scholars are likely to show more interest. Many are set to posit theories
about cronyism and ‘what went wrong’ in Asia*\ while a few might want to discover 
why Singapore seems to have emerged relatively unscathed from the economic turmoil.
1.2 Methodology
The word development connotes a dynamic process of change over time. The 
objective of this study therefore dictates that my investigation employs historical meth­
ods of analysis. These are combined with basic quantitative and qualitative methods.
6 See, e.g., Martin Lee, Economic Crisis is Proof the Asians Need Democracy, International Her­
ald Tribune, Wed Jan 21,1998, p 8, col 3:
The first lesson from the Asian crisis is that a government that is not answerable to its 
people will not be likely to have open markets or the institutions required to impose 
discipline to overcome a financial crisis. The second lesson is that guanxi, or connec­
tions, are never a substitute for the rule of law.
See also Paul Krugman, Asia's economic pain for real, USA Today, Fri Jan 2,1998, p6A:
Rules are there for a reason. In the United States, we do business under a lot of annoy­
ing regulations that require company managements to report profits and losses accu­
rately, that prevent banks and those they lend to from getting too friendly, and so on. 
And we also made it hard for government officials and businessmen to strike deals 
without a lot of lawyers present. In Asia, they scoffed. They did business on the basis of 
personal relationships, not narrow legalisms. And now we know the results.
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Thus, using simple, descriptive, statistical analyses and qualitative assessments based on 
secondary sources, I trace the pattern of Singapore’s economic development from 1959 
to 1999. Where changes or paradigmatic shifts are found, they are identified as develop­
ment phases. While I expect that major changes such as the shift from import- 
substituting industrialisation (ISI) to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) will be well 
marked, for instance in government statistics, care will be taken to identify more subtle 
changes, including negative ones. I do not imagine that changes manifested themselves 
as Damascus road events, rather they probably took place over shorter or longer time pe­
riods. This will undoubtedly add to the complexity of making an exact correlation be­
tween specific laws and economic development. However I hope that broad trends mani­
fested during periods of two-three years following the coming into force of specific laws 
will be indicative.
1.2.1 Strategy
Conceptually, the study divides into two parts. In Part 1 ,1 try to capture the na­
ture of Singapore’s law as it appeared in 1959. The historical context in which Singapore 
received its English common law system is presented in outline, in sufficient detail to
help identify the status or ‘ideal type’? of Singapore’s laws as at 1959, when Singapore 
won self-rule from the British. Next, using a relational database, I register the major sub­
stantive laws** that were in force in 1959 and attempt to plot, chronologically, the devel­
opment of these and subsequent laws from 1960 to 1999. In registering changes in the 
laws during the period, care is taken to note how they coincide in time with each previ­
ously identified phase of economic development. Using my modified version of Trubek’s 
model of ideal types of legal systems (see 1.5), I attempt to draw conclusions about the 
nature of Singapore’s laws in 1959. I also examine whether the cursory correlation, 
which might have been found between law and economic development from 1959 to 
1999 reveals any developmental tendencies or changes in the nature of Singapore’s laws.
7 Ideal type refers to Trubek's model of three ideal types of legal systems, see 1.5 infra.
'■ 8 By substantive law I mean all legislation, as in a body of statutes, all Acts of Parliament, the
Constitution, subsidiary legislation, directives, rules and regulations. The study focuses on pri- 
| mary legislation. A typology of Singapore statutes, which forms the structure of a customised
i database of Singapore laws 1959-1999, is shown in the Appendix. The database is available on
diskette.
}
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Part 1 and Part 2 of my study are closely linked. Part 1 forms the macro-level ba­
sis from which the more detailed methodology for Part 2 evolves. In Part 2 ,1 conduct a
micro-level test of key LAD-informed hypotheses^. Here I attempt to go beyond the 
mere mechanical correlation between law and development, which was established in 
Part 1 .1 analyse the development of three specific areas of economic law over the period 
1959 to 1999 and examine the nature of their links with economic development during 
the period. For this micro-level analysis, I have chosen laws governing labour, land, and 
capital. This is because these laws govern what economists call ‘factors of production’, 
that is, resources, which they claim cause the production of wealth in capitalist societies. 
How such laws originated, developed and operate in Singapore should therefore be in­
dicative of the link between law and economic growth in the country.
I move from a macro-level analysis in Part 1 to a micro-level analysis in Part 2 for 
two reasons. First, there are so many variables, which might effect economic change that 
it is not easy to differentiate the role that law might have played from the role of other 
change-agents employed by the state. It is here that LAD theory reveals its inadequacy, 
since as discussed at 1.3 infra, there are no proven causal links between law and devel­
opment. Secondly, the operation of legal systems is so complex that it is impossible to 
isolate the impact of internal interaction between laws and legal institutions from the im­
pact between the legal system and other socio-economic factors. By focusing on three 
areas of law I hope to simplify the task somewhat by reducing the number of variables.
Part 2 presents three competing hypotheses, which are informed by core LAD 
assumptions about the causal link between law and economic development. Assumptions 
relating to hypothesis (1), Convergence, are synthesised from LAD rhetoric discussed in
1.3 infra as represented by, for instance, the World Bank. Hypothesis (2), Divergence, 
accepts as a working hypothesis that there is a link between law and development but 
rejects convergence; while hypothesis (3), Irrelevance, rejects the existence of a link.
9 These and an historical account of the LAD movement are discussed at 1.3 infra. There are 
two basic ideas. One, that economic development will result from the implementation of ra­
tional or modem western law, especially laws that safeguard individual property rights and 
contracts. In the 1990s this concept developed into a more elaborate diet of legal reform which 
forced transplantation of the mle of law to developing countries under the guise of structural 
adjustment programmes which the World Bank and the IMF claim will lead to economic devel­
opment. The second idea is that laws and legal systems develop along a continuum from 
primitive or customary law to modem, rational, rights-based western law. This natural evolu­
tion ends with the convergence of laws, so that those in developing countries will inevitably be­
come like those in the developed West.
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The general claims for the three competing hypotheses are summarised thus:
(1) Convergence. Modem law is synonymous with the rule of law as practised in devel­
oped western countries. It is characterised by inter alia clearly defined, predictable rules 
which safeguard individual property rights and transactions between parties. Its charac­
teristics are universal and essential for the operation of a free market economy 10. Unless 
developing countries implement the rule of law they will not achieve economic devel­
opment. The laws and legal systems of developing countries will converge with, and be­
come like, those of the developed countries, because convergence is an inevitable out­
come of economic development. The globalisation of markets and the use of information 
technology serve to accelerate the convergence of laws.
(2) Divergence. Modem law is an organic, culture-specific, political entity. Even if 
country A’s legal system is initially the same as or similar to that of country B, the laws 
of country A and country B will diverge and develop in different ways as they respond 
to challenges in ways that are influenced by indigenous socio-cultural, political and 
economic imperatives. Thus laws and legal institutions of countries will vary in design 
and function. Some may be conducive to rapid economic development, others not. It 
really depends on the policies, strategic intent and decisions of governments.
(3) Irrelevance. Modem law is irrelevant for economic development. There is no dis­
cernible link between law and economic development. Economic growth is the result of 
strategic decisions taken by wise charismatic leaders.
To summarise, my purpose in Part 1 is threefold:
1. To examine the origins and nature of the laws that operated in Singapore in 1959.
2. To identify and analyse growth phases in Singapore’s economic development from 
1959 to 1999.
3. To correlate, where possible, changes in the laws with growth phases in the econ­
omy during the same period.
My purpose in Part 2 is twofold:
L To identify the nature of the link between changes in the law and changes in the 
economy that were uncovered in Part 1.
10 This part of the hypothesis is informed by LAD interpretation of Weber's work on the role of 
law in Europe's development. For an insightful discussion, see Trubek (1972) especially 11-16. 
The remainder of the hypothesis derives from World Bank rhetoric; see notes 2 and 9.
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2. To determine the extent to which the nature of the link (in relation to three specific 
areas of law) corresponds with key LAD hypotheses.
1.2.2 Sources
A mix of primary and secondary sources is used. Economic data derive from sec­
ondary sources: government statistics and statistics presented in academic and other lit­
erature, including reports from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. There 
is an abundance of such data, for many studies have marvelled and continue to marvel at 
Singapore’s rapid economic growth. However, the accuracy of some historical govern­
ment data is disputed, for instance, regarding unemployment rates. But as the focus of my 
study is law and not statistics, I shall not enter into this debate. Instead I employ govern­
ment statistics, and accept that these might paint a rosier picture than some pure statisti­
cians might like. For the purposes of this study, it is important only to register the broad 
trend of moving from surplus labour to full employment; a percentage point or two will 
not alter the general picture. To clarify the overall picture and accuracy of the phases of 
Singapore’s economic growth 1959-1999, interviews were conducted with various groups 
of non-scientifically selected employers and employees in the private and state sectors as 
well as retirees, especially ex-civil servants.
Legal data were gathered from primary sources. The focus of the analysis is pri­
mary legislation, though some subsidiary legislation and cases are considered. Official 
Reports from debates in Singapore’s Legislative Assembly and Parliament, and ministe­
rial speeches about the government’s intention regarding specific bills form the core of 
the extra-judicial documents that were consulted. These data were collected in Singapore. 
Primary legislation and cases were consulted in Singapore and England.
Interviews were conducted with legal professionals and academics who had 
worked in Singapore in the 1960s, 1970s and so on, and with members of Singapore’s 
bureaucracy and some of its retirees. According to Economic Development Board (EDB) 
statistics a significant number of EDB officers have served for well over 10 years. For 
instance, 65 officers in its Manpower Development Division joined the EDB in 1961 and 
some were still employed in 1990 when the Low et al (1993, 398) book was researched.
However, it proved a formidable task to achieve a reasonably open dialogue with 
Singaporeans. While obstacles to collecting [unbiased] information on commercial and 
legal activities exist in all societies, in Singapore they are compounded by a high degree
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of reluctance on the part of officials and private citizens to be open with strangers. This is 
due partly to cultural norms that stress information exchange within existing relationships 
(Hwang 1987), and partly to repressive internal security - the siege mentality (Harding 
1998), which means that many people do not seem to feel free to exercise basic civil lib­
erties. Many also seem to feel that giving any commercial information to strangers may 
be detrimental to the nation’s (or their firm’s) competitive advantage. This is probably 
underlined by the Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) 
Act, cap 319. Thus, instead of a random sample of interviewees, I was forced to build 
relationships with few trusting locals and foreigners who have firsthand knowledge of the 
workings of the statutory bodies and government-linked companies. Interviews were con­
ducted in June and September 1998 and April 1999. The database of Singapore’s primary 
statutes 1959-99 was established in the same period and revised in May 1999.
1.2.3 Approach and Outline of Chapters 
According to Burg (1977,492):
A theory of law and development is one which seeks to describe the relationship(s) between law 
(however defined) and development (however defined) in the particular context of the so-called 
developing countries of the world.
Consequently, a study, which seeks to discover the role of law in the economic devel­
opment of Singapore from 1959 to 1999, should be well served by a theory of law and 
development (LAD). However, as indicated at 1.3.2, there seems to be a lack of LAD 
theory, but an abundance of rhetoric and, in the 1980s and 1990s, renewed pressure on 
developing countries to effect legal and economic liberalisation. The 1980s’ debt crisis 
in developing countries induced the introduction of World Bank and IMF structural ad­
justment programmes and other interventions, in which legal reform was an explicit 
precondition to assistance from the two Bretton Woods institutions. The stick and the 
carrot are used. On the one hand, developing countries are warned that there will be no 
foreign investment or World Bank loans without modem [western] law. On the other, 
they are promised that modem law inevitably will lead to economic development. This 
is akin to the current neo-liberal position in economics which argues that neo-classical 
economic principles (of the free market) are universally valid; as relevant to Europe or 
North America, as to Africa, Asia and South America (Tan & Jomo in Fitzgerald ed 
1995, 18). I am concerned that such powerful machinery can be put into motion without
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a firm theoretical basis, but that is the case with neo-liberalism, both of the legal and the 
economic type. For this reason I propose to spend some time getting to grips with the 
ideological basis of LAD and its link with the new legal liberalism.
Chapter 1 examines the genesis of LAD in the 1950s and 1960s spurred by 
American and UN euphoria in the post-World War 2 years. It analyses the early demise 
of LAD in America in the 1970s (Trubek & Galanter 1974, 1062; Merryman 1977, 
457). It traces the movement’s revival during the following decade (Flory 1987, 15) into 
the 1980s when LAD metamorphosed into the more expressive French phrase le droit 
international du developpement, where idu> means ‘for’ development (Slinn 1995, 
265); climaxing in the 1990s when paternity was reclaimed for the UN (Paul 1995, 307; 
Slinn 1995). LAD seems to have come full circle, but with the resurgence of economic 
liberalism and the globalisation push, the agenda has changed. In 1994, Law & Society 
Review (vol 28,189) noted that:
[A] great deal of attention is being given to what members of [the US] Congress,..., have termed 
‘strategic’ research issues, including, in particular, the role of law in democratization and the de­
velopment of free markets in developing countries.
I therefore examine the new free market focus and define the rule of law, since both are 
considered vital for economic development (Shihata 1991, 1995; Krugman 1998). Chap­
ter 1 ends by considering Trubek’s model of ideal types of legal systems which is modi­
fied to serve as a tool for identifying and describing changes in Singapore’s laws from 
1959 to 1999 (see Appendix 1).
Chapter 2 accounts for the reception of English law into Singapore. Using the 
modified Trubek model I attempt to characterise the nature of Singapore’s laws as they 
appeared in 1959.
Chapter 3 outlines salient features of the pre-1959 basis for Singapore’s mod­
em economic development. Just as there was a legal base from which modem legal de­
velopment started, so too several socio-economic and political elements determined the 
platform for modem economic growth.
Chapter 4 outlines and analyses Singapore’s economic development from 1959 
to 1999. It identifies significant shifts in the economy, describing changes as develop­
ment phases. This chapter paints with a broad bmsh and draws on accepted as well as 
disputed accounts of Singapore’s economic development during the period.
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Chapter 5 identifies and examines major substantive laws that might have af­
fected economic development during the period. It attempts to plot a mechanical corre­
lation between the economic growth phases identified in chapter 4 and the substantive 
laws discussed here. This completes Part 1, a macro-level analysis, whose overall pur­
pose is to discover whether there was a link between law and economic growth in Singa­
pore during the period.
Chapters 6 to 8 comprise Part 2 whose purpose is a micro-level analysis of the 
nature of the link between law and economic growth in Singapore. Part 2 focuses on 
three specific areas of economic law, one for each chapter, in which key LAD-informed 
hypotheses are tested. The areas of law selected represent laws that economists claim 
govern factors of production. Chapter 6 examines labour and industrial relations laws. 
Chapter 7 investigates land laws, and chapter 8 analyses laws governing intellectual 
property rights. The overall purpose of this Part is to discover whether these laws con­
verged or are converging with those of the West. If so, whether convergence is a function 
of economic development.
Finally, chapter 9 draws conclusions about the nature of the relationship be­
tween law and economic development in Singapore, and pinpoints lessons that might be 
learned from Singapore’s experience. It speculates on whether Singapore’s experience is 
more relevant for late-industrialising nations than the experience of early industrialisers.
1.3 The Theoretical Framework: Law and Development
Singapore’s economic development coincides almost exactly with the period 
when academic and professional interest in law and development (LAD) ideologies 
(1.3.2) became popular. The movement’s growth is rooted in the post-World War 2 pe­
riod when European nations, particularly Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Portugal and 
Spain, sought to divest themselves of their colonies. Singapore was among the newly 
liberated nations that were deemed ready for modernisation. The West, it was thought, 
possessed ‘the models and know-how for raising up these new members of the commu­
nity of nations’ (Burg 1977,495).
1.3.1 The Movement’s American Origin and Demise
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the USA, emboldened by the success of the Mar­
shall plan in Europe, seemed ready to take on the rest of the world. The targets were obvi-
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ous. Variously called developing countries, the south or the third world, as opposed to the 
industrialised nations, which were called developed, the north or the first world, the new 
sovereign nations were to be developed and modernised. For as President John F Kennedy 
said in his speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September 1961, proposing that the 
1960s be called the United Nations Development Decade: political sovereignty is simply 
derisive unless it is accompanied by the means of overcoming poverty, ignorance and 
disease.11 Such means according to Kennedy’s advisor, professor Galbraith (1979) were 
‘broadly speaking ... capital and,... useful technical knowledge’. Put more specifically by 
former Supreme Court judge Douglas (1962, 909-910):
These newly developing nations need our help - not only our money and machines and 
food, but also the great capital of knowledge accumulated by our professions. ... [T]he 
young nations need teachers from the West by the hundreds and thousands - law teachers, 
professors of government, research assistants. We must not miss out on this opportunity for 
service - for participation in the long creative period ahead of legal development in over 
half the world.
In the event ‘help’ took as many forms as Douglas had envisaged. It was funded mainly 
by the US Agency for International Development (USAID: Title IX of the Foreign As­
sistance Act 1966) and the Ford Foundation. These bodies and Kennedy’s Peace Corps 
sponsored research at academic institutions as well as hands-on projects in the new na­
tions (Burg 1977,496 n 17).
There were four kinds of projects. First, export of legal education (Trubek & 
Galanter 1974, 1066; von Mehren 1965, 1180; Steiner 1971, 39). Secondly, export of 
concrete, goal-oriented development projects (Seidman 1972, 312). Here, law would as­
sist in turning development goals into reality. Thirdly, projects that encouraged mod­
ernisation. Modernisation was not clearly defined. It could mean rooting out local ele­
ments that stood in the way of advancement (Murphy 1967, 54-60); or modernising 
state structures and revising the laws (David 1963) as was being done by the Law 
Commission in England; or modernising the outlook of the people (Allott 1963); or the 
natural ‘progression’ of the local legal system to one that aped modem law in America. 
The fourth kind of project was the export of legal aid programmes similar to those that 
were being developed in America and England (Abel 1985,474-642).
11 This period also marks the founding of Kennedy's Peace Corps. For an insightful history, see 
Fischer F (1998) Making Them Like Us.
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Attempts were made to institutionalise law and development as a field of study 
in American universities. Many testified to its importance.12 The International Legal 
Center (ILC) in New York was set up by the Ford Foundation in 1966 with a USD 3 
million grant (Merryman 1977,457 n4). Yale Law School established a program in Law 
and Modernization, and Stanford Law School a long-term study of the role of law in 
Latin American development, both of which were sponsored by USAID (Trubek & Ga- 
lanter 1974,1067 nl4). The ILC was specific about its aims (Merryman 1977,459 n6):
Working with US, foreign, and international agencies, foundations, universities, and practicing 
(sic) lawyers and jurists, the center will stimulate and support systematic study of the role of law 
in international relations and the development of modem nations. The center will also be con­
cerned with recruitment and training to expand the ranks of lawyers, social scientists and others 
qualified to work on problems of law and development; and with projects to help developing 
countries establish legal institutions essential to the functioning of modem, free societies.
American help, however, was far from altruistic. The new nations were emerging markets 
to be pruned and plied for the consumption of American goods and services, and the 
continued supply of cheap raw materials and valuable resources such as oil. Indeed one of 
the main theories that informed the movement (see 1.3.2) held that development meant 
accelerating the new nations through stages from primitive, static, subsistence societies to 
complex, industrialised ones; from traditional to modem ways of life; from widespread 
poverty to widespread consumption. The period marked the rivalry of the Cold War. The 
third world was to be won over, to prevent defection to the enemy. Indeed, the ‘world 
outside of Europe was insignificant except as a battleground in the Cold War’ (Fischer 
1998, 10). American foreign policy focused on worldwide competition with the Soviets 
and the law and development movement became its humane face.
Apart from demonstrating pride and patriotism, the universities and the scholars 
themselves also had their own selfish agenda and motivations. As Trubek and Galanter 
point out (1974,1068):
...the theme had something for everyone. The comparative lawyers saw in ‘law and development’ a 
way to break out of the rather sterile comparison of legal rules which had dominated comparative 
law studies. The social scientists and area specialists saw the theme as a way to relate their tradi­
tional disciplinary interests to broader social needs in Third World countries. The social theorists 
of law saw Third World nations engaged in massive use of law in social change. And the reformers 
sought a set of ideas that would both guide and justify their projects. Moreover, all saw the theme 
of law and development as one that would promise increased support for academic and action 
work, for it was hoped that scholarship would demonstrate to action agencies that legal research 
and reform would further their goals of fostering Third World development.
12 See, for instance, Harvard Law School International Legal Studies Program, 1961 Report, 3.
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However, as it turned out, the movement failed after just over a decade (Merryman 
1977; Burg 1977). For in 1974, Trubek and Galanter, two of LAD’s most fervent pro­
tagonists, famously proclaimed that law and development was in crisis, and declared 
themselves self-estranged. Among their concerns were that they had been too naive and 
insensitive in seeking to transplant American legal institutions to foreign cultures with­
out studying those cultures (Trubek & Galanter 1974, 1080-82). Their criticisms focused 
on liberal legalism: the original paradigm of law and development (id 1070). However, 
as Tamanaha (1995, 473) points out and their own analysis illustrates (id 1078, where 
they list the core elements), liberal legalism is synonymous with the rule of law. In any 
event, their article is seen as an epitaph to the American movement (Burg 1977, Merry­
man 1977); while others claim that the crisis continued into the 1990s (Adelman & 
Paliwala 1993, 10).
If the movement was energised by the oxygen of aid agencies’ funding, so too its 
death centred around funding. As Merryman documents (id 459 n7), after an internal 
review in 1971, the Ford Foundation believed that its own and the International Legal 
Center’s law and development programme had been unsuccessful. This led it to with­
draw from the field.
In other words, after only about 10 years’ perseverance, when the developing 
countries failed to ‘take-off as the model had predicted they would, the entire pro­
gramme was terminated. Both Ford and US-AID withdrew their funding, and the experi­
ments and field of study collapsed.
Scholars like Merryman (1977, 483) concluded that law and development would 
do better under the rubric of comparative law and social change with American lawyers 
placing emphasis on inquiry rather than advice. Others suggested that scholars should 
work from the specific to the general, using a country-by-country approach to gather em­
pirical data around less refined hypotheses, eventually providing the basis for a general 
theory of law and development.
Echoing Friedman (1969), Burg (id, 530) recommends ‘greater emphasis on law 
as a culturally specific phenomenon in the context of tangible development problems’. 
Among the benefits, he finds that ‘[i]t might encourage us to examine societies radically 
different from our own which minimize the role of law... without regarding them as aber­
rations from established theories’. To judge by the condemnations levelled at Asian na­
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tions in the wake of the 1997-99 economic setback, no such lessons were learnt and no 
such benefits accrued.
However, the 1970s crisis among American scholars did not filter through to le­
gal practitioners in developing nations (Tamanaha 1995, 474; see also 1.3.4). They were 
obliged to get on with the practicalities of everyday life, albeit with fewer American 
dollars. In addition, French and English scholars, focusing on former colonies, and South 
American, African and Indian scholars and practitioners persevered. They participated in 
the later politicisation of law and development (see 1.3.3), though history shows that 
Asian nations like Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan just got on 
with the job of modernisation, utilising the legal framework as they deemed necessary.
It is also worth recalling that the period during which American LAD movement 
flourished, then collapsed, coincided with the great civil rights movement in America, 
and the Vietnam War. Both events, especially the blacks’ fight for civil justice left many 
academics, civil rights activists and anti-war protesters with a feeling that America was 
perhaps ill-equipped to preach the benefits of the rule of law when its own domestic af­
fairs were in such disarray. The civil rights marches and anti-war sit-ins were televised 
around the world and greatly embarrassed the establishment. Noteworthy in this context 
is the fact that, having abandoned law and development, Trubek became a key actor in 
the critical legal studies (CLS) movement. Galanter became an influential socio-legal 
scholar.
The oil price shocks of the early 1970s probably also soured the development at­
mosphere. As the situation of many developing countries grew worse, relative to the 
West, relations between rich and poor nations deteriorated into the North-South con­
frontation which is still being played out in various international fora both in and out of 
the UN embrace (see 1.3.3).
In conclusion, the American movement failed or was abandoned for many rea­
sons, including a lack of consensus among its protagonists about the core concepts (see 
1.3.2), and a host of essentially parochial, domestic matters like the embarrassment of the 
civil rights movement. But perhaps the real reason for failure was the protagonists’ na­
ivety and impatience in thinking that, by transferring so-called correct policies and trans­
planting the rule of law, developing countries could achieve in ten years what it had taken 
the industrialised West a century or two to accomplish.
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1.3.2 The Movement’s Intellectual Base
Theories about development abound in western social and political thought from 
Greco-Roman times and beyond (Bock 1978; Bury 1928; Pollard 1968; Nisbet 1980). 
However in this study theory is subject to two limitations. First, theory is construed nar­
rowly to mean concepts or assumptions used to produce results, rather than ‘a set of hy­
potheses related by logical or mathematical arguments to explain and predict a wide vari­
ety of connected phenomena in general terms’ (Collins English Dictionary 1994). For, as 
Higgott points out, there would seem to be no theory of development in the formal sense 
of hypotheses which have been verified in a systematic manner through empirical study 
(1989 reprint xii). Secondly, the theories I pursue here are concerned only with the post- 
World War 2 period.
1.3.2.1 Modernisation Theory
There is a consensus that the American concept of law and development grew 
out of the theory of political development which was itself informed by the modernisa­
tion theory (Tamanaha 1995,471). Both are rooted in American euphoria of the imme­
diate post-World War 2 period. There are two main influences at work. One was in­
formed by Parsons’ structural functionalism, the other by Rostow’s five categories of 
development. According to Rostow (1960, 4) development progresses on a linear scale 
ranging from backwardness to capitalism’s mass consumption:
It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five 
categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to matur­
ity, the age of high mass-consumption.
Rostow thought that to progress, societies would inevitably have to move along this 
scale. Further, that this movement could be accelerated if planners and political leaders 
chose the right tools and social structures (all western), which would assist in the transi­
tion towards modernity.
Parsons’ theory, simply put, held that development was an inevitable, evolution­
ary process of increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately result in eco­
nomic, political and social institutions similar to those in the West. The outcome of this 
progression would be the creation of a free market system, democracy and the rule of 
law. Huntington (in Kabashima & White 1986, 96) identified four essential stages of de­
velopment towards modernisation: One, rationalization (based on social theories in­
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spired by Weber, Durkheim, Parsons) which involved a move from the particular to the 
universal, in order to achieve the functional differentiation of society. Two, nation- 
building or national integration. Three, democratization, which emphasised pluralism, 
competitiveness and accountability. Four mobilization or participation, which would be 
fostered by education and would result in involving a greater number of the population 
in the political arena.
These assumptions formed the basis for the emergence of the theory of devel­
opment as modernisation. As summarised by Higgott (id 59):
Modernisation theory... had as its central essence a belief in the inevitable development of the 
Third World... The well-known metaphor was of course that of developing countries sitting as 
aeroplanes at the end of a runway, about to take off into a process of self-sustained growth and 
fuelled by the diffusion of knowledge, capital, and culture from the developed world.
Law and development theorists adopted these assumptions and beliefs, hypothesising that 
one of the preconditions for Rostow’s take-off was modem law. The core concept viewed 
law in two essentially conflicting ways: One, as a specific social process emerging from 
the overall process of development, i.e. as a necessary outcome of development itself. 
Two, it was a useful tool for achieving development (Tmbek & Galanter 1974, 1073). It 
was thought that Weber’s work on European development backed these claims (Tmbek 
1972, 15). Both aspects were to be studied and exported to developing countries. Earlier 
Galanter (1966, 154) had identified modem law as ‘a cluster of features that characterize, 
...the legal systems of the industrial societies of the last century.’ The features listed in 
his model of modem law (154-156), emphasise unity, uniformity and universality (157); 
though he admitted that ‘no actual legal system is really so unified, regular, and univer- 
salistic’ (id) owing to discrepancies between law in books and law in action.
It is clear from the literature that modem law was viewed as an instrumental of 
change (see, for instance, Friedman 1969; Seidman 1966, 1972; Galanter 1966; David 
1963). This was not an organised school of thought, but it was a prominent way of 
thinking, underpinned inter alia by Pound’s theory of law as social engineering (1942, 
6). The focus is on positive law: rules promulgated by the state, with lawyers playing the 
roles of formulators and advisors. Thus Proehl and Richardson (1970, 221) could talk 
about the post-independent African phenomenon and:
the felt need of the new governments to use law-as-legislation as the obvious tool of social engi­
neering to meet the pressing problems of nationhood presented by independence and to reach 
development goals....
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Seidman’s model of law and development (1972, 1996) is based on what he calls three 
‘jural postulates’ or value acceptances among which he requires developing countries to 
choose. The postulates are status, contract and plan, representing three bodies of law: 
customary, received (i.e. English) and public regulatory. Ideally, a country should 
choose public regulatory laws because only these can drive rapid development. Custom­
ary laws (status) are ill-suited as they obviously had not yet led to development; while 
contract (received) laws are capable of bringing about only incremental changes. Thus 
although ideal, received laws were too slow for the kind of development which law and 
development practitioners like Seidman had in mind.
It is clear from the foregoing that, although aspirational and speculative, LAD 
built on theories of modernisation in which law was seen mainly as an instrument of 
change, in the mould of Bentham, Mill and the utilitarians. In this model, law was 
Austinian law-as-legislation, i.e., positive sanction-backed rules derived from the state 
and distinguishable from norms derived from religion or ethics. Despite its inherent 
flaws, this model continues to exert influence in development circles, even though all 
formal links are denied. It also clearly informs the model adopted in modem Singapore.
1.3.2.2 Dependency Theory
As is well known, a crisis of confidence arose among modernisation theorists in 
the 1970s when most states failed to taxi to the runway, let alone get airborne, as pre­
dicted.
The dependency or radical development theory emerged. There is a lack of con­
sensus about its origin. Some claim it has Marxist roots (Foster-Carter 1973), others that 
it grew out of Latin America’s dissatisfaction with the ignorance and insensitivity shown 
by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) during the first UN Develop­
ment Decade (Prebisch 1963; Frank 1969, 1975, 1981). The truth is probably more nu- 
anced, as Higgott argues (1989 reprint, 45).
In any event, by the mid-1970s, dependency theory had taken over the chair va­
cated, at least in part, by modernisation theory. Where the latter blamed factors internal 
to the developing countries (cultural backwardness) for their failure to take-off, depend­
ency theory saw the source of underdevelopment as the history of exploitation and the 
structure of the global capitalist system. Frank (1969) and others such as Santos (1973) 
argued that while developing countries might have been wwdeveloped before western
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penetration, they became wwcferdeveloped after incorporation into the global capitalist 
system. David Greenberg (1980) outlines the theory eloquently in his article ‘Law and 
Development in Light of the Dependency Theory’.
Simply put, the theory held that global capitalism is structured (historically and 
currently) around a western core and a developing periphery, in which the wealth of the 
core is based upon keeping the periphery in a state of permanent dependency and under­
development (see Snyder 1980). The dependentistas argued that, in its modem guise, 
dependency was effected via the international division of labour. They questioned the 
inevitability of the move from backwardness to modernity under such division of labour.
Dependency theorists also criticised modernisation theorists for defining devel­
opment in purely economic terms, for failing to acknowledge wHcfer-development and its 
causes, for not emphasising class conflicts, and for unsound reasoning. In its most ex­
treme form, the theory precluded the industrialisation of peripheral economies within the 
global capitalist system (Adelman & Paliwala 1993, 5). However, even at this phase (late 
1970s), the experience of Singapore and the other tigers (Taiwan, Hong Kong and South 
Korea) was sufficient to refute this aspect of the theory; though few scholars paid atten­
tion. In the case of Singapore, as discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the state intervened ex­
tensively and gained a high degree of control over its labour and other markets. It was not 
totally subservient to the free sway of international market forces as the theory requires.
In reality, by this date, Singapore had become a newly industrialised country and 
its model of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) began to influence others. Many de­
veloping countries adopted EOI strategies. This involved state-guided development, of­
ten accompanied by an authoritarian form of intervention. However, the new EOI strate­
gies were not always successful. Corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement 
characterised many projects. This left the field open for critics especially those fuelling 
Reganomics and Thatcherism (Friedman, Jeffrey Sachs, Keith Josephs). Failure, critics 
claimed, was proof that state-centred development lacked efficacy. What was needed 
was the withdrawal of the state from the economy and an opening up of the economy to 
free global markets. They argued that the rule of law was essential for orderly free mar­
kets. This recipe, which also informed the strategy of the UN agencies in the 1980s and 
1990s, is examined at 1.3.3.
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1.3.3 The Movement’s United Nations’ Mandate
There is ample evidence to show that the idea of law and development is firmly 
rooted in the United Nations Charter, which was signed on 26 June 1945. For instance, 
the Charter’s preamble lays the foundation for the imposition of obligations on the 
United Nations as an organisation and on its member states, acting jointly and severally, 
to commit to the use of international machinery for the promotion of economic and so­
cial advancement for all people. A significant part of the machinery was the Bretton 
Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). My 
focus is on the World Bank (see note 2).
The Charter is also specific about the purpose and nature of development. For in­
stance, Article 13(1) requires the General Assembly to promote international co­
operation in economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, ... human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all. Article 55 reiterates this and includes the promotion 
of higher standards of living and full employment.
By the late 1940s and 1950s, the UN was attempting to fulfil its mandate by con­
ducting surveys and co-ordinating technical assistance projects designed to encourage 
economic growth in the new nations. One of the World Bank’s early studies was con­
ducted in 1955 in Malaya and Singapore. It recommended formation of the Malaysian 
Federation. Subsequent reports (Lyle 1959, UN 1961) affirmed the 1955 study claiming 
that a federal market was crucial for Singapore’s modernisation.
Following Kennedy’s proposal, the UN named the 1960s its Development Dec­
ade (UN Resolution 1710, 1961, 17-19). The emphasis was on ‘catch-up’ policies. But it 
was unclear whether the UN thought that one decade was sufficient for the developing 
countries to catch-up with the developed. This, after all, was the period when America’s 
goal was to put a man on the moon, and return him safely to earth, before the end of the 
decade. The Resolution was silent as to how growth would be achieved or shared be­
tween the three sectors of agriculture, industry and services. It was also silent about how 
to share the proceeds of growth fairly among the peoples of the new nations. However, 
the UN conducted numerous individual country studies, many of which resulted in de­
tailed proposals or recommendations.
In Singapore, the most influential report, and the one whose recommendations 
were adopted, resulted from the 1960-61 UN Mission led by Dutch economist Dr Albert
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Winsemius (UN 1961). This report, entitled^ Proposed Industrialisation Programme 
for the State o f Singapore (13 June 1961), remains unpublished.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the ideas, which informed the UN policies 
are rooted in modernisation theory, which, as discussed above at 1.3.2, also informed the 
law and development movement (see Shihata 1995, 127). However, in the mouth of the 
UN, the paradigm must of necessity be termed international.
Quite when the concepts of international law and development started to appear in 
concert is uncertain. In his 1962 article, The Changing Dimensions of International Law, 
Professor W Friedmann seems to invent the phrase law o f international economic devel­
opment (1153). He claimed that ‘... the increase in the influence and articulateness of the 
underprivileged nations accompanies the evolution of a largely new and vastly important 
branch of international law...’ {id 1152-53). He delineates it as a body of law that ‘... must 
concern itself not only with the minimum principles adequate for the legal protection of 
foreign investment, but also with the principles for protecting national control of natural 
resources...’ (1164). Also to be included were ‘the structures, policies and methods of 
international financing, as represented by the increasing number of public international 
organizations devoted to the long-term financing of economic development’ (1165). The 
emphasis was on law in the context of inter-state trade and commerce. Although it recog­
nised certain needs of new nations, Friedmann’s new species of law was essentially a 
neutral somewhat traditional concept.
However, in 1965 Professor Virally presented the idea of international law for 
development in his article Vers un Droit International du Developpement. The expres­
sion, as Flory points out, ‘...is not neutral in content, since it implies purposiveness and 
even a result’ (Snyder & Slinn 1987, 11). Indeed Virally claimed that a re-reading or re­
interpretation of the entire body of international law was needed to redress developmental 
imbalance. His proposal inspired the French school of international jurists. However, 
Virally’s idea did not make its mark on Anglo-American jurists until the 1970s when 
western/UN lawyers were obliged to respond to the dependency theorists (see 1.3.2.2), 
who had attacked the UN, when the new nations (save for Singapore and the other tigers) 
had failed to take off. Developing countries embraced the idea of re-reading international 
law. This and the dependency theory gave new impetus to discourse in the UN assembly.
The UN was an obvious target for dependency theorists’ criticism. During the 
1970s the theory bred a consolidated attack on the UN. It fuelled the developing coun­
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tries’ call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and an insistence on what
1Keba Mbaye described as the human right to development.
In 1971 the UN Secretary General prepared a survey of international law (2 YB 
Inti Law Comm 1-215). Its findings stressed the expanding role of law, concluding inter 
alia that law was no longer concerned only with protecting the independence of states, 
but had a duty to co-operate in the promotion of national and human welfare (id, 35).
Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted a series of Resolutions which, 
taken together, form a code of principles which de facto invented the NIEO in 1974 
based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation 
among all States (Brownlie 1989,2).
However it soon became clear that because of political deadlock the NIEO’s aims 
would not be fulfilled. During the 1980s, a polarity developed in the UN assembly. It was 
characterised by a divergence of expectations and different aspirations of rich and poor 
nations. For instance, the poor nations’ insistence on a right to development resulted in 
the 1986 General Resolution with its appended Declaration on the Right to Development. 
Here the right was described as an inalienable human right (article 1). However, the USA 
voted against; and the 8 abstentions included Japan, Germany and the UK. Thus what 
could have been a political triumph, served to fuel the atmosphere of antagonism. The 
1990s too were marked by polarity. The UN Decade of International Law was sponsored 
mainly by poor countries (UNGA Resolutions 44/23 of 17/11/1989 and 45/40 of 
10/1/1991); while the fourth UN Decade of Development (45/199 of 21/12/ 1990) was 
sponsored mainly by rich nations. They paid lip service to the idealistic intentions of the 
1960s development agenda.
Nevertheless there was a positive note in the 1990s, as law and development 
gained acceptance as international law o f  development (ILD) within the UN regime (Paul 
1995). The French School is still a step ahead with international law for  development but 
the concept seems set for UN incorporation under yet another re-reading of the latter’s 
remit. Or so it would seem, to judge by Slinn’s restatement of the paradigm (1995, 265 
footnote omitted):
... we are dealing not with a neutral, value-free rule system but with a purposive, dynamic, 
teleological process ... embodying, in Flory’s words, ‘the principles, rules and institutions for the 
promotion of harmonious development of international society’. Thus international development
13 A discussion o f NIEO is outside the scope o f this study, but see, e.g., Brownlie 1989; Pellet in Snyder & 
Slinn 1987,117-136; Bedjaoui in id 87-116; Rich in Carty 1992, 223-64 and Donnelly in id 169-205.
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law is not only concerned with economic matters.... The concept has outlived the ideology of the 
NIEO and now embraces issues o f sustainability - what may now be described as the interna­
tional law of sustainable development (my italics).
It could be argued that herein lies part of the problem: fragmentation of objectives. For 
law and development has changed its goals. It no longer concerns itself with economic 
development as in the 1960s and 70s. The agenda now embraces issues of sustainability, 
good governance, democratisation, the environment and human rights (see Ginther et al 
1995). As Sands points out (in Lang 1995, 53):
Historically, these three subjects [economic development, the environment and human rights] 
have for the most part followed independent paths, and it is only with the advent of the concept 
of sustainable development,... that they will increasingly be treated in an integrated and interde­
pendent manner.
That might be so, but it is difficult to reconcile this idea of integration with reality when 
each of the three concepts has been the subject of individual 1990s UN Conferences. For 
instance, following the sustainability conference, the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, which 
dealt with the Environment and Development (Lang 1995), Human Rights were tackled 
in Vienna (1993), Population and Development in Cairo (1994), and Social Develop­
ment in Copenhagen (1995). The Environment was revisited in Kyoto (1997). The 
rhetoric and the separate conferences suggest parallel rather than integrated tracks of de­
velopment; and significantly, no 1990s conference addressed Law and Development.
In a report on the agenda for the UN 1995 World Summit on Social Develop­
ment (the Copenhagen conference), the Secretary General’s analysis reiterated that (UN 
Doc A/Conf 166/PC/6 (1994), 172):
It is particularly through the development of legal instruments that the world community of na­
tions attempts to provide for the basic conditions for social process.
It seems feasible then that legal instruments permeate the entire spectrum. Law could 
well be regarded as the integrating glue. Even so, current practice does not stand up to 
careful scrutiny. A startling example is the drafts of the OECD’s MAI (Multinational 
Agreement on Investment) proposal, which would limit the right of nations to enforce 
environment laws that seek to integrate environmental and economic policy. The MAI 
drafts largely ignore UNCED’s call for just such integration (Werksman 1997). Under 
the proposal, multinational companies (usually from rich nations) would be able to sue 
governments for imposing environmental laws that discriminate against them directly or 
indirectly. For instance, they could sue a developing country for enacting a law which 
grants domestic companies priority access to scarce natural resources, or a law which
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imposes higher standards on foreign multinationals operating in environmentally sensi­
tive areas. Dispute settlement under MAI would be compulsory and binding, and would 
be open to state-state as well as investor-state disputants. Significantly, the MAI also ig­
nores the skeletal general exceptions that allow WTO members to shield environment 
regulations from trade rules. It is exactly in such areas that the ILD could show its new 
commitment to integration and interdependence with the purpose of promoting sustain­
able development, as postulated by Sands (in Lang 1995,53).14
The World Bank, which is no longer under the control of the UN General As­
sembly, and thus perhaps not as democratic as it ought to be 15, allows its lawyers to ad­
dress what it calls governance issues in borrowing countries. The Bank is constrained by 
its Articles of Agreement from considering political criteria in its lending policy. How­
ever, determined to safeguard efficient use of its funds, general counsel Shihata drafted a 
memorandum that claims to distinguish governance from politics, identifying governance 
as a legitimate consideration in the award of its loans (Shihata 1991, 53-96). Here Shi­
hata generally equates good governance with good order. He also calls it the rule of law 
which he defines as ‘a system based on abstract rules which are actually applied and on 
functioning institutions which ensure the appropriate application of such rules’ (id.).
Clearly in the 1990s, the World Bank is captivated by the rule of law and the role 
of law just as it was in its infancy in the 1950s and ‘60s. However according to Upham 
(1994,233-4) this infatuation:
is shared by, inter alia, the United Nations Development Project (UNDP), the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), which is picking up where it left off in the 1970s at the end 
of the last law and development movement and sending American law professors far and wide to 
instruct countries emerging from communism and dictatorship in the construction of effective le­
gal systems.
I hasten to add that aid institutions of the European Union are similarly infatuated. Wit­
ness, for instance, the Lome IV Convention 1995, where, after 20 years’ existence, arti­
cle 5(1) was revised to incorporate ‘... good governance... democratic principles and the 
rule of law’ as ‘essential element[s] of this Convention’ (The Courier 1996,155,11).
14 The MAI proposals were withdrawn in 1998. For reasons for MAI's defeat, see Leader: A 
Case of Mai culpa, Financial Times, 20 October 1998; Retreat Over OECD Pact on Investment, id, 
21 October 1998; Council of Canadians' website at http: /  /  www.canadians.org with links.
15 The World Bank and the IMF have claimed autonomy from UN General Assembly control. 
For a commentary on the consequences of this, see Childers & Urquhart (1991.
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Thus during the 1990s, the 1960s’ concepts of law and development have be­
come institutionalised in the instruments of the international agencies. But, whereas the 
1960s’ agenda focused on over-coming poverty, ignorance and disease in individual 
new nations using law as one of its tools, the new agenda seems to focus on globalisa­
tion and processes for creating free markets, not all of which are for the benefit of de­
veloping countries.
True to form, the Singapore government seems to have remained focused on its 
own pragmatic developmental goals. Thus, at the methodological level, the 1960s LAD 
model is eminently well-suited as a starting point for a study of the role of law in Singa­
pore’s economic development. Further, the rhetoric of the model in its 1990s’ guise as 
advocated by inter alia the World Bank, the IMF and the EU leaves us in no doubt that 
the rule of law is at the core of the LAD model. The next section therefore briefly ex­
amines the rule of law in the context of LAD.
1.4 The Rule of Law in Law and Development
There is no single, consensual definition of the rule of law. Some scholars view 
it as a bundle of ideals rather than a specific or necessary set of institutional arrange­
ments (Tamanaha 1995, 476), some claim that the ideals are connected more by family 
resemblance than by a unifying conceptual structure (Solum in Shapiro 1994,121). This 
section analyses key concepts of the rule of law, and examines their link with LAD.
Basically, there seems to be three strands of interpretation. First, there is the tra­
ditional ideal, which dictates that government must be by settled, standing Laws, not by 
Absolute Arbitrary Power (Locke 1690). Herein lies a multiplicity of interwoven ideas. 
For example, there is the idea that laws should be positive, i.e, they should be adopted 
and actually endorsed in formal fashion by the state. Then there is the idea of the individ­
ual’s right to protection against the state; and the judge’s duty not to dispense justice on
some ad hoc, case-by-case basis but on the basis of the law. This goal or aspiration is 
expressed in the well-worn phrase: rule of law, not of men. It is this strand of the rule of 
law, which dictates the idea of the separation of powers: To prevent legislative and ex­
ecutive tyranny (against the individual), a constitution is required to place limitations on 
these state bodies. Those limitations are to be enforced by an independent judiciary. The
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issue then becomes how to limit the enormous powers of the judiciary.16 This strand of 
the rule of law has been called the legal accountability aspect of law (Altman 1990, 23- 
24). It seems that this aspect also embraces what World Bank rhetoric calls the govern­
ance aspect of the rule of law. Of particular relevance in this context, the Bank prescribes 
the curbing of state intervention in economic development (1993, 1995). As this study 
argues, this aspect of the rule of law has not been fully utilised in the Singapore model of 
law and development (see chapters 5, 6, 7).
The second strand of the rule of law concerns what might be called social order. 
Put differently by Professor Raz (1979, 213), not only should people be ruled by law 
and obey it; the law should be capable of providing effective guidance. Effective guid­
ance implies that people should know the law in advance so they should not be held 
civilly or criminally liable, based on rules of which they could not, through normal 
means, have been aware. Laws should therefore be clear, stable and prospective. Fur­
ther, the making of laws should be guided by transparent, general rules. The machinery 
for enforcing the law should be fair, neutral and open, and the crime-preventing agen­
cies should not be allowed to pervert the law (Raz 1979, 214-218). This can be called 
the procedural aspect of the rule of law. It obviously overlaps with the first strand but 
whereas the former is mainly concerned with protecting the rights of the individual 
against the state, this second strand focuses on justice among citizens by insisting on 
known workable rules that are applied openly and complied with objectively. It is note­
worthy that Singapore seems to have complied with this aspect of the rule of law, as op­
posed to, e.g. Malaysia, which abused it, most recently during the 1998-99 arrest and 
trial of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar.
Thirdly, there is the notion of the rule of law as a vehicle or infrastructure for 
protecting property rights. The ideals here concern the stability the law confers on con­
tractual transactions and the predictability it supposedly gives to how property rights and, 
for instance, management and labour relations are treated. Director of Research at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, T Carothers, puts it this way (1998, 97):
Basic elements of a modem market economy such as property rights and contracts are founded 
on the law and require competent third-party enforcement. Without the rule of law, major eco­
nomic institutions such as corporations, banks, and labor unions would not function, and the 
government’s many involvements in the economy.... would be unfair, inefficient, and opaque.
16 A debate is outside the scope o f this study, but see, eg, Hart 1958,1961, Fuller 1958, Scalini 1989.
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Carothers overstates his case. He provides no evidence that the named institutions would 
not function without the rule of law. Nevertheless the notion overlaps with the second 
strand, and is considered crucial for creating an environment that is conducive to eco­
nomic development. According to the World Bank’s legal counsel (Shihata 1991, 89):
[T]he transformation of economies from command to market systems cannot in particular be 
successfully achieved in the absence of workable, comprehensive legal infrastructures.
Shihata too seems to overstate his case. He seems to ignore the transformation which 
the People’s Republic of China has achieved in the decades following 1978. In two dec­
ades, China transformed its economy from a command to a socialist market economy, 
though one would be hard-pressed to argue that China has comprehensive legal infra­
structures in the World Bank sense of the phrase.
To my mind, it is important to view all three strands of the rule of law as ele­
ments of one bundle of ideals as discussed above. The strands should not be seen as al­
ternative ways of thinking about the rule of law (as suggested by Ohnesorge 1998, 7). 
Rather they are parts of the bundle of ideals that comprise the rule of law. Furthermore, 
these elements are largely aspirational, that is, they are goals to be achieved. It is also 
feasible to envisage that a country might live up to certain aspirations at different phases 
of its development. It is trite to point out that even in countries that regard themselves as 
cradles of the rule of law, aspects of the system are suspended when the nation is at war. 
It is plausible that a similar suspension comes into play when emerging nations are suf­
fering the instability of rapid growth and modernisation.
It could thus be argued that it is unwise to assume that the fulfilment of all the 
elements of the liberal legal paradigm is a prerequisite for a functional rule of law sys­
tem. It is quite possible that there are many variations of the rule of law, each with par­
ticular emphasis on one or more of the strands identified. It is also possible that various 
rule of law systems are operating around the world today (Tamanaha 1995, 476). Fur­
ther, as the bundle of ideals is aspirational, it could be that different countries are at dif­
ferent stages of seeking to achieve these goals. Indeed, various nations may well have 
adapted variants of the aspirations to suit their developmental goals. For as Tamanaha 
suggests (id):
A minimalist account of the rule of law would require only that the government abide by 
the rules promulgated by the political authority and treat its citizens with basic human dig­
nity, and that there be access to a fair and neutral ... decision maker or judiciary to hear 
claims or resolve disputes. These basic elements are compatible with many socio-cultural 
arrangements and,..., they have much to offer to developing countries.
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Indeed. I have aimed to keep an open mind as I pursued my investigation of the role of 
law in Singapore’s economic development. According to Shihata (1991, 85) the rule of 
law provides the general social discipline that enables economic development. No one 
could claim that Singapore lacks general social discipline, and that the nation has 
achieved a high degree of economic development is indisputable. But what role did the 
rule of law play in these achievements, and do Singapore’s laws converge with the 
West’s notion of modem law? To help answer these questions I adapt Trubek’s model of 
three ideal types of legal systems as an analytical tool. In the next section Tmbek’s 
model is discussed and modified to form just two ideal types.
1.5 Ideal Types of Legal Systems
In his seminal 1972 article, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the 
Study of Law and Development, Tmbek posits a broader perspective to analyse the rela­
tionship between law and the economy in developing countries. His main thesis is that 
since all nations now aspire to increase their level of economic well-being through in­
dustrialisation, we should accept that there are many roads to such development. Further, 
we should recognise that the road chosen by a nation will significantly affect the struc­
ture and function of the nation’s legal system (Tmbek 1972, 62). He then discusses three 
types of economic structures, defined by their relationship with the state. Much of Tru- 
bek’s model is based on Weber’s work {id 49-54). The main axis lies in the pure market 
contra the command economy. In-between these two is the mixed market economy.
The main characteristics of each type of economic structure are well known.
In the pure market system, there is separation between the state and the economy. 
Through the wishes of consumers or customers, the market decides questions of produc­
tion, distribution and allocation. The state provides only those services which the market 
is theoretically unable or unwilling to supply: defence, education, law enforcement, and 
so on. In the command economy, on the other hand, the state and the economy merge. 
The state’s bureaucrats, not consumers, are the ultimate arbiters of economic activities. 
They allocate resources. Consumers do form a market but this is used mainly as a meas­
uring rod of desirable state action or an instrument of economic policy. In the mixed 
market economy, the idea of market-driven decision-making is mediated by various de­
grees of state guidance, as seen, for instance, in some Asian countries.
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Before examining the kinds of law that are associated with each of the three eco­
nomic structures it is necessary to update Trubek’s typology, to make allowance for ob­
servations over the past two decades. For instance, many scholars have emphasised the 
activist role of the state in East Asian models of economic development, even though 
they were never categorised as command economies. And with the demise of Russia and 
China’s conversion to a socialist market economy, the term command economy might 
now be irrelevant. World Bank staff member, Parvez Hasan (1976, 29) points out that:
In Korea the government’s role is considerably more direct than that of merely setting the board 
rules of the game and in influencing the economy indirectly through market forces. In fact, the 
government seems to be a participant and often the determining influence in nearly all business 
decisions (my italics).
Similarly, Mason et al (1980,254) conclude that:
The rapid economic growth that began in South Korea in the early 1960s and has accelerated 
since then has been a government-directed development in which the principal engine has been 
private enterprise. The relationship between a government committed to a central direction of 
economic development and a highly dynamic private sector ... presents a set of interconnections 
[which is] difficult to penetrate and describe.... The hand of government reaches down rather far 
into the activities of individual firms with its manipulation of incentives and disincentives. At the 
same time, the situation can in no sense be described in terms of a command economy.
Others have made similar claims for Japan (Johnson 1982, 1983), Korea (Amsden 1989), 
Taiwan (Wade 1990) and Singapore (Lim 1983, Low 1998). The World Bank’s 1993 
study of the East Asian Miracle also acknowledged the activist roles of those states in 
their economic development. In 1982 Johnson called his descriptive model the capitalist 
developmental state. Although accepted by some (e.g. White 1988), others such as Wade 
(1990,26) claimed that the theory is too descriptive rather than analytic. Wade posits his 
own theory of the governed market which builds on both the idea of the developmental 
state and on the older development economics understanding of the nature of the devel­
opment problem (id). I apply Wade’s theory in chapter 4 in an analysis of Singapore’s 
economic growth patterns. (See also 3.8.2).
As Wade suggests, Johnson’s model of the developmental state can be recast to 
account for concepts developed elsewhere in political science for comparing political 
regimes. The relevant pairs are democratic versus authoritarian, and pluralist versus cor- 
poratist. The first pair refers to how rulers are chosen, the second to relations between 
interest groups and the state. In democratic regimes, rulers are chosen by a process that 
allows political participation in which popular preferences are expressed. In authoritarian
51
regimes there is little scope for expressing popular choice. Wade (1990, 27) explains the 
second pair of distinction thus (references omitted):
In pluralist regimes, interest groups are voluntary associations, free to organize and gain influ­
ence over state policy corresponding to their economic or political resources. The process of 
government consists of the competition between interest groups, with government bureaucracies 
playing an important but not generally dominant role. In corporatist systems the state charters or 
creates a small number of interest groups, giving them a monopoly of representation of occupa­
tional interests in return for which it claims the right to monitor them in order to discourage ex­
pression of ‘narrow’ conflictful demands. The state is therefore able to shape the demands that 
are made upon it, and hence - in intention - maximize compliance and cooperation.
In this model, the USA is the best example of democratic pluralism, with Thatcher’s and
Blair’s UK as an excellent runner-up 17. Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Austria 
probably illustrate democratic corporatism, while Singapore is an example of authori­
tarian corporatism. South Korea, Taiwan and Japan illustrate corporatism combined with 
processes for selecting rulers that are in-between true democracy and authoritarianism, or 
what Johnson calls soft authoritarian. In East Asia, corporatist and authoritarian regimes 
formed the basis for Wade’s governed markets, which, to my mind, is a useful extension 
of Trubek’s mixed market economy system.
In Trubek’s model, law in a pure (or free) market system is characterised as a 
voluntary, rights-based system; while law in a pure command system is involuntary and 
directive-based. In a mixed economy, law is regulatory. I suggest that law in Wade’s 
governed markets is also regulatory. It is akin to law in Trubek’s mixed economy, which 
he characterises as (id 30-31):
a hybrid of the universal rules of pure market and specific directives of pure command: It is more 
specific than the general rules that establish contract, tort and property rights; yet more general 
than the specific directives of the command economy.
Thus, in distinguishing regulatory from all economically relevant law, we must stress 
two dimensions. The first is explicitness of intent... The second ... is the specificity of the provi­
sions enacted...
Trubek was careful to point out that the theoretical distinction between market and 
command and their related legal phenomena are ideal types used to analyse empirical 
reality rather than depict it. Some characteristics of one will be found in the other; the 
distinctions are not rigid. This remains so. In using the model, we are looking for indi­
cations of shifts in broad trends.
17 It is worth remembering that during the 1960s and early 1970s, in Harold Wilson's UK, the 
country would have provided an excellent example of democratic corporatism. See Yergin & 
Stanislaw (1998), chapters 1 and 4.
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With the passage of time, the exercise seems to have been rendered easier. 
Writing in 1972, Trubek notes that even in capitalist countries, the pure market structure 
of competitive, laissez-faire capitalism has been replaced by economies wherein large, 
often oligopolistic industries predominate, and government regulation of industry is the 
rule and not the exception (id note 78). However, that scenario described the post-WW2 
ascendancy of social democracy in some West European states. In Britain it was exem­
plified by corporatism - the triangular co-ordination of economic policy by government, 
employers and trade unions - under, e.g., the Atlee and Wilson governments. But that 
scenario ended in the 1980s, notably in Thatcher’s UK and Reagan’s USA, when the re­
surgence of economic liberalism began to undermine the earlier Keynesian-Beveridgean 
(and Marxist) economic ideologies which favoured state intervention to achieve social 
and economic objectives. In the UK it started with the urgent need in 1980 for capital to 
invest in the telecommunications industry. It resulted in privatisation of British Telecom 
in 1982 which was so successful that the idea of privatisation of major utilities featured 
for the first time in the 1983 Tory election manifesto (Gray 1998, 27). With neo­
liberalism came a major shift in the UK’s ideology of the role of the state and the domi­
nance of the free market (see Yergin & Stanislaw 1998). Gray relates it thus (id 28):
According to the Thatcherite understanding of the role of the state, its task was to supply a 
framework of rules and regulations within which the free market - including, crucially, the labour 
market - would be self-regulating. In this vision the role of trade unions as intermediary institu­
tions standing between workers and the market had to be altered and weakened. Employment law 
was reshaped.
Thus the resurgence of free market ideology in Anglo-American cultures in the 1980s 
put an end to British [Labour] corporatism. The end of the Cold War and disintegration 
of the socialist bloc in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s sig­
nalled the failure of communism, and the triumph of the free market ideology, except 
perhaps in China. But even in China the virtues of market forces have been co-opted to 
form the socialist market economy. Thus whereas it is now difficult to find a command 
economy, market economies excel, as do mixed or state-governed market economies. 
The issue now is whether the free market ideology is set to conquer the ideology of the 
mixed or state-governed market economies.
I have discussed the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the free market, the Asian 
state-governed market economy, the demise of communism and the command economy, 
and China’s move towards greater reliance on market forces because to my mind these
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trends confirm the need for a reconceptualisation of Trubek’s model. He was right to note 
that several roads can lead to rapid economic growth. However, the roads must be catego­
rised to account for the Asian experience of the state-governed market (Wade 1990), 
which is not the same as a command economy. When that adjustment is made, it becomes 
clear that the ideal types of legal systems required to account for the experiences of law in 
developing countries must also be modified. The modification I propose is to adapt 
Regulatory laws so that they account for the kind of law which is a driving force behind 
the governed markets of (soft) authoritarian corporatist states. Such laws also coincide 
with what Pistor & Wellons (1999) call state-allocative laws. I shall call these laws 
‘westemistic’. Westemistic or state-allocative laws can be juxtaposed to the notion of 
modem western law [the rule of law], which purportedly enables free markets. A version 
of western law often appears as a stage along the road to economic development in gov­
erned market economies like Singapore. It often operates as part of Westemistic Law or 
state-allocative laws, which are situational, and whose primary role is to mediate the im­
pact of the laws which might be necessary to facilitate direct foreign investment and 
those necessary to secure the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The latter are 
also laws that ensure social justice and a more equal distribution of wealth.
The modification of Trubek’s model (Appendix 1) is inspired by Wade (1990), 
Yasuda (1998) and Oakeshott (1975). No doubt other models could be employed, as oth­
ers have identified the interaction between socio-cultural, political and economic forms, 
and the types of legal principles with which they operate. Examples include the work of 
Unger (1976), Ghai (1986), Kamenka & Tay (1980), Nonnet & Selznick (1978), and 
Miller (1976). The list is not exhaustive. As I am concerned only with using a typology to 
identify and examine legal change, a review of the merits of typologies is outside the 
scope of this study.
1.6 Conclusion
Much has been written in recent years about the miracle of Singapore’s rapid eco­
nomic growth. However most studies have been conducted in the main-stream Anglo- 
American social science framework of the 1980s and 1990s which focuses on economic 
development in terms of neo-classical or rational choice theories. Their view is generally 
strongly supportive of free-market ideology, minimum state intervention and the intrinsic 
value of transplanting western liberal-democratic institutions to all countries. Singapore is
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either exalted as an exemplar par excellence, or dismissed as a minnow that is too special 
to be of general significance. The few studies, which have departed from these moulds 
have examined special aspects of Singapore’s social or political economy, specific areas 
of law or the role of multinational companies in Singapore’s economic development.
This study seeks to fill a gap by investigating the role of law in Singapore’s eco­
nomic development from 1959 to 1999. It draws on ideas of the 1960s law and develop­
ment (LAD) movement, which were revived in the 1980s and 1990s, portraying the rule 
of law as one of the western liberal-democratic institutions whose transplant is deemed 
essential for modernisation and economic growth. The World Bank and the IMF are 
prominent among LAD revisionists. Modem LAD ideology is fortified by the ever- 
increasing power of the owners and managers of global financial capital and intellectual 
property assets (knowledge). It posits that only one set of rules should apply to all partici­
pants in the global economy; furthermore that those rules should confirm a minimalist 
role for the state. The core ideology holds that the rule of law is essential for economic 
development and that the laws of developing nations will converge and become like those 
of the industrialised west as a function of modernisation. Moreover, LAD protagonists 
assert that the role of the state in the economy is to provide a minimal framework for pri­
vate economic activity, leaving the rest to the market [the invisible hand].
However, in the case of Singapore (and East Asian developmental states), the 
state played a major activist role. It is my thesis that law also played a crucial role and the 
nature of the law was shaped by the nature of the state’s ideology. Part 1 of the study 
conducts a macro-level analysis of Singapore’s laws from 1959 to 1999 to ascertain 
whether there is a correlation between the laws and the significant phases of development 
in the economy during the period. Part 2 moves to a micro-level analysis of three areas 
of law in an attempt to test the nature of the link between law and economic development 
in Singapore. Using a modified model of ideal types of legal systems I try to identify the 
nature of the laws that operated in Singapore during the various phases.
My conclusion is that, starting from its English common law heritage, Singapore 
developed a species of law that is more situational, pragmatic, regulatory and holistic in 
nature than the laws imported from England, Australia and elsewhere. Moreover, de­
pending on the government’s strategic intent at particular phases of development, laws 
became more state-allocative rather than market-allocative in nature, reflecting the state’s 
intervention to promote economic growth and effect a more equitable sharing of wealth.
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Thus, far from converging with laws from the West, many Singapore laws have 
diverged and developed a content and style of their own in response to local, socio­
cultural, political and economic imperatives. In short, Singapore laws are westemistic^, 
in crucial areas such as labour and land, they have diverged into a more situational, 
pragmatic and regulatory kind of law than LAD predictions require in order to validate 
their theory.
However, evidence of convergence can be found in the new species of global 
laws, which are the result of supranational bodies such as the World Trade Organisation 
compelling compliance with minimum standards in all countries that seek to participate 
in world trade.19 But, of course, such imposed convergence still does not satisfy LAD 
predictions which purport an inevitable ‘natural’ progression.
18 The term probably derives from Buzan & Segal (1998). It is used here to mean laws and legal 
cultures that have the appearance of western laws and legal cultures that embrace mixed market 
economies so as to make foreign investors [from the West] feel comfortable about their invest­
ments.
19 See chapter 8 on Intellectual Property Rights and the WTO, which demands compliance un­
der the TRIPs (Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement.
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PART ONE 
MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS
To establish whether there was a positive correlation between law and 
economic development in Singapore from 1959 to 1999. 
And whether changes in the law caused economic development or whether
economic development caused changes in the law.
CHAPTER 2 THE LEGAL BASIS: ENGLISH LAW
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The life o f  the law has not been logic, it has been experience. The fe lt ne­
cessities o f  the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions 
o f  public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the 
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The 
law embodies the story o f  a nation’s development ...In  order to know what 
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We must 
alternately consult history and existing theories o f  legislation.... The sub­
stance o f  the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, ... with what 
is then understood to be convenient; but its form  and machinery, and the 
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much 
upon its past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. ]n Posner, ed. (1992) The Essential Holmes - Selec­
tion o f  the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions & Other Writings o f  Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., University o f Chicago Press, 237.
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2.1 Introduction
It has been said that when Raffles landed at Singapore on 28 January 1819 only 
a handful of Malay fisherfolk resided there (Napier 1898, 9).1 But it is difficult to assert 
this with confidence since another report describes a society of about 2,000 engaged in 
tin-mining (Greenberg 1951, 97). One thing is clear: the local Malay ruler permitted the 
British party to establish a trading post on the island on behalf of the East India Com­
pany.2 And by treaty in 1824 with the Sultan of Johore the British ceded the island, thus 
gaining permanent possession. By then Singapore had been transformed: its population 
had climbed to about 11,000; some 60% of these were Malays and 31% Chinese. Indi­
ans and various European adventurers comprised the remainder.
The lives and transactions of the indigenous Malay people were undoubtedly 
ordered by their own rules and customs, as is the way in any society. However, as was 
common practice in 19th century colonial acquisitions, and following Austinian con­
cepts of law, English colonists rarely regarded local rules and customs as ‘laws’, espe­
cially if they were unwritten.
Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a Malay society, the history of law in 
Singapore starts with the arrival of the English. This chapter presents a brief outline of 
the transplantation of English law to Singapore. Its purpose is twofold. First, to examine 
the extent to which English law became applicable in Singapore. Secondly, to determine 
the nature of the legal platform that existed in Singapore in 1959 and from which the 
new nation’s legal system developed. But first a brief summary of Singapore’s political 
and administrative history is apt, for this skeleton supported the flesh of the law.
2.2 Political and Administrative Platform3
Singapore’s political history, like its geography, is linked inextricably with that 
of the Malay Peninsula. In 1786 the British East India Company, in competition with 
Dutch adventurers, succeeded in acquiring the island of Penang from the Sultan of Ke­
dah. This became the strategic port of call on the Straits of Malacca, which supported 
the British India-China trade. In 1795 the British occupied Malacca, then a Dutch col­
ony, but returned it to the Dutch in 1818 under the Vienna Treaty, as part of a political
1 For an eloquent history, see Turnbull (1977). See also Chew (1991).
2 Historians debate whether it was Raffles or John Crawfurd, Resident of Singapore, who se­
cured the island for the British. For this study, it is sufficient that British links were established.
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settlement in Europe. Having lost Malacca, the English were eager to gain another port 
in the region, for they realised the strategic importance to British trade of a commanding 
position in the Straits. This led to the establishment of a trading post in Singapore in 
1819 in agreement with the local Temenggong (an official representing the Johore Sul­
tanate). The 1824 ceding of the island gave the British full sovereignty in perpetuity.
From 1819 to 1823 Singapore was administered from Bencoolen. Under the 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, Malacca was ceded to the British, with the result that the 
administration of both colonies was placed under the British Bengal Presidency. How­
ever, in 1826, Singapore, Malacca and Penang were placed under a separate Straits Set­
tlements Presidency (Act of Parliament: 6 Geo IV c 85). In 1830 the metropolitan power 
rescinded the separate government status and again placed the Straits Settlements under 
the Bengal Presidency, with Singapore as the trio’s administrative centre. Increasing 
dissatisfaction with marginalisation by the Indian administration led to the transfer, in 
1867, of the government of the Straits Settlements to Crown Colony status under the 
direct control of the Colonial Office in London. This status remained intact until 1946, 
when the Straits Settlements were disbanded, retaining only the highly profitable and 
politically convenient Singapore as a separate Crown Colony. The Japanese occupation 
of Malaya and Singapore, from 1942-45, set an indelible mark on the region. It fired the 
post-war campaign for self-government, which Singapore achieved in 1959. When its 
1963 merger into the Malaysian Federation failed to live up to political and economic 
expectations, Singapore seceded and declared itself an independent Republic in 1965.4
2.3 The Colonial Englishman’s Burden
An English adventurer travelling in foreign lands during the 19th century was 
deemed to transport with him, as his birthright, all the laws of England. Consequently, 
as stated by Sir William Blackstone (1 Commentaries 107) and applied by the House of 
Lords in Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 AC 286:
... if an uninhabited country be discovered and planted by English subjects, all the English laws
then in being, which are the birthright of every English subject are immediately there in force.
During the colonial period this was a known common law rule. While Singapore was 
placed under the Bengal Presidency, a Privy Council decision extended and clarified the
3 This section is based on information in Turnbull (1977,2nd ed. 1989) and Chew (1991).
4 For a spirited account of the demerger, see Lee Kuan Yew (1998).
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rule. In AG o f Bengal v Ranee Surnomoye Dossee (1863) 15 ER 811 at 824a Lord 
Kingsdown held:
Where Englishmen establish themselves in an uninhabited or barbarous country, they carry with 
them not only the laws, but the sovereignty of their own State, and those who live amongst 
them and become members of their community become also partakers of, and subject to the 
same laws.
On the other hand, where English adventurers acquired land by cession or conquest, 
because they found civilised inhabitants in occupation, they were subject to local laws, 
unless and until such laws were altered by the English Parliament or the local legislature 
enacted locally applicable laws (s2 of 2 P. & Will 75).
In determining the extent to which English law became applicable in Singapore 
two issues are considered: First, whether Singapore was open to automatic reception 
because Raffles had settled an ‘uninhabited and barbarous’ country. Secondly, whether 
Singapore was subject to express enactment because the island had been ceded.
2.3.1 Was Singapore ‘uninhabited or barbarous’? Does it Matter?
This study can add nothing new to the debate about whether Singapore re­
ceived its law under the cession or settlement rule5, which remains undecided.6 How­
ever, it is interesting to note that Australia was considered settled because English ad­
venturers decided to ignore its population of Aborigines, or deem them barbarous. 
Except in the few instances where evidence of millennia-old civilisations such as those 
of China or India, superior to the adventurers’ own, stared them irrefutably in the face, 
English adventurers appear to have denied the existence and relevance of most indige­
nous peoples and their laws. This interpretation is also consistent with their treatment of 
peoples and civilisations in various African and Caribbean countries. Thus, it matters 
not whether Singapore was in fact inhabited upon Raffles’ arrival. For it seems unlikely 
that English adventurers would have regarded any inhabitants of Singapore sufficiently 
civilised to preclude operation of the settlement rule.
Perhaps a more fruitful line of discussion is to assert that Raffles himself left 
evidence of a negotiated agreement dated 30 January 1819 followed by a Treaty of 7 
February 1819, suggesting that Singapore was ceded, not planted. Other evidence in-
5 For a discussion, see Bartholomew in Harding, ed (1985) 3-30; Rutter (1989) 96-111.
6 Braddell was first to conclude that whether English law was received under the settlement 
doctrine was never finally determined: Braddell (1921) vol 1,160-161.
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eludes Raffles’ attempts to incorporate English law into the February Treaty, and his 
Memorandum of 1823, in which he tried to introduce law into Singapore. These could 
refute the claim that English law was received automatically upon his arrival in 1819.
However, during the period from 1819 to 1823, administration of Singapore 
was under the Bencoolen Presidency. Logically, it could be thought that English law as 
it stood at January 1819 would begin to apply, and jurisdiction would be under the Ben­
coolen Court. But as intimated above, an analysis here can add nothing new to the de­
bate. The second issue, reception by express enactment, is considered below.
2.3.2 Express Enactment from England
If Singapore were ceded by Treaty, the application of English law on the island 
would have to be based on express enactment from England. The first such enactment 
was the so-called Second Charter of Justice of 1826. Until then, the lex loci would con­
tinue to apply, although it is feasible to expect that colonisers and their entourage com­
plied with English law or an approximation of it, combined with personal or customary 
laws of, for instance, the Indian soldiers and ship’s crew who accompanied the English. 
The various regulations, which Raffles promulgated in 1819 and 1823, would appear to 
have lacked authoritative backing, so that their status as English law is dubious.
Upon the request of the East India Company, in 1807 the Crown delivered a 
document, which granted that certain institutions should be created in Penang. The 
document, called Letters Patent, stipulated a basic framework or Charter for creating a 
court system based on English courts. The 1807 Letters Patent was called the First 
Charter of Justice. It was granted to Penang 20-odd years after its British acquisition.
In 1826, following a similar petition from the Company, another Letters Patent 
was granted to the Straits Settlements and their dependencies. This was called the Sec­
ond Charter of Justice. It expressly repealed the parts of the First Charter which had 
conferred jurisdiction on the Penang Court of Judicature, and now embraced Penang, 
Singapore, Malacca and other territories. In 1855, a Third Charter of Justice was 
granted which split the jurisdiction into two: one for Singapore and Malacca, the other 
for Penang.
When the administration of the Straits Settlements was removed from India, a 
Letters Patent of 1867 established the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlement, 
which was empowered to legislate for the peace, order and good government of the col­
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ony. Ordinance V of 1868 made provisions for a local Supreme Court of the Straits Set­
tlements abolishing the old Court of Judicature and with it the right of Resident Coun­
cillors to sit as judges. It repealed the 1855 Charter (the court system) but retained the 
substantive law, which was considered received under the 1826 Charter.
None of the Letters Patent expressly introduced English law to Singapore. 
Letters Patent allowed for the creation o f Courts and prescribed their jurisdiction and 
powers. However the courts regarded the 1826 Charter as having formally introduced 
English law to Singapore. Perhaps the most important decision is that of Penang’s Re­
corder, Sir Benson Maxwell, in R v Willans4 (1858) 3 Kyshe Reports 16. In Willans, 
Maxwell R had to decide two preliminary issues: First, whether any part of the Statute 
law of England was in force in Penang; if so, whether the particular Act was applicable 
in Singapore. He held inter alia:
... the Charter does not declare totidem verbis that the [law of England] shall be the territorial 
law of the Island; but all its leading provisions manifestly require that justice shall be adminis­
tered according to it, and it alone.
I think it [is] plain that English law was intended to be applied in Civil cases. The Charter di­
rects that the Court shall, in those cases “give and pass judgment and sentence according to 
Justice and Right”. The “justice and right” intended, are clearly not those abstract notions re­
specting that vague thing called natural equity, or the law of nature, which the Judge or even 
the Sovereign may have formed, in his own mind, but the justice and right of which the Sover­
eign is the source or dispenser. The words are obviously used in the same sense as in the 
Magna Carta from which they were probably borrowed.... They are, in jurisprudence, mere 
synonyms for law; or at least only measureable by it; and a direction in an English Charter to 
decide according to justice and right, without expressly stating by what body of known law they 
shall be dispensed and so to decide in a Country which has not already an established body of 
law, is plainly a direction to decide according to the law of England.
In other words, Maxwell R was confident that the interpretation of the Charter’s justice 
and right provision meant that English law was applicable to civil cases in Singapore.7 
A line of decisions reiterates this conclusion, including important Privy Council prece­
dents and decisions in the English as well as the Straits Court of Appeal. However, 
scholars like Gopal8 argue that judges may have read more into the 1826 Charter than 
its language properly allows. This study can add nothing useful to that debate. Instead, it 
submits that the weight of evidence of legal practice in Singapore for nearly 180 years 
renders this debate redundant. Then, like now, administrative convenience is a powerful 
motivating force for lawyers and decision-makers. It was simply easier for English- 
educated barristers and judges to receive and apply English laws.
7 The Charter makes specific provisions for criminal and ecclesiastical cases.
8 See Gopal M, [1983]. C/. Phang A [1986],
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2.4 Singapore’s Colonial Legal Legacy
The reception of English law was not unrestricted but was subject to exemp­
tions and modifications regarding suitability and applicability of the law.
Thus, in clarifying the notion of automatic reception, Blackstone noted (id):
Such colonists carry with them only so much of English law as is applicable to the condition of 
an infant colony... The artificial requirements and distinctions incident to the property of a great 
and commercial people ... are neither necessary nor convenient for them, and therefore are not 
in force... (My italics.)
The issue, of course, was to decide how much of English law was applicable to the con­
dition of a particular infant colony. For as Lord Cranworth ‘sighed’ in Whicker v Hume 
(1858) 7 HLC 125; 11 ER 50:
Nothing is more difficult than to know which of our laws is to be regarded as imported into our 
colonies.... Who is to decide whether they are adapted or not? That is a very difficult question.
2.4.1 The Concepts of Suitability and Modification
The 1826 Charter provides that the Court’s jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
actions should apply only ‘as far as circumstances will admit’ (21). Similarly, ecclesias­
tical jurisdiction is to be exercised only ‘so far as the several Religions, Manners and 
Customs of the Inhabitants of the said Settlement and Plan will admit’ (21). Criminal 
jurisdiction is to be exercised ‘as nearly as the condition and circumstances of the Place 
and the Persons will admit of... due attention being had to the several Religions, Man­
ners and Usages of the nature of inhabitants’ (42-43).
In Willans (1858) 3 Ky 16, Maxwell R said that the issue of how much of the 
English statute law, which was in existence in 1826 was actually brought into force in 
the Colony was a matter of construction. Thus, construing the 1826 Charter, he said its 
effect is to make (at 37-38):
... the English Criminal Law in force ‘as far as the condition and the circumstances of the place 
and the persons admit’, the civil law, ‘as far as circumstances admit’, and that branch which is 
administered in England by the Spiritual Courts, ‘as far as the religions, manners and customs of 
the inhabitants admit. In other words, it makes just so much of the law of England our lex loci as, 
according to Blackstone, is imported into a Colony newly founded by English settlers, viz. ‘as 
much as is applicable to the situation and condition’ of the Settlement. (Reference omitted).
In his construction of the Charter, Maxwell R found two exceptions (at 39): one, Eng­
lish law is not considered imported if its object or means is peculiarly local to England; 
two, English law is not applicable in the Colony if its application would cause injustice 
or inconvenience to local people.
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In Yeap Cheah Neo v Ong Cheng Neo (1875) LR 6 PC 381, the Privy Council 
considered the suitability issue and stated that (394):
.. it has been held that statutes relating to matters and exigencies peculiar to the local condition 
of England, and which are not adapted to the circumstances of a particular colony, do not be­
come a part of its law, although the general law of England may be introduced into it.
However, in the same case, their Lordships were of the opinion that the distinctive and 
special English rule against perpetuities was imported into the Straits Settlements. Their 
Lordships agreed that (id):
...whilst the English statutes relating to superstitious uses and to mortmain ought not to be im­
ported into the law of the colony, the rule against perpetuities was to be considered part of it. 
This rule, which certainly has been recognised as existing in the law of England independently 
of any statute, is founded upon considerations of public policy, which seem to be as applicable 
to the condition of such a place as Penang as to England: viz, to prevent the mischief of making 
property inalienable, unless for objects which are in some way useful or beneficial to the com­
munity. (My italics).
In other words, it would seem that while statutes relating to matters peculiar to the local 
condition of England do not become part of the colony’s law, rules which exist in the 
law of England independently of any statute were to be considered part of it. Thus 
judge-made law9 would become part of the colony’s law, even when it was declared as a 
matter of public policy in England, and therefore likely to pertain to local English con­
ditions. On the other hand, English statutes were not received in Singapore if they were 
considered peculiar to England in their objects or machinery.
Another line of cases, including the Privy Council decision in Khoo Hooi Leong 
v Khoo Chong Yeok [1930] AC 346, held that there would be no reception of a statute 
or common law rule, which would cause injustice or inconvenience to the people, when 
applied to local personal, religious or social issues. Finally, it was held that statutes 
legislated in the colony superseded imported English statutes and common law rules; 
presumably because home-grown statutes would be more suited to local conditions.10
However, despite the good intentions, it is doubtful whether the concepts of 
modification and suitability resulted in anything more than lip service. This is particu­
larly evident in early property and contract cases. For instance, in Choa Choon Neoh v 
Spottiswoodex (1869) 1 Ky 216, Maxwell CJ held that the rule against perpetuities (ty­
ing up property for future generations) was applicable in the case of a Singapore Chi-
9 For a discussion of the reception of the common law, see 2.4.2 infra.
10 Locally legislated statutes were subject to the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865.
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nese gentleman who was prevented from establishing a fund for the memories of his 
deceased wives.11 This decision was contrary to Chinese custom of ancestor worship 
and respect for the deceased. As mentioned above, the Privy Council in Ong Cheng Neo 
(1875) confirmed the reception of the perpetuities rule, even though the rule is founded 
upon considerations of public policy, which they held to be as applicable to the condi­
tion of Penang as to England. The latter opinion was left unreasoned. More surprisingly, 
it was held in the Penang Court, that English law governed the issue of the validity of 
wills, and ‘it is the fault of native holders of property if any inconvenience results from 
such a decision’: per Hackett J in Fatimah v Logan (1871) 1 Ky 255 at 262.
In other words, a brief review of the cases shows a marked reluctance on the part 
of local courts (manned by English barristers) to make modifications to English law to 
suit local conditions. They were also unable to rule English law unsuitable, despite the 
several religions, manners and customs of the inhabitants. On the contrary, there are 
cases in which English law takes precedence over matters governable by religious laws. 
For instance, in Mong v Daing Mokkah_(\935) 4 MLJ 147, the Singapore court allowed 
an action for damages for breach of promise of marriage between Muslims. And in an 
earlier case, In the Goods o f Abdulla (1835), it was held that a Muslim could give away 
all his property by [English] will, contrary to Muslim law.
However, the experience in Singapore might not have been unique. In an exami­
nation of the common law’s impact on native custom throughout the British Empire, 
Green (1970, 56) concluded that:
... it is clear that while the introduction of the common law into native societies has undoubtedly 
led to some modification of local native customs which were not acceptable to western Christian 
society, and has resulted in the expansion of the scope of the rule of law as understood in such 
society, it remains true that too often the judges called upon to apply the one or the other or an 
admixture of the two have tended to disregard local conditions or susceptibilities, and have fre­
quently stretched English concepts as if their task lay in creating replicas o f the English legal 
system wherever English-trained judges held sway. (My italics).
It is therefore not implausible that other interests, including the economic 
agenda of colonialism, played a far greater role than the alleged ‘concern’ of English 
law to ensure the best of both worlds for indigenous peoples. In the infamous Six Wid­
ows’ Case (1908) 12 SSLR 120, the issue was compounded when the court applied
11 However, in 1918 the Singapore Court in Syed Ali v Syed Omar Alsagojf (1918) 15 SSLR 103 
held that the English feudal rules against perpetuities did not apply in Singapore, presaging 
the separate development of Singapore land law.
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neither English marriage law nor Chinese customary law, but the court’s perception of 
the formal law pertaining in China at the time -  and got it wrong.
2.4.2 The Cut-off Date: Statutes and the Common Law
The cut-off date refers to the notion that the law which was considered received 
was the law as it stood on the date the Charter was granted. The notion is based on a 
principle of statutory interpretation, which holds that English statutes are applicable 
only in England unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication provides oth­
erwise. Thus, where the English Parliament has provided otherwise (usually by an Im­
perial Act), then the relevant statute will be applicable even though it is passed after the 
cut-off date of reception: Ismail bin Savoosah (1887).
For the sake of clarity, it is worth summarising what could be considered im­
ported at the cut-off date:
• English statutes in force up to the date of the 1826 Charter
• Common law and equity up to the same 1826 date.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis:
• Common law after 1826 (House of Lords or Privy Council);
And, under the declaratory theory or by voluntary adoption of local courts:
•  Common law after 1826.
The consensus seems to be that as a general rule, the reception of English statutes (ex­
cept Imperial Acts) was a cut-off reception, while the reception of case law was a con­
tinuing reception, based either on the declaratory theory or the willingness of local 
courts and the legal profession to adopt and observe common law precedents.12
Two points should be noted about the continuing reception of the common law. 
One, under the principle of stare decisis the local courts would only be bound to apply 
decisions of the House of Lords until Singapore’s colonial status ended: Robins v Na­
tional Trust Co Ltd [1927] AC 515. Thereafter they would only be bound to apply deci­
sions of the Privy Council for as long as the government of independent Singapore per­
mitted, or as long as the local courts and the legal profession acquiesced.
Two, the declaratory theory, which has Blackstonian roots, holds that the com­
mon law has existed from time immemorial and is merely discovered and declared by 
judges from time to time. From this point of view, the reception in Singapore of the 
common law is an on-going process rather than an historic event like legislative recep­
12 See, for instance, Bartholomew in Harding ed (1985).
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tion. The decisions of English courts become applicable irrespective of whether they 
were made before or after the cut-off date, since each decision is merely declaring what 
the law is. This argument could apply as a double-edged sword: As Singapore judges 
become well versed in the common law, arguably, they too could discover and declare 
the law, without having to wait for English declarations.13
A better explanation of the reception of English common law after the cut-off 
date appears to be that the local courts and the profession have chosen to adopt and ap­
ply common law rules as being ‘suitable’ to local conditions.14 For instance, as late as in 
1984, Lai Kew Chai J in Singapore Finance Ltd v him Kah Ngam (S’pore) Pte Ltd 
[1984] 2 MLJ 202, held that an English common law rule, declared in 1843 ‘is received 
into and is part of the law of Singapore’.15
2.4.3 Continuing Legislative Reception
At a stroke, the 1878 Civil Law Ordinance allowed the reception of a substan­
tial body of English statutes into Singapore on a continuing basis, despite the cut-off 
reception of statutes discussed above.16 The operative section was s6, later s5 of the 
Civil Law Act (cap 43). The sections have been the subject of intense debate among 
scholars and practitioners alike. Indeed section 5 amendments seem to have generated 
more problems than the original section.17 Now the 1993 Application of English Law 
Act (cap 7A, 1994 ed.) provides the definitive solution (see 2.5 infra). However, a few 
salient points of historical interest can be raised.
Primarily, section 5 provided for the continuous reception of what we today 
would call English commercial law. It was not subject to the cut-off date. Section 5 spe­
cifically provided inter alia that18:
13 But see Phang (1990) who argues that the Singapore judiciary has slavishly followed Eng­
lish case law and failed to innovate, despite rich opportunities.
14 This is based on Bartholomew's view in Harding A ed (1985) 3-30 at 15-30.
15 For a discussion of how voluntary reception of common law rules might be 'stultifying' the 
development of an autochthonous legal system, see Phang A (1990), chapters 2 and 3.
16 The phrase 'continuing basis' should be understood in the sense that even as English law 
changes, under this provision, it continues to be applicable in Singapore. This contrasts with 
the importation of law under the Second Charter, which had a cut-off date for reception of 
English law as it stood in 1826. See 2.4.2 supra.
17 See, for instance, Soon Choo Hock and Phang A (1985); Hickling R (1979).
18 Quoted from the 1979 amended version: Civil Law (Amendment No 2) Act, 1979 (24 of 
1979). The 1979 amendments are italicised. See Hickling (1979).
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5(1) Subject to the provisions o f this section, in all questions or issues which arise or which have 
to be decided in Singapore with respect to the law of partnerships, corporations, banks and 
banking, principals and agents, carriers by air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, life and 
fire insurance, and with respect to mercantile law generally, the law with respect to those matters 
to be administered shall be the same as would be administered in England in the like case, at the 
corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or had to be decided in England, un­
less in any case other provision is or shall be made by any law having force in Singapore.
By listing the areas to which the law should apply, drafters of the section might have 
hoped for clarity. However, by adding and with respect to mercantile law generally, 
the section was rendered ambiguous. In 1979 when with respect to those matters, was 
added, confusion reigned. Despite the fact that during the debate of the second reading 
of the 1979 amendments, the Minister of Home Affairs stated, inter alia (PD vol 39, 
col 445-448):
The main purpose of this Bill is to amend section 5 ... so as to clarify the scope of application 
of the section and to eliminate certain unintended and undesirable effects and doubts arising 
from the existing provision. ... In spite of a number of judicial decisions, including two Privy 
Council cases, there is considerable uncertainty as to the precise scope of application of the 
section. ... even the two Privy Council cases were incompatible with each other.19 Because of 
the uncertainty ... it has become difficult at times to say whether a particular piece of English 
legislation is or is not applicable to Singapore.
While this might [not] have been of such great consequence in the past, it is increasingly be­
coming a serious problem, especially after the entry of Britain into the European Economic 
Community in 1973. There is and will be an increasing tendency as a result of such to harmo­
nise English commercial law with European Common Market law.... Some of the legislative 
changes in the UK may not be quite appropriate to the needs and circumstances of Singapore, 
but under section 5, as it stands, we may find ourselves automatically bound by these legislative 
changes...
The Minister summarised the proposed amendments, concluding that he hoped the 
amended section would prove very useful ‘for lawyers and businessmen’. But as dis­
cussed above, neither lawyers nor legal scholars (and probably no businessmen) found 
the s5 amendments very useful. Arguably the only part which, for the purposes of this 
study was useful is s5(2)(a) which confirms unequivocally an original part of s6 of the 
1878 Ordinance:
Nothing in this section shall be taken to introduce into Singapore any part of the law of Eng­
land relating to the tenure or conveyance or assurance of, or succession to, any immovable 
property, or any estate right or interest therein;....
In other words, there is no reception of English statute law relating to real property in 
Singapore. The consequences of this prohibition are examined in chapter 7 infra.
19 The Privy Council cases are: SST Sockalingam Chettiar v Shaik Sahied bin Abdullah Bajerai 
(1933) SSLR 101; and Seng Djit Hin (1923) AC 444.
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Apart from the s5 reception of English commercial law, other English statutes 
were imported, often for ad hoc reference. This is because specific words in individual 
Acts often directed the courts to refer to various English statutes. Imperial Acts also 
applied directly either by express words or by necessary implication.
The continued reception of Imperial Acts was based on the interpretation placed 
on various continuity provisions as Singapore passed through its various political ad­
ministrative phases. No fewer than eleven different bodies have exercised law-making 
powers over Singapore during its 170-odd years of modem history. With this rich tap­
estry, it is difficult to say with certainty which statutes have survived the several 
changes of administration. For instance, the Wills Act, cap 352, originated under the 
Indian administration when the Government of India Act 1858 provided for the con­
tinuation in force of all Acts and Provisions (Rutter 1989, 227). Naturally many have 
been repealed, but several were extended in various situations (for instance, during the 
Malaysia merger) and may not have been repealed. Bartholomew’s introduction to the 
Tables o f the Written Laws o f the Republic o f Singapore (1970,1-liv) gives an explana­
tion of the continuation of existing laws. However, even the official Statutes o f the Re­
public o f Singapore, prepared by the Law Revision Commission by virtue of the Re­
vised Edition of the Laws Act (cap 275) lists in Part V only two Imperial Acts20 and a 
note explaining that ‘[T]his Part does not include all the Imperial Legislation in force.’ 
The result can be surprising for modem lawyers and their clients. For instance in 
1985, Thean J in Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd & Ors v Ng Sui Nam [1985] 1 MLJ 
196 at 199, observed that:
On August 31, 1958 the United Kingdom Parliament passed the State of Singapore Act, 1958 
and pursuant to that Act the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council 1958 (SI No 1956 of 
1958) was made which came into force on June 3, 1959.... By that Act Singapore was called the 
State of Singapore and the Constitution Order gave to the newly named State of Singapore inter­
nal self-government, reserving to the United Kingdom the responsibility of defence and external 
affairs. This Act and the Constitution Order did not have any effect on the copyright protection 
conferred by the 1911 Act (read with Paragraph 41), and the State of Singapore, though having 
an internal self-government was still a British colony. (My italics.)
Thus the English Copyright Act 1911 survived Singapore’s changed political relation­
ship with the UK. For although Singapore was responsible for its internal affairs from 3 
June 1959 and became a Republic from 9 August 1965, its judiciary was obliged to ac­
20 The Acts are the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 and the Straits Settlements and 
Johore Territorial Waters (Agreement) Act 1928.
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cept that works first published in the United Kingdom continued to enjoy copyright 
protection in Singapore under the 1911 Act. This was so because s i3(1) of the 1965 
Republic of Singapore Independence Act, preserved the existing law:
... with such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to 
bring them into conformity with this Act and with the independent status of Singapore upon 
separation from Malaysia.
It was held that nothing in the 1911 Copyright Act was repugnant to Singapore’s Con­
stitution. And although it might no longer be apt to refer to Singapore as one of His 
Majesty’s dominions to which the 1911 Act applied, the phrase could be construed as a 
geographical reference, in line with the decision in State o f Madras v Menon (1954) 
AIR SC 517. Thean J’s decision was affirmed in the Court of Appeal: (1987) 2 MLJ 5.
2.5 Continuing Reception Discontinued
The Application of English Law Act (cap 7 A) came into force on 12 November 
1993. It removed all uncertainty as to which English commercial laws apply in Singa­
pore. The Act’s First Schedule lists the 13 English statutes, which shall apply in Singa­
pore from this date.21 The Act provides that no other English enactment will be part of 
the law of Singapore except by express words in another written law of Singapore.
Thus the continuing reception of English statues, whether by s5 or Imperial 
Acts, was discontinued conditionally - or at least put on a more predictable basis. As far 
as the common law is concerned, s3 of the 1993 Act stipulates:
(1) The common law of England (including the principles and rules of equity), so far as it was 
part of the law of Singapore immediately before die commencement of this Act, shall continue to 
be part of the law of Singapore.
(2) The common law shall continue to be in force in Singapore, as provided in subsection (1), so 
far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and subject to such 
modifications as those circumstances may require.
Subsection (2) introduces Singapore’s modem version of the suitability and modifica­
tion concepts. These appear to be similar to the clauses expressed in English statutes 
and countless judgements (see 2.4.1 supra). This might be an area in which the nature 
of the law of independent Singapore does not differ substantially from that of its colo­
21 The 13 English statutes have been given individual chapter numbers and incorporated in 
the Revised Edition of the Statutes of the Republic of Singapore. They are published as Revised Edi­
tions 1994. See Phang A (1994).
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nial past. However, further research is necessary to discover the extent to which the ap­
plication of seemingly similar legal provisions may vary.
Arguably, the pervading influence of English law in Singapore (and other ex­
colonies) goes beyond the simple function of transplant of English law. Elias (1962, 
285-6) sees six ways in which laws ‘migrate’ from the English to other jurisdictions:
(1) English law is the common source from which local legislation springs
(2) British trained lawyers and judges supplied through the Colonial Legal Service forged the
mould for local practice
(3) Lawyers practising in the (ex-)colonies are called first to the English, Scottish or Irish Bar
(4) The influence of the Privy Council as the final instance of appeal
(5) The borrowing of laws from other British colonies or ex-colonies
(6) The introduction of the laws of one area under British rule into another (eg the application
of the Indian Penal Code and the Evidence Act into the Straits Settlements).
To these could legitimately be added the on-going impact of legal education, textbooks, 
law journals, academic research and so on. To the extent that these remain essentially 
anglicised (or Anglo-American), their effect on the development of a truly indigenous 
legal system might be stultifying.
2.6 Cutting the Umbilical Cord
In 1989, several provisions were enacted whereby appeals to the Privy Council 
(PC) from the Singapore Court of Appeal were severely curtailed.22 In effect, rights of 
appeal to the Privy Council were restricted to criminal cases where the decision of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal was not unanimous. Further, in civil cases, only cases in 
which the parties to an action had a prior agreement could be appealed to the Privy 
Council. Between 1989 and 1993 no criminal appeals, and only two civil appeals, were 
made to the Privy Council.
In 1994 the Judicial Committee Act (cap 148) was repealed. It abolished all 
rights of appeal to the Privy Council. Singapore’s own Court of Appeal is now the final 
instance of appeal.23 When the Bill was tabled on 17 January 1994 the Law Minister 
Prof Jayakumar stated that the time had come to cut the umbilical cord.
Now that the Privy Council no longer heads Singapore’s hierarchy of courts, the 
Singapore judiciary is free to take bold steps towards building its own jurisprudence. 
However, the Singapore Court and the government might continue to consider decisions
22 See the Internal Security (Amendment) Act 1989 (cap 143) and the Judicial Committee 
(Amendment) Act (cap 148). The latter was repealed in 1994, see below.
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of Courts of final appeal in common law jurisdictions like England, Australia, Canada, 
and even America, especially in cases involving intellectual property, banking and fi­
nancial services and the Internet. These areas increasingly call for global standards and 
global solutions.
Thus, the umbilical cord might have been cut, but the other ties that bind might 
prove even more difficult to sever. Indeed they might be tightened, given the encroach­
ing ‘globalism’ and the supra-national institutions’ power to enforce minimum stan­
dards of legal protection, e.g. for intellectual property rights (see chapter 8).
2.7 Conclusion: Has Singapore Crossed the Rubicon?
This chapter analysed the transplant of English law to Singapore in order to 
discover the extent and nature of its reception and application in the Colony. The goal 
was to gain an understanding of the nature of the legal platform from which Singapore 
took-off in 1959. This would form the necessary background for identifying possible 
changes in the nature of the law during the next decades as the PAP government at­
tempted to implement its developmental strategy.
The chapter analysed the historical reception of both statutes and case law. Re­
ception occurred, first, [controversial] upon Raffles’ initial ‘planting’ in 1819; secondly, 
under the 1826 Second Charter of Justice; thirdly, on a continuing referral basis under 
s5 of the Civil Law Act; fourthly, by express words in local Acts; fifthly, on a continu­
ing basis under unrepealed Imperial Acts. In addition certain Indian and Malaysian Acts 
were received at relevant periods.
A startling discovery is that despite gaining internal self-rule in 1959, legally, 
the State of Singapore was a state in name only. Its legislative autonomy was partial; it 
was still subject to intervention from the metropolis. Indeed even after the merger with 
Malaysia and the subsequent formal severance of British political ties by virtue of the 
[English] Malaysia Act 1963 and the [Malaysian] Malaysia Act 1963, Singapore re­
mained within the colonial embrace of English laws. This is because, as Thean J neatly 
summarised it in his Butterworth judgment [1985] 1 MLJ 196 at 200: ‘Both the Malay­
sia Acts contained necessary provisions preserving existing laws.’ Even after Singapore 
left the Malaysian Federation and declared itself an independent Republic, s i3(1) of the
23 See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) (1994) 2 SLR 689.
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1965 Republic of Singapore Independence Act provided for the continuation of existing 
laws.
Thus all that can reasonably be said about the legal platform at 1959 or even at 
1965, when the country was purportedly a sovereign state, is that the reception and 
practice of English law were institutionalised. In other words, English law had become 
an integral part of Singapore society. But it is also apt to note that what had taken root 
in Singapore was not necessarily what had been uprooted in England. For as Lord Dip- 
lock observed {obiter) in Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] 1 All ER 801 at 871:
The common law would not have survived in any of those countries which have adopted it, if it 
did not reflect the changing norms of the particular society of which it is the basic legal system. 
It has survived because the common law subsumes a power in judges to adapt its rules to the 
changing needs of contemporary society - to discard those which have outlived their usefulness, 
to develop new rules to meet new situations.
Arguably, what had taken root in Singapore was an instrumental version of English law 
designed primarily to enable the smooth running of a colonial economic regime. It has 
been said that the common law is rooted in respect for the dignity of the individual, and 
her entitlement to life, liberty and property. In Lord Ellenborough J’s opinion in R v 
Cobbett (1804) 29 State Tr 1 at 49: ‘The law of England is a law of liberty.’ However, 
this law was removed from its natural habitat, and harnessed for a specific colonial pur­
pose in which its original agenda of freedom and liberty had been compromised.
Despite this, the nature of the law, as it stood in Singapore at the time of inde­
pendence was undoubtedly rooted in the law of England. It was undeniably western 
rights-based law, which had retained its individualistic character and its commitment to 
protect property and life. Its stress on economic gain was supported by colonial laissez 
faire attitudes, which served to commoditise individuals and relationships among them. 
These characteristics clearly equate with market-allocative, western law as described in 
Table 1 (see 1.5 infra). Moreover, legislation gradually diminished the field of operation 
of case law as the legislature (in Singapore and less so in England) increasingly took 
advantage of the doctrine of legislative supremacy. As will be seen in chapters 4 to 8 on 
the substantive law, this development is particularly evident in modem Singapore.
Those factors appear to have set the scene for the development of a new species 
of law in which respect for the dignity and liberty of the individual was undermined and 
easily made subservient to concerns for society as a whole. It must be remembered that 
in 1959 the population of Singapore was predominantly Chinese, and that, as discussed
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in chapter 4, by 1965 the PAP government had wedded itself to the notion of nation- 
building and economic development. Arguably, these factors made it easier for the PAP 
leaders to foster the growth of a communitarian ideology, founded on pragmatism and a 
local siege mentality, from which the new species of law would gain support.
In 1985 Bartholomew (in Harding ed 1985, 28) claimed that Singapore’s legal 
system ‘has crossed the Rubicon and now stands alone, master of its own fate and cap­
tain of its soul.’ His claim was premature. Or maybe it was 20 years too late. To my 
mind, Singapore’s legal system crossed the Rubicon when the PAP leadership commit­
ted itself irrevocably to a developmental, nation-building course of action (by 1965), 
and opted for pragmatic state intervention as the way of orchestrating the desired re­
sults. From then on, law became synonymous with mature PAP policy. Law was to be 
fashioned in the image of the new society’s developmental ideology and aspirations. As 
these were materially different from the English colonial legacy, law too became mate­
rially different in nature.
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CHAPTER 3 PRE-1959 BASIS FOR MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH
It is impossible to conceive o f  a place combining more advantages; it is 
within a w eek’s sail o f  China, still closer to Siam, Cochin-China, ... in the 
very heart o f  the Archipelago, or as the Malays call it, ‘the Navel o f  the 
Malay countries
Our object is not a territory but trade, a great commercial Emporium, and a 
fulcrum whence we may extend our influence politically as circumstances 
may hereafter require... One Free Port in these Seas must eventually de­
stroy the spell o f  Dutch monopoly; and what Malta is in the West, that may 
Singapore become in the East.
Stamford Raffles writing to Colonel Addenbroke, Colonial Office, London, 1819 
Cited in Hoe I (1991) Introduction to Singapore, Hong Kong: Odyssey Guides, 12.
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3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 traced the pre-1959 reception of English law and analysed the nature 
of the laws in operation in Singapore up to the time of self-rule in an attempt to estab­
lish the basis from which the laws of modem Singapore developed. Similarly, this 
chapter aims to characterise the pre-1959 socio-economic and political bases for Singa­
pore’s modem economic development. The economy did not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, 
not only were some historical and socio-political factors inextricably entwined with the 
process of economic growth, some were determinants. This chapter therefore provides a 
brief analysis of what some economists call catch-up capabilities (Nolan 1995). It also 
evaluates three theoretical accounts for rapid economic development in the context of 
Singapore’s experience. One of these, Wade’s governed market theory (see 3.8.2; 1.5), 
seems most apt for analysing Singapore’s economic growth experience from 1959 to 
1999 (see chapter 4).
It is common practice (among economists) to portray a nation’s economic de­
velopment as progressing through a transition from the predominance of primary com­
modity enterprises (agriculture, forestry, fisheries) to secondary sectors (construction, 
manufacturing) and tertiary services (retail, financial, education) enterprises. Studies by 
Clark (1953), Kuznets (1959), Chenery (1979) and others suggest that this is the typical 
economic growth pattern. That is, it is usual for a country’s economy to move through 
the three phases chronologically. But Singapore’s economic growth has been different. 
As shown below, its tertiary sector pre-empted its secondary and it has had little primary 
sector to speak of. The analysis below is based primarily on information provided by 
Huff (1997) and Rodan (1989).
3.2 Geo-political Location
From the early 19th century, Singapore’s economic development was based on 
its strategic location at the crossroads of Asia and its endowment of a large natural har­
bour. It was never a substantial agrarian society, even though the first Malay settlers 
were probably fisherfolk. The competitive advantage provided by Singapore’s location 
and its large natural harbour was underpinned by the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 
1869. This opened the Eastern trade to European steamships. As steamships needed 
coal, the choice route became the coast-hugging Straits of Malacca rather than the
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Sunda Straits which would require a longer open-sea voyage across the Indian Ocean 
from Netherlands India [Indonesia] to Ceylon and India.
Lacking in its own primary commodities, Singapore was forced to develop a 
service economy and hone its entrepreneurial skills at an early stage. The free port, which 
formed the core of Raffles’ policy, took shape quickly. Singapore’s economy soon be­
came dependent on exporting primary produce such as spices, vegetable oils, pineapples, 
tin, rubber and later petroleum from its hinterland: the Malayan Peninsula and Indonesia. 
The demeaning return flow of imports was British cotton piece goods and opium. But 
this was no ordinary port, for as Huff (1997, 15) explains, Singapore’s economic growth 
fits the general pattern of a staple port:
One of the principal features of the nineteenth century was that regions with surplus natural re­
sources and, sometimes, surplus labour, in relation to demand in the domestic economy, experi­
enced a very rapid expansion in the production of primary commodities for export, largely to in­
dustrial countries. It is only to be expected that international trade which served as an engine of 
growth and created, through export of primaiy commodities, an outlet or ‘vent’ for surpluses 
would lead to the development of port cities to service the new trade.
Huffs analysis is correct. But it is incorrect to suggest that the indigenous populations 
were voluntarily exporting their surpluses in relation to demand in the domestic econ­
omy. Although a discussion of colonialism is outside the scope of this study, we must 
bear in mind that the rapid expansion in the production of primary commodities for ex­
port was driven by colonial entrepreneurship, some would say, greed; and in the case of 
Singapore, also political rivalry. Raffles himself writing about Singapore to Addenbroke 
at the Colonial Office in London noted that (cited in Hoe 1991,12):
[0]ur objective is not a territory but trade, a great commercial Emporium, and a fulcrum whence 
we may extend our influence politically as circumstances may hereafter require ... One Free Port 
in these Seas must eventually destroy the spell of Dutch monopoly; and what Malta is in the West, 
that may Singapore become in the East.
Moreover, we should remember that Raffles was commissioned to found Singapore on 
behalf of the British East India Company. The latter was established under Royal Charter 
granted by Queen Elizabeth 1 on 31 December 1600 specifically to develop English 
commerce over as wide an area of Asia as possible (Bassett 1960, 17). Thus the exercise 
was colonial-driven commerce, demands in the domestic economy do not seem to have 
entered the equation at that stage. Indeed, a crucial issue for investigation in Singapore’s 
modern economic development is to consider how the new nation managed to rearrange 
its inherited priorities to take account of its domestic economic needs once its colonial 
masters had withdrawn from the key decision-making posts in 1959 and 1965.
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Nevertheless Huffs analysis of the development of Singapore as a staple port is 
masterful; for as he argues its trade came to depend on a few commodities [tin, rubber, 
petroleum]; and this resulted in a new set of economic relationships between port and 
hinterland ( id  17). In other words, Singapore was more than an entrepot.1 To the acci­
dents of nature: geographic location and natural harbour, were added (over time) a port 
city that performed five inter-related functions which laid the foundation for Singa­
pore’s economic development. According to Huff (id, 16), these included:
1. The performance of entrepreneurial, investment, management and mercantile functions
connected with production of the staple;
2. The provision of financial services;
3. Processing of the staple commodity;
4. Marketing services including the port’s role as the region’s main market for the staple;
5. The close involvement of business interests in the port with hinterland production.
Not all inter-related functions were developed or performed in the early years. For many 
decades some were performed only by English merchants, English banks and their 
agents, and European-dominated merchant houses. However, even in these early days, 
an outline of what was possible, indeed of what was to come, was already discernible.
3.2.1 Size and the Hinterland
Singapore has never possessed the physical size to enjoy economies of scale, or 
the opportunity to take the 19th century American way to industrial prosperity, that is, to 
hide behind protectionist barriers while producing for a massive domestic market of con­
tinental dimensions (Nolan 1995, 115). Thus development of the staple port rendered the 
hinterland a double asset. But Singapore’s experience as a staple port revealed two ex­
traordinary features: One, its hinterland was not populated by the same race as Singapore 
itself. Two, its hinterland was not within the same jurisdiction, unlike, for instance, the 
port of Lagos in Nigeria, or New Orleans in the USA. Thus Netherlands India, the major 
supplier of rubber and petroleum, was a Dutch colony; while the Malayan Peninsula, the 
major tin supplier, and Borneo were under British rule. The population in the hinterland 
was predominantly Malay and Javanese. Initially, the political disparity between the hin­
terland and the staple port curtailed the development of the inter-related functions of the 
staple port somewhat. For instance, in the beginning, the staple port performed the more
1 Entrepot: a trading centre or port at a geographically convenient location, at which goods are 
imported and re-exported without incurring liability for duty: Collins English Dictionary 1995.
politically sensitive functions of management and investment almost solely for the Ma­
layan Peninsula.
One persisting geo-political feature is race. Singapore’s population is predomi­
nantly Chinese (75%), although it boasts a modem multicultural society with Malays ac­
counting for about 15% and Indians for about 6% of citizens. However the populations of 
its neighbours are largely indigenous Malays -  bumiputras or sons of the soil2, who are 
predominantly Muslims. Historically, the diversity of race and the issue of jurisdiction 
probably slowed the establishment of close mutual ties, but they also helped Singapore 
hone its skills and ability to deal flexibly and cooperate with its neighbours in later years.
The key points to note are the early commercial and entrepreneurial links with the 
hinterland, the wider Western world and the regional markets. Thus Singapore’s role de­
veloped not just as a conduit, but also as a promoter of export expansion in the region. 
First, it gave the hinterland access to new markets in the West. Secondly, in the case of 
Siam, Burma, Indo-China, and so on, it gave producers greater access to the expanding 
inter-regional market for food. Thirdly, it played a major role in providing labour (by 
attracting immigrants) and capital (through foreign and local banking) to support produc­
tion in and trade with the hinterland. The seeds for future collaboration across the region 
were sown in these early years.
Thus as statistics of Singapore’s imports and exports by commodity by country 
show (see SSAR 1899, 213-34), by the late 19th century, Singapore was the hub of the 
region’s trade. Strategically, Singapore’s role can hardly be overstated for as Huff shows, 
as international and regional trade flows increased, the Singapore hub transformed the 
economies of the surrounding countries and was itself transformed in the process. For 
instance, Singapore’s response to the West’s demand for tin, rubber and petroleum im­
pacted crucially on Singapore’s and the region’s development both economically and 
demographically. In the case of tin, as discussed at 3.3 and 3.4, Singapore’s role was piv­
otal in providing two of the three main factor requirements: labour and capital.
2 There have been anti-Chinese riots in the surrounding countries even in the modem period. 
For instance in Malaysia in 1969, riots were sparked when the Chinese made a strong showing 
in the elections. For a discussion, see Mahathir (1970) The Malay Dilemma. Written in 1969, this 
book was banned until he became Prime Minister in 1981. During the 1997/99 economic setback 
there were also anti-Chinese riots in Malaysia and especially in Indonesia.
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3.3 The Labour Force
Singapore’s population is comprised of immigrants. It is a population formed ar­
tificially, in response to the need for labour. It is said that when Raffles landed there in 
1819 he found only a colony of about 150 Malay fisherfolk.3 But with the opening of the 
free port, people flocked to the island from as far afield as China and India, and from 
closer to home: the Malay Peninsula and Netherlands India (Indonesia).
The population grew in concert with the staple-port. The Chinese population was 
the most numerous, and there is a direct correlation between the rise of tin production 
and the increase in Singapore’s Chinese population. This is because, in Malaya, the tin- 
excavating method (manual labourers working in simple, open-cast mines) allowed 
small-scale enterprises to develop the industry. This called for an abundance of transitory 
labour, in tandem with fluctuating needs of production. For instance, in 1903, it required
224.000 men to produce 51,000 tons of tin. Chinese immigrants, entering via Singapore, 
comprised the majority of the constantly changing labour force. Thus whereas 10,000 
Chinese labourers landed in Singapore in 1877, the number that landed in 1887 was
101.000 corresponding to an increase in Malayan tin production from 3,000 tons in 1877 
to 24,000 tons in 1887.
Some of the Chinese immigrants were traders who settled in Singapore and sup­
plied much of the circulating capital needed to support the mining labour force (see 
3.2.4). Some entered services such as the lodging house system (see below). However the 
majority were manual labourers initially recruited in south China either personally or 
through the immigrant lodging house system, to work in the Malay tin mines. By the turn 
of the century, three-quarters of Singapore’s 142,000 inhabitants were Chinese. This 
proportion would remain virtually unchanged during the following decades.
Personal recruitment involved an employer in Malaya sending a recruiter to 
China, who having selected, would pay all expenses from village to port and from [Sin­
gapore] port to Malaya and with his assistants shepherd the flock to the place of em­
ployment (Blythe cited in Huff 155). Thus, for personal recruitment, Singapore was a 
transit point not a destination. Recruitment via the lodging house system required more 
active Singaporean participation.
3 As discussed in chapter 2 it is difficult to assert this with confidence as another report sug­
gests the existence of a bigger population of Malays engaged in tin-mining.
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Lodging houses were established in China and Singapore. Those in Singapore 
were run typically by a Chinese agent for a Malay or European employer or for a lodging 
house in China. There were also independent keepers. The houses were licensed by the 
government and could contain up to 150 men. [Prior to World War 1 over four-fifths of 
Chinese immigrants were unaccompanied men.] Apart from lodgings for new arrivals, 
the houses also provided bridging loans for independent, self-financing immigrants. The 
Singapore keepers often assumed costs incurred at the lodging houses in China and ex­
tended loans to immigrants who had incurred those costs. They also acted as recruitment 
centres for local or Malayan employers. Thus the lodging house system came to embody 
what, in modem Singapore management speak, would be termed an integrated service 
concept. A British Consul in China justified it thus (Huff 156):
The passengers themselves and especially passengers of the type that the Straits Authorities wish 
to encourage are for the most part ignorant peasants from the interior who have never seen a ship 
and who are bewildered by a town even of the size of Swatow. They are without capital and would 
be quite incapable of finding their [own] way to the South Seas.... A large proportion are given 
credit by the Lodging Houses for all their travelling and other expenses including the steamer 
ticket.
Labour recruitment from Indonesia and India was on a much smaller scale than that from 
China. Those from Indonesia were typically indentured labourers from Java recruited to 
the European rubber estates in Johore. The numbers were small and the system ended 
when indentured labour was abolished in 1932. There is evidence that the majority of 
those Malays who migrated to [British] Malaya did so as permanent settlers, accompa­
nied by spouses and families. They farmed their own individual plots in Malaya; some 
settled in Singapore. The character of Singapore’s Indian population was transient and 
marked by male pioneers. It remained so well into the 1900s, due mainly to the close 
proximity of India to Singapore and Malaya, and the ease with which Indians could re­
turn home, compared with their Chinese counterparts. Tamil labourers from south India 
formed the majority, though many merchants, textile importers and exporters, and other 
professionals also arrived from the north, especially from Bombay.
As stated above, population growth patterns fluctuated with the demand for tin 
and other staples. Thus when the demand for tin diminished or its production was 
mechanised by European miners, labourers attempted to find alternative work in Singa­
pore or Malaya or returned home. By 1931, tin mining accounted for only 4% of the 
working population in Malaya, whereas over a third of all workers were employed in 
rubber production. However, when the price of staples collapsed later in the 1930s, there
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was a reverse population flow. For instance, between 1931 and 1933 over 500,000 more 
Chinese deck passengers left British Malaya than immigrants that arrived there (Huff 
1997, 150-178).
The August 1930 quotas on immigration, subsequently incorporated into the 1933 
Straits Settlements Aliens Ordinance, had the [intended] effect of limiting Chinese im­
migration. Women were exempted from quota restrictions until May 1938. Thus for the 
first time, during the period after 1933, large numbers of women sought employment in 
British Malaya. Of the annual average of 147,000 immigrants arriving during 1934 to 
1938, more than half were women and children. The influx of women impacted posi­
tively on Singapore’s urbanisation since women were more likely to settle in the town 
than unaccompanied men.
The 1947 census reveals a greater number and much wider range of occupations 
for women than any previous census had shown. A trend towards a more settled and 
gender-balanced Chinese community emerged during the inter-war years. It accelerated 
after World War 11, especially during the rise to power of Mao Zedong and the forma­
tion of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, when the new influx of Chinese 
immigrants also comprised families. Although some years of the 1950s saw a rubber 
boom, large-scale immigration from China was curtailed both by developments in the 
PRC and by new immigration laws in Singapore. The population stabilised. The size and 
stability of the Chinese community thus formalised the growing perception of Singapore 
as a Chinese city.
Despite the seeming homogeneity, Singapore’s Chinese community was plural­
istic. It comprised groups that displayed a diversity of language, ways of life and char­
acteristics reflecting the different geographic areas from which each group had emi­
grated. Chinese immigrants originated from south China, predominantly from around 
the ports of Amoy, Swatow in Kwangtung province, Foochow in northern Fukien, and 
from Hainan island. As many as six different dialects were spoken by different groups, 
often understood by no other group in Singapore but themselves (Huff 1997, 163). This 
slowed assimilation and cooperation among the Chinese in Singapore.
Although written Chinese is a universal language, the extent to which the groups 
communicated meaningfully is unknown because little is known about literacy levels of 
the various groups. Judging by colonial accounts, the educational level of the majority 
must have been low, since the type of immigrants that the Straits Authorities wished to
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encourage were for the most part ignorant peasants from the interior of China (id). There 
is, however, some evidence that the colonial administration provided some training fa­
cilities and apprenticeship schemes, especially after World War 2. However these were 
implemented in the context of promoting colonial trade. For as one prominent colonial 
educator had declared in relation to Malaysia: ‘The purpose of Malay education is to 
make them better farmers and fishermen’ (Yergin & Stanslaw 1999, 185). Similarly, in 
Singapore, many clerks were schooled for the British civil service. In the Chinese com­
munity two classes emerged: the Chinese- and the English-educated. This duality had 
great significance in post-World War 2 society, especially as the Chinese-educated pro­
vided the main impetus and campaigning fervour for creating a communist-inspired and 
leftist trade union movement, which fought against British colonialism (see chapter 6).
3.4 Economic Structure and Entrepreneurship
During the early tin-mining years, Chinese entrepreneurs established a barter- 
based system of transaction in which goods (typically food and textiles) required by the 
mine owners were advanced on credit and the debt liquidated by the return shipment of 
tin produced. This method of financing also extended to the lodging house recruitment 
system (see 3.3). When the tin trade declined, local rubber planters were also financed in 
a similar fashion, as were those who processed rubber: small manufacturers of rubber 
footwear, for instance. Thus grew and prospered an undergrowth of Chinese finance 
houses and money-lenders, in parallel with the big European banks which, by and large, 
dealt only with the European trade houses and large plantation owners.
By the turn of the century some Chinese finance houses had metamorphosed into 
local Chinese banks and were making their mark on local capital formation and the de­
velopment of financial services. The three dominant domestic private banks have their 
roots in the rapid rise in the need for local finance, especially during the post-war years. 
The Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), United Overseas Bank (formerly 
the United Chinese Bank) and the Overseas Union Bank (OUB) made a substantial 
contribution to financing local Asian industries. But as Huff accommodatingly puts it 
(jY/289):
In the 1950s Chinese and European banks remained more complementary than competitive, but 
together constituted what could be regarded as a modem financial sector. However, financial du­
alism was a marked feature of Singapore’s economy...
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Raising finance via the Malayan stock exchange, of which Singapore became the centre, 
was not popular with local Chinese entrepreneurs: perhaps they feared dilution of own­
ership. But the exchange took-off in 1961 and experienced a boom of company floata­
tions to coincide with the later formation of the Malaysian Federation (see 4.3.1; 5.2.1 
infra). Until then, and even well afterwards, banks remained the main source of business 
finance, although the government itself participated actively from the early 1960s.
As mentioned above (3.3) there was a division between Chinese who were Eng­
lish-educated and those who were Chinese-educated. The division was reinforced in the 
business world, with the formation in 1900 of the Straits Chinese British Association 
(SCBA) and in 1906 of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC). The 
SCBA, which united the Straits-bom Chinese elite, became the more prestigious and 
politically powerful of the two associations simply because while their leaders were 
granted a political voice by the British authorities, the others were not. The SCCC repre­
sented the economically more powerful Chinese businessmen, those with good trading 
contacts with the hinterland, and with mainland China. Ultimately, however, the SCBA 
formed a bridge between all Chinese business interests and the government, and created 
a united Chinese business front. This, however, did not extend to education, which re­
mained dual until the post- independence PAP government intervened, especially in ter­
tiary education.
3.5 Industry
Industrialisation, which entails the systematic application of technology to pro­
duction, thereby mechanising (often automating) the manufacturing process, is held to 
be the source of modem economic growth. It began in 18th century Britain, spread first 
to other West European countries in the 18th and 19th centuries, then to the USA, Can­
ada and Japan, transforming each into an industrial nation. Although British colonies 
like Singapore existed during the period, which has been called the Industrial Revolu­
tion, they hardly participated in this transformation. Their roles were designated largely 
as suppliers of raw materials and primary commodities, and as consumers rather than 
producers of the new manufactured goods.
By upholding this artificial designation of roles, colonialism essentially pre­
vented commodity-producing nations from entering the industrial age. Thus Singapore, 
like other colonies that became independent nations after World War 2, is a latecomer
85
to industrialisation. Instead of a 19th century experience, Singapore’s industrialisation is 
a late 20th century phenomenon. Some processing of primary commodities such as tin 
and some yam was mechanised at the beginning of the 20th century, but for the most 
part and for the period considered here, manual, non-automated labour dominated until 
the late-1960s.
Although it is a controversial topic, it seems fair to say that the colonial admini­
stration could well have done more to promote industry in Singapore during the long 
British occupation. However, it should be remembered that the age was ruled by Adam 
Smith’s theory of the self-regulating economy and Mill’s concept of minimal govern­
ment interference and free trade. Having said that, it is necessary to balance the picture 
by emphasising the presence in Singapore of functional administrative institutions, the 
enduring legacy of the English language, which is the commercial lingua franca, and, 
arguably, also a functioning legal system. They supported rather than opposed the proc­
ess of catching up with industrial development upon which Singapore would embark in 
1959, and in particular from 1965 when true independence was won.
3.6 Political Stability
The topic that most exercises lawyers and economists with an interest in Asian 
economic development is the role of the state in Singapore’s modern economic devel­
opment. Yet the role of the state in the economy during the colonial period is also a fas­
cinating topic. For its performance must also have impacted on the post-1959 period of 
nation-building, if only in so far as it influenced the new PAP government’s resolve to 
imitate, reject or select solutions from the past administration.
A primary role of any state must be to secure political stability. The achievement 
of political stability seems to be the one enduring feature that underlies Singapore’s de­
velopment during the colonial as well as the post-1959 period. As discussed at 3.1 supra, 
the impetus for the founding of Singapore was trade. To meet this goal, the colonial ad­
ministration established itself in the role of provider and maintainer of peace and stabil­
ity. Above all, in those days, the role of the state was to ensure an environment that was 
conducive to colonial trade. Apart from the late 1940s and ‘50s it succeeded mightily.
As Huff points out, following its founding in 1819 Singapore enjoyed 12 decades 
of unbroken peace, until World War 2, when the island was occupied by the Japanese. 
Indeed the failure of the colonial power to protect Singapore against Japanese aggression
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in 1942 marked a turning point in Singapore’s political and economic development. For 
although the British were welcomed back after the Japanese withdrawal, it became clear 
that, politically, Singapore’s independence from British rule was inevitable. Events in 
nearby India (independence in 1947) might have quickened the pace, yet those in China 
(the victory of Mao Zedong and communism in 1949) dictated delay, as the west consid­
ered that their security interests in the region were threatened. However, the important 
link to make here is to note that when Singapore won self-rule in 1959, the new PAP 
government seemed determined to follow in the hegemonic footsteps of the past rulers. 
A discussion is outside the scope of this study but Rodan (1989) gives an excellent ac­
count of the PAP’s consolidation of power. One can debate the tactics used to gain and 
retain power (Tremewan 1994), but like them or not, they secured political stability in 
Singapore from 1959 up to the present.
Thus political stability has been and remains the one crucial, enduring feature 
underlying Singapore’s economic development during both the colonial and the modem 
periods. This contrasts sharply with the experience of many other newly independent, ex­
colonial countries. Arguably, another pivotal feature was the adaptation of English as the 
lingua franca but this is secondary and did not apply officially until during the modem 
period.4 Although both eras fostered political stability, there is a major difference be­
tween the roles of the pre-World War 2 colonial administration and the subsequent PAP 
government. Whereas the former restricted itself to providing and maintaining a peaceful 
environment that was conducive to colonial trade and essentially leaving the rest to the 
laissez-faire market, the latter prided itself in actively promoting economic growth and 
social equity. The mission of the new political leadership and of successive PAP gov­
ernments was economic development of the new nation. Their commitment was total, 
and throughout the period the PAP government used strong, if highly selective, interven­
tion to effect its policies.
3.7 Confucian Ethics and Asian Values
Confucian ethics is often cited as one of the determining factors of Singapore’s 
economic development (Lee Kuan Yew, 1998). It was popularised as Asian values. For
4 Huff (1997,163-164) argues that the Chinese community was divided into two classes: the 
Chinese- and the English-educated. The former was the bigger of the two groups. Thus in 1921
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instance, management consultants urged the imitation of Japanese management tech­
niques (grounded, they said, in Confucianism) to spur the economic success of western 
corporations.5 But these concepts are unwieldy: Confucian ethics has been cited both as 
a promoter and an inhibitor of economic growth. Besides the concept of Asian values 
remains strangely artificial and inaccessible to meaningful definition.
Max Weber, whose work informs the theoretical law and development frame­
work in which this study is set (chapter 1), also theorised about the motivational force of 
a belief system and its causal link with economic development and the rise of capitalism. 
Weber paid particular attention to China (1951). He concluded that China’s failure to 
develop rational, bourgeois capitalism was due to the absence of an ethic comparable to 
the Protestant ethic. Weber hypothesised that because the core values of Confucianism 
(adaptation and adjustment to the world, inner self-cultivation, communitarianism, and 
so on) were incompatible with Protestant ethic (individualism, transformation rather than 
adaptation to the world), the Chinese belief system was not conducive to economic 
growth and capitalism. He argued that Confucian ethics had inhibited the growth of the 
entrepreneurial spirit among peoples of China and, by implication, of East and Southeast 
Asia. Needless to say Weber’s work influenced many 1960s modemisationists and other 
thinkers (see, e.g., Levenson, 1968: Confucian China and its Modern Fate). However, as 
events over the past 30-40 years show Weber was wrong or his theory too narrow, in that 
it failed to recognise that there might be several paths to capital formation.
In modem Singapore, the government has put a new spin on claims of a link with 
Confucianism. Dr Yeo, then Minister of Communications and Information puts the offi­
cial view thus (Clammer 1985,103):
We are an Asian society with Asian values. Confucianism provides the bedrock of our value sys­
tem. Our values embody filial piety and concern for family, community and nation. We are more 
concerned with respecting our elders and those in positions of authority. In turn our elders and 
those in authority have a moral obligation to their charges, to fulfil their responsibilities to us and 
to be concerned over our welfare. It is a relationship of inter-dependence and mutual obligations, 
different from the Western concept of every man for himself.
As a defence for a soft authoritarian state the claim is well put. But despite an abundance 
of rhetoric on both sides of the argument, the verdict is still out as to whether there is a 
causal link between Confucian ethics, entrepreneurship and economic development.
only one-fifth, and in 1931 only a quarter of all Chinese bom in British Malaya knew English. 5 
See, e.g. Vogel (1978) Japan as Number One', Pascale & Athos (1981).
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Studies by Harvard professor Tu Wei-Ming (1984), who is trained in western social sci­
ences as well as Confucian ethics, and other scholars have been unable to confirm causal 
links.
Another related aspect, which also remains unresearched and undecided is the 
effect of the relative homogeneity of the Singapore population on rapid economic 
growth. Thus while it is clear that, for instance, geography played a crucial role in Singa­
pore’s economic development (see 3.2), it is not possible to say anything definitive about 
the role played by Confucianism or race. Besides as discussed at 3.3 above, it should be 
remembered that, far from being a homogeneous entity, the Chinese community was it­
self rather pluralistic in language, customs, and lifestyles.
As chapter 4 shows, it seems that the political will and determination of the colo­
nial administration and of successive PAP governments, rather than race, culture and 
Confucian ethics, might have played the more dominant, formative roles. If ancient Chi­
nese roots must feature in the equation, it seems to me that the use of law in modem Sin­
gapore bears greater affinity to Chinese Legalist tradition rather than Confucianism, to fa  
rather than to li6. Though admittedly, the communitarian ideology that was nurtured 
during the modem period probably had more in common with Confucianism than the 
stark individualism of the industrialised west. Thus instead of promoting individualism, 
the post-colonial PAP government encouraged communitarianism and sometimes forced 
the formation or operation of unions and associations to suit its purposes (see chapter 6).
3.8 Theories Accounting for Rapid Economic Growth
There seems to be common ground among economists that two key ingredients 
of Singapore’s post-colonial recipe for rapid economic growth were to ply external free 
trade while maintaining strong internal economic control, and building the country’s so­
cial and physical infrastructure (see, e.g., Huff 1997, 299-371, Sen 1983 745-753). 
However, as nothing is as simple as it appears, the theorists disagree about how to de­
construct the ingredients. It has been particularly difficult to agree on the role played by 
the state. Below are brief summaries of three theories that could explain the reasons for 
Singapore’s rapid economic growth and success. However these theories are only partly
6 The Legalists saw 'law7 as punishment (fa), while Confucians viewed it as moral codes of
conduct (li). See Bodde & Morris (1967); Carter (1996), 37-39; Chu Tung-tsu (1965).
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valid as they are only partly substantiated by the facts. One falls short because it com­
pletely ignores the role of the interventionist state, another because, while it admits to 
the state’s activist role, it denies its effectiveness. The third theory, that of the governed 
market, presented by Wade (1990), seems to fit best with key aspects of Singapore’s 
economic growth experience. Unfortunately, Wade himself dismisses Singapore as a 
minnow (id 19), implying that because of its size and special situation Singapore’s ex­
periences are less valid for consideration elsewhere (but see 1.1 supra). The following 
sections draw heavily on Wade (1990).
3.8.1 The Neo-classical Explanation
Neo-classical economists point to four areas which they claim are responsible for 
Singapore’s rapid growth: (1) free trade regime, (2) free labour market, (3) high saving 
and investment rates, and (4) conservative government budgeting. The ingredients ac­
count largely for what they call the basics of macroeconomics. Once these basics are 
right, the invisible hand [the market] ensures that growth and prosperity follow. Rational 
choice theorists advance a similar explanation: growth is ensured when right choices are 
made. Adherents argue that Asian NICs like Singapore have been better than other de­
veloping countries at providing stable macroeconomic conditions and a reliable legal 
framework which promote competition (World Bank 1993, 9). Each point is discussed 
below as a basis for analysing how Singapore might have used each in its growth en­
hancing mix during the 1959-99 growth phases which are examined in chapter 4. 
Free trade regime for exports
To create a free trade regime for exports, two conditions must be met. First, the 
makers of goods for exports must be able to import inputs and components in the quan­
tities they need, without having to pay tariffs, which would make their imports more ex­
pensive. Manufacturers must be free to buy goods and services in the world market at the 
same price as their competitors. Secondly, the exchange rate must be in parity with the 
hypothetical free trade rate. When met, these two conditions ensure free trade in the 
sense that exporters are not loaded with added costs, which would create disadvantages 
for them in international competition. With some qualifications about exchange rates and 
government-linked companies, which received generous access to low-interest credit and 
tax breaks, Singapore seems to have followed this approach from about 1966 onwards 
(see chapter 4).
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Free Labour Market
A free labour market is one in which the price of labour is said to adjust (of its 
own accord) to match the market conditions of price and productivity. In other words, 
wages adjust themselves through supply and demand, and productivity rates, not through 
government policy. The government’s role in this area is particularly interesting in rela­
tion to Singapore (see chapter 6).
Three kinds of indicators of a free labour market might be used. First, a lack of 
intervention in the institutions that operate between the buyers and sellers of labour. 
There should be no wage-adjusting legislation (minimum or maximum) or public-sector 
pay policies. Where trade unions or other collective bargaining institutions and employ­
ers’ associations exist, they should be weak. Singapore’s experience shows that the state 
intervened in all areas, paradoxically, to secure what it considered a free labour market. 
The second indicator is that the labour market has cleared. In other words, the level of 
unemployment has remained low since the period of eliminating the labour surplus was 
achieved. Singapore achieved full employment by 1973. From then on foreign workers 
were needed to support continued growth. The third indicator of a free labour market is 
that the share of labour costs in the total cost of production has remained roughly con­
stant throughout the period. In other words, real wages have grown at about the same 
rate as, or slower than, the growth of labour productivity (output per person), except for 
short inflationary periods. As discussions in chapters 4 and 6 reveal, this has not been 
the case in Singapore.
High Interest Rates, Savings and Investment
The high cost of credit means that exporters might be disadvantaged if they have to pay 
higher interest rates than their competitors. That is why governments often initiate export 
credit schemes which give exporters substantial margins of preference for short-term 
loans compared to loans for non-export production. Singapore seems to have taken this a 
step further by providing low interest credit and subsidies to state-owned enterprises and 
other government-linked companies (see chapter 4).
High savings and investment rates are also prescribed by neo-classicists. Singa­
pore excelled at both, but savings were compelled via the Central Provident Fund and 
labour market interventions. The bulk of investments in the private sector was not in­
digenous, but was co-opted through an alliance with foreign multinational companies.
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In the public sector, statutory bodies became astute entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
(4.4 and chapters 6 and 7).
Conservative Government Budgeting
The neo-classical proposition here is that the government should support only 
those policies that result in state budget surpluses. Such policies should include low di­
rect and indirect taxes, especially the former so that there is an incentive to make money 
(Little 1979,478). Singapore has boasted huge budget surpluses (see Data Sheet, Dept of 
Statistics, various years) and low direct income tax. Moreover until 1994, no indirect 
taxes were levied on goods and services. However, the sums exacted from employers and 
employees through the Central Provident Fund (CPF), various skills-enhancing funds 
and utilities levies compensate fully for the absence of indirect taxes.
Neo-classicists stress the importance of government investment in health and 
primary education, factors in which Singapore excelled. However they abhor state inter­
vention in other areas, in particular in industrial development, financial markets and any 
form of price control, be it in housing, labour, tertiary education and so on. These are all 
areas in which the Singapore government was particularly activist, so Singapore’s 
growth experience fails to conform to the neo-classicists’ model.
3.8.2 The Revisionist Explanation
It was the so-called revisionists who pointed out the inconsistencies of the neo­
classical model in relation to Asian countries such as Japan (Johnson 1982), South Korea 
(Amsden 1989), and Taiwan (Wade 1990). Their work showed that these East Asian 
governments employed flexibility and diversity in their policy choices, that they con­
stantly intervened in the market, picked and promoted special industries, and frequently 
altered their policies in response to market fluctuations or in order to generate desirable 
results. In other words, the revisionists recognised that East Asian governments led the 
markets at crucial stages of their countries’ development. Government intervention was 
often key in getting the prices wrong, by deliberately changing the incentive structures so 
that some industries flourished, when they otherwise might have failed (Amsden, 
Wade)7. Wade called the system the governed market and his analysis adequately de­
scribes Singapore’s growth patterns, although he did not study Singapore.
7 For an opposing view, see Porter and Takeuchi (1999).
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There are probably no revisionist studies of Singapore in the way that it is possi­
ble to point to studies about Taiwan, Korea and Japan. Most studies simply acknowl­
edge, as a matter of course, the highly activist role that the government played in Singa­
pore’s economic growth (Fordham 1988, Rodan 1989, Huff 1997, Low 1998). It is a 
matter of record and not a major discovery; for as Dr Goh Keng Swee, the first Finance 
Minister admitted: [W]e had to try a more activist and interventionist approach [than] the 
laissez-faire policies of the colonial era (Nair 1976, 84). Dr Goh seemed in no doubt that 
only such an activist approach could provide the accelerated growth that he and the cabi­
net required.8 His explanation is backed by the World Bank’s 1993 study (see 3.4.3), 
which acknowledges that the high-performing Asian economies employed government 
activism in their economic growth.
3.8.3 The Market-friendly View
The market-friendly view is the phrase, which the World Bank in its 1993 study, 
The East Asian Miracle, used to describe and expand upon its previous stance described 
in the World Development Report 1991. This approach builds on the neo-classical ex­
planation but makes room for what the Bank calls effective but carefully limited gov­
ernment activism (1993, 10). In so doing, the Bank breaks new ground because (since 
the 1980s and) until this 1993 study, it had persistently rejected the validity and efficacy 
of government intervention into the working of the free market. In other words, it had 
ignored the experiences of Japan and the Asian NICs. For instance, the Bank claimed 
that the attempts of developing economies to guide resource allocation with non-market 
mechanisms have generally failed to improve economic performance (id). Moreover it 
concluded that beyond the roles of maintaining stable macroeconomics, governments 
are likely to do more harm than good, unless interventions are ‘market-friendly’.
In 1993, however, the Bank acknowledged that apart from the excellent macro- 
economic management documented for East Asian economies (id, 5-6):
[I]n most of these economies,..., the government intervened - systematically and through multi­
ple channels - to foster development, and in some cases the development of specific industries. 
Policy interventions took many forms: targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries, 
keeping deposit rates low and maintaining ceilings on borrowing rates to increase profits and re­
tained earnings, protecting domestic import substitutes, subsidizing declining industries, estab­
lishing and financially supporting government banks, making public investments in applied re­
8 The post-World War 2 British Labour Party and European social democratic strategies were 
influential. It was felt then that only governments could marshal the resources needed to re­
build the devastated nations. For an insightful discussion, see Yergin & Stanislaw (1998).
93
search, establishing firm- and industry-specific export targets, developing export marketing in­
stitutions, and sharing information widely between public and private sectors. Some industries 
were promoted, while others were not.
Not all of those interventions are market-friendly in the Bank’s definition of the term. 
Indeed some of them go far beyond what the Bank deems as acceptable. Therefore, al­
though it praises the success of state intervention in some areas, it is keen to point out 
that industrial policies were largely ineffective {id, 312). Moreover, the Bank finds that 
industrial policies were largely ineffective because ‘the manufacturing sector seems to 
have evolved roughly in accord with neo-classical expectations: industrial growth was 
largely market conforming’ {id, 315, my italics). This convenient interpretation allows 
the Bank to straddle the two opposing views, praising both, yet finally reining in the re­
visionist view by claiming that, in crucial areas, intervention was ineffective and is 
therefore not worthy of imitation. Whereas, it claims, the neo-classical theory still pro­
vides the answer for late developing countries. However, as the analysis in chapter 4 
shows, in the case of Singapore, it is incorrect to say that industrial policies were largely 
ineffective. Indeed, at various times, the state itself was a major entrepreneur, owning 
several hundred companies in key industries, and constantly intervening in the market 
and peoples’ lives via some 60-odd statutory bodies.
The interpretation, quality and objectivity of the Bank’s study have been widely 
criticised (see, for instance, Wade et al 1994, Amsden 1994, 627-633). Amsden finds 
the study rich in empirical data, but unsupportive of the Bank’s dismissal of industrial 
policy as ineffective. Further, the Bank’s data are presented in such a way that makes it 
difficult to corroborate its findings {id, 627). She is pleased that the Bank has widened 
the scope of the debate on the role of the state in economic development. It is a debate, 
which she thinks is muffled by the neo-liberal Washington consensus. She regrets that 
the study reverts to being ‘quintessentially political and ideological’ because it cannot 
prove its own major conclusion. She is disappointed that the Bank did not study how 
elements of the East Asian model can be adapted to suit other countries {id}.
Wade sees the study as political and convenient, in that the Bank uses it as evi­
dence that the successful Asian countries have practised what the Bank has been 
preaching, at least since the 1980s, that is, the necessity for the state to provide a strong 
enabling environment (Wade 1994, 56). But as Wade’s earlier study demonstrates the 
Asian countries went far beyond ‘enabling the environment’, they governed the markets.
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In 1997 the Bank warned that: ‘[s]tate-dominated development has failed, but so 
will stateless development. Development without an effective state is impossible’ (World 
Development Report 1997, 25). This stance is in line with the emphasis on good govern­
ance, which, in the wake of the Asian economic setback, seems to have out-manoeuvred 
the getting-the-prices-right theory.
3.9 Conclusion
Singapore’s rapid economic growth from 1959 to the present did not start in a 
vacuum. Four features seem to have been crucial for securing a degree of prosperity and 
a solid base for future growth. First, there was Singapore’s geographic location at the 
crossroads of Asia. Secondly, Singapore’s huge natural harbour, which together with its 
strategic location enticed colonial adventurers. It became even more important when the 
Suez Canal opened in 1869; Singapore became the refuelling port. Thirdly, the interre­
lations and peaceful inter-regional staple-port trade (albeit with a colonial focus), which 
it fostered with the huge Malay hinterland during the decades. Fourthly, 13 to 14 dec­
ades of political stability interrupted only by the Japanese invasion during World War 2.
The population, which comprised mainly poor, uneducated immigrants from 
south China, India, Malaya and Netherlands India [Indonesia], was predominantly Chi­
nese, but with a cacophony of dialects and plurality of customs. The popularly touted 
‘Asian values’, which are supposedly grounded in Confucianism, probably do not ac­
count substantially for Singapore’s success as they seem to have been more myth than 
reality. However, successive PAP governments did nurture a communitarian ideology 
(as opposed to the stark individualism of the west). As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, 
this, political stability and the will to focus on economic development with social equity 
were more influential. After World War 2, the diverse groups formed a united front 
against colonialism and won internal self-rule in 1959. The stage was set for a new 
struggle to achieve economic growth and social justice under the new regime.
The accepted theoretical economic explanations seem to fall short of explaining 
the reality of Singapore’s modem economic growth. Wade’s model of the ‘governed 
market’, a revisionist theory, seems to offer the most plausible explanation. An analysis 
is attempted in chapter 4. However, it is also clear that the model, which was adapted to 
fit post-1959 Singaporean conditions was influenced by the post-World War 2 ‘mixed 
market’ economies of Labour Britain and social democratic northern Europe.
CHAPTER 4 SEVEN ECONOMIC GROWTH PHASES 1959 to 1999
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Singapore’s economic p o licy ... differed from  the laissez-faire policies o f  the 
colonial era. These had led Singapore to a dead end, with little economic 
growth, massive unemployment, wretched housing and inadequate housing. 
We had to try a more activist and interventionist approach.
Goh Keng Swee, Singapore’s first Minister o f Finance ]n
Nair C (1976) Socialism That Works, Singapore: Federal Publications, 84
What undoubtedly helped most was the strong position o f  the economies o f  
the United States, Europe and Japan.... [T]he 1960s saw what was virtually 
a long sustained boom among the rich nations. One after another, they 
reached conditions o ffu ll employment and had to depend fo r  further expan­
sion either on imported labour as happened in the case o f  Germany and to a 
lesser extent Britain, or they had to move some o f  their manufacturing op­
erations abroad, as happened particularly with the United States and, to a 
lesser extent, Japan.
Goh Keng Swee (1972) The Economics o f  Modernisation, Singapore: Asia Pacific 
Press, 254.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies seven phases of economic growth in Singapore from 1959 
to 1999 and examines government policies and interventions in key areas of the economy 
during each phase. It aims to paint a coherent picture of Singapore’s economic growth, 
and in particular to analyse key government policies and interventions, which according 
to revisionist theories, have caused Singapore’s rapid economic growth (see 3.8). It is 
likely that such interventions were mediated through legislation, and therefore are di­
rectly relevant to the theme of this study. Thus this chapter forms the basis for the legal 
analysis in chapter 5.
Folklore relates that Dr Goh, Singapore’s first Finance Minister, and one James 
Puthutcheary penned Singapore’s First Development Plan (Ministry of Finance 1963) 
during one weekend. It was written in response to the World Bank’s insistence that a re­
port outlining the country’s economic strategy should exist before Singapore could be­
come a client. Irrespective of how long it took to write the Plan, the facts, sentiments and 
proposals that it contained had weighed heavily on the minds of all PAP politicians dur­
ing the run-up to the 1959 election (Lee Kuan Yew 1998). For despite the economic up­
turn in trade experienced during the Korean War and its aftermath, all trends pointed to 
the demise of free port trade and non-viability of Singapore’s continued dependence on 
staples and entrepot for economic growth (Lyle 1959). The first challenge was therefore 
to find a way of diversifying the economy.
All other problems were linked to the first. Although immigration had been cur­
tailed during the 1930s and 1940s, Singapore’s own home-grown population was in­
creasing by 4% annually (Mirza 1986, 29). Unemployment was estimated to be 10% and 
rising (Chng et al 1988, 5). It was particularly high among school-leavers (Low et al 
1993, 6). The majority of Singaporeans lived in shop-houses or shacks and squatter 
dwellings clustered around the port and densely populated coastal town (Huff 1997). 
Like in every other (ex-)colony, the wealth of the newly independent nation was un­
evenly distributed. This reflected the colonial economic structure, which comprised a 
tiny hard-core of privileged expatriates, surrounded by a ring of aspiring local elite, fol­
lowed by the masses who eeked out a living in the most precarious ways. It is therefore 
easy to understand why the PAP government chose job-creation and housing as its focus 
areas. This was not a unique step; other countries have been forced to focus on solving 
the problems of joblessness and wretched housing before and also since Singapore’s ex­
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perience. The key issues are how did the government turn devastating joblessness into 
full employment in just 13 years (by 1973), and how did it solve its housing problem.
4.2 Seven Economic Growth Patterns 1959 to 1999
It is now clear that industrialisation, in particular industrial manufacturing, was 
the impetus for rapid growth and the solution to Singapore’s job problem. It was imple­
mented in four phases. First, through import-substituting manufacturing as suggested by 
the World Bank (1955), the Lyle Report (1959) and the UN (1961). Secondly, through 
labour-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing in which government-linked companies 
(GLCs) and multinationals (MNCs) were the entrepreneurs (as masterminded by statu­
tory boards, particularly the Economic Development Board). The third and fourth phases 
are entwined. They involved an attempt to broaden the manufacturing and services base 
by encouraging the participation of Singaporean enterprises, and a quest for skills- 
intensive, higher value-added production using both foreign and local actors. These four 
phases are discussed at 4.2.1 to 4.2.4. Subsequent periods: 1985-86 (recession), 1987-97 
(services, regionalisation, privatisation) and 1997-99 (regional setback) are discussed at 
4.2.5 to 4.2.7. Together they constitute seven phases of growth, which characterise Sin­
gapore’s economic development from 1959 to 1999.
The story that is analysed in the following sections concerns the almost unbroken 
record of high annual economic growth rates experienced for 40 years. Instead of re­
peating here the many charts and tables, which usually document Singapore’s feat, I refer 
to Huff (1997, Appendix tables, and Data Sheet, various years: Department of Statistics, 
Singapore). Suffice it to say that starting in 1960, GDP grew at 7% or more every year 
for 23 of the 31 years between 1960 and 1990 (Huff 1997). The same rate was sustained 
from 1990 until the regional economic turmoil of 1998. This sustained growth rate is 
unparalleled among industrialised countries. It has been argued that this performance 
supports an economic convergence hypothesis. That is, that such rapid growth reflects a 
process of ‘catching up’, made possible by drawing on existing world knowledge and 
technology (Baumol 1986, 1072-85; Hanna 1996) as opposed to growth that is spurred 
by new inventions. While this study does not examine the merits of this theory, it accepts 
that Singapore first industrialised when the volume of world manufactured exports was
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expanding rapidly1. It did so by utilising known technology with the help of multina­
tional companies (MNCs), which found it favourable to relocate their labour-intensive 
production to Singapore (Goh 1972).
As Table 4.1 below shows, Singapore’s economic performance from 1959 to 
1997 was accompanied by broad changes in the sectorial distribution of output. These 
are represented by the percentage that each sector contributed to GDP during each phase. 
For instance, the decline in the contribution of agriculture and trade/commerce sectors 
(staples and entrepot-linked activities) during the first two phases is balanced by the in­
crease in the contribution of manufacturing and financial and business services.
Table 4.1: Industry structure 1959-1997: % contribution to GDP by sectors (Source: Dept of Statistics). 
Sectors 1959-65 1966-73 1974-84 1985-86 1987-97
Agriculture 3.9 2.7 1.5 0.4 0.2
Manufacturing 11.7 20.2 28.1 27.8 26.2
Utilities 2.4 2.6 2.1 1.8 1.7
Construction 3.5 6.8 6.2 5.3 7.1
Commerce/Trade 33.0 27.4 20.9 16.3 16.9
Transport & Communications 13.6 10.7 13.5 12.6 11.5
Financial & Business Services 14.4 16.7 18.9 26.5 27.4
Other Services 17.6 12.9 8.7 9.5 9.1
It is these broad sectorial changes or phases, relative to government macro-economic and 
industrial policies, that are analysed in the sections below. They reveal the PAP govern­
ment in roles such as economic planner, facilitator, regulator, venture capitalist and en­
trepreneur par excellence. Chapter 5 considers whether there is a causative link between 
these changes and changes in the law, as the Law and Development theory predicts.
4.2.1 Import-substituting Industrialisation: 1959 to 1965
When the recommendations of the 1955 World Bank Report, which predicted the 
demise of Singapore’s free port and advocated industrialisation, were reiterated in 1957 
in the Lyle Report (1959), the colonial administration created an Industrial Promotion 
Board. Based on post-war development organisations in England, the board’s task was to 
encourage private firms to enter manufacturing. This venture was not particularly suc­
cessful in Singapore. It soon became primarily a give-away organisation, doling out in­
centives under the statute, mostly to existing companies (Hughes in Low et al 1993, 6).
1 From 1963 to 1973 the volume of world manufactured exports grew at an annual average rate 
of 11.5%: GATT (1985) International Trade 1984/85,4, Geneva.
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For instance, Shell, established in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia since the 19th cen­
tury petroleum boom, was first to qualify for pioneer status (id). Shell received healthy 
pioneer benefits even though no new manufacturing enterprise emerged at the time.
The early industrialisation policy, which the PAP state inherited in 1959, was 
one in which firms were encouraged to manufacture goods that would substitute for ex­
pensive imports, thus its name: Import-substituting Industrialisation (ISI). The idea of 
the Malaysian Federation was the basis of the policy. ISI would be set up for failure un­
less Singapore could become part of a large domestic market in which it could trade its 
import-substituting manufactured goods. It was 1963 before this part of the plan materi­
alised. In the meantime, Singapore introduced fiscal incentives to match pioneer import- 
substituting measures that were being offered to entice companies to Malaya.
In 1959, only 554 manufacturing enterprises in Singapore employed 10 or more 
workers.2 Of these, 23 processed rubber, which accounted for 75% of the value of out­
put. Thus this staple dominated the manufacturing sector. By 1960 only 548 manufac­
turing enterprises employed 10 or more workers. These totalled 27,416 employees out of 
61,000 for the entire sector. Enterprises with 10-39 workers represented over two-thirds 
of all enterprises, while those with more than 100 employees accounted for less than 9% 
of the total. Moreover, the manufacturing sector as a whole accounted for only 13% of 
Singapore’s GDP. In 1961 the number of enterprises employing 10 or more had reached 
562, with just over 27,600 employees. Clearly, such slow incremental growth in the 
manufacturing sector would not solve Singapore’s unemployment problem or secure its 
uncertain future. The undergrowth of smaller enterprises (those with fewer than 10 em­
ployees) was engaged mainly in household repairs and other casual domestic services - 
occupations that were insecure at the best of times.
Thus in 1961 the manufacturing sector still reflected the legacies of the staple 
port around which Singapore’s colonial livelihood had been built. Among the most 
prominent activities were processing, warehousing, transport, and other functions related 
to dealing with commodities from the resource-rich neighbouring countries. As dis­
cussed above, manufacturing enterprises were small or medium-sized, and their indus­
tries were decidedly low-tech. Of enterprises employing 10 or more workers, the largest 
industry group was food and beverage, representing 30% of manufacturing value added,
2 Information in this section draws heavily on Lim Chong-Yah (1984) and Huff (1997).
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followed by industries for fabricated metal products, machinery and transport equip­
ment, which accounted for 23% of manufacturing value added. Not all manufactured 
goods were for domestic consumption. For instance 27% of the food and beverage proc­
essed were exported. But export of goods manufactured in Singapore was still only a 
small part of trade.
Singapore’s industrial transformation began in the second half of 1961. Dr Win- 
semius, the Dutch economist who led a UN Mission to Singapore, presented his report 
in June 1961 (UN 1961). By August the government had implemented several proposals 
and created the Economic Development Board (EDB) to replace the colonial Industrial 
Promotion Board. Moving the second reading of the Bill to set up the EDB, the Finance 
Minister explained that the EDB would be charged with (LD vol 14, col 1519):
the investigation and evaluation of industrial opportunities, the assessment of market potential 
and the advancement of capital. [Moreover, it was] to participate in establishing industries in 
cases where, for whatever reasons, no private participation was forthcoming. In addition, it was 
to provide prepared sites for industries and assist in industrial enterprises by giving technical ad­
vice (my italics).
The EDB’s own interpretation of its core functions during the early period included the 
development of industrial estates, the promotion of [foreign] investment and industrial 
financing (Low et al 1990, 62). It is important to note that in 1961 it was the govern­
ment’s specific intention to participate in establishing industries, if the EDB were unable 
to attract suitable private participants.3 Moreover, the UN, through its mission leader 
(who remained an economic adviser to Singapore until 1984), supported this stance. 
Clearly the ‘Western’ development agencies of the 1960s were less suspicious of gov­
ernment guidance then than they became in the market-driven 1990s.
Apart from recommending the establishment of the EDB, the UN Report pro­
posed changes in five specific areas: Markets, Labour, Capital and Entrepreneurs, Or­
ganisation and Specific Industries. Together with the government’s First Development 
Plan 1961-64 (Ministry of Finance 1963), the 1961 UN Report became the blueprint for 
government policy, or, perhaps closer to the truth, it gave the stamp of approval to many 
ideas of the ambitious PAP cabinet. In the following sections, the ideas underlying Sin­
gapore’s ISI phase are discussed under the headings of the five sectors proposed in the 
UN’s 1961 Report.
3 The British Labour Party took a similar stance in the post-war years. It was felt then that the 
country could only be rebuilt if government participated. See Yergin & Stanislaw (1999).
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Market Priorities
Following the UN proposals, the government decided to focus on Malaya, in 
preparation for the Federation, which would give Singapore a huge domestic market. 
The next priority would be the UK and Indonesia, though care would be taken with the 
latter which was considered erratic and unstable. EFTA (the European Free Trade Asso­
ciation) countries would be considered primary markets on a par with the UK. Efforts 
would be made to expand exports to Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, Thailand and Burma.
The EDB followed this scenario in its implementation of the government’s in­
dustrialisation policy. Malaya and the UK became prime markets for manufactured 
goods. A system of import quotas was introduced for a limited number of goods, as were 
controls on how many enterprises could enter a specific line of industry. Textiles were 
Singapore’s single largest manufactured export, followed by food and beverage. At this 
stage, the new electronics and electrical equipment industries remained undefined. 
However Indonesia was still a prominent trading partner as it supported the world’s 
largest primary rubber market,4 as well as Singapore’s new oil refinery operations. 
Labour
The UN team found the quality of Singaporean workers satisfactory but sug­
gested that their calibre be improved through education, degree courses, vocational 
training and overseas visits (Mirza 1986, 31). However it criticised Singapore’s inter­
nationally uncompetitive wage patterns claiming that wage costs were 20-30% too high 
for world markets (UN 1961, 115). Moreover the Report blamed unrest, low productiv­
ity and irrational wage demands for damaging Singapore’s political stability and manu­
facturing prospects. The term unrest covered the ongoing political battles between the 
right and left (pro-communist) wings of the PAP. Such battles often implicated the un­
ions (see chapter 6, Rodan 1989, Tremewan 1994, Lee Kuan Yew 1998).
It is clear that Singapore’s reputation was suffering from the aftermath of the 
struggle for independence from British rule. Strikes called by unions had been potent 
weapons in the post-war anti-colonial struggle. For instance 946,354 workdays were lost 
in 1955, the year of the first elections ever held in Singapore [as a result of the Rendel 
Constitutional Commission’s proposal for limited self-government in the colony]. In 
1959 when self-rule had been won, the number of workdays lost was a mere 26,588.
4 At this time, about 37% of the world's rubber production traded in Singapore.
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However, the number re-escalated to hundreds of thousands during 1961 to 1963, until 
the PAP government defeated the left-wing, pro-communist unions which opposed the 
Federation (chapter 6, Huff 1997, 295; Deyo 1989, 62, Lee Kuan Yew 1998).
The UN team recommended improvements in industrial relations. These in­
cluded steps to compel unions to accept longer term, productivity-linked agreements, 
and the government as arbitrator in industrial disputes. The PAP government imple­
mented these proposals but also went further and disabled the communist-inspired left- 
wing party, eliminated opposition unions and emasculated the rest. In 1963 the PAP-led 
National Trade Union Congress (NTUC) was formed to represent the majority of Sin­
gapore’s unions (see chapter 6).
Organisation
The UN team recommended the establishment of the EDB and an Investment 
Development Bank as statutory boards. Initially only the EDB was established. It was 
given a SDlOOm budget and far-reaching powers, as discussed above. Later in 1968 the 
EDB’s financial investment activities were spun off into the Development Bank of Sin­
gapore (DBS), which was a government-linked company (GLC). The idea of statutory 
bodies and GLCs, which was a relic of colonialism5, was seen as an effective way of 
getting things done. In fact similar bodies had served the British well during the war 
years and after World War 2, when the British Labour government sought to implement 
the Beveridge Report (1942).6 Subsequently, the EDB, the DBS and other bodies such 
as Jurong Town Corporation (JTC), the International Trading Company (Intraco), and 
the Neptune Orient Line served as channels for government participation in the promo­
tion of industrialisation.
These spin-off agencies belong to the next growth period (1966-73), when the 
EDB turned its attention to export-oriented industrialisation and increased physical con­
struction of the infrastructure (see 4.3.2). But the bodies illustrate the early organisa­
tional pattern by which government participated in industry and business. In addition, 
with EDB mediation, the government participated in industry through wholly and par­
tially owned government companies. For instance in 1961, it held equity shares in the
5 The colonial state had created five statutory boards. The PAP transformed them and added 
others during the decades. For a list of statutory boards and their distribution by ministries, see 
Singapore Government Directory, various years.
6 The Beveridge Report's policies set out to slay the five giants: want, disease, ignorance, 
squalor and idleness [joblessness].
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National Iron and Steel Mills, the Prima Flour Mills, and in Malayan Airlines, which 
became Singapore Airlines, a wholly owned company in 1972. The former is doubly 
interesting as it was the first factory to start production in Jurong, the government’s in­
dustrial estate. As Goh Keng Swee (1972, 261) pointed out, in December 1963 there 
were only two factories in Jurong: National Iron and Steel Mills, and Pelican Textiles; 
between them they employed ninety workers. From this fledgling start, the state’s role 
as entrepreneur would increase substantially during the decades.
Capital and Entrepreneurship
The UN Report pinpointed the need for Singapore to attract overseas capital, 
technology and skills. It recommended that the government should facilitate foreign in­
vestment through three main steps:
1. Improve the investment climate via better industrial relations, better social and 
physical infrastructure, double taxation agreements, and so on;
2. Increase inducements via tax holidays, tariff reductions and subsidies;
3. Establish appropriate bodies to organise the industrialisation process.
The PAP government adopted all the proposals. In fact, it had started some of the prepa­
rations prior to the 1961 Report. For instance, the 1960 Industrial Relations Act was de­
signed to enable speedy settlement of industrial disputes, outlaw strikes (unless approved 
by the government) and generally tighten up labour force discipline (see chapter 6).
Regarding infrastructure, the Housing and Development Board (HDB), another 
statutory body, replaced the colonial Singapore Improvement Trust in 1960. It busied 
itself with the construction of housing for low-income families to raise their living stan­
dards and redistribute social wealth. According to Chen (1983, 5, 7) the main aim was to 
prevent social unrest and mobilise the support of Singapore’s citizens towards the goal of 
development. Commercial infrastructure became a major focus of the EDB. This in­
volved physical improvement of roads, transportation, telecommunications, factories and 
utilities, as well as the development of human resources via education, skills training and 
vocational courses, which were tailored to satisfy the needs of industries.
The 1959 inducements exempted pioneer industries from company tax for five 
years, while existing enterprises whose investment expansion plans were approved by the 
EDB received tax exemptions on a sliding scale varying progressively with the capital 
invested. Tariff and subsidies also followed. As discussed above, the idea of setting up 
statutory bodies to organise the industrialisation process was adopted and applied vigor-
104
ously. The JTC was one of the most prominent statutory boards. Its task was to prepare 
land for industrial sites and build factories for leasing or selling to entrepreneurs.
Specific Industries
Four key industries were earmarked for special promotion:
1. Ship-building and ship-repairing;
2. Metal and engineering products;
3. Electrical equipment and appliances;
4. Chemicals.
The selected industries represented a degree of continuity with the past. For instance, as a 
staple port, Singapore had offered ship-repairing services. To these could now be added 
the manufacturing aspects of the industry, with the potential of huge savings on previ­
ously imported parts. In 1963, Jurong Shipyard Ltd was formed under the pioneer status 
scheme. It was established as a GLC with 30% state-ownership. The UN Report had also 
proposed engineering and chemicals, especially industrial and petro-chemicals as new 
areas for development. There was scope for synergism between, for instance, metal and 
engineering products and electrical equipment. These industries were chosen because 
they promised excellent growth potential.
However, it is important to remember that during this period (1959-65), the entire 
focus of economic development was on import-substituting industrialisation, that is, 
manufacturing which aimed to substitute imported products and sell them within an en­
larged single domestic market: the Malaysian Federation.
The Malaysian Federation
One of the major, though perhaps unintentional, effects of the UN Report was the 
tremendous support it gave to the PAP government by directly mandating the Federation, 
which at the time was a contentious issue among the domestic political parties. The or­
ganised left, the Barisan Sosialis, was against federation. Lee Kuan Yew and his party 
were absolutely for, and Lee probably had larger political ambitions vis-a-vis the merger. 
The federation campaign was bitter. The tactically worded options were put to the vote in 
a referendum on 1 September 1962. The federalists won overwhelmingly.
However, a general election was due to be fought in 1963 before federation. 
Fearing that the left might cause obstruction, the PAP government sought to further se­
cure its power. The instrument of repression was blunt: in February 1963, over 100 lead­
ers of Barisan and other leftist groups were jailed by the Internal Security Department - 
apparently with the collusion of Malayan leaders (Mirza, 34; Lee 1998). In July 1963 the
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agreement under which Singapore would enter the Federation was finalised, and on 31 
August Singapore became fully independent of Britain. The Federation was declared on 
16 September 1963, and the PAP government viewed entry as a triumph.
The tensions that had been foreseen between the bumiputra (indigenous Malays) 
and the economically more well-off, relatively skilled, predominantly Chinese Singapor­
eans were lessened by a stroke of genius of Malaya’s Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul 
Rahman. He proposed the inclusion of Malaya, Brunei, Sarawak, Sabah and Singapore 
into the Federation. Brunei stayed out, but the result was still a diluted Singaporean pres­
ence, which ensured that numerically the non-Chinese dominated.
In 1963 when the Malaysian Federation was formed the number of Singapore 
manufacturing companies employing 10 or more workers increased to 858, with a total 
of 36,586 employees. The respective numbers rose to 930 and 41,488 in 1964 and 1,123 
and 52,807 in 1965. The Rueff Report (1963) had predicted a massive SD2-billion im­
port replacement market in the enlarged Federation. Singapore enterprises, spurred by 
EDB-administered incentives, were well on their way to gaining a foothold in the single 
market. But progress was slow. Unemployment remained massive. The UN Report 
(1961) had predicted that 214,000 new jobs would be needed by 1970. In 1965 only 52 
807 had materialised. It was thought that slow growth was caused by the fact that all 
EDB’s plans and industrial policies had to be approved in Kuala Lumpur, rather than by 
a minister in Singapore. There were also complaints that firms in Singapore were being 
treated unfairly when the Kuala Lumpur administration granted pioneer status certifi­
cates and export quotas (Turnbull 1977, 209-291).
By 1965 it was clear that the expectations of the single internal market remained 
unfulfilled. The policies and incentives had failed to attract industrial investments to 
Singapore. The few investors who might have been induced to manufacture for the fed­
eral market found it easier and more logical to establish themselves on the peninsula, 
where the bulk of their customers were to be found. Singapore was still perceived as a 
minnow-market, and worse, there was also a degree of political uncertainty, despite the 
Federation. Some western investors viewed Singapore as the Cuba of Southeast Asia. Its 
predominantly Chinese population provided ‘proof of sympathy for communist China. 
Besides during the independence struggle the national political groups had portrayed 
themselves as socialists. Investors, especially those from America, were wary of the 
connotations.
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Another source of disappointment was Indonesia’s hostile reaction to the union. 
Right from the start, the government of Indonesia declared a policy of Confrontation 
against the federal state, especially against Singapore. Confrontation meant economic 
boycott and political opposition, sometimes these extended to violent incidents (Huff 
1997, 30; Lee Kuan Yew 1998). Singapore could ill-afford economic boycott or violent 
incidents. The latter hiked expenditures of the British military budget, which was bad for 
future co-operation, while the former created havoc since Indonesia supplied not only 
the main commodity exports which kept the staple port alive, but also crude oil upon 
which Singapore’s infant refineries depended.
The reason for Indonesian hostility was complex. However, at the core was fear. 
First, the Javanese-dominated Indonesian government feared that the non-Javanese in 
the Outer Provinces of Indonesia might want to join the Malaysian Federation because 
their economy was inextricably linked with Singapore’s. Secondly, the government 
feared that the Singaporean Chinese would soon dominate the Malay Peninsula thus 
making the Peninsula territorially stronger than Indonesia.
One consequence of Indonesian hostilities is that Singapore stopped publishing 
statistics for trade with Indonesia from late 1963. This does not mean that trade ceased. 
On the contrary, apart from a dip in 1964, studies such as Huff (1997) suggest that sub­
stantial trade must have continued. But as Goh Keng Swee told Parliament on 14 De­
cember 1963 (LD vol 22, col 555): ‘in the economic war which is now being waged... 
this kind of information constitutes valuable economic intelligence’. In his 1970 budget 
speech Goh claims that entrepot trade declined by 16.8% as trade relations with Indone­
sia were severed and as a result, earnings on the entrepot trade declined from SD441m 
in 1963 to SD306m in 1965 (Goh 1972, 262). However, entrepot trade was in decline 
generally, as nations sought to conduct direct bilateral trade instead of trade via Singa­
pore. Thus this statistic does not add to our knowledge about the effect of Confrontation. 
Average annual growth rate for 1959 to 1965 was 5.7%: low by the standards with 
which Singapore would be judged a decade later, but high for a developing country.
On 9 August 1965, Singapore left the Malaysian Federation. The reasons for the 
break are immaterial as far as this study is concerned.7 It is the consequences, which are 
material: Singapore became an independent Republic and sovereign nation. According to
7 For a comprehensive account, see Lee Kuan Yew (1998).
107
Goh Keng Swee news of the separation was greeted by the firing of crackers in China­
town (id 264). The crisis which the sudden break sparked was a godsend for the PAP 
government. The government used it astutely to encourage a communitarian ideology 
and create a new society. The result was an acquiescent nation motivated by the fear of 
failure and the need for material success, which, according to the government, could only 
be achieved through self-sacrifice and efficiency. This cult of material success, pragma­
tism, efficiency and self-reliance is neatly encapsulated in the phrase the siege mentality 
by a long-term observer (Harding 1998). However it is loyally packaged as the five fun­
damental principles of national ideology by Chen (1983, 4):
multi-racialism, multi-culturalism, multi-lingualism, meritocracy, and a self-reliant (rugged) soci­
ety. On this basis Singapore is forging ahead towards a highly industrialized economy, striving for 
the highest efficiency and raising the living standards and the quality [s/c] of the people.
As Singapore-based firms could no longer hope to benefit from a large domestic federal 
market, the import-substituting industrialisation policies had to be reversed. It was 
thought that with barely 600 square km and a population of only 2 million, the Republic 
of Singapore would never constitute a market worth investing in for its own sake. Other 
means of attracting capital, skills and technology would have to be devised - and 
quickly. One of the first signs of the government’s new intention took the form of an 
amendment to the Income Tax Act 1965 (No 29 of 1965). Among other matters, it in­
troduced tax deductions for overseas market development expenditure, and made it 
more attractive to conduct export promotion activities.
4.2.2 Shift to Export-oriented Industrialisation: 1966 to 1973
One concrete result of Singapore’s demerger from the Federation was that the 
Indonesian Confrontation ended in June 1966. According to Dr Goh this gave the main 
impetus to economic growth during the first year as a republic (id 265). It also pointed 
the government and the EDB to their alternative economic growth scenario. As an eco­
nomic development policy, import substitution had been flawed. Export trade had to re­
enter the equation. For as Dr Goh explained (id 10):
Industrialisation based on import substitution had proved a double-edged sword. As a means of 
saving foreign exchange it had been self-defeating... [since the] machinery and equipment needed 
to establish these industries had to be imported from abroad.
It became clear to Dr Goh that often the amount saved by substituting for imported 
goods was less than the amount needed to pay the instalments and interest on loans re­
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quired to buy the production machines and the spare parts needed for their maintenance. 
This was the case especially for capital-intensive industries like steel production, oil re­
fineries, heavy metal plants and other so-called basic industries which economic plan­
ners, both foreign and indigenous loved to recommend. Another reason why import- 
substituting industrialisation would often fail is that the demand for such products is 
small in developing countries because these countries are so poor (id).
It was upon this background that the PAP government adjusted its strategy. The 
general objective of modernisation through industrial manufacturing, as outlined in the 
1961 UN Report, still applied but the focus became export-oriented. External conditions 
were conducive to this move. In his 1970 budget speech Dr Goh claimed that: (id 264)
What undoubtedly helped most was the strong position of the economies of the United States, 
Europe and Japan.... [T]he 1960s saw what was virtually a long sustained boom among the rich 
nations. One after another, they reached conditions of full employment and had to depend for 
further expansion either on imported labour as happened in the case of Germany and to a lesser 
extent Britain, or they had to move some of their manufacturing operations abroad, as happened 
particularly with the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan.
It was the possibility of foreign companies moving some of their manufacturing opera­
tions abroad that ignited the PAP government’s imagination. If the EDB could attract 
such footloose multinational companies (MNCs) to Singapore, at least five problems, 
which the fledgling export-oriented nation faced, could be solved simultaneously. First, 
Singapore’s inward entrepot experience meant that Singaporeans had little experience in 
marketing goods abroad. Most of the enterprises, that had exported primary commodities 
or processed goods and imported manufactures through Singapore for the region did not 
have to market goods abroad, they simply made deliveries. Marketing skills could not be 
learnt overnight but luckily MNCs would be responsible for marketing their own manu­
factures abroad. Secondly, the foreign exchange problem would be solved; it might not 
even arise, as investment in production equipment would be made by the MNCs not the 
government. Thirdly, the unemployment problem (the most pressing) would be solved 
and with it would go other socio-economic problems such as housing, education and 
health. Fourthly, it was hoped that technological and management skills would be trans­
ferred from the US-, European- and Japanese-MNCs to the local population. In this way, 
the MNCs would actively contribute to Singapore’s objective of catching-up technologi­
cally with the developed world. Finally, large-scale commitment of western and Japanese 
capital would keep Singapore free from communist influence during the Cold War.
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While world trade conditions were conducive to an export-led strategy (see 
above), the PAP government became convinced that in order to build and maintain the 
confidence of foreign investors, domestic conditions needed an overhaul. In particular, it 
was thought necessary to differentiate Singapore’s comparative advantages from those 
of other newly independent developing nations, which also had an abundance of cheap, 
unskilled labour. Five areas were selected for improvement: (1) political and industrial 
stability, (2) infrastructure, (3) promotion of priority industries, (4) the establishment of 
statutory bodies and government-linked companies to direct economic growth, (5) the 
marketing of Singapore in key target countries. These areas essentially reflected the five 
upon which the UN Report had focused in 1961. However, in 1966, after the extended 
domestic [Malaysian] market was denied, Singapore turned its focus to export rather 
than import-substitution.
Political and Industrial Stability
The concept of political and industrial stability was translated into two factors. 
One, consolidating PAP power, which was achieved when the harassed Barisan MPs re­
signed in disgust in 1966. Two, disabling the unions. Both ventures had been started 
prior to the 1963 election and the Federation. By 1966 the PAP seem to have felt that 
completion was necessary in order to advance economic development.
Several studies have shown how the PAP systematically eroded the rights and 
power of the unions and the Barisan party, starting soon after their common cause and 
struggle against colonialism ended in success in 1959 (Chan 1976; Pang 1971). That 
story will not be rehearsed here. Instead, I attempt to analyse why the common cause, 
which united the national parties in the anti-colonial campaign, failed to coalesce into 
common development strategies afterwards. It seems that although both parties pro­
moted themselves as socialists, they held substantially different views of how this could 
be translated into strategies for national development. Essentially, the dichotomy can be 
seen as the difference between modernisation theories and dependency theories (see 
chapter 1). Dependency theories influenced the leftist movement. For the leftists, the 
key prerequisites for development were (Chen 1983, 107):
1. To break the traditional dependence of the local economy on the western industrial centres 
of Britain, the United States and Europe;
2. To control the roles played by local and foreign private capital in industrialization pro­
grammes.
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The two objectives were rooted in an analysis which argued that the majority of Singa­
poreans could only profit from industrialisation if the economy were based on socialist 
planning. This view was in sharp contrast with the PAP’s conviction that the capitalist 
system, if correctly handled, could be a prime mover in the creation of wealth (Goh 
1972, 129). The PAP was therefore interested in harnessing the capitalist system for so­
cialist aims rather than radically transforming it. The proposed alliance with MNCs as 
discussed above, was one of the vehicles through which the PAP would ‘harness’ capi­
talism. Seeing only exploitation, the left [pro-communists] disagreed.
These views were not reconciled. Instead the PAP forced the demise of the op­
position party, vocalised its development plans, established mechanisms for social con­
trol and the control of corruption (Bellows 1970; Chan 1976; Pang 1971), quickly im­
plemented plans for low-cost housing (through the HDB) and stepped up moves to 
provide instant export-oriented manufacturing jobs (through the EDB). The PAP 
speculated (and was proved right), that once it had demonstrated economic success, the 
system would become almost self-perpetuating. However, embedded in the successful 
implementation of this economic development policy was the fear of failure to deliver 
constant economic success. In this way, the PAP also succeeded in institutionalising the 
cult of economic development and materialism in Singapore society (chapters 6 and 7).
The way in which the government dealt with the unions is a good example of the 
PAP’s cunning. The unions were suppressed and the workforce disciplined, especially 
in ft68, when the government passed three crucial pieces of legislation (see chapter 6). 
These were followed by a so-called modernisation seminar whose main goal was to co­
opt the unions into playing educative and socialising roles in the nation-building proc­
ess. For as Dr Goh explained in a 1969 speech to members of the Singapore Manufac­
turers’ Association commemorating the government’s 10th anniversary (Goh 1972, 
214), Singapore could afford neither an undisciplined labour force, nor a wage spiral. 
The 1968 Employment Act and other measures were designed to secure industrial peace 
for job creation (1972, 265). He praised the fact that workers’ rights and benefits were 
curtailed by the 1968 Acts, commending acceptance as ‘an impressive demonstration of 
the will of the people to overcome all obstacles to make temporary sacrifices the better 
to secure the future for themselves’ (id). The control of the unions was inextricably 
linked with political and industrial stability in Singapore.
I l l
According to Shorter and Tilly (1974) one indicator of the organisational 
strength and effectiveness of unions is the extent to which large numbers of workers can 
be mobilised for work stoppages within and across firms and industries. These are usu­
ally measured by the number of workdays lost due to stoppages. Another indicator is the 
nature of the disputes between labour and management. During periods of labour weak­
ness, disputes are largely linked to defensive issues such as declining real wages, dis­
missal or retrenchment and so on, whereas during periods of strength, unions seek im­
proved wages and benefits. Statistics for workdays lost and the nature of disputes reveal 
that Singapore’s workforce was significantly weakened during the second industrialisa­
tion phase, 1966-73, compared with the first 1959-65. For instance, the number of 
workdays lost due to stoppages during 1959-65 was 1,225,000 against only 134,000 
during 1966-73 (Ministry of Labour Yearbook, various issues).
Legislative activity in industrial relations from 1966-73 indicates a correlation 
between law and the government’s policy to secure an environment, which it regarded 
as conducive to economic development (see chapter 6). Thus via the 1968 Acts, the 
government effectively weakened the labour movement, took control of the unions and 
transferred bargaining power from workers to employers (Lim & Pang 1986, 11). But 
what the government also had in mind was tripartite co-operation. For as Dr Goh ex­
plained {id 215):
... there must be willing and intelligent co-operation between the three parties who are vitally in­
terested in achieving economic growth - namely, the Government, the businessmen and the la­
bour movement. If we continue to work together towards this common purpose, I am confident 
that the successes that we will achieve in the years ahead will be even greater than those we have 
left behind us.
Subsequently the government set up a tripartite National Wage Council (1972) which 
published guidelines for wage increases. Although not mandatory, the guidelines kept 
wage inflation at bay even after full employment was achieved in 1973. Increases in real 
wages averaged 1.7% from 1973 to 1978 (Huff 329). And amazingly, there were no 
strikes or lost workdays from 1978 to 1985 indicating even more weakening of unions 
in the later periods, despite economic growth.
Infrastructure
Improvements ranged from the provision of physical infrastructure of factories, 
transportation, telecommunications and so on, to the development of human resources 
(primary, secondary and tertiary education); low-cost housing; and health care. As dis-
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cussed below these were developed under the direction of statutory boards and govern­
ment-linked companies.
Promotion of priority industries
It could be argued that priority industries were all those that were earmarked for 
growth in the 1961 UN Report. However that would be misleading. For although elec­
tronics and electrical appliances, shipbuilding and repairs, and so on were considered key 
areas, it seems that the EDB used a wider definition. First, it is apparent that key indus­
tries changed during the periods. Secondly, in practice, key industries included not only 
those pinpointed as growth areas, but also those with significant linkages to high growth 
industries, e.g., as suppliers. Thirdly, industries with defence links also acquired priority 
status, especially after 1967 (see ‘Marketing the Singapore Brand...’, 116 infra).
Having laid these markers, it can further be argued that priority industries can be 
defined simply as those in which the state would participate actively, if no private capi­
tal was forthcoming, or if private participation was undesired, as in defence. The EDB’s 
mandate was wide. It was acknowledged that (Low et al 1993, 72-73):
... within the charter of investment promotion, is embedded a broader mission of national eco­
nomic growth and development which allows the EDB to move conceivably into any relevant 
area. By the nature of its work, the EDB network and staff need to maintain close contacts and 
feelers with the private sector locally and abroad in the lookout for emerging technologies and 
industries.
The EDB could conceivably pick any industry for priority by investing in it. For in­
stance, in 1968 it established the wholly owned Neptune Orient Lines Ltd in order to re­
duce Singapore’s dependence on foreign shipping, which controlled freightage. Setting 
up this shipping line allowed Singapore to trade with centrally planned economies whose 
waters were considered unnavigable because of Cold War politics. The former British 
military bases were also incorporated into state-owned companies like Sembawang 
Shipyard Ltd, while Keppel Shipyard Ltd was formed to take over the Dockyard Divi­
sion of the old Singapore Harbour Board (see below). The establishment of statutory 
bodies and state-enterprises with significant economic linkages is therefore considered 
indicative of priority industries, as are the annual average output of key industries and 
the average number of jobs provided by each industry.
Successful key industries probably equate to the so-called winners that the EDB 
picked. However, in a now famous analogy, Dr Goh claims that the EDB is like a gam­
bler who bets on all the horses in a race. In other words, all the MNCs chose to enter the
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investment race in Singapore. If Dr Goh is right then the winners picked themselves. The 
EDB merely facilitated the MNCs’ entry. They then had to prove themselves under com­
petitive market conditions. But clearly this analogy does not apply to the government’s 
active participation as an entrepreneur.
To judge by the average annual output during the periods the key manufacturing 
industry was the petroleum sector; while the sectors providing the greatest number of 
jobs in the 1960s were still the food industry followed by printing and publishing. How­
ever, in the 1970s, the new electronic industry became the largest employer, rising from 
zero to an average of 34,032 employees per year. An industry capable of creating jobs at 
such a high rate would definitely be considered a priority. The EDB would therefore 
aim to attract or establish more of them.
Statutory bodies and government-linked companies (GLCs) guide growth
The PAP did not invent statutory boards. The British colonial administration had 
established boards for the harbour (Singapore Harbour Board 1913), housing (Singapore 
Improvement Trust: SIT 1927), telephony (Singapore Telephone Board 1955), pension 
savings (Central Provident Fund: CPF 1955) and industrial promotion (Industrial Pro­
motion Board: IPB 1957).
In 1961 the PAP replaced the SIT with the Housing Development Board (HDB), 
and the IPB with the Economic Development Board (EDB). The CPF was retained but 
with radically expanded usage. The harbour and telephony also acquired modernised 
Boards and a host of new statutory bodies were created especially during the EOI and 
higher value-added (HVA) periods. To these must be added a clutch of other state enter­
prises: companies, which are either wholly or partially owned by the state. Both vehicles 
were used extensively to initiate, nurture or guarantee key industries where venture 
capital from foreign investors or local entrepreneurs was lacking or undesired.
The advantage of creating statutory boards to administer public sector and some­
times private sector functions is that they avoid the rigidity and stodginess of a central­
ised bureaucracy and the controls that characterise government departments. In justifi­
cation of their intervention in the private sector, civil servants and economists often add 
the rationale that (Chen 1983, 150):
In the context of Singapore’s small, open and vulnerable economy and in terms of external forces 
and circumstances which can so easily upset its economic balance in development, some form of 
government direction and control is warranted. Such fine-tuning to changing external forces can­
not be left entirely to private hands given Singapore’s lack of natural resources and smallness in 
size. The government’s economic philosophy is... democratic socialism in a mixed economy.
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Thus it seems that in Singapore’s small open economy, the case for statutory boards and 
GLCs is argued not so much in terms of an ideological stance but more in response to 
pragmatic situational needs. Although worlds apart, and made in very dissimiliar situa­
tions, perhaps the comments of Joseph Stigliz, the World Bank’s chief economist strike 
a similar chord {Financial Times, 25 March 1998):
Small open economies are like rowing boats on an open sea. One cannot predict when they might 
capsize; bad steering increases the chances of disaster and a leaky boat makes it inevitable. But 
their chances of being broadsided by a wave are significant no matter how well they are steered 
and no matter how seaworthy they are.
Arguably, Singapore’s early attempt to safeguard itself against these inevitable risks 
was to employ sturdy rudders and oars: statutory bodies, state enterprises and the firm 
grip of government. Statutory boards are created by Acts of Parliament which specify 
the reasons for formation, their functions, rights and powers. The boards are responsible 
to the ministries under which they are established, and the ministers accountable to Par­
liament. However, within the legal framework, there is complete freedom and flexibility 
with regard to financial and administrative policies, and daily management. Each statu­
tory body has its own board of management, whose chairman is usually chosen by the 
minister in charge, and each sources its own finances and manages its own accounts. 
Thus, each is highly autonomous and represents direct state participation in and guid­
ance of the economy. In addition, huge manuals and the fear of penalties direct the be­
haviour of staff at every level. A culture of ‘no corruption’ permeates the organisations.8
The EDB is the most powerful of the statutory bodies directly charged with 
promoting economic growth. It adopts a multi-disciplined approach to investment pro­
motion. This involves industrial policy co-ordination, identification of new business 
opportunities, manpower development, technology promotion, business capability de­
velopment, and industry development for both local companies and MNCs (Low et al 
1993, 72). It is interesting to note that the first EDB organisation plan listed Legal Ad­
viser and Industrial Economist at the same level, underneath the Chairman and Director. 
However, by 1970 and in all subsequent EDB organisation charts, legal adviser or legal 
department was no where to be seen.
The significance of the elimination of this post is unclear. However it should be 
remembered that the 1961 Report was drafted at a time when President Kennedy had 
just persuaded the UN to name the 1960s the UN Decade of Development. At that time,
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law was seen as one of the instruments of modernisation (chapter 1) and it was consid­
ered a natural component of any development plan. That the post of Legal Adviser dis­
appeared in the 1970s probably reflects the growing disenchantment with the law and 
development movement. This does not mean that law was not co-opted as an instrument 
of development in Singapore. Indeed confidential sources reveal that very often EDB 
personnel would draft pertinent laws, which they considered necessary to advance their 
economic development work. Obviously such legislation would have to be passed in 
Parliament, but the origin suggests a perception that laws could promote economic 
growth (see chapters 5, 6, 7,and 8). There is also a prolific undergrowth of secondary 
legislation and regulations to support the use of law in the Boards’ development work. 
However, this aspect deserves separate treatment and is not pursued in this study.
As mentioned above, government companies, wholly and partially owned, were 
incorporated in priority industries. For instance, in 1968 the industrial financing opera­
tions of the EDB were spun-off and incorporated under the Banking Ordinance 1958 to 
form the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS). It was incorporated as a public lim­
ited company to operate as a commercial bank as well as a primary source of finance for 
manufacturing and processing industries. Its share capital was SD200m with SDlOOm 
issued and paid-up; the state held 49% of the shares. The Finance Minister was both 
chairman and president until 1970 when a civil servant as appointed. The bank’s assis­
tance to companies took the form of medium- and long-term loans, equity participation 
and guarantees of loans raised by entrepreneurs from other sources.
Similarly, the newly formed Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) took charge of the 
development and management of industrial estates in 1968. The National Productivity 
Board (NPB) and the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR) 
were also EDB offsprings in 1972 and 1973 respectively. While its Engineering Indus­
trial Development Agency, formed in 1968, became the National Engineering Services 
Private Ltd in 1973, a wholly state-owned company. This left the EDB free to concen­
trate on marketing the brand of Singapore Inc. abroad and promoting local investment 
in the industrial sector.
8 For a descriptive account, see Mohan 1988.
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Marketing the Singapore Brand in target countries
The promotion of Singapore abroad was one of the central tasks of the EDB. 
During the first EOI phase (1966-73), the definition of industrial enterprise in the EDB 
Act was widened and the EDB was given greater powers to raise loans, and obtain 
overdrafts and credit facilities from suppliers. In 1966 it was charged with the urgent 
need to attract MNCs. The EDB quickly set up industrial promotion offices in New 
York, for the USA was seen as the major target, despite Lee Kuan Yew’s sentiments 
about the US and the Vietnam War. Japan was the second target, again despite the ani­
mosity still felt because of the experiences during the 1941-45 occupation.
The UK and Commonwealth countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
were third tier targets but companies from these countries had settled in Malaysia and 
were not easily displaced. Besides, some already had a presence in Singapore.
For growth, one had to look to American and Japanese MNCs. Lee Kuan Yew 
therefore established connections during his visits to the US (October 1967) and Japan 
(November 1968). Mirza (1986, 49) notes that it was after the US trip that Singapore’s 
defence spending rocketed from 5% of the national budget in 1965 to 17.6% in 1968. In 
1968 Israeli officers (disguised as Mexican advisers) arrived in Singapore to help fashion 
the military. It suited Singapore to promote itself as the Israel of Southeast Asia and per­
haps serve as the linchpin of western influence in the region (id). The formation of 
ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) in 1967, unwittingly, under­
pinned the notion. Singapore was, after all, at the centre of the region - geographically, 
and, from an historic point of view had always played a key commercial role. On this 
basis, foreign investors, especially American MNCs, were relatively easily persuaded to 
view Singapore as a regional production platform and later also as the headquarters from 
which to conduct regional sales, distribution and technical services. Armed with its bun­
dle of incentives and efficient infrastructure the EDB enticed US firms to Singapore.
In 1966 Singapore joined the World Bank. A year later the Economic Expansion 
Incentives Act re-enacted, in an expanded form, the more limited 1959 legislation, which 
had provided benefits for pioneer and expanding industries. Benefits under the Act were 
to be granted at the discretion of the Minister of Finance in the public interest and sub­
ject to such conditions as he thinks fit (s4(l), 5(2) et seq.).
While many countries often offer comprehensive, non-discretionary benefits, it is 
not unusual for some incentive statutes to require a case-by-case treatment with wide
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discretion being given to an administrative body. In this case, such discretionary powers 
were delegated to the EDB. The EDB was therefore able to develop the concept of the 
one-stop-shop in which its offices, even those based abroad, were able to scrutinise busi­
ness investment plans and fairly quickly give planning permission, licences or the re­
quired certificates without much red tape. The EDB quickly gained a reputation for its 
professionalism, competence and efficiency in dealing with development proposals and 
succeeded mightily in promoting Singapore abroad and enticing foreign investors to es­
tablish their manufacturing plants in Singapore. Texas Instruments was first in a long 
line of electronics MNCs to establish a Singapore plant.
During the ideological struggle of the Cold War, Singapore became a convinc­
ing anti-communist model. Although US funding was never on the vast scale as that 
lavished on South Korea or Taiwan, Singapore, like Hong Kong, became a showcase 
for the success of capitalist societies over communist ones. By 1973 Singapore’s unem­
ployment problem had been solved, in the main by the tremendous activity in the ex­
port-oriented textiles, electronic and electrical manufacturing industries.
4.2.3 Broadening the Industrial Base: 1974 to 1978
Statistics show that in 1972, if one excluded investments in the petro-chemical 
industry, the electrical and electronic industry absorbed the bulk of net foreign invest­
ment commitments, some 58.9% of the total (Low et al 1993, 132-33). Most of these 
comprised simple MNC assembly plants, which required an abundance of low-skilled 
labour. Typical finished products included portable transistor radios, clocks, electric 
fans and small household appliances. Electronic components, the major growth area, in­
volved assembling computer memory modules. Dr Goh commented that: ‘The elec­
tronic components we make in Singapore probably require less skill than that required 
by barbers or cooks, consisting mostly of repetitive manual operation’ (1972,27).
Assembling such products for export helped solve Singapore’s unemployment 
problem and substantially increased its GNP per capita. However, by 1973 the strategy 
was creating problems of its own. First, labour shortage was encouraging immigration, 
especially from Malaysia and Indonesia. Secondly, Singapore was experiencing compe­
tition from other developing countries which imitated the export-oriented manufactur­
ing model based on MNC investments. They were willing to undercut Singapore’s low 
wages and thus indirectly held Singapore in the low-wage sector. Thirdly, the advance
118
of technology, in particular the invention of the micro-computer, enabled the cheap 
automation of production lines and thus cheaper production in industrialised countries. 
This and the fourth influence, the 1973 oil crisis, created disincentives for MNCs to 
move production to Singapore or other developing countries. The new automated pro­
duction lines offered two advantages: they were more reliable and more stable than un­
skilled workers, and they allowed MNCs to keep proprietary technology at home where 
their intellectual property rights would be protected. Fifthly, there was some criticism 
that the MNC-model was crowding out local entrepreneurs. Sixthly, Singapore’s suc­
cess with labour-intensive, export-oriented industries, which was being emulated in 
other developing countries and the onset of a world recession in the mid-1970s fuelled 
protectionist trade policies in the West.
These developments impacted greatly on the EDB and the government. At an 
early date they devised ambitious restructuring plans with which to counter them. How­
ever, as the world went into recession, they feared aggravating domestic problems and 
delayed their plans until 1979. In the interim, the EDB sought to broaden the industrial 
base and promote inclusiveness and self-reliance by introducing a number of measures. 
First, home-grown SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) were encouraged to en­
ter manufacturing by becoming sub-suppliers or joint-venture partners of the technol­
ogy-rich MNCs. Joint ventures were encouraged by making it easier to obtain certain 
benefits when local ownership of a company was 50% or more. Secondly, the tourist in­
dustry was supported inter alia through a massive hotel construction programme. 
Thirdly, the financial services market was opened to foreign investors. Fourthly, the pe­
riod for tax incentive was extended from five to ten years for industries such as those 
manufacturing machine tools, diesel engines, precision instruments, aircraft components 
and specialised electrical and industrial machinery. For as Finance Minister Hon Sui 
Sen made clear in a 1975 parliamentary debate, five years were too short for the more 
sophisticated types of industries, which Singapore was trying to attract (PD vol 34, col 
39). The EDB thought that diversifying into these areas would broaden Singapore’s in­
dustrial base, and that such products would be less prone to western protectionism. The 
EDB was right. Singapore also survived the 1974-5 oil-induced world recession re­
markably well. Growth rates remained robust: in 1976 growth was 7% and by 1978 it 
averaged 9% per annum.
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4.2.4 Seeking Higher Value-added Production: 1979-84
With annual growth rates averaging 9% in 1977 and 1978, by 1979 the EDB and 
the government felt more confident about implementing their ambitious economic re­
structuring plans of moving Singapore from labour-intensive to skills-intensive manu­
facturing. The 1978 budget signalled the shift, though, naturally export was still the fo­
cus. In a speech to members of the Singapore Economic Society on 30 March 1978 Goh 
Chok Tong, then Senior Minister of State for Finance (Prime Minister from 1990) de­
scribed the need for change and the proposed programme thus (Mirza 1989, 62):
Singapore’s manufacturing sector has now reached an intermediate level of development... We 
will now have to accelerate our programme to diversify into higher technology industries ... we 
must try to encourage greater local entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector ... we should 
exploit our comparative advantage in trade-related services and our strategic location to the 
maximum. More attention will now be devoted to make Singapore an export-oriented services 
centre.
The driving force continued to be the need to circumvent western protectionism in the 
low-wage, consumer-focused, manufacturing sector. But there was also a desire to dis­
courage low-skill, labour-intensive investments as Singapore sought to lessen its reliance 
on labour expansion for economic growth. It was thought that the services sector would 
fit the bill. As Goh Chok Tong explained during a 1979 debate (PD, vol 39, col 323):
The services sector has been doing well despite the recession. Export of services has been less 
vulnerable to protectionism. With the fast expansion of our financial, transport and other com­
munication services, this sector will continue to sustain our economic growth, complementing 
the contribution of the manufacturing sector. The prospect for further expansion of the services 
sector is promising. We shall encourage the development of warehousing and servicing, interna­
tional trading, and consultancy activities.
In 1979, the plan was launched as Singapore’s ‘Second Industrial Revolution’. Its stated 
purpose was to accelerate Singapore’s transition to a more sophisticated stage of eco­
nomic development: out of the ‘overcrowded, over-competitive third league’ and up 
into the second league’ (Rodan 1989, 142). The football metaphor was probably more 
apt than the usual first and third world cliches. For Singapore and the other Asian tigers 
now formed a distinctly different group of nations, which had experienced high, rapid, 
sustained economic growth rates for two decades or more.
The plan’s economic features were outlined in a report entitled Highlights of 
Singapore’s Economic Development Plan for the Eighties (Ministry of Trade & Industry 
1981). It argued inter alia, that in a full employment economy, low wages would lead to 
an over-tight labour market, that low wages would not bring out the best in workers, 
and that low wages discouraged training. Furthermore, the plan held that other decisive
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steps had to be taken to solve the following new problems, which Singapore would face 
in the 1980s:
• slow growth in labour supply;
• rising expectations for better wages which could only be afforded if higher skilled 
jobs were created;
• continuing dependence on foreign skills, technology and markets;
• declining rate of savings;
• slow growth and protectionism in industrialised countries;
• high oil prices;
• competition from developing and developed countries.
Four distinct strategies were implemented to move Singapore into the ‘second league’. 
First, a radical turnaround in wage policy was engineered. Secondly, measures were in­
troduced to curb imported labour, and tariffs were placed on certain products. Thirdly, 
tax and fiscal incentives were granted to encourage investments in capital-intensive, 
higher valued-added production, and research and development. Finally, the government 
initiated or expanded social and physical infrastructures, and direct capital investments in 
favoured industries such as the Singapore Technology Corporation (STC). The most im­
portant aspects of these strategies are discussed briefly below.
Corrective Wage Policy
The National Wages Council (NWC) awarded wage increases of 20% per an­
num in 1979 and 1980. In 1981, it was reduced to 6% in response to employers’ pro­
tests. However the signal was clear: investors should automate their low-skilled, repeti­
tive production functions, as human resources were too valuable for such tasks. As 
discussed below, the government then instituted a massive education and training pro­
gramme to raise skill levels.
Manufacturing
Manufacturers that were unwilling to upgrade and automate their production 
would be forced abroad by higher wages in Singapore. Incentives were withdrawn from 
undesirable low-wage production and used to attract desirable industries in petro­
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, high-level electronic components, industrial and medical 
equipment, technical services and components for aircraft and shipping. Local entrepre­
neurs were encouraged to enter higher skilled, higher value-added production and serv­
ices, especially in joint ventures with foreign investors.
In other words, the measures introduced to broaden the industrial base in the in­
terim period (1974-78) were strengthened in 1979. The harder line in wage policy led to
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the closure of foreign companies that assembled cars in Singapore, and withdrawal of 
the country’s only tyre manufacturer (Rodan 147). These actions did not release many 
workers for other manufacturers, but they signalled the government’s conviction that 
low-skilled, low-waged employment had outlived its usefulness in Singapore’s econ­
omy. The aim now was to develop Singapore into a modem industrial economy based 
on science, technology, skills and knowledge (id). The stated goal was to increase the 
manufacturing sector’s share of GDP from 23% to 31% by 1990.
Computer services
The EDB and the government had argued that Singapore would become the in­
formation society of the future, driven by brains, not brawn. Computer services and re­
lated services such as consulting, and medical and educational services were considered 
suitable ‘brain work’. They were non-polluting and knowledge-intensive and therefore 
right for the future. Incentives to foster them included accelerated depreciation of com­
puters and peripheral equipment, and investment allowance for R&D projects.
Financial Services
Historically, Singapore’s banking services have been well-developed (see 3.4 
supra), even though a dual system of foreign and local Chinese banks operated. In 1968 
the government announced its policy to develop a higher level of expertise in the finan­
cial sector in order to increase capital inflow and investment. Withholding tax on inter­
est paid to non-residents’ deposits with banks in Singapore was abolished in 1968. The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), a statutory body, was established to co­
ordinate banking functions in 1971. Exchange controls were liberalised in 1978, re­
moving all restrictions on the movement of funds.
However the biggest step involved the development of offshore banking, which 
created the Asian Dollar market. Its use involves a double bookkeeping system known 
as the Asian Currency Unit (ACU), which allows the acceptance of time and call de­
posits and lending in foreign currencies. Its invention marked the start of participation 
in what would later explode into the global financial services market. In 1981, another 
statutory body, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) assumed re­
sponsibility for the investment and management of Singapore’s official foreign ex­
change reserves. This left the MAS free to supervise and regulate the banking and fi­
nancial services markets.
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The plan envisaged Singapore as an international business centre. Thus the full 
range of financial services and institutions had to be developed. This included commer­
cial, merchant and offshore banks; finance companies; insurers; re-insurers, and so on. 
The plan was to expand futures and commodity markets to join the stock exchange. 
Education and Training
A huge manpower development programme formed the basis of the plan. For as 
Goh Chok Tong explained (Rodan 148):
...only increasing the relative price of labour to capital to bring about restructuring is like trying 
to cut with one blade of the scissors. The other blade is the skill of our workers. Both blades 
must cut in unison. Thus training must be stepped up to enable our workers to acquire new skills 
and refine old ones.
The programme involved all levels of education. Government development expenditure 
on education leapt from SD32.75m in 1978-79 to SD374.68m in 1982-83, an increase of 
1044% (Dept of Statistics 1984, Table 14.16, 251). At the tertiary level, science and 
technology were in focus. The aim was to increase the number of engineers per thousand 
in the population. From 1979 to 1983, enrolments in engineering courses rose by 2104% 
at the National University of Singapore and 10 232% at the Singapore Polytechnic {id, 
various tables, 236, 245, 246 and Rodan 149). The dramatic increases were prefaced by 
structural changes in the tertiary educational system. For instance in 1980, the govern­
ment merged the University of Singapore and the Mandarin-speaking Nanyang Univer­
sity to form the National University of Singapore. The new Nanyang Technological In­
stitute, (NTI) was set up at the old Nanyang site in 1981 and Ngee Ann Polytechnic 
designed to house the new Centre for Computer Studies.
The EDB, through its specialised manpower division,9 ensured that all man­
power development was tailored to the needs of private enterprises which either were 
engaged in, or moving towards, higher value-added production. In a novel way of trans­
ferring technology and ensuring that learned skills meet the needs of enterprises, the 
EDB engineered a programme of technical training in co-operation with Germany, 
France and Japan. The German-Singapore Institute focused on courses in production 
technology, the French-Singapore Institute on electro-technology, especially automation 
and microprocessor application, and the Japan-Singapore Institute supported systems
9 The EDB's Manpower Development Division included training institutes. I am grateful to Mr 
Chua Soo Tian, past division director, for drawing my attention to the importance of the special 
institutes of technology set up with the German, Japanese and French governments.
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analysis programming and engineering. A Japan-Singapore Institute of Software Tech­
nology was also set up. The Institutes offered diploma courses, while the EDB training 
units and various MNCs established shorter on-the-job courses. For instance, joint 
MNC-Singapore Training Centres were established with Philips, the Dutch conglomer­
ate, Brown-Boveri, the Swiss engineering (now Asea-Brown-Boveri: ABB, the Swed- 
ish-Swiss) group, American Computervision and several others.
Particular attention was paid to vocational training of school-leavers in courses 
designed and implemented through a growing network of centres, supervised by the 
Vocational and Industrial Training Board (VITB). Advisory committees ensured that the 
courses were tailored to meet the specific needs of industries. Additional expenses were 
met by a skills development levy which was paid by the labour market.
Revenue and Savings
From where did Singapore obtain the huge sums required for its development 
drive? Governments derive their revenues from many sources: taxes on incomes and 
profits, social security contributions, employers and manpower payroll tax, taxes on 
property, on trade transactions, on goods and services, and so on. It is usually through a 
shift in emphasis from one tax to others that real differentiation occurs.
However Singapore’s revenue profile differs from that of many countries in a 
number of ways. First, because the aim was to attract tax-avoiding MNCs to invest in 
Singapore, the trade environment was liberalised. This means taxes on incomes, goods, 
services and international trade transactions were relatively low; and, of course, there 
were exemptions for suitably qualified firms. Secondly, because of the scarcity of land 
in Singapore, property taxes are very high. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 7, land scar­
city is one of the major catalysts of Singapore’s socio-economic modernisation pro­
gramme. It has been and is still one of the greatest revenue generators. The way in 
which most land was acquired made the transactions doubly lucrative for the state (see 
7.4 supra). Thirdly, the government derives an income by charging users (commercial 
and private) for services rendered by statutory bodies and state-owned enterprises. It 
also receives dividends, profits and other returns from its many overseas investments. 
Although an analysis of Singapore’s sources of revenue reveals that there are no contri­
butions to social security, this finding requires clarification. Huge compulsory contribu­
tions are made directly to the Central Provident Fund (CPF), the statutory scheme run by 
a Board, which receives and administers these pensions or labour-related savings.
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Through state-issued bonds and securities, the CPF finances most of the gov­
ernment’s borrowing requirement. It is an ingenious way to generate investment reve­
nue and ensure that savings rates are kept consistently high (one of the factors said to be 
necessary for economic development: 3.8 supra). Besides, in lean years, the government 
can release funds in order to stimulate growth. In 1984, as part of the government’s 
policy to move upmarket and compel higher value-added investment through higher 
wages, CPF contribution was increased dramatically. In that year, the combined em­
ployees/employers’ contribution was the equivalent of 50% of all employees’ earnings, 
compared with a mere 10% in 1965. The CPF has helped finance government capital 
formation, notably in the public housing scheme and in other infrastructure. For as sug­
gested by Low (Low et al 1993, 41) ‘[Hjaving the CPF as a conduit allows some of its 
[the government’s] socialistic, distributive objectives to be fulfilled...’.
However, even when Singapore has its own funds and is capable of financing its 
economic growth, the government still ‘borrows’ foreign capital through FDI schemes 
because in this way, the monetary investment is accompanied by foreign technology, 
management expertise and ready-made markets abroad. Thus the development recipe 
includes not only foreign funding but also technology and knowledge transfer, and the 
ability to sell in foreign markets.
4.2.5 Recession 1985 to 1986
The recession was short and sharp, and need not be dealt with at length here. 
Annual growth (real GDP) fell to -1.8% in 1985. This was a traumatic experience for 
Singapore, which had become accustomed to high GDP growth rates except in the worst 
Confrontation year of 1964 (see 3.3. supra).
The causes of the recession are widely debated. However, the contribution of the 
government’s macro-economic decisions is undeniable, and painful because of the bra­
vado with which some of these policies were announced. Secondly, some external mar­
ket factors also played a decisive role.
The Ministry of Trade and Industry in 1986 admitted that a number of internal 
policy decisions needed revision. These included policies regarding high savings, high 
wage and labour costs, payroll tax, skills development fund and foreign worker levies, 
the CPF, and excessive fees and charges levied by statutory boards. All of these added 
to the costs of operating a business in Singapore (Low et al 49) and resulted in loss of
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competitiveness at a time when massive public sector investments were being made in 
housing and state-owned enterprises. It is claimed that housing investments were being 
made to prime the wheels before the December 1984 general election. But many other 
major development projects were planned and embarked upon. For instance, Jurong 
Town Corporation (JTC) devised a ten-year master plan (1980-90), which entailed the 
reclamation of land and many building projects including an ambitious international 
petrochemical manufacturing and distribution centre. Loyang was to be the first centre 
for aviation industries and an engineering base to support offshore oil and mineral ex­
ploration. Seletar Air Base was to be developed for aeronautical industries (the plan was 
dropped in 1983). Singapore Science Park was to house the development of industrial 
and scientific R&D enterprises (Rodan 151).
It is clear that the government’s strategy to shift from low-wage to high-wage, 
from low-skills to high-skills and manufacturing requiring high capital investments was 
an expensive affair, not least because of its determination to put a solid support structure 
behind the strategy. But as documented in the Economic Committee Report (1986), pre­
pared by the Prime Minister’s son, Lee Hsien Loong, then Junior Minister for Defence, 
an important reason for Singapore’s economic setback was its decline in international 
competitiveness. Unit labour costs rose by 40% from 1979 to 1984 while productivity 
stagnated. Singapore’s competitive position weakened by as much as 50% against Hong 
Kong, 15% against Taiwan and 35% against Korea (id 192). The escalation in costs 
meant that enterprises in the private sector were experiencing low profits. In the manu­
facturing sector, official data put the decline in return between 1980 and 1984 at 50%.
Other problems were also uncovered: industrial output in Singapore declined by 
8% in 1985 while the decline in other NICs averaged only 2%. In 1985, eight out of Sin­
gapore’s top ten industries declined, while other NICs continued to expand their key in­
dustries, although expansion was slower than in previous years. Lower wages and the 
promise of a huge market in China (available since 1978 when Deng’s open-door policy 
began) attracted many foreign investors away from the Asian tigers. This occurred at a 
time when the most important markets in western Europe and America were experienc­
ing an on-going, oil-induced recession which was being regarded by some as a return to 
the low-growth scenario that characterised pre-war growth patterns10.
10 Economists say that postwar growth rates in the West have been unprecedented. According 
to Hughes (1993) 'until 1950, the most rapid period of sustained growth in England was only
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The government’s remedy was immediate and straightforward. First, it cut em­
ployers’ CPF contributions from 25% to 10% for two years. Then skills development 
contributions were halved. Secondly, a two-year, wage freeze was ordered and wage re­
ductions approved wherever deemed necessary to restore an enterprise’s competitive 
edge. Thirdly, the government promised to reduce charges on its utilities, communica­
tions, transport and other services; and reduced interest rates and rents affecting busi­
nesses. The Singapore dollar was devalued. A host of tax incentives were introduced, 
including a reduction from 40% to 33% on corporate tax, and a concessional tax rate of 
only 10% for firms establishing their operational regional headquarters in Singapore.
4.2.6 Services, Regionalisation and Privatisation: 1987 to 1997
Recovery from the 1985-86 recession was fast: by 1987 growth rate was again up 
to 9%. The government moved away from its Second Industrial Revolution strategy and 
quickly targeted services and regionalisation. The manufacturing sector, whether low- or 
high-waged, was no longer expected to fulfil a lead role in future growth, for three rea­
sons. First, because the opportunities for export expansion at ‘the intermediate level’ 
where Singapore was located were considered limited. After all, although the US was 
Singapore’s largest market, the Reagan administration withdrew GSP (Generalised Sys­
tem of Preferences) benefits from the NICs mainly because they had trading surpluses 
with the US. Protectionism was also initiated in the European Community, especially for 
electronic office equipment. Secondly, the higher value-added production strategy, which 
might move Singapore into ‘the second league’ was capital-intensive, at a time when the 
relative contribution of labour to total production costs was declining because of im­
proved technology which allowed greater opportunities for automation11. The huge in­
vestments required to implement this high-technology strategy might therefore prove im­
prudent, given the precarious nature of the international trading environment for such 
products. Thirdly, the kind of manufacturing that Singapore had identified as desirable 
was like a technological moving target: advances seem to occur logarithmically, dramati-
1.4% per annum, during 1830-1870/ In the first half of the 20th century, per capita income 
growth fell to less than 1% per annum.
11 Fairchild, one of the first US companies to set up production in Singapore in the 1960s, re­
patriated its integrated circuit assembly operations to Portland, Oregon because developments 
in automation made machines more cost-effective than cheap labour. See Galante (1986).
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cally reducing the life cycle of electronic products12. The investments required to catch­
up, and keep-up, could be enormous yet there were no guaranteed markets, only increas­
ingly fierce competition and protectionism. Thus the long term prospects of the export- 
oriented, manufacturing strategy seemed less promising, whether in its low-tech, labour- 
intensive or its high-stake, high-tech version.
Manufacturing was not to be rejected totally, rather it would be integrated into 
the service concept, since as the 1986 Report asserted (id 61):
[W]e have a greater comparative advantage in exporting services than in exporting goods. We 
have comprehensive transport and telecommunication links to the rest of the world. We have a 
well-educated, English-speaking workforce. Without underrating the importance of manufactur­
ing to our economy, we can safely predict that services will be a leading growth sector, providing 
we promote them aggressively.
Services had been the bedrock upon which Singapore’s early economic growth had been 
built; it continued to contribute significantly to national prosperity.
Regionalisation
The US removal of Singapore’s GSP benefits and the general world trade condi­
tions in the late 1980s encouraged the PAP government to refocus its trade strategy from 
looking predominantly to the West, to looking in its own backyard: at home, to Japan 
! and ASEAN. For opportunistic Singapore, a voice on a multilateral body might be a
| better investment than bilateral agreements, which might backfire or be ignored. For in-
; stance, the PAP government claimed that the US withdrawal of GSP benefits breached a
I 1987 undertaking in which the Singapore government understood that its readiness to
| allow its currency to rise in line with the falling US dollar and to tighten its copyright
[ law would ensure continued GSP benefits (see chapter 8 infra).
\ The decision to focus on Asia coincided with Japan’s need for trade expansion.
In 1986 and 1987, Japanese enterprises provided the major contribution to total invest­
ment increases in Singapore, outstripping US investments for the first time (EDB Year­
book 1986/87, 20). Japan was enjoying high exchange rates (against a low US dollar) 
and suffering calls from the US Congress to liberalise its markets and cut its trade sur-
I 12 An example from the UK illustrates the point. Just 14 months after investing over £1 billion
I in a semi-conductor factory in Tyneside, creating 1100 jobs, Siemens, the diversified German
industrial group announced its closure. The main reasons given were the collapse of prices in 
the market, owing to competition from Asia; and the need for more power in each chip, i.e. a 
technology leap to the next generation. The company decided to move from making 16Mb to 
! 64Mb memory chips, thus 'pushing for growth in logic chips where price fluctuations are less
| volatile'. See Ralph Atkins, Munich head office sees closure as logical sacrifice, Financial Times 1
I August 1998, 5 col 4.
!
|
[
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plus. As part of its export solution Japan turned to the Southeast Asian markets with re­
newed fervour; though its strategy also included major investments in the US and in 
various EC countries, since non-tariff barriers or other forms of protectionism cannot be 
practised against enterprises which are manufacturing domestically. Apart from invest­
ing in manufacturing, some Japanese companies also bought the idea of using Singapore 
as their bridgehead and established regional headquarters there. Others entered the 
growing financial services market.
In 1992 Singapore took the services and regionalisation concept a step further. 
The idea was ‘to build an external economy, which is strongly linked to and which en­
hances the domestic economy’ (EDB 1997, 1). Projects were devised whereby Singa­
pore’s expertise in business management and administration could be sold as services to 
its less well-organised neighbours. First, the ‘growth triangle’ of Singapore, Malaysia 
and Indonesia was formed. According to government insiders, the idea represents a stra­
tegic partnership in which each state agrees to share its complementaiy resources and 
capabilities in order to create synergy in their development efforts. Specifically, the plan 
involves industrial projects in Johore, the southern tip of west Malaysia, which is sepa­
rated from Singapore by the Johore Straits; and industrial projects and tourism in Batam 
and Bintan, two Indonesian islands just southeast of Singapore. The concept holds that as 
the three states are at different stages of development they can offer three levels of serv­
ice to foreign investors. Labour-intensive industries can be established in Batam, inter­
mediate industries in Johore, while Singapore can contribute management and marketing 
expertise, and accommodate the operational headquarters of the investing companies. In 
Bintan, 17kms of pristine beaches can be seeded with hotels, golf courses and marinas, 
under Singaporean management, so that both countries might share the tourists who ar­
rive at Singapore’s ‘world class airport’ and quickly run out of interesting sights to see 
and things to do in tiny Singapore.
Secondly, plans were devised whereby Singapore’s technology companies, 
mainly state-linked enterprises, would invest in and help create a technology park in 
Bangalore in India. The focus would be high-tech facilities for software development, 
R&D work and light manufacturing.
Thirdly, in 1994 the governments of China and Singapore signed a memoran­
dum of understanding whereby Singapore would mastermind an integrated industrial 
growth concept in Suzhou in Jiangsu province, about 70 km west of Shanghai. The
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brainchild of the two past leaders Deng Xiaoping and Lee Kuan Yew, the project ini­
tially aimed to replicate the Singapore town of Jurong in Suzhou. The plan included de­
veloping 70 sq km bare fields into a modem city. After five years of development, Sin­
gapore managed to apply its magical recipe of attracting American multinationals (40% 
of all foreign investors), as well as Japanese, Korean and few European MNCs to estab­
lish manufacturing plants in Suzhou. According to EDB promotion literature, about 
40% of all MNCs manufacture electronics, 21% chemicals and 19% food and beverage. 
The long-term plan was to establish a town capable of supporting a population of 
600,000 over a period of 20 years. However, in June 1999, Singapore announced that it 
plans to reduce its stake in the joint-venture from 65% to 35% and hand over manage­
ment of the Suzhou Industrial Park to the Chinese by January 2001 {Straits Times, June 
29, 1999, l).13 A smaller, less ambitious China project (creation of only 150,000 jobs) is 
underway in Wuxi, further along the Yangtse Delta, 130km northwest of Shanghai.
Singapore has also invested heavily in infrastructure, residential, business, retail 
and hotel projects elsewhere in China, both on the mainland and in Hong Kong {Straits 
Times 7 February 1997, 30, col 1-5). The government, through GLCs and statutory 
boards, supports private investments in Vietnam, Myanmar, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, 
Australia, Europe and the USA. In the case of Vietnam and Myanmar, industrial parks 
like those in Wuxi and Batam are envisaged. The question is whether all these countries 
can successfully target western economies as export markets, and whether western mar­
kets can continue to absorb low-cost manufactures. The World Bank (1993) seems to 
think they can because it urged late-industrialising countries to follow in the NICs’ foot­
steps and adopt export-oriented manufacturing strategies. But in 1999, the sustainability 
of this strategy is dubious as protectionism looms again. Indeed Alan Greenspan, chair­
man of the US Federal Reserve Fund, has found it necessary to warn against protec­
tionism on several occasions {Dallas Morning News, April 17, 1999, FI).
Privatisation
The government’s wish to privatise some of its enterprises and statutory bodies 
was signalled in 1985 as part of its post-recession plan. From the early 1960s, the gov­
ernment had entered into joint ventures with foreign and local investors, and had estab­
13 For a discussion, see Carter (2000 - forthcoming).
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lished wholly owned state enterprises in industries as disparate as food, textiles, steel, 
petrochemicals, biotechnology, aerospace, hotels, banking and insurance. The rationale 
was that government-linked companies (GLCs) and statutory boards were necessary 
tools for guiding and accelerating growth and building an industrial base, or for ventur­
ing into risky areas. As Lee Kuan Yew explained (Sesser 1992, 52):
The only reason the government moved in was that no entrepreneur had the guts and the gump­
tion and the capital to go in on his own. So we went in and got it going, using government offi­
cials who had the drive and the flair. And we are prepared to go into more high-risk areas where 
Singaporean entrepreneurs are unable to carry that risk, either for lack of daring or for lack of 
capital.
It was a policy that seems to have paid dividends. For although information is scarce, 
most GLCs appear to have been profitable; several grew into huge conglomerates, espe­
cially in ship-building and construction.
However with the 1980s’ move to neo-classical and laissez faire strains of eco­
nomics, particularly in Reagan’s USA and Thatcher’s UK, and increasing protection­
ism, Singapore could ill afford to be seen as anything but a free trade market in which 
the private sector reigns over the public. Where there might be alien practices, the gov­
ernment should at least be seen to be working towards reining in the public sector. As 
Finance Minister Tony Tan indicated in his 1985 budget statement, ‘in the 1980s the 
engine of economic development should be the private sector and not the Government’, 
therefore ‘the private sector must be encouraged to set the pace in leading Singapore to 
a new economic era’. He announced that (PD vol 47, cols 481-82):
(a) Government will invest in new priority industries only where private entrepreneurs do not 
have the will or the money to undertake projects on their own or where it is essential for Gov­
ernment to provide the entrepreneurship;
(b) Government will divest its shares in companies where it does not have a majority stake and 
where it is not essential for Government to have effective control;
(c) Unlisted Government companies will, wherever possible, be listed on the Stock Exchange;
(d) For critical companies which are considered to be vital to the national interest, Government 
will maintain a controlling interest but will invite participation from the public through listing on 
the Stock Exchange.
The appointed Public Sector Divestment Committee (1987) made its recommendations 
in 1987. Lee Hsien Loong, then Minister for Trade and Industry, pointed out that the 
‘divestment exercise will be a slow process with no promises of a quick killing on the 
stock market for the investing public’ (Straits Times 24 March 1987). No doubt he had 
the privatisation of the UK’s British Telecom still fresh in memory. (BT was privatised 
in 1982). Lee added that (id):
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... privatisation does not mean that the Government will stay out of business altogether 
[for] where the private sector does not have the means to take up opportunities or when 
foreign investors want a token official commitment, the Government will not hesitate to 
do so;... [neither will it] rule out investing its reserves in good, local companies through 
minority shareholdings.
So, despite the privatisation policy, the government’s role as entrepreneur may diminish 
but it will not disappear. The first company to be divested (partially) was Singapore 
Airlines, a subsidiary of Temasek Holdings14. It was listed on the stock exchange in 
1985 but the government, through its Temasek holdings, remained the majority share­
holder. Similar profiles have been noted for other divested companies. This leads one to 
speculate on whether the government is merely trying to fulfil the second of three pri­
vatising objectives listed by the Public Sector Divestment Committee (1987, 12):
1. To withdraw from commercial activities which no longer need to be undertaken by the pub­
lic sector.
2. To add breath and depth to the Singapore stock market by the flotation of GLCs and statu­
tory boards and through secondary distribution of Government-owned shares.
3. To avoid or reduce competition with the private sector.
Adding breath and depth to the stock market fits well with Singapore’s plan to become 
Asia’s second major financial services market (after Japan). The move also reinforces 
the overall business services concept.
4.2.7 Regional Set-back and the Globalisation Assault 1997 to 1999
Singapore’s regionalisation plans were thrown into disarray by the regional eco­
nomic setback, which started in Thailand in July 1997. What began as a depreciation of 
the Thai currency relative to the US dollar became a regional nightmare as foreign in­
vestors in their lemming-like fashion panicked, called in their short-term, unhedged for­
eign currency loans, repatriated their capital and headed out of the region. Contagion 
threatened every country in the region, and by 1998 also others as far away as Brazil and 
Russia. It is now clear that the problem was one of lost confidence.^ With the collapse 
of international confidence in the region, global capital flowed out of East and South­
east Asia. However, in 1997 the Singapore economy grew by a robust 7.8% (PD vol 68, 
col 526). For Singapore was not among those countries whose lack of prudential super­
14 In December 1990, Temasek Holdings comprised 391st tier companies and 469 subsidiaries.
It employed 65,000; had a capital of SD 9.1 billion but its turnover and profits are not published. 
(A 1st tier company is one in which a ministry, holding company or statutory board has direct 
investments.) Temasek Holdings is a wholly owned state enterprise.
15 For opposing views, see Alatas 1999, Krugman 1998. See generally Rao 1998, Booth 1999.
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vision attracted a huge influx of cheap foreign capital (hot money). The problem arose 
during the early 1990s when the West, celebrating the triumph of ‘the market’ over ‘the 
state’, encouraged rapid liberalisation of financial markets and seduced late- 
industrialising countries into huge unsustainable foreign debts. The lenders were as 
reckless as the borrowers. Asset ‘bubbles’ were created in the property and stock mar­
kets in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and even Japan and else­
where. Singapore too was implicated because its regionalisation policy aimed at these 
countries and at China. For instance, in 1993 the EDB helped 150 Singapore companies 
invest abroad. Of these 52% involved projects in China, 27% in Southeast Asia and 
18% in South Asia. By December 1996, Singapore’s exposure in Indonesia alone was 
nearly USD 15 billion: (EDB 1997, 1). The cost of extended government incentives 
should also be added to these investments. Incentives included (EDB 1997, 5-6):
Double deduction for Overseas Investment Development Expenditure, Business Development 
Scheme, Total Business Planning Programme, Regionalisation Finance Scheme, Overseas In­
vestment Incentive, Intech For Regionalisation, Regionalisation Training Scheme, Overseas En­
terprise Incentive and Regional Venture Funds Incentive.
The damage to Singapore’s economy is still unknown. The growth triangle concept (see 
4.2.6) has the advantage of allowing Singapore companies based in Indonesia and Ma­
laysia to benefit from lower production costs resulting from devaluation.™ The pegs of 
the Singapore and the Hong Kong dollars to the US dollar were maintained by govern­
ment intervention in the markets. And, true to form, the Singapore government trimmed 
corporate operating costs by lowering CPF contributions and wages. Unemployment 
rates were kept lower than anywhere in the region: 1.8% for 1997 and under 4% in 1998 
(PD vol 68, col 452). According to the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB) 
investment in research and development was kept high: up 17% from 1996 to 1997: 
(iStraits Times, 3 September 1998, 5). Banking reforms were introduced to ensure 
greater transparency and accountability {Financial Times, 9 June 1998, 4; 5.7 infra) in 
preparation for a more open domestic market when the crisis ends. And end it will, for 
by April 1999 foreign investors were returning to the region. The recovery is fragile. 
Much of the interest reflected the unsustainably high US stock market (the Dow 
breached the 11000 mark in May 1999) and the proverbial ‘cheap bargains’ to be had in 
Asia.
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4.3 Conclusion
The story of how Singapore was transformed from the 1959 squalid, jobless 
gloom to the modem state that we now know is entwined with the history of the People’s 
Action Party (PAP). It is the story of how Lee Kuan Yew and his liberal faction in the 
PAP ruthlessly suppressed the leftist opposition groups and the unions, and stayed in 
power from 1959 until the present17. This study does not examine the politics of the 
state, except where they impinge directly on economic matters, e.g., in the suppression of 
the unions (chapter 6). Nevertheless an apt conclusion seems to be that during the PAP’s 
forty-year mle, this authoritarian-pluralistic developmental state has functioned almost 
like a socialist command economy, yet it has been dedicated whole-heartedly to the pur­
suit of capitalism. It is a paradox. Yet it helps explain why Wade’s theory of the gov­
erned market (see 1.5, 3.8) aptly accounts for Singapore’s experience of rapid, sustained 
economic growth.
After a long struggle, the Malaysian Federation was formed in 1963. In prepara­
tion for the merger, Singapore had practised some import-substituting industrialisation. 
This continued during the merger. However, Singapore left the Federation in 1965 and 
declared itself a sovereign state and republic. The prerequisite for import-substituting 
industrialisation was a large ‘domestic’ market, and with that gone, export-oriented in­
dustrialisation was the only alternative. This Singapore introduced and sustained in a 
very novel way: First, by an alliance with multinational corporations, which brought for­
eign funds, technology, skills and ready-made markets for the products and components, 
which Singaporeans manufactured. Secondly, far from practising the free market ideol­
ogy, the PAP’s most fundamental act was to intervene decisively in the labour market in 
the 1960s and whenever necessary to take active steps to ensure the presence of condi­
tions which it deemed conducive to economic growth (see chapters 5 and 6 to 8). State 
activism occupied a prominent place right from the start and has remained so ever since.
The government’s pervasive activist role is evident in areas as diverse as labour 
market regulation, investments in human resources and social and physical infrastructure, 
redefinition of housing as a merit good and ensuring its equitable distribution, and in­
vestments in industry and services through aggressive corporate incentive schemes. It
16 Malaysia imposed capital controls in 1998, which artificially stabilised the Ringit at 3.80-lUS$.
17 In 1990, Lee Kuan Yew retired as Prime Minister, becoming 'second minister' in the PM's of­
fice. Deputy Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong became PM.
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was also hyperactive in reducing corruption and crime, and intervening in areas where 
western governments dare not tread, for fear of infringing their citizens’ rights or 
breaching the free market ideology.
Thus, contrary to what neo-classicists say, the state did intervene to help create 
Singapore’s comparative advantage. Moreover, the state’s role was not minimal. It 
played the all-embracing roles of entrepreneur, regulator, venture capitalist and facili­
tator. Through the visible hands of nearly 100 statutory boards and several hundred 
government-linked companies the state practised economic development. Plans in the 
late 1980s and 1990s to divest itself of some companies and embrace the free market 
are probably better explained as the government’s pragmatic ploy to add breath and 
depth to the local stock exchange, to make it a more credible player in the global finan­
cial services market. They do not necessarily reflect a genuine need for government to 
loosen its grip in the area.
Somewhere in the interstices of these major governmental roles and intervening 
acts, law must reside, for Singapore’s leaders are keen to praise the nation’s ‘reliable le­
gal system’18 and proud of its rating by the Swiss Institute for International Management 
Development and World Economic Forum as having ‘the best legal system among 
NICs’.19 The next chapter seeks to discover whether there is a causative link between 
law and the economic development discussed here.
18 See Straits Times, Overseas Edition, 16 May 1998.
19 See Straits Times 26 November 1993.
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CHAPTER 5 CORRELATION BETWEEN MAJOR LAWS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1959 to 1999
No major social change occurs or is put into effect in a society which is not 
reflected in some kind o f  change in its laws. Legal institutions are respon­
sive to social change; moreover, they have a definite role, ...a s  instruments 
that set off, monitor, or otherwise regulate the fact or pace o f  social change.
Lawrence M Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development,
(1969-70) 4 Law & Society Review  29-44, 29
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5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 traced the major developments in Singapore’s economy from 1959 to 
1999. It divided them into seven growth phases or patterns which seem to characterise 
the period. This chapter aims to discover whether and, if so, to what extent changes in 
Singapore’s economic growth patterns from 1959 to 1999 exhibit positive correlation or 
causative links with changes in the law during the same period. In the first instance, a 
rather primitive measuring tool is used. It is a simple quantitative test of the number of 
laws enacted or amended during the periods identified, which reveals an intention or ap­
pears to have had an impact on economic growth. Of the total number of laws enacted or 
amended in each period, an analysis is made of key laws to ascertain how and to what 
extent their main provisions may be linked to corresponding changes in the economy. 
This is a macro-level study of the possible link between law and economic growth. In 
three subsequent chapters, 6 to 8, a micro-level investigation of selected laws is con­
ducted to test key hypotheses of law and development theory about the role of law in 
economic development (see chapter 1).
As discussed in chapter 2, to facilitate the proper conduct of the colonial econ­
omy, a specific legal infrastructure was imposed upon Singapore. The quest in this 
chapter is for cognisance of a legal framework whose functional purpose, doctrine or 
ideology may have shifted from its colonial heritage to accommodate the new underly­
ing economic developmental context (discussed in chapter 4) in which the laws of mod­
em Singapore were enacted and intended to operate.
Perhaps the most significant legal landmark was the coming into force on 3 June 
1959 of the new Constitution. This can serve as the line of demarcation between legisla­
tion of the old regime and that of the new. For following the dissolution of Parliament on 
31 March 1959, the PAP won a landslide victory1 at the general election and took office 
on July 1, under the new Constitution.
As established in chapter 4, the PAP was dedicated to economic development and 
changes, the nature of which previous colonial administrations had probably never con­
templated if only because the focus of their economic policies had tended to maximise 
benefits that were external to Singapore. Indeed some colonial policies seem to have in­
hibited the restructuring of Singapore society and economy, and in particular prevented a
1 The PAP won 43 of the 51 seats, including every seat in the rural areas: Singapore Annual Report 1959, 7.
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more equitable distribution of the national income. The PAP established itself in power 
in 1959 and has remained there ever since. It did so mainly by retaining, in the words of 
Buchanan (1972, 19) ‘the veneer of a peculiar form of ‘democratic socialism’; but in so 
doing, has also achieved political stability, rapid economic growth and a more equitable 
distribution of the national wealth than any other late industrialising country2. As chapter 
4 shows, the PAP government also exhibited a rare degree of continuity in its pragmatic 
developmental ideology and in the tenor of its development goals, all of which might 
well be reflected in the legal system. In particular, it might be expected that legislation 
passed after the coming into force of the Constitution might reflect the new socio­
political and economic agenda. In other words, law as the ‘mature policy’ of the new 
government or new legislation might show signs of law being used as an instrument of 
socio-economic change. For as Lawrence M Friedman points out (1969-70, 29):
No major social change occurs or is put into effect in a society which is not reflected in some 
kind of change in its laws. Legal institutions are responsive to social change; moreover, they have 
a definite role,..., as instruments that set off, monitor, or otherwise regulate the fact or pace of so­
cial change.
It is assumed that Friedman’s words can be extended to include economic and political 
changes, there being no logical reason why they should be limited to social changes. The 
indications of change could be the immediate or gradual emergence of laws, which were 
geared primarily towards nation-building, socio-economic regeneration, internal capital 
formation, redistribution of wealth and so on. In other words, these would be activities 
that reflect a developmental ‘governed market’ ideology while discarding or at least 
downplaying the laissez faire pure market economy inherited from the colonial period.
Of course, as all legislation which entered the statute books and came into force 
are to be observed on an equal footing until repealed or amended, all major economic- 
related laws will be analysed irrespective of whether they were enacted by the PAP or 
the previous administration. Care will be taken to identify any shifts in the nature or ide­
ology of the laws enacted under the two very different regimes. This discussion is con­
ducted in the analytical framework of the Ideal Types of Legal Systems (Appendix 1 and 
chapter 1), in which rights-based, individualistic, westem-style legalism is juxtaposed to 
an emerging hybrid westernistic legal system which is situational, communitarian, ho­
2 Buchanan's phrase is probably a simplistic way of explaining (or denying) two essential ingre­
dients in Singapore's success. One, the rulers gained political legitimacy through elections. Two,
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listic and regulatory. The latter type of laws would be justified by holistic, developmen­
tal rationality as opposed to the more calculable, neutral rationality of western laws.
5.2 Law and the Domestic Industrial Market 1959 to 1965
From the point of view of legislative activity, this period can be sub-divided into 
two phases. The first is characterised by laws seeking to provide a framework for self- 
rule in the economic and political arena. However, simultaneously, and almost contrary 
to this effort, were the activities, which aimed to prepare Singapore for merger into the 
Malaysian Federation. The paradox can be understood in light of the merger’s promise 
to open up a large, viable, single domestic market to Singapore’s future manufactures 
and services. The second wave of laws seeks to cope with demerger, the abortion of 
Singapore’s 2nd four-year plan, and the birth of a small nation state. As discussed at 4.3 
supra, the Federation was touted as the road to economic progress, and it was hoped 
that it would help complete Singapore’s independence from colonial rule. Naturally, 
when the merger failed, other laws had to assist to untie the knots and facilitate an or­
derly separation.
5.2.1 Self-rule and the Malaysian Single Market
Of the 75 Ordinances enacted in 1959, 38 were enacted before the coming into 
force of the new Constitution, and 37 were enacted after. Of the 38 laws, 22 were 
amendments and 13 were new ordinances. Conversely, of the 37 enacted by the PAP 
government, four were ordinances to transfer powers, one was an ordinance to invalidate 
proceedings of the City Council, one restricted proceedings of the court, 11 were new 
ordinances and 19 were amendments.
Two key new ordinances, enacted in the first part of 1959, were also the first 
promulgated in Singapore to encourage economic development by means of tax incen­
tives. They were the Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) Ordinance and the In­
dustrial Expansion (Relief from Income Tax) Ordinance, subtitled No 1 and No 2 of 
1959, respectively. The Pioneer Industries law (PIL) was originally intended to be in 
force for only 6 years (s4(5), s5(4)). However, towards the end of the merger, the Malay­
sian government extended PIL’s life. This law aimed to encourage investment of capital,
'democratic socialism' is more than a buzzword. It encapsulated the postwar formula for a more 
equal distribution of the nation's wealth among people who sacrificed to create it.
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local or foreign, in industries that were not carried on in Singapore on a scale considered 
adequate for Singapore’s economic needs. It made provisions for income tax exemption 
on the profits of a pioneer company for five years, starting from the date when produc­
tion in marketable quantities of the object of investment commenced.
The Industrial Expansion Ordinance (IEO) aimed to encourage the expansion of 
existing industries where such expansion would benefit Singapore economically. It was 
intended to be in force for three years (s4(4) and 5(5)), however, it was never brought 
into force.3 One commentator (Manring 1971, 1-97) speculates that the reason for this 
was that the PAP government found it expedient to encourage new operations. How­
ever, others, e.g. Buchanan (1972, 65) suggest that local entrepreneurs were ‘unventure- 
some ’ and that local capital generally followed the well-established colonial pattern of 
emphasising primary and tertiary investment (id 35); i.e., growing and harvesting com­
modities, and providing services. If Buchanan’s observation were correct, it would pre­
sumably apply to new as well as existing local entrepreneurs4, rendering implausible 
Manring’s explanation of why the PAP government did not bring the IEO into force. In 
other words, both categories of local entrepreneurs would need to be encouraged to in­
vest in the neglected secondary [manufacturing] sector. The speculation that the gov­
ernment did not bring the law into force because it might have thought that the expense 
involved in administering the scheme for existing enterprises would not be cost- 
effective also seems to be unfounded. In any event, it was only in 1967 that the provi­
sions of the IEO were brought into operation; and then, only by repeal of the ‘colonial’ 
law and re-enactment, with amendments, under part of the Economic Expansion Incen­
tives (Relief from Income Tax) Act 1967 (see 5.4). A more plausible explanation could 
be that the PAP government was already focusing on job creation as one of its major 
goals, and this could be fulfilled more easily, by new pioneer or strategic labour- 
intensive industries upon which the government hoped to build in future.
Other important 1959 laws included the Control of Manufacture Ordinance, 
which provided wide regulative powers for the establishment of industries and the pro­
tection of local manufacturers, and the Trade Unions Amendment Ordinance, which 
tightened regulations the registration of unions (see chapter 6). The Law Reform (Frus­
trated Contracts) Ordinance 1959 introduced into Singapore the provisions of the similar
3 But see 5.3 infra and footnote 10.
4 For an analysis of investment patterns in Malaya and Singapore, see Puthutcheary J (1960).
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1943 Act from England, and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Ordi­
nance provided for the registration and enforcement of foreign judgments in a similar 
way to the provisions of the UK’s Act of 1933 as amended by the 1956 Administration 
of Justice Act. The Services Lands Board Ordinance established as a corporate body the 
Services Lands Board to hold land for the Service departments [the military] of the UK 
government in Singapore. By incorporating this Board, the PAP government was re­
lieved of direct control of military property, administrative or otherwise, as the property 
was vested in the Board. Besides, it should be remembered that at this stage, Singapore 
had not gained independence with regard to foreign affairs and defence, both remained 
in the hands of the British (and later the Federation) until Singapore became a republic 
in September 1965. In any event, this is an example of the use of western law to protect 
real property rights in the traditional manner. It was not until 1960 that land law began 
to take on a more developmental and redistributive function (see chapter 7).
The Customs (Amendment) Ordinance extended the power to impose customs 
duties on all goods entering Singapore. The Control of Manufacture Ordinance, the 
various Customs amendments (1959, 1960, 1962, 1964) and the PIL were clearly in­
tended to pave the way for import-substituting industrialisation. These laws aimed to 
encourage manufacturers to invest in industry and to protect the domestic market for 
their goods. Similar laws were in operation in Malaya and when the Federation was 
formed in 1963, the Yang di-Pertuan-Agong (Head of the Federal State) made modifi­
cation orders in many areas to ensure integration and harmonisation of laws within the 
single market. For instance, during 1964 (the first and only full year of Singaporean par­
ticipation), modification orders were made to amend 12 Singapore Ordinances; repeal 
12, wholly or in part; and extend to Singapore, with suitable modifications, 19 Federal 
Ordinances and Acts. Such modification orders were made under s74 of the Malaysia 
Act 1963, which was passed to give effect to the Malaysia Agreement in the Federation5.
A study of the Customs Ordinances is revealing, especially in light of the popular 
misconception that Singapore advocated free trade throughout its development. It is true 
that Singapore continued to build on its founding strategy as a free-trade port and it did
5 For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of the Federation, see Harding (1996), chapter 
10. For the role and powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, see id 67-72.
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not and still does not prohibit exports or impose export duties on goods6. However, the 
same cannot be said for imports. In 1959 there were no protective duties on imports and 
revenue duties were levied on only 24 items such as liquor, tobacco and petroleum, pre­
sumably as preventive measures to discourage excessive use. By 1960, provisions of the 
1959 Customs amendment introduced selective protective tariffs on five items. Subse­
quent amendments (as discussed below) increased duties to protect infant industries and 
to encourage pioneer investors during the import-substituting phase and especially after 
separation from the Federation when export-oriented industrialisation was adopted. 
There seems to be a direct correlation between subsequent growth in fledgling industries 
and an increase in the number of items on which import duties were levied as provided 
for by Customs amendments and statutes enabling protective measures.
Many of the early statutes may seem timid when judged by later government in­
terventionist standards. However, it should be remembered that during this period, the 
focus was on implementing policies that prepared Singapore for the creation and opera­
tion of a single market (chapter 4). The perceived need to integrate with Malaya, and the 
then conventional wisdom that domestic markets should be protected in order to facili­
tate import-substituting industries were policies that influenced the amendments made 
and the laws enacted during this period. In general, the laws were facilitative. They 
aimed to encourage pioneer, job-creating, manufacturing industries and to provide con­
ditions that were considered conducive to economic growth mainly by protecting the 
home market, especially in the context of the Malaysian Single Market.
Bolder statutes which set the PAP’s developmental ideological imprint on early 
legislation were witnessed when the government addressed the serious problems of 
housing and unemployment, the two major commitments which had ushered it to power. 
For instance, the Housing and Development Board Ordinance 1959 transferred the assets 
and functions of the Singapore Improvement Trust to the new Housing and Development 
Board (HDB). With amendments in 1963 and 1964, the HDB was empowered to become 
more activist and productive than its Trust predecessor in providing low-cost housing for
6 There are exceptions. E.g, exports of rice were completely banned from November 1966, and 
partially lifted in March 1967. In general, during the early years, the Supplies Department 
maintained a rice stockpile. Rice importers were required to buy from the stockpile in order to 
rotate the stocks held there. However, transshipment of rice was not restricted provided it was 
covered by Bills of Lading or on condition that the rice was not landed at Singapore. Thus en­
trepot trade was not compromised.
142
the poor7. The Planning Ordinance transferred the remaining functions of the Trust 
[town planning] to a department in government, which later turned swamps into indus­
trial and residential estates (see chapter 7). The Financial Secretary Ordinance incorpo­
rated the Financial Secretariat (now Ministry of Finance) and vested all assets and prop­
erty in the new corporation. The first legislative moves designed to tackle unemployment 
appeared in 1960 and 1961 (see below).
Of the 77 Ordinances enacted in 1960, 23 were new, 43 amending, 3 repealed 
existing legislation and two merely changed the existing names of ordinances. This 
means that legislative activity continued to be on a high level in comparison with annual 
activity during the colonial period. Key areas included: (1) Nation-building: e.g., citizen­
ship, elections, banishment, organisations and societies. (2) Labour: the Trade Disputes 
(Amendment) Ordinance and the Industrial Relations Ordinance. (3) Social infrastruc­
ture: the Lembaga Gerakan Pelajaran Dewasa Ordinance (incorporated a body to take 
over the functions and assets of Singapore Council for Adult Education and promote 
adult education). Similarly the People’s Association Ordinance incorporated the assets 
and functions of the Singapore Youth Sports Centre to promote community recreation in 
Singapore, and the Dewan Bashasa dan Kebudayaan Kebangsaan Ordinance established 
a body for the development of the national language (Malay) and promotion of Malayan 
culture. (4) Crime prevention: e.g., amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code; the 
new Prevention of Corruption Ordinance directed mainly at corruption in the public 
services, but also applicable to trustees and others acting in a fiduciary capacity. This 
statute represented a landmark as it set the scene for a largely incorruptibe bureaucracy. 
Its harsh sanctions acted as a deterrent. The Road Vehicles (Special Powers) Ordinance, 
which was both enacted and amended in 1960 to enable wider police powers for dealing 
with theft, house-breaking and secret societies - including stop, search and seizure of ve­
hicles suspected of being used to commit scheduled offences. The Printing Presses 
(Amendment) Ordinance extended the provision of the previous law to cover all news­
papers printed in Malaya and published, sold or distributed in Singapore. It required the 
proprietor of every such newspaper to obtain an annual permit. It empowered the police, 
postal and customs authorities to search for and detain illegal newspapers, and impose
7 For instance, the total number of housing units built by the SIT during 31 years of existence 
was 23,264; whereas during its first five years, the HDB built 54,430 units or an average of 9,072 
units per year: Quah (1985) 241.
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penalties for being in possession of illegal newspapers without lawful excuse for the 
purpose of their publication, sale or distribution in Singapore. These draconian measures 
to restrict freedom of the press, and the stop and search provisions in the Road Vehicles 
Ordinance do correlate directly with the PAP’s crusade to consolidate its power and im­
mobilise the opposition ‘in the national interest’.
Similarly, the labour laws mentioned above and the amendment of the Trade 
Unions Ordinance in 1959 sought to curb the power of trade unions. The Industrial Re­
lations Ordinance provided for mandatory and state-assisted settlement of trade disputes. 
The Industrial Arbitration Court, established under the same Ordinance was empowered 
to arbitrate upon trade disputes in three situations (s20-22, Cap 124, 1970 ed):
1. When all the disputants agree to submit the dispute to the Court
2. When the Minister directs that the trade dispute be submitted to arbitration, or
3. When the Yang di-Pertuan Negara declares that it is essential in the public interest that a 
trade dispute be submitted to arbitration.
The Minister and the Yang di-Pertuan Negara held wide powers to direct that trade dis­
putes be settled by the Arbitration Court. The Court’s decision was to be considered final 
and breach of any term of the award settlement was made a criminal offence. This law 
was perhaps the best example of the PAP’s early determination to lay new ground rules 
for the industrial labour market, which was considered in need of greater discipline in 
order to attract investors. The PAP also used the 1959 Trade Unions Ordinance to pre­
vent the registration of communist and other opposition-affiliated trade unions, and to 
deregister those, which it regarded as unfriendly to PAP objectives (see chapter 6). Ap­
peals from the Registrar’s decision lay to the Minister for Labour, who might confirm or 
reverse the Registrar’s decision without giving a reason (si 8(2)). The Minister’s decision 
was final. Deregistration of a trade union in Singapore meant its automatic dissolution, 
rendering Singapore one of the few countries in the world where a union can be dis­
solved by purely administrative action.
The Customs Ordinance 1960 amended and consolidated the law relating to 
customs duties. It empowered the Yang di-Pertuan Negara to make an order to levy 
customs duty on any goods, where he considered it necessary for protecting any indus­
try, which is established or about to be established for the manufacture of any goods in 
Singapore. He could also make orders to protect the interests of the entrepot trade, and 
where it was considered expedient to impose customs duties on the import or manufac­
ture of goods. Responsibilities for collecting special taxes relating to motor vehicles
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were transferred to the Registrar of Vehicles. The English method of valuation of im­
ported goods for the purposes of the Customs Ordinance was adopted (from the UK 
Customs and Excise Act 1952). The power to prohibit exports or imports was trans­
ferred from the Yang di-Pertuan Negara to the Minister, and the Comptroller of Cus­
toms was empowered to decide which goods fell under the prohibited categories. Fi­
nally, of great importance, the law empowered customs officers to make arrests without 
a warrant, and put them on a par with their police colleagues who were thus empowered 
under the Criminal Procedure Code.
We are left in no doubt that the PAP government saw the inducement of private 
investment in industry as one of its major objectives. As Dr Goh Keng Swee stated 
(Ministry of Finance 1963, 55):
It will be necessary to introduce Government policies such as expansion of markets, protection 
against imports of competing goods, exemption from income tax for pioneer industries, aggres­
sive industrial promotion and other measures to bring about the desirable volume of private in­
vestment.
An analysis of early legislation shows that the government policies to which Dr Goh 
alluded were all transformed into statutes, and that, as witnessed, for instance, in the 
Customs Ordinances, institutions were also empowered to implement and enforce them. 
Indeed, to judge by Dr Goh’s declared intention, and what actually occurred, it can be 
argued that many statutes were in effect mature government policies.
Perhaps the single most important statute devised for the realisation of the in­
dustrialisation policy was the Economic Development Board Ordinance 1961, which 
repealed the Industrial Promotion Board Ordinance and gave wide powers to the new 
Board, the EDB. The huge financial backing and wide powers immediately set the EDB 
apart from its colonial predecessor. In the 1962 Budget the government allocated 
SD871m to development expenditure. The sum was divided into three (Annual Report 
1962,117):
1. Economic Development SD 507.95m or 58.32%
2. Social Development SD 349.88m or 40.17%
3. Public Administration SD 13.19m or 1.51 %.
Of the sum earmarked for economic development, some 66% or SD 337m were allo­
cated to development of industry and commerce. The EDB was endowed with the single 
largest portion, namely SDlOOm. The law empowered the EDB to promote industrial 
development with focus on assistance and organisation relating to finance, promotion,
technical consulting services, project appraisal and industrial facilities. As discussed in 
chapter 4, the EDB in effect became an arm of government, smoothing the way for pri­
vate capital investments and investing directly in industrial enterprises where necessary. 
Huge investments were made in public utilities (water, gas and electricity), education, 
transportation and communications. The EDB’s pragmatic view was that profits and ease 
of operation were the only real incentives that would attract private capital. It was 
thought that efficient infrastructure would help ensure both. In addition as former EDB 
director Mr Chua explained (1998 interview), ‘the PAP government has never been in­
terested in curtailing investors’ profits or preventing foreigners from repatriating their 
capital. The government realised that the more private investors invested, the more jobs 
they would create, and in the early days the government was primarily in the business of 
creating jobs’.
By 1962 legislative activity had fallen to a less hectic pace. Of 25 Ordinances 
enacted, 15 were amendments and only 7 were new. Seven enactments were of particu­
lar importance to the economy. The Banking Ordinance laid down regulations relating 
to capital requirements, reserve funds, auditing, transparency of transactions and infor­
mation, restrictions on mergers and so on. It also required companies conducting bank­
ing business to be licensed by the Minister. Existing banks were given ten years to en­
sure compliance. The Minister was empowered to set up a Clearing House and appoint 
an Inspector of Banks and bank advisers. This law did not apply to the state-owned Post 
Office Savings Bank, registered co-operative societies or licensed pawnbrokers. The 
Customs (Dumping and Subsidies) Ordinance provided for the imposition of anti­
dumping and countervailing duties in respect of goods dumped in Singapore or im­
ported into Singapore under subsidy. The Civil Law (Amendment) Ordinance provided 
for enforcement of all contracts or agreements purporting to be contracts or agreements 
for the sale or purchase of rubber, either for immediate or future delivery. Before this 
law, all forward contracts for the sale or purchase of unascertained rubber by description 
had been considered unenforceable as they were regarded as wagering contracts.
The Singapore Overseas Telecommunications Board Ordinance provided for the 
incorporation of a telecom Board and the transfer to the Board of all external telecom 
undertakings of the government and of Cable and Wireless Ltd in Singapore. The gov­
ernment held 51% of the shares, Cable & Wireless held the remainder. Specific provi­
sions prohibited Cable & Wireless from selling its shares to a third party without prior
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government approval, required the company to hold its assets for ten years unless the 
government requested prior transfer and to provide training for the Board’s officers in 
England or elsewhere at the Board’s expense. The Board was empowered to operate, 
maintain and develop domestic telecom services on behalf of the government.
The Tariff Advisory Commission Ordinance replaced a committee appointed 
under the 1960 Customs Ordinance and widened the scope for protecting fledgling in­
dustries. The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance enabled the establishment of 
more than one Industrial Arbitration Courts, and vested the power to certify collective 
agreements in the Court. Members of the panel were to be nominated by such trade un­
ions of employees as were invited by the Minister, and referees were to be chosen from 
a list maintained by the Minister. Appeals from the referees’ decisions would lie to the 
Court whose decision was final. Finally, the Advocates and Solicitors (Amendment) 
Ordinance provided for the regulation of the legal profession, including setting up a 
compensation fund for the victims of malpractice, supervising solicitors and auditing 
their accounts. It also allowed legal practitioners not ordinarily resident in Malaya to 
practise in Singapore if it was in the public interest to do so, paying due regard to their 
special qualifications or experience.
5.2.2 Birth of a Small Nation State 1965
While Singapore’s separation from Malaysia might have been traumatic from a 
political and short-term economic perspective, juridically it was straightforward. The 
result too was straightforward: the birth of a small nation state. But its future was con­
sidered so insecure that even the usually ebullient Mr Lee found it hard to hide his ap­
prehension: he broke down in tears in public8.
The Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 empowered the President of 
Singapore to make orders (published in the Gazette) which ensured such modifications 
in any written law as appeared necessary or expedient in consequence of the independ­
ence of Singapore upon separation from Malaysia. In this context, ‘modification’ in­
cluded amendment, repeal and adaptation, in relation to any law of Malaysia or the UK 
for the time being in force in Singapore. The President was empowered to declare that 
any such law shall cease to apply to Singapore. However, as discussed at 2.4 supra and
8 The report (Buchanan 1972,250-253) was confirmed in his autobiography: Lee Kuan Yew 
1998.
147
witnessed in Butterworth9, the President did not seem to make much use of the power. 
In 1966, the first full year after demerger, 20 modification orders were published in the 
Gazette. Under the Interpretation Act 1965, the Attorney General may, with the Presi­
dent’s consent, implement the reprint of Acts and Ordinances. In any reprint of a law, 
all amendments, modifications or new laws in force in respect of that law must be taken 
into account so that the new reprint represents a fused document comprising the whole 
body of that current law. This practice eases the work of legal practitioners. In 1966, 31 
Reprints were made in accordance with the Interpretation Act.
5.3 The Pragmatic Imperatives 1966 to 1973:
Industrial Export, Labour Discipline and the Public Housing Glue
As discussed in chapter 4, the period 1966 to 1973 saw the most vigorous growth
in Singapore’s industrialisation. This was when Singapore, in the infamous Rostow 
metaphor, experienced take-off. Growth rates reached double digits, with an annual av­
erage of 13.6%. Three areas of law were most prominent during the period: Those de­
signed to encourage industrial manufacturing for export mainly through tax incentives 
and providing attractive physical infrastructure; those regulating the labour market; and 
those permitting the construction and distribution of low-cost public housing.
In addition to changes resulting from modification orders made by the President 
under the 1965 Independence Act, in 1966, 57 Acts were enacted. Of these, 21 were 
fresh legislation and 30 were amendments (the others were Supply Acts). In the context 
of economic development, several amendments were of great importance. For instance, 
amendments to the EDB Act widened the definition of ‘industrial enterprise’ and gave 
the EDB wider powers to raise capital in the form of government loans, issue of deben­
tures, stocks, bonds and so on. Amendments to the Customs Act regularised the post­
independence situation and provided for the licensing of a new kind of warehouse. The 
Prevention of Corruption Act was extended to cover offences committed by Singapore 
citizens outside of Singapore. The Trade Unions Act introduced a secret ballot and re­
quired a majority vote to validate any decision to start, promote, organise or finance any 
strike. The Merchant Shipping Act established a register of Singapore ships, and fol­
lowed the UK 1894 Act relating to the registry of British ships. The Government Pro­
ceedings Act required the government to publish a list of government departments,
9 Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd & Ors v Ng Sui Nam [1985] 1 MLJ196; see 2.4 supra.
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which may sue or be sued in their own names, and for the Attorney-General to represent 
the government in other cases. Another amendment provided for cases involving im­
portant questions of law or precedent to be transferred from the District to the High 
Court.
Of new laws, four were particularly important: the Free Trade Zones Act which 
established such zones in Singapore for the preservation of entrepot trade (it also spurred 
a second Customs amendment during the year). The Asian Development Bank Act im­
plemented the agreement to establish and operate the Bank with Singapore as a member. 
The Bretton Woods Agreements Act authorised the government to become a member of 
the IMF, the IBRD (World Bank) and the GATT. Finally, the Land Acquisition Act pro­
vided for the compulsory acquisition of land for public and other specified purposes, 
which in the opinion of the Minister are of public benefit, public utility or in the public 
interest or for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes. Under this Act, it was 
no longer possible for a person aggrieved by an award of the Collector of Land Revenue 
to appeal to the High Court. Appeals were merely to a quasi-judicial Appeals Board con­
sisting of a Commissioner of Appeals or a Deputy either sitting alone or with two asses­
sors, depending on the amount of the award appealed against.
The Land Acquisition Act is a prime example of the shift from the individualistic 
protection of property rights (sacrosanct in the West) to a more situational, communi­
tarian approach driven by holistic rationality and pragmatism. It became the norm for 
statutes to be enacted citing specific public interest objectives. The statutes themselves 
empowered a Minister or a statutory board to make decisions as to what comprised the 
public interest or national benefit. For a micro-level analysis of Singapore’s land laws 
and public housing policies in relation to the country’s economic development, see 
chapter 7.
The watershed years were 1967 and 1968. Two key laws were enacted with the 
intention of stimulating export-oriented industrialisation: the Economic Expansion In­
centives Act (EEIA)10 in 1967 and the Employment Act in 1968 (now cap 91, 1985 rev
10 No 36 of 1967. This Act is still the basis of the law governing economic expansion incentives. 
However following numerous amendments and additions to the principal Act since 1970, a new 
consolidated and renumbered edition of the Act, dated 1985, was published in 1987. The Act is 
designated Cap 86 in the 1985 Rev Ed. The original numbers of parts and sections in the 1967 
Act and subsequent amendments do not coincide with the revised edition. For this reason and 
for the sake of clarity, references to numbers of specific sections have been omitted.
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ed). The latter went hand in hand with the 1968 amendment of the Industrial Relations 
Act (now cap 136, 1985 rev ed).
The EEIA was a landmark because it promoted export-oriented industrialisation 
instead of import-substituting manufacturing. During the debate on the second reading 
of the EEI Bill, Finance Minister Dr Goh commented that since 1959 one ‘cardinal fea­
ture of this government’s economic policy’ had been the active promotion of manufac­
turing industries. But, he said (PD, vol 26, col 466):
[S]ince our separation from Malaysia, which has put a seal on the still-born Malaysian common 
market, it has become abundantly clear that [it is] only through a rapid increase in domestic ex­
ports of traditional products in traditional markets as well as of new products in new markets that 
Singapore can attain salvation.
The EEIA consolidated existing laws which already provided incentives and extended 
them into definitive new areas such as export promotion and the application of science 
and technology to industry. The emphasis on expansion (as opposed to pioneer) signalled 
the fact that both new and existing enterprises could qualify for tax and other relief. In 
effect, Part 11 of the new Act re-enacted the provisions of the 1959 Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance while Part 111 replaced the 1959 Industrial Expansion Ordinance, which had 
never been brought into operation. Part IV was completely new. It provided for the de­
velopment of production for export. In other words, it encouraged the domestic manu­
facture of products for sale in export markets. Interestingly, deep-sea fish was included in 
this Part, perhaps in an attempt to include as many local entrepreneurs as possible (food 
and beverage processing accounted for a major share of local manufacturing) and to en­
courage the industrialisation of fish processing. Part V (Foreign loans for productive 
equipment) was also new. It was designed to encourage local entrepreneurs to seek loans 
abroad. Those who borrowed over SD200,000 from foreign sources could do so without 
paying tax on the interest payable. Part VI (Royalties, fees and development contribu­
tions) was designed to encourage foreign participation and knowledge transfer. It allowed 
the cost of approved ‘intellectual’ assistance to be taxed at the reduced rate of 20% (as 
opposed to 40%), or where fees received were used to invest in shares in the company 
paying such fees, there was total tax exemption.
The EEIA received presidential assent on 9 December 1967, but did not come 
into force until 1 August 1968. However, its provisions were made retroactive to 15 De­
cember 1967 so that incentives applied in respect of the 1967 assessment year and sub­
sequent years of assessment as stipulated in each Part of the law. Foreign investors were
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guaranteed freedom from expropriation and freedom to repatriate capital and remit 
earnings with full exchange convertibility. From an investor’s point of view, the envi­
ronment was rendered non-discriminatory and open. In short, Singapore became an in­
vestor’s paradise.
The Employment Act 1968 and the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) as amended in 
1968, reformed the legal basis and the way in which Singapore’s labour market oper­
ated. Both Bills were considered controversial as they sought to set lower standards of 
working conditions and restrict workers’ rights, especially their right to strike and nego­
tiate bonuses. The government spent a year preparing for this legislation, mainly because 
of the implications of the disciplinary measures it planned to introduce. Discussions 
were held between members of the Cabinet, the NTUC and MPs. The National Trades 
Union Congress held a landmark seminar at which the labour movement was encour­
aged to modernise (Lim 1970). The seminar’s goals were to (Anantaraman 1990, 36):
• Subordinate the sectorial interests of labour to the larger interest of the nation
• Shed the traditional adversarial role in preference to the modem role of consultation in union- 
management relations
•  Start a third sector in the economy viz. the co-operative sector ventures like Welcome, Income, Com­
fort, Denticare etc.
•  Play an educative and socialising role in nation building.
During the debate of the Employment Bill’s second reading, all views of the moderni­
sation policy were aired. It was said that the intention of the Bill was to ‘rationalise and 
regularise the working conditions of white- and blue-collar workers’ (PD vol 27 col 
526); ‘to safeguard the long-term interest and survival of Singapore’ {id, col 547); to 
remove fringe benefits such as bonuses, overtime pay and retirement benefits, and to en­
force much stricter labour discipline. For as Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew made clear 
{id, col 637):
[W]e must cut out unnecessary stoppages of work. ... Now we shall go back to 11 paid public 
holidays a year... The assumptions made in the 1950s and 1960s by the trade unions and their 
advisers, of whom I was one, were that our workers wanted more leisure to enjoy their pay. 
These assumptions were based on British practices which were and are completely irrelevant to 
our social conditions.
This Bill was considered more in tune with the demands of the new nation and more 
relevant to local conditions. It received full support in Parliament as both the survival of 
the nation and the pragmatism themes were invoked as the basis for enactment. As one 
MP explained {id, cols 631-633):
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...in the wake of the British withdrawal ... completely by the end of 1971, Singapore must forge 
ahead in economic development in all fields, particularly in industry... There is an urgent need to 
make modifications in our existing labour legislation so as to help accelerate the development of 
economic growth...
If Singapore is to survive and progress as an industrial nation, there must be concerted effort by 
labour, management and the Government... It is the national interest and not the personal or sec­
tional interest which should be given consideration....
... [t]he Employment Bill is by far the most important piece of legislation which the P.A.P. Gov­
ernment has ever introduced... [and although unpopular] this piece of legislation has to be intro­
duced... because the nation’s economy and the survival of its people are at stake.
The Employment Act duly regulated work conditions ranging from the contract between 
the parties (Part 11), to salaries (Part 111), working hours, rest days and other condi­
tions of service (Part IV), the employment of children, young persons (Part V I11) and 
women (Part IX), employment exchange (Part X), health, environment and medical 
care (Part XI), worker complaints (Part XV) and so on.
In the words of the Minister for Labour, Rajaratnam, the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Bill 1967 was (id, vol 27, col 733, 734):
an attempt to rationalise employer-employee relationship with a view to attracting new invest­
ments and increasing the efficiency of our trading and industrial enterprises. [For] ,..[N]o inves­
tor or entrepreneur is going to risk millions of dollars if he has not the final say and the responsi­
bility to decide how the enterprise should be run.
The Bill thus formalised the rights and responsibilities of management ‘to hire, fire, 
promote and transfer employees where these are necessary to enhance the efficiency of 
the enterprise’ (id, col 734). It cemented the government’s extremely pragmatic stance.
As if to underline the government’s role as model employer, the Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Act 1967 provided that no employees of statutory boards, or of bodies as 
may be specified by the Minister (by order published in the Gazette) shall be a member 
of any trade union, unless the union is confined exclusively to the employees of that 
statutory board or body. If such an exclusive trade union were established and registered 
then all the usual trade union legislation would apply.
The Currency Act 1967 established the Board of Commissioners of Currency, 
Singapore. It was empowered to issue currency notes and coins, specifying the unit as 
the Singapore Dollar (SD) whose par value was the same as the Malaysian Dollar. The 
SD was made automatically convertible into Sterling, and any deficiency in the Board’s 
assets were to be charged to and paid out of the Consolidated Fund.
Other important laws that laid the framework for orchestrating export industriali­
sation during this period included those which created statutory bodies or incorporated
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government-linked corporations, some of which were formed by demerger and spin-off 
from the EDB. For instance, the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) was incorpo­
rated in 1968 under the Companies Act and licensed to conduct banking business under 
the Banking Act. It was created to take over and conduct the financing of projects, which 
enhanced the government’s industrial strategies. To transfer the financial activities of the 
EDB to the DBS a new law had to be passed to ensure that the Minister and others were 
not acting ultra vires the EDB Ordinance or in breach of any contractual obligations. 
Thus, by virtue of the 1968 EDB (Transfer of Assets) Act, the EDB’s relevant loans, as­
sets, equities and so on were transferred to the Finance Minister, who in turn transferred 
the banking and financial services aspects to the DBS. Thus assets and financing activi­
ties which were previously controlled by the statutory body were moved to an incorpo­
rated body [privatised] while the parties involved circumvented questions about acting 
ultra vires the EDB Ordinance, ignoring the ‘will of Parliament’ and indeed whether the 
EDB’s assets were transferred at a fair price. At the same time, the DBS was rendered 
free to transfer its assets to any purchaser via shares on the open stock exchange. In the 
event, the government itself retained 48% of this stock.
The Jurong Town Corporation Act (JTC) facilitated the second EDB spin-off in 
1968. It empowered the JTC to develop and manage industrial land and industrial es­
tates for manufacturing and export-processing. The Singapore Institute for Standards 
and Industrial Research (Act No 48 of 1973), spun-off from the EDB as a statutory 
body, was charged with ensuring the quality of products and promoting industrial re­
search. Finally, the Rubber Association of Singapore (Incorporation) Act made the 
Rubber Association a corporation and empowered it to conduct a rubber market in Sin­
gapore, and to promote and regulate the rubber industry. It also established a Singapore 
Rubber Fund.
Already in 1967 the government decided that Singapore should also prepare to 
move its financial services activities into the international arena. The Finance Compa­
nies Act (now cap 108, 1995 ed.) empowered the Minister to appoint a Commissioner 
for Finance Companies for granting licences to companies to carry on financing busi­
ness and to decide and supervise the standards that should govern the issue of licences 
and their revocation. The Asian Dollar Market was set up, inspired by Bank of America, 
which became the first foreign bank to receive an operating licence in Singapore. In 
1967, the government consolidated the Companies Act. This Act repealed the Foreign
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Corporations (Execution of Instruments under Seal) Ordinance, the Companies Ordi­
nance and the Companies (Special Provisions) Ordinance, and made other amendments 
to the law relating to companies. It followed closely the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 
(in force April 1966, which also followed the UK legislation). This made sense, since 
Singapore law-makers had assisted in the 18-month drafting of the Malaysian Compa­
nies Act; besides it was thought that divergence in this area might be disadvantageous to 
trade and commerce in Singapore.
The years 1969 and 1970 witnessed more legislation aimed specifically at en­
couraging export-oriented manufacturing, especially via foreign investors. For instance, 
amendments were made to the Control of Manufacture Ordinance, as well as to the 
Economic Expansion, Customs, Free Trade Zones, Immigration and Industrial Relations 
legislation.
In 1971 two laws were enacted which helped lay the foundation for environ­
mental protection: the Clean Air Act appointed a Director of Air Pollution Control, set 
standards for factory emissions, and so on, while the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
Act implemented the international treaty. The 1971 Monetary Authority of Singapore 
Act (MAS) empowered the MAS as the government’s banker and financial agent, and 
the statutory body in charge of administering all statutes pertaining to banking and fi­
nancial regulation. The Act was amended in 1972 to widen the Board’s ambit, including 
empowering it to make loans to banks and approve financial institutions in times of 
monetary instability against such forms of security as the Authority considered suffi­
cient. The MAS has acted and continues to act as Singapore’s de facto Central Bank.
The Industrial Relations Act was amended to empower the Arbitration Court to 
have regard to ministerial recommendations about wage increases and to vary awards or 
collective bargaining agreements accordingly. The Employment Act empowered the 
Minister to notify wage-change recommendations at his discretion. This was done every 
year, and from 1972 also in concert with the new tripartite National Wages Council. 
These amendments and the powers they conferred illustrate how the government con­
stantly used law to intervene in the labour market during all the periods in order to 
regulate working conditions and from 1972, when labour demand began to outstrip sup­
ply, also to regulate the cost of labour11. The Central Provident Fund (CPF), established
11 For texts of the annual Employment (Recommendations for Wage Increases) Notifications for 
1972 to 1983, see Murugasu 1984,190-237.
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under the colonial administration, proved a useful tool with which the PAP government 
could effect compulsory national savings, while regulating wages. Contributions were 
usually of equal share for employers and employees. From 1968 onwards, the CPF Act 
was amended annually, mainly to regulate and widen the scope and purposes for which 
employees could withdraw accrued sums. These were usually for investment in private 
residential property and in apartments built by the Housing and Development Board (see 
chapter 7), and for tertiary education. In later years, the purchase of approved stocks was 
also allowed. Numerous ministerial notifications (published in the Gazette) frequently 
changed the annual interest rate paid to the Fund, and permitted the use of funds for in­
vestment by statutory bodies or government-linked companies.
5.4 Law and Socio-economic Infrastructure Phase 1: 1974 to 1978
As discussed in chapter 4, by 1973 the government’s export-oriented industriali­
sation had achieved full employment in Singapore; so much so that it soon became ap­
parent that continued growth would depend on immigrant workers from Malaysia, Indo­
nesia and further afield. The shortage of workers was particularly marked in the 
construction industry. This was engaged in massive residential construction works for 
the HDB12 and large commitments on the JTC industrial estates. Having determined that 
the economy’s dependence on foreign workers was an unhealthy trend for nation- 
building, the government devised a strategy whereby it would move away from low- 
wage, labour-intensive production (see 4.2.4). The almost annual amendment to the Im­
migration Act during this period is evidence of the government’s determination to re­
strict the influx of unskilled foreign labour.
The oil-induced world recession in 1974-75 did not affect Singapore signifi­
cantly, although the rate of growth in manufacturing and employment slowed to an aver­
age of 8.1% and 7.7% respectively. However, the slowdown was sufficient to make the 
government delay implementation of its strategic plan to move manufacturing up-market. 
That is, to move out of industries requiring labour-intensive manufacturing into the kinds 
of industrial production that required a more skilled, highly trained labour force. The de­
sired industrial restructuring was postponed until the return of a better economic climate. 
In the meantime, government policies and the accompanying legislation aimed to support
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local entrepreneurs, to broaden the industrial base into more science and technology 
based industries, and to prepare the workforce for the change by relating their vocational 
training and education to the specific needs of industry. With this plan in mind, several 
new statutory boards were set up, while others were consolidated under various minis­
tries. Particularly noteworthy was the 1973 Industrial Training Board set up under the 
Ministry of Education.
The 1975 amendment to the EEIA widened the pool of local investors who could 
qualify for incentives and empowered the EDB to apply various schemes and benefits 
more generously, including direct equity investment on a case by case basis at the EDB’s 
discretion. For instance, the EDB could apply funds from the Capital Assistance Scheme, 
established in 1975, to provide financial help to companies participating in projects that 
were likely to be of economic and technological benefit to Singapore. Similarly, the Joint 
Venture Bureau, set up in 1975 to encourage foreign and local joint ventures, the Small 
Industries Finance Scheme and the Extended Small Industries Finance Scheme 1976, all 
offered financial assistance for new activities considered worthy of promotion. Worthy 
projects were those, which in the eyes of the EDB, undertook activities to promote Sin­
gapore’s manufacturing development or service capability. The EDB’s Manpower and 
Training Unit was set up in 1971, and the National Productivity Board (an EDB spin-off) 
became a statutory board under the Labour Minister in 1972 and under the Minister of 
Trade in 1986. Both spent much energy and resources improving workers’ industrial and 
engineering skills, and encouraging local investors to form alliances with multinational 
companies.
The Singapore Labour Foundation Act 1977 sought to support the general move 
towards improving the skills of the labour force, though it aimed to do so via the trade 
union movement, which by then had become a government appendage (see chapter 6). 
Specifically, the Act aimed to promote the welfare of trade union members and their 
families by aiding and assisting in social, economic and educational activities relating to 
the development of the trade union movement. It also provided bursaries, scholarships 
and fellowships for the children of union members, for workers who pursued studies 
relevant to trade unions, and for persons nominated by the NTUC to pursue studies at 
institutions of higher education in Singapore or abroad. The Act also awarded fellow-
14 According to HDB's Annual Reports 1971-75, during the 3rd five-year building period, the
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ships for research into union matters, established rehabilitation centres, and assisted gen­
eral charitable works in aid or furtherance of the trade union or co-operative movement 
(cap 302, s 4, 1985 ed.). Subsequently, the Singapore Labour Foundation invested hugely 
in business and co-operatives. One publication (NTUC 1992, 32) listed ownership of 
several enterprises, including: Pasir Ris Resort Ltd, a holiday resort developer; SLF 
Holdings Ltd, SLF Leisure Enterprises Ltd, a country club developer; SLF Management 
Services Ltd; SLF Properties Ltd; Transcom Enterprises Ltd; and Vicom Ltd. These en­
tities are separate from the major enterprises, some noted on the Singapore Stock Ex­
change, in which the NTUC invested or masterminded as co-operative sector ventures 
after the successful 1969 modernisation seminar, e.g., Comfort taxis, Welcome, Income, 
Denticare, and so on.
5.5 Law and Socio-economic Infrastructure. Phase 2: 1979 to 1984
With the world’s major economies recovering from the first oil crisis, by 1979 
Singapore was ready to implement its industrial restructuring strategy. Of the 33 Acts 
enacted or amended during 1979, two played key roles in the economy: (1) amendments 
to the EEIA (No 8 of 1979), and (2) the new Skills Development Levy Act. The EEIA 
amendments addressed investment allowances on approved projects. Specifically, as ex­
plained by Gok Chok Tong, the then Minister for Trade and Industry, the Act aimed to 
encourage multinationals to ‘expand and invest in higher value-added production’ and 
local entrepreneurs to ‘improve and diversify their business into the manufacturing of 
better kinds of products’ (PD, vol 39, cols 321-324). The provisions allowed investors to 
benefit from incentives without requiring a company to make immediate profits from 
which to make deductions. A second EEIA amendment was made in 1979 (No 32 of 
1979) to reverse the effect of a Privy Council decision in favour of Union Carbide in 
Union Carbide Singapore Pte Ltd v Comptroller o f Income Tax ([1979] 1 MLJ 275). 
There was to be no doubt who was in control, and legislation was the easiest tool to 
wield. Investment allowance benefits as well as regular capital allowances and relief 
were made available under the Income Tax Act (ITA), but only on EDB-approved proj­
ects. The ITA was amended annually from 1959, in recent years it also provided corpo­
rate and personal tax breaks that encourage investments in professional training and edu-
number of units built reached 113,819 or an annual average of 22,764 units.
157
cation, which supported the government’s policy to upgrade skills and add value during 
this period.
The Skills Development Levy Act (SDA) imposed on every employer a skills 
development charge in respect of each employee. The government was also required to 
make monthly contributions just like any other employer. The SDA was a major source 
of revenue for financing the government’s industrial restructuring programme. The idea 
was for employers to contribute to the improvement of the quality of the workforce and 
thus help the government implement its new industrialisation strategy of moving into 
skills-intensive as opposed to labour-intensive kinds of industry. Under the SDA, a com­
prehensive system of training was organised and bodies set up to administer approved 
courses and to encourage the development of suitable courses at existing institutions. An 
SDA Approved-in-Principle scheme was established to help make it easy for companies 
to choose courses in which their employees could participate. The Vocational and In­
dustrial Training Board Act 1979 established the Vocational and Industrial Training 
Board (VITB) and empowered it to develop and administer full-time institutional train­
ing which was recognised under the SDA scheme.13
In parallel with skill development, investments in physical and other social infra­
structure were also made to support businesses and private individuals. Consequently 
there were amendments to Acts in areas such as transportation, telecommunications, 
education, employment, health, housing and development, the Jurong Town Corporation, 
merchant shipping, and so on.
Apart from the major training and education drive during the period 1979 to 
1984, the NWC also recommended a spate of wage corrections, i.e. wage increases, 
which employers gladly paid because labour was in short supply. This was the result 
partly of restrictions on immigration and partly because of the success of the govern­
ment’s upgrading policies. Contributions to the CPF were also increased for employers 
and employees. In this way, the government sought to prevent high inflation by in­
creasing the rate of compulsory savings. From 1978 to 1984, CPF contributions rose 
from 16.5% to 25%; i.e., 25% from each party. The vast sums accrued by the CPF were 
invested as loans by the government in infrastructure, housing and specially approved 
key industries at home and abroad.
13 For a list of participating institutions and sample of courses illustrating the pragmatic scope 
and reach of the SDA scheme, see Murugasu 1984.
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Provisions of the 1984 amendment of the EEIA (No 34 of 1984) made pioneer 
status available to certain service companies. These included companies involved in en­
gineering and technical services, research and development activities, computer and 
computer-related services, industrial design and other ‘qualifying services’, which the 
Minister was empowered to define by regulation from time to time. Services had been 
pivotal in Singapore’s colonial development but until now the PAP’s focus had been on 
industrial manufacturing. This strategy had paid off handsomely in job creation: between 
1957 to 1985, manufacturing employment multiplied four times, raising the sector’s 
employment share to 25.4%, making it the largest employer in the economy’ (Pang Eng 
Fong 1988, 202). But by the 1980s it was becoming more prudent to promote other 
sources of wealth since, as discussed in chapter 4, protectionism was rising in the West 
against importation of products produced by low-skill, low-wage, labour-intensive 
manufacturing.
There is no doubt that legislative activity, especially in the areas of labour rela­
tions, human resource development, incentives and infrastructural improvements con­
tributed significantly to economic growth during the period. Inadvertently, as the 1985- 
86 recession showed, the attempt to engineer an abrupt shift from low-skill, labour- 
intensive manufacturing to skills-intensive, higher value-added production back-fired 
temporarily (Rodan 1989). However, recovery was engineered, in part, by a clutch of 
policies and laws, which coerced, nudged and encouraged society in a new direction.
5.6 Hiatus 1985 to 1986
The global recession (provoked by hikes in the price of oil) caught up with the 
Singapore economy in 1985. As discussed in chapter 4, nearly all sectors of the econ­
omy registered decline in 1985. From a quarterly GDP of 10.1% in the first quarter of 
1984, GDP fell every quarter in 1985, registering -1.2% growth for the second quarter 
of 1985 and -1.8% for the whole year. This was the most severe setback for the post­
independence Singapore economy. Not even the 1998/99 recession, sparked by the 1997 
regional downturn, registered such negative growth rates. Priming the pumps in the 
classical Keynesian way was not an option in 1985 as the statutory boards and govern­
ment-linked companies had already embarked on massive housing development 
schemes, construction of the Mass Rapid Transit system, and other infrastructure works. 
The recession in Singapore was deepened by poor demand from export markets, law-
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sanctioned domestic structural factors resulting in low competitiveness, and the global 
setback in petroleum-related exports (which in 1983 comprised 36.6% of Singapore’s 
manufacturing sector exports). As the government report (Economic Committee 1986) 
concluded, the main medicine was to correct the lack of competitiveness, and then 
change direction.
To restore competitiveness, the Economic Committee proposed immediate re­
ductions in corporate and personal income tax and a huge expansion of investment al­
lowance provisions under the EEIA. As growth areas on which to focus, it emphasised 
services - especially banking and finance, transport and communications, and interna­
tional business consulting. Highlighted too was the idea of promoting Singapore as a 
home for regional head-quarters of multinational companies that require effective, se­
cure distribution and technical service centres in Asia. Tourism and hotel management 
were also selected for focus.
Most of the Committee’s proposals were accepted, though few statutes were 
needed to implement them. Indeed of the 10 Acts passed during 1985, only one, the Req­
uisition of Resources, was new; seven were amendments and two Supply Acts. However, 
important changes were effected via the Budget, the Income Tax Act and notifications, 
which were issued to reduce CPF and skills development levies, as well as fees charged 
for services rendered by statutory bodies and government-linked companies.
Major legislative activities occurred in 1986 and 1987 (with 32 and 30 enact­
ments in each year) as the government sought to shift direction by giving bigger incen­
tives to service industries and orchestrating the promotion of the regionalisation policy. 
For as the Economic Committee noted (1986, para 113):
The government must promote services actively, the same way it successfully promoted manu­
facturing. It should depend not only on the growth of local Singapore companies, but also on at­
tracting international service corporations to set up in Singapore. The EDB should be given the 
task of attracting such companies, in coordination with the respective ministries and statutory 
boards responsible for individual professions and sectors... Suitable incentives... will speed the 
shift towards a service economy (my italics).
5.7 Business Services, Privatisation and Regionalisation 1987 to 1997
This decade was characterised by Singapore’s determined effort to promote and 
consolidate its position in Asia, especially in the financial and business services sector, 
and in tourism, as recommended by the Economic Committee in 1986. It was marked by 
the government’s attempt, albeit somewhat half-heartedly, to privatise and divest itself of
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some government-linked companies. There was also robust response to growing external 
pressures to enact laws to protect intellectual property rights and to liberalise banking 
and the financial services sector. The use of secondary legislation escalated, especially in 
areas related to economic incentives for investors.
Business Services
Following the 1986 budget, the EDB was empowered to approve post-pioneer 
benefits for both foreign and local investors, and to implement several liberal investment 
allowance schemes for small and medium-sized service enterprises. Two prominent 
regulations (No SI33/86 and No S297/86) added ‘qualifying activities’ to the ambit of 
the EEIA, thus widening its scope and the type of service companies, which could qual­
ify for incentives. Subsequently, the EEIA 1987 (No 22 of 1987) enacted most of the 
Economic Committee’s 1986 proposals, except provisions relating to incentives for set­
ting up regional headquarters, which were included in the 1986 Income Tax (Amend­
ment) Act (No 31 of 1986).
The number of incentives and schemes designed to encourage services and in­
dustrial expansion multiplied enormously. The majority now also aimed specifically at 
local businesses. For although foreign investors were never left out, the Minister made it 
clear in his 1987 budget statement that the government was committed to building ‘a 
solid base of thriving resilient local businesses’. Apart from numerous EDB- 
administered schemes, there were schemes that operated under the Trade Development 
Board Act (cap 330), the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Research (now 
cap 303A), the National Productivity Board (cap 200, now cap 303A)14, and under the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (cap 186). To help small local businesses find their 
way round the jungle of schemes the Small Enterprise Bureau was empowered to screen 
and co-ordinate applications.
Special laws facilitated and regulated the financial and business services indus­
tries. Among those enacted or amended during the period were Acts in the areas of ar­
bitration (cap 10), bankruptcy (cap 20, 1996 ed), corporate governance (cap 50), as well 
as those regulating lawyers (cap 161, 1997 ed), bankers (cap 19, 1994 ed), accountants 
(cap 2, now cap 2A, 1988 ed), architects (cap 12, 1992 ed), and so on. The Securities 
Industry Act (cap 289), administered by the MAS, came in the wake of a crisis in Sin­
14 The National Productivity Board and Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial Re­
search merged under the Singapore Productivity and Standards Board Act (cap 303A, 1996 ed).
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gapore’s fledgling securities industry following the collapse of Pan Electric Industries 
Limited. The new Act, modelled on the Securities law in the US rather than the more 
self-regulatory system under the previous UK Act, tightened provisions governing secu­
rities operations and introduced business conduct rules. The Act passed its first real-life 
test on the October 1987 Black Monday crash, when despite tremendous pressures, all 
members of the SES survived without difficulty. Also notable was the Futures Trading 
Act (cap 116, 1996 ed). Its 1995 Amendment took place in the aftermath of the Barings 
debacle in which Nick Leeson allegedly brought about the collapse of the merchant 
bank by trading Nikkei-225 futures contracts on SIMEX. Other important amendments 
to Acts designed to regulate the sector include Finance Companies Act (cap 108, 1995 
ed), Commodities Futures (cap 48A, 1993 ed), Insurance (cap 142, 1994 ed) and the 
Banking Act (cap 19, 1994 ed).
The Banking Act (cap 19) was amended in 1993 to tighten admission criteria 
and make exceptions to banking secrecy rules (s 47) to combat drug money laundering. 
Singapore operates a two-tier financial services sector: the first being domestic banking 
in which the Singapore dollar (SD) is the sole currency of transaction, and the second 
being offshore banking, which transacts in foreign currencies, mainly the US dollar, 
Japanese yen and the Deutsche mark. In 1998, 34 banks held full licences to operate in 
the domestic market, of these 12 were Singapore-controlled, and 22 foreign. In addition, 
there were 13 restricted and 107 offshore licensed foreign bank branches in Singapore, 
which are permitted to undertake wholesale SD business. Banks may transact in all as­
pects of financial services including commercial banking, securities/futures trading, in­
surance and other activities. The government seems to consider that the domestic sector 
is overbanked and has been unwilling to issue new banking licences. However, the off­
shore banking sector is ready to admit new institutions, which meet MAS’ standards. 
But there are external pressures to further liberalise the domestic market and open it to 
foreign institutions. The demands of supranational trade agencies such as the World 
Trade Organisation are particularly keen. Singapore’s response has been to set up the 
Competitiveness Committee and the Financial Services Review Group, both of which 
made preliminary reports in 1998. One of the results is the Banking (Amendment) Act 
(No 27 of 1998). It provides inter alia for the establishment of a real-time gross settle­
ment system (RTGS) for funds transfer and settlements on a continuous basis. This is 
the BIS-preferred (Bank for International Settlements) mode, which it claims reduces
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the chances of settlement failure in one bank affecting other banks. It is clearly a confi­
dence-building move, although the dangers of the ‘one-button instantaneous electronic 
transfer’ were demonstrated in the 1997-1999 crisis. More legislation will follow. In­
deed the government has been encouraging local banks to merge and consolidate. It 
took the lead by introducing the Post Office Savings Bank of Singapore (Transfer of 
Undertakings and Dissolution) Act 1998, which privatised the government-owned bank, 
merging it with the GLC, the Development Bank of Singapore. The next step is to allow 
greater participation by foreign banks. However, given the persistent turmoil in the 
global financial markets and calls for integrated regulation, including curbing the free 
flow of speculative capital and making global bodies like the IMF and World Bank 
more accountable, further legislation might well await the lead of global fora.15
This would be in line with developments in the area of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs). Singapore started the decade (1987) by being seduced (or threatened) 
unilaterally by the USA to enact a stringent copyright law and ended it by freely enact­
ing a raft of IP laws to comply with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on TRIPs 
(Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). During a debate on the 1987 
Copyright Bill (cap 63,1988 ed) Mr Chandra Das complained that (vol 50, col 590):
... [W]e were told in this House that there was a linkage between the introduction of the Copy­
right Act and the granting of a new GSP [Generalised System of Preferences] package by the US 
Government. This House ... accordingly enacted one of the stiffest Copyright regulations in the 
world and undoubtedly one of the main beneficiaries was the United States. In return, a new and 
favourable GSP package was given to Singapore in 1987.1 am told this package... amounted to a 
12% increase in monetary terms, compared to a 3% increase for Hong Kong... Suddenly the GSP 
status will be withdrawn with effect from 1st January 1989...
However, ten years later, in February 1998, Prof Jayakumar, the Minister for Law ac­
knowledged that (vol 68, col 310-11):
... the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, including copyright, will be­
come increasingly important as the Singapore economy matures. With advances in information 
technology, the global economy is rapidly moving from an industrial-based to a knowledge- 
based society....
To ensure that Singapore stays ahead of the competition for high-value, knowledge-intensive in­
dustries, a good system of protection for intellectual property rights is... necessary. Knowledge- 
based industries will be attracted to invest in Singapore if they are confident that their intellectual 
property will be given sufficient protection here.
The Minister conceded that a good IPR infrastructure is important to the success of Sin­
gapore’s own home-grown, knowledge-based industries. Other IP or technology- 
oriented laws, include a new Patents Act 1994 (cap 221), Layout-Designs of Integrated
15 See, for instance, debate on the Tobin Tax: Schmidt 1994, Eichengreen et al 1997.
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Circuits (Act No 3 of 1999), Geographical Indications (Act 44 of 1998), Trade Mark 
(Act No 46 of 1998), and amendments to the Medicines (cap 176), Control of Plants 
(cap 5A), and Computer Misuse (cap 50A) Acts. The latter was comprehensively 
amended in June 1998 inter alia to widen the category of illegal acts and to increase 
substantially the associated penalties. Work on legislation for IP laws was completed to 
meet the TRIPs deadline of 1 January 2000 (see chapter 8).
Singapore laws have moved decisively into the digital age to give credence to the 
government’s aspiration to become a regional high technology and business services 
hub. For instance, the Electronic Transaction Act 1998 was designed to generate confi­
dence among the public in conducting e-commerce on the Internet. In 1998 the Films 
Act (cap 107) was amended. Importantly it redefines the word ‘films’ so as to include 
regulation of a wide range of new technologies such as CD-ROMs, enhanced CDs, 
VCDs, DVDs, e-mails and the Internet. Computer file formats with extensions like .mpg, 
.dat, .avi and .mov are also defined as ‘films’ because, according to the Minister for In­
formation and the Arts, they comprise moving images (PD vol 68, cols 475-76). Unfor­
tunately, the Act also includes a provision to disallow the distribution and exhibition of 
party political films in Singapore. This, the Minister claims, over-generously, will not 
affect the freedom of political debate in Singapore {id, col 477). I conclude otherwise.
Indeed, under the veil of ‘necessary response’ to rapid technological advance, the 
government has amended various Acts such as the Undesirable Publications (cap 338, 
1992 ed), the Newspaper and Printing Presses (cap 206, 1991 ed), the Digital Signatures 
and the Singapore Broadcasting (cap 297, 1995 ed). It has restructured provisions for the 
enforcement of these laws in such a way that it could be argued that the level of censor­
ship in Singapore is bound to increase, despite the Minister’s claim to the contrary. 
Privatisation
One area in which the government had promised to loosen its grip concerns the 
divestment of government-linked companies (GLCs) and statutory boards. It is difficult, 
if not impossible, to get any substantial information about progress in this area. Even 
Singaporean scholars (Tynne & Ariff 1989; Low 1998) point to the paucity of data. 
However, trawling through Parliamentary Reports often has its rewards. For instance, in 
a written reply to an MP on 6 March 1985, the Minister for Finance was obliged to give 
a list of GLCs, including their paid-up capital and the percentage of the government’s 
shareholding in each (PD vol 45, col 345-54). Cross-checking the 1985 ownership pro-
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file with one synthesised for 1998, it becomes clear that the divestment programme has 
proceeded and is proceeding at a snail’s pace. Indeed as the Minister for Finance, Dr 
Richard Hu, explains (PD vol 68, col 459):
... in principle, the Government is prepared to divest fully its stakes in the GLCs other than those 
of strategic interest to our defence or our economy. Other than these strategic investments, the 
rest can be privatised in due course.... [However] the Government has put in much effort and re­
sources to develop the GLCs, and we would want to divest them in such a way that the issue of 
management succession is properly addressed... This is important as Government would want the 
GLC to remain in relatively good hands. ... and be mindful that its divestments do not have too 
adverse an impact on the future of the company. This requirement will, however, slow down the 
divestment process.
Of course, only the government is qualified to say which GLCs are ‘of strategic interest’ 
to Singapore’s defence and its economy so the criteria for full divestment might never 
be known or be fulfilled. Similarly, only the government can decide when a GLC can be 
divested into ‘relatively good hands’. Dr Hu gives an example, which illustrates the 
problem {id col 460-461): ‘in the case of Singapore Press Holdings, it has been fully di­
vested, except that Government holds a golden share because it is a sensitive area’. .. .A 
golden share is ‘one nominal share’, (which has) ‘overriding powers over the manage­
ment of the company. In other words, it can determine the Chairman and the Board’.
Thus, the government might be loosening its grip, but it does not intend to let 
go. Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 4, the government seems to be divesting only 
those companies, which will help to widen and deepen activities on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange. Acts that gave effect to the privatisation of statutory boards during the period 
include: Telecommunications Authority of Singapore (cap 323, 1993 ed), Singapore 
Broadcasting Authority (cap 297, 1995 ed) and Public Utilities Board (cap 261, 1996 
ed). The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act (cap 170A, 1997 ed) repealed 
the Port of Singapore Authority Act (cap 236) in preparation for partial privatisation. 
Regionalisation
The policy has been discussed at length at 4.2.6. Many of the laws which gave 
effect to the policy and supported the idea were the same as those that sought to pro­
mote Singapore as a business services hub. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat them 
here. It is, however, worth noting that an abundance of subsidiary legislation, especially 
ministerial notifications, was used. The Economic Development and the Trade Devel­
opment Boards carried out much of the regionalisation work, though investments were 
channelled through government-linked companies and private enterprises. In his address 
to parliament in January 1994 the President promised a major review of laws to provide
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‘adequate infrastructure to support Singapore businesses investing in the region’ in­
cluding appropriate international conventions and model laws to harmonise and facili­
tate international trade and dispute settlements (Straits Times 12 January 1994, 1). Sub­
sequently, the International Arbitration Act (cap 143 A, 1995 ed.) was enacted. It co­
opted the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model 
Law on international commercial arbitration. Its provisions will apply to commercial ar­
bitrations in Singapore, unless parties expressly exclude it. Similarly, the United Na­
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna 1980) was 
ratified in February 1995 and the Sale of Goods (UN Convention) Act 1995 gave it ef­
fect from 1 March 1996. The Income Tax Act was amended to provide tax incentives 
for Singapore companies to invest abroad. As discussed in chapter 4, Indonesia, Malay­
sia, Vietnam, India, China and others were targeted. As yet, there have been no compre­
hensive studies of the performance of Singapore’s regionalisation policy. However to 
judge by occasional government announcements in Parliament, the policy has not been 
an unqualified success. The latest and perhaps most expensive setback is Singapore’s 
decision to reduce its investment in Suzhou, China from 65% to 35% and hand over 
management of the industrial park to the Chinese on January 1 2001 (Straits Times, 29 
June 1999). The bilateral MOU signed in 1994 had proposed a 20-year management 
project. Clearly, there is a need to investigate ‘what went wrong’ and learn lessons.16
5.8 Response to Regional Set-back 1997-99
As is now well-known, in 1997 the Southeast Asian countries’ policy of pegging 
their currencies to the US dollar proved imprudent because, as it turned out, the pegs in
•  17many countries were supported by speculative short-term foreign loans (hot money) . 
The currency crisis, which started in Thailand in July 1997, had serious economic, so­
cial and political repercussions throughout the region (see, e.g. Booth 1999). In Singa­
pore, the greatest impact was economic, for as shown in chapter 4, the government, via 
GLCs and statutory boards, and private enterprises had invested heavily in the regionali­
sation policy. However, as in the 1985 recession, the government’s first reaction was to
16 See Carter 2000, The Clonability of the Singapore Model of Law and Development: The Case 
of Suzhou, China, in Antons (2000) forthcoming Curzon Publishers.
17 See 4.2.7, chapter 1 and accompanying notes. See also Managing Capital Flows in East Asia, 
Washington: World Bank 1996.
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consolidate, then extend incentives, improve workers’ skills and plan for the future. As 
BG Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister, explained: (PD, vol 68, col 291:
We must take the regional economic slowdown in our stride. The Government will continue to 
invest in economic infrastructure to build up our capabilities and productive capacity. Compa­
nies too should use this opportunity to trim costs, restructure and upgrade productivity, so that 
when the region recovers and becomes more competitive, they will not be left behind.
Primary laws in support of this stance were few, as ministries seem to prefer to take ac­
tion through subsidiary legislation. For instance, the Ministry for Trade and Industry 
continued to support eligible companies with financing under the Regionalisation Fi­
nance Scheme, by providing low-cost loans for investment in fixed assets such as build­
ings and equipment (id, col 298). It also broadened the scope of the Local Enterprise Fi­
nance Scheme, which is designed primarily to assist operation of local small and 
medium-sized enterprises. However, the Income Tax Act (No 31 of 1998) introduced 11 
new tax incentives, which were announced in the 1998 Budget.
Towards the end of 1998, the Manpower Ministry launched four schemes to 
tackle the worsening job situation. Called the Action Plan, the core concepts included 
skills redevelopment (especially for new growth areas such as wafer fabrication and the 
hotel services sector), wage adjustments, shorter work-weeks and identification of future 
growth areas which require retraining of workers. Adjustments in CPF contributions and 
skills development levies were debated in September 1998 and reluctantly effectuated in 
November 1998.
In January 1999, the Straits Times proclaimed that 1998 growth had been 
stronger than expected at 1.3% (Overseas ed 2 January 1999, 1, 1-6). November’s eco­
nomic package had cut business costs significantly and strengthened Singapore’s com­
petitiveness (id). Here too, secondary legislation was used to effect the necessary cuts 
and changes. Thus, Singapore seems to have weathered the storm. However, with the 
uncertainties caused by the spread of economic disarray to Russia and Brazil, and the 
continued fragility of Indonesia, it might be too soon to claim robust recovery. But with 
the government’s proactive stance and its willingness to use legislation (primary or sec­
ondary) to force its will upon market actors, Singapore might not suffer huge setback - 
unless protectionism raises its head in Singapore’s primary export markets, which are 
still the USA, the European Union and Japan. Continued dependence on the West might 
also indicate that Singapore’s regionalisation policy has failed.
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5.9 Conclusion
Chapters 4 and 5 should be read together. Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the 
growth patterns that the state engineered in response to Singapore’s predicament in rela­
tion to the realities of the world economy at various phases of its economic develop­
ment. It reveals how the government harnessed investment and resources (foreign and 
local) to effect its ambitious industrialisation policies, which account for Singapore’s 
rapid economic development, especially from 1966 to 1979. It also unravels the state’s 
attempts to transform itself from a labour-intensive, low-skilled, reliable industrial para­
dise into a high-skilled, knowledge-based, technologically competent, business services 
regional hub from 1979 to 1999.
Chapter 5 attempts to chart the development of those growth patterns in relation 
to the enactment and implementation of major economic-related laws. It is clear that 
laws were relevant to Singapore’s economic development. It is equally clear that there 
was a direct correlation between the two variables. What is less clear, is whether there is 
a causal link because there is no known method for measuring cause and effect here.
Perhaps it might be taken on faith or common sense. For instance, the foregoing 
makes it is clear that labour laws in particular supported the PAP’s industrialisation 
policies by providing investors with low-cost labour, which was rendered stable and 
disciplined. The policy was successful until about 1979, for as chapter 4 shows, local 
and especially foreign investors in the textile and electronics industries responded 
mightily. Later the government removed Tow-cost’ from the equation but retained sta­
bility and discipline. A Wall Street Journal study conducted in 1979 (Wain, ed, 1979, 
135-145) seems to vindicate the government’s stance on labour and trade unions. It 
showed that foreign investors prioritised the following factors in their decision-making 
process: (1) political and economic stability, (2) stable labour force, (3) stable currency 
value, (4) ready availability of foreign exchange, (5) access to local finance, (6) exis­
tence of good joint venture partners, (7) tax incentives, and (8) duty-free imports. On 
this basis, the 1979 study found that Singapore’s investment climate was the best among 
all ASEAN countries {id 139). It is tempting to speculate on whether the government 
could have saved on the tax incentive programmes, which are rated so low in the deci­
sion-making hierarchy. But that issue deserves its own study.
This study suggests that Singapore laws effected political and economic stabil­
ity. They also secured a stable, disciplined labour force. These were laws which in the
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main suppressed political opposition and neutered the trade unions. In any event, they 
fulfilled the top two investor-requirements and were undoubtedly instrumental in ef­
fecting growth. But other laws also provided for the relatively equal distribution of 
merit goods such as low-cost housing, education, health care and so on. There is un­
doubtedly a positive correlation between the laws, which enabled these steps, and the 
rapid, sustainable economic development that occurred. Whether causation can be 
shown, as is required by Law and Development theory, is another matter. The factors in 
play are too multifarious and complex to warrant singling out law as the crucial change- 
agent.
The period 1979 to 1999 was more challenging than 1959 to 1979 as Singapore 
moved from labour-intensive to skills- and capital-intensive production and services. In 
the second period it had to try to minimise the effects of competition from other low- 
cost countries and circumvent western protectionism, which grew worse as competition 
increased. However, throughout the periods, the government remained active and dem­
onstrated its willingness to intervene with flexibility, creativity and agility in response to 
whatever it perceived the economic realities to be. Even in 1999, forty years on, it dem­
onstrated it ability to tailor the cost, size, discipline and skills of the labour force in the 
face of regional economic setback. Through its statutory bodies, it picked specific in­
dustries in which to invest and fearlessly stepped out first by ‘risking’ regionalisation in 
an attempt to circumvent protectionism in industrialised western markets. In every case, 
government policies seem to have been mediated by laws, although in recent years the 
growth of subsidiary legislation has proliferated.
In many cases, law seems to be merely facilitating or legitimising government 
policy. This is what I have called Taw as mature policy’. But it is unclear whether policy 
alone, without gaining ‘maturity’, could have effected change. Perhaps the idea of law as 
mature policy is a characteristic of all laws whether in Asia or in the West; whether they 
appear as promises in the pre-election Party manifesto or are created as pragmatic ‘plans 
of action’ once a government is in power. The issue then, is whether the nature of laws 
in Singapore differs significantly from the nature of western laws. The issue is also 
whether Singapore laws confirm Law and Development hypotheses about the relation­
ship between law and economic development. These issues are analysed in the following 
three chapters, which comprise Part 2 of this study.
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PART TWO 
MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS
Testing key Law and Development hypotheses about the role of law in 
economic development by examining the operation of law in three factors of 
production that affect capital formation: labour, land and capital
(intellectual property).
CHAPTER 6 LABOUR LAWS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
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This Bill [Central Provident Fund (Amendment)] is the third o f  three Bills 
which are designed to meet the challenging economic problems that loom 
ahead. Whilst the purpose o f  the Employment Bill and the Industrial Rela­
tions (Amendment) Bill is to have more realistic terms and conditions o f  
service and employer-employee relations consonant with the need to induce 
greater investment, generate higher productivity and employment, this Bill 
deals with another inter-related problem - the marshalling o f  domestic 
savings fo r  the economic and social benefit o f  our people.
S Rajaratnam , M inister  for Labour,
Parliamentary Debates vol 27, col 792.
In-stru-men-tal-ism
A system o f  pragmatic philosophy holding that ideas are instruments, that 
they should guide our actions and can change the world, and that their 
value consists not in their truth but in their success.
Collins English D ictionary 1991, 3rd ed.
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6.1 Introduction
Conceptually, the enactment and operation of labour laws occurred in four distinct 
phases. During each phase, law was used to support a specific agenda, which the gov­
ernment perceived would help it achieve its declared objectives:
1. Pre-1959, when the agenda of the post-war colonial government was to control trade 
unions in order to curtail the anti-colonial freedom movement and communist infil­
tration. The fledgling People’s Action Party (PAP) was in opposition during the last 
four years of this period.
2. After 1959, when the PAP formed the government and until 1965 when the Malay­
sian Federation failed. During this period, the goals were to defeat left-wing unions, 
minimise industrial conflicts, consolidate PAP support among moderate unions, and 
propel the trade union movement towards acceptance of the government’s develop­
mental ideology, including support for the Federation.
3. The era of modernisation from 1966 until 1972. The government’s goals were to se­
cure and maintain industrial peace and discipline, achieve ‘restraint in wage negotia­
tion and, ... a greater awareness of social responsibility of organised labour in the 
larger framework of the national interest’ (Goh Keng Swee 1972, 103).
4. The tripartite era from 1972 until the present when the objectives were to consolidate 
the links between labour, management and government, and move from merely non- 
adversarial union-management relations to more active co-operation for the effective 
control of wages, education and training, and sharing in national prosperity.1
This chapter attempts a micro-level analysis of key aspects of Singapore’s labour laws2 
from 1959 to 1999. The main thrust is to assess the efficacy of the laws in helping the 
governments to achieve their respective declared objectives during the four periods out­
lined above. Although the first period falls outside this study’s remit, post-war colonial 
labour laws are analysed briefly because they form the essential platform upon which the 
PAP built its laws.
Consistent with the theme of this study, the chapter seeks to determine two issues. 
First, whether changes in the economy caused changes in the law, or whether changes in
1 It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the merits of corporatism or decide which, if 
any, of the categories Singapore fits: state corporatism, societal corporatism or authoritarian 
corporatism. For a discussion, see Schmitter 1974; Deyo 1981; Anantaraman 1990.
2 Aspects of the following laws that govern labour and industrial relations in Singapore are con­
sidered in this chapter:
Central Provident Fund Act, cap 36
Employment Act, cap 91
Employment of Foreign Workers Act, cap 91A
Industrial Relations Act, cap 136
Retirement Age Act, cap 274A
Skills Development Levy Act, cap 306.
Trade Unions Act, cap 129,1970 rev ed; cap 333,1985 rev ed.
Trade Disputes Act, cap 331
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the law caused economic development. Secondly, whether changes in the law steered 
Singapore’s labour laws towards convergence with or divergence from labour laws in the 
West. But first, what was the nature of post-war colonial labour laws?
6.2 Post-war Colonial Labour Laws 1940-59
Labour legislation of the late colonial period was characterised by laws designed 
to control trade unions’ power. Three key laws can be identified: the 1940 Trade Union 
Ordinance (now cap 333), the 1940 Industrial Courts Ordinance3 and the 1941 Trade 
Disputes Ordinance (now cap 331). The Ordinances came into force in 1946, after the 
occupying Japanese forces of World War 2 were replaced by the British Military Admini­
stration.
The Trade Union Ordinance was key. It made provisions for compulsory registra­
tion and stringent regulation of the unions’ internal affairs. Many unions were registered 
from 1946-48, including the Communist-backed Singapore Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU), which was registered in June 1947. The SFTU won the support and leadership 
of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had co-operated with the British against 
the Japanese during the occupation and felt betrayed by the British after the war. The 
government soon realised that the SFTU-organised strikes had economic as well as po­
litical aims, and therefore sought to curtail them. The April 1948 strike protesting the 
government’s refusal to allow a May Day assembly culminated in large-scale unrest. In 
June 1948 a state of emergency was declared and the MCP banned. Simultaneously, pro­
visions in the Trade Union Ordinance were strengthened so as to deny registration to 
agitators. Several MCP members were arrested. The SFTU was deregistered in October 
1948 (Chew 1991, 31). Many left-wing and communist unionists went underground, with 
a new resolve to fight colonialism. Their battle was fought through the labour move­
ment.4 The scene was set for successive governments to view labour law as a way of 
curtailing the powers of trade unions rather than a means of protecting workers’ interests, 
as had been the case in western labour legislation. Thus, right from the start, Singapore’s 
English-inspired colonial labour law differed in purpose and substance from its English 
counterpart.
3 This was incorporated in the Industrial Relations Act 1960 (cap 136).
4 For background and discussion, see Chew 1991; Balakrishnan 1976; Nair 1973.
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6.2.1 Controlling the Unions: Compulsory Registration
The stated purpose of the 1941 Trade Union Ordinance was to provide for the 
registration and control of trade unions. Section 7 prescribed registration of the union’s 
name, rules, officers, registered office ‘and all such other matters as may be required to 
be registered’. Under s27(2) a ‘certified copy of any entry in the register shall be conclu­
sive proof of the facts specified therein ...’. This provision was important because of the 
stringent criteria for deregistration, and the registrar’s power to declare void, the regis­
tration of any union if any one of its objects is deemed unlawful. Unions established after 
the coming into force of the Ordinance were given one month, reckoned from the date of 
establishment, in which to comply with registration, s8(2). Section 8(5) provided for 
prosecution of a trade union, which failed to apply for registration within the prescribed 
month. Such a union became an unlawful association, on a par with a union whose reg­
istration was refused, withdrawn or cancelled, s i9. Under s20 the unlawful association 
shall be dissolved and its funds disposed of according to its rules or (if the Minister so 
directs) paid into the consolidated fund of the government.
The powers of the registrar to refuse to register a new union or to cancel registra­
tion of an old were very wide. For instance, under slO, registration was at the registrar’s 
discretion. The section’s phrase ‘may register’ indicates that he was not bound to register 
a union even when it satisfied all requirements. Registration could be refused or can­
celled for a host of reasons (see sl4 and si 5), including if the registrar felt that a union is 
likely to be used for unlawful purposes or purposes inconsistent with its objects and 
rules, si4(d), or likely to be used against the interests of its members in a particular trade, 
occupation or industry, si4(e). Neither was the registrar bound to deregister a union even 
if satisfied that the statutory requirements for registration were unmet or if there were 
evidence of other grounds for deregistration. But the law was silent as to how the regis­
trar would arrive at his decisions. Thus, not only were there huge discretionary powers to 
refuse or cancel registration, the powers also imposed on the registrar an improper duty 
of prophecy.
The second statute, the 1941 Trade Disputes Ordinance, provided the legal 
framework for regulating trade disputes. In particular, it laid down mles for when strikes 
and lock-outs were to be deemed illegal, s3; penalties for inciting or instigating strikes 
and lock-outs, s6; and for giving financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs, s7. During 
the post-war years, many strikes were called to support political activists who sought to
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free Singapore from colonial rule. This statute effectively repressed many of these ac­
tions.5
6.2.2 Early PAP-Trade Union Connection
From 1950-59, Lee Kuan Yew was engaged as a legal advisor of trade unionists 
(Lee 1998, 664). By 1954, he and other moderates and some left-wing unionists had 
formed the People’s Action Party (PAP), one of whose goals was the liberation of Singa­
pore. The close link between the PAP and the unions was unmistakable. Indeed, accord­
ing to the Straits Times (19 November 1954) seven of PAP’s 14 co-founders were 
prominent trade unionists. Lim Chin Siong, Secretary of the Factory and Shopworkers’ 
Union, became an Assemblyman of the PAP.6 His union was registered in April 1954 
with 200 members. By October 1954, there were 29,000. According to Josey (1956, 6) 
this union declared that ‘the true function of a trade union is to defeat colonialism. Only 
then will the worker be free from the slave trade.’
The line between PAP members and union members was blurred. Further, Lee’s 
contact with the unions led him to believe that ‘any man in Singapore who wants to carry 
the Chinese speaking people with him cannot afford to be anti-communist’ (Pang 1971, 
2). Many Singapore Chinese were proud of and sympathetic towards the new People’s 
Republic of China. It seems that a substantial number of them believed that communism 
could be harnessed to defeat colonialism. This suited Lee’s political goals. As Pang aptly 
puts it (id) Lee decided to ‘ride the communist tiger’ - at least for the time being.
6.3 PAP Labour Legislation 1959-67
The PAP’s landslide victory in the 1959 general election was secured inter alia 
by the support of the leftists, communists and the moderates. However, during the next 
five years, the PAP government was obsessed with freeing the party from its electoral 
dependence on the left, and preventing an alleged communist take-over of Singapore. 
These goals also coincided with the PAP’s determination to create a nationalistic trade 
union movement, which, although free from communist influence, would nevertheless
5 Although the 1955 Preservation of Public Security Ordinance was not a labour law it affected 
labour relations by providing for detention of left-wing leaders, many of whom were trade un­
ionists. In this way it clearly supplemented the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinances.
6 Four PAP candidates fought the 1955 general election. Three won: Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Chew 
Chua and Lim Chin Siong. The prominent trade unionist, Devan Nair failed to win his seat.
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support social justice. At the opening of parliament, the government had the Yang Di- 
Pertuan Negara declare that (LD 1959, vol 11, col 8):
The government’s guiding principle is industrial peace with justice. Justice implies ensuring fair 
and just demands for a reasonable share of the fruits of their labour. At the same time we must 
remember that a chronic state of industrial unrest means the wrecking of our economy, and if our 
economy is damaged the workers, employers and the country as a whole will suffer.
He failed to define ‘industrial peace with justice’ but the government pledged to estab­
lish a permanent, independent Court of Labour, whose findings and awards would be 
binding and enforceable on both employers and employees (id). It also promised to 
curtail strikes.
Of the statutes retained by the PAP government, four were key: the Trade Un­
ion, Trade Disputes, Central Provident Fund and Public Security Ordinances. While in 
opposition, in 1957, the PAP had approved the colonial government’s anti-union action, 
the so-called Operation Liberation, under which 35 [communist] leaders of unions, 
which were about to be accepted into the Trade Unions Congress, were detained (Fong 
Sip Chee, 1969, 61). Now in government, the PAP itself intended to strengthen these 
legal provisions in its effort to unify the unions and continue to weaken the communist 
influence. The section below analyses key PAP amendments of the Trade Union statute.
6.3.1 T rade Union (Amendment) Act 1959
The 1959 Amendment purportedly sought to remedy two major shortcomings in 
the 1941 Ordinance. In fact, it merely widened the registrar’s discretionary powers.
First, under the TUO any seven persons could form a union. Registration was re­
fused only where an association was suspected of being sponsored by communists. Thus 
employers were free to register so-called yellow (company) unions which they used 
against genuine workers’ unions. For instance, the local branch of the Singapore Bus 
Workers’ Union at Hock Lee Bus Company was refused recognition by the company, 
which established its own Hock Lee Bus Workers’ Union. While the law did not prohibit 
employers from organising workers’ unions, sl4 was amended to empower the registrar 
to refuse to register a trade union, which was likely to be used against the interests of 
workmen, and to cancel the registration of any such union. It was for the registrar to de­
cide whether a company-sponsored union was likely to be used against the interests of a 
genuine workers’ union.
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Secondly, many splinter union groups were formed and registered because no 
rules provided for the compulsory recognition of a majority union, and with only a pre­
requisite of seven members, registration of splinter groups was easy. The law, as it stood, 
seemed to encourage dissidents to break away and form rival unions in the same trade or 
industry. The registration of unions proliferated: over 125 were registered between 1955 
and 1958 (The Mirror, 1983, vol 19, 5, 9). Thus the amended sl5 empowered the regis­
trar to refuse to register or to deregister a union, if in his opinion, it was necessary to do 
so in the interest of the workmen (sic), having regard to the existence of another trade 
union in the same trade, industry or occupation. As discussed, the amendment aimed to 
limit splinter groups and prevent a multiplicity of trade unions in any one industry or 
trade. However, it could be argued that the section also curtailed the right of workers to 
establish or join an organisation of their own choice. In other words, it denied them free­
dom of association. Section 17 allowed appeals of the registrar’s decisions to the Minis­
ter of Labour, but under si 8(2), the Minister’s decision ‘... shall be final and shall not be 
called into question in any court’.
Thus, despite the huge discretionary powers conferred upon the registrar, neither 
his nor his Minister’s decisions were open to judicial review. The 1959 amendments 
aimed to consolidate the trade union movement, but by retaining final decision for the 
Minister, the government gained control of the movement. In addition, the Act failed to 
provide for any sanction against employers who interfered in the affairs of trade unions, 
or to prescribe penalties for employers who financed trade unions, unless they were held 
to be communist sponsors. This was in harmony with the PAP government’s policy to 
strengthen the non-communist unions but weaken the others.
6.3.2 The Industrial Relations Ordinance 1960
The Industrial Relations Act (cap 136) was the first piece of original labour rela­
tions legislation passed by the PAP parliament.7 Its stated purpose was the regulation of 
the relations of employers and employees, and the prevention and settlement of trade 
disputes by collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration. As amended, it also pro­
vided for the recognition of trade unions by employers.
7 This Ordinance was a foreign transplant. Under the Colombo Plan, a legal officer seconded 
from the Australian government drafted the Singapore statute. However, the PAP government 
made some changes 'in the national interest' to reflect its more developmental, activist stance.
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The Act comprised eight parts. Part 2 established the Industrial Arbitration 
Courts, while the remaining Parts set the procedures for collective bargaining, arbitra­
tion, awards, boards of inquiry, powers of the courts, and so on. The Bill was introduced 
purportedly to implement the government’s declared policy of ‘industrial peace with 
justice’ (Rajaratnam 1968, PD, vol 27, col 733).8 
Collective Bargaining
The Act provided a framework for conducting collective bargaining negotiations 
between employers and trade unions of employees. Section 16 stipulated that to be eli­
gible to serve an invitation to negotiate under s i7, a registered trade union must have 
prior formal recognition by the employer. Recognition could be obtained upon applica­
tion under Form A of the Schedule. Sections 17, 18 and 19 set out the procedures and 
time limits for the acceptance of an invitation to negotiate and for completion and deliv­
ery of the agreement for certification by the Registrar of the Industrial Arbitration Court 
(IAC). Under s i7(1) a recognised trade union or an employer may serve on the other 
party, ‘a notice in the prescribed form setting out proposals for a collective bargain­
ing...’. If the serving party has not received an acceptance to negotiate from the other 
party after seven days, that party may notify the Commissioner, s i9. The Commissioner 
will seek to persuade the party to accept negotiations. If he fails, he shall notify the 
Minister, and unless the Minister directs otherwise, the Commissioner shall notify the 
Registrar that a trade dispute exists, s i9(3), and conciliation can begin. Possible 
grounds for refusing to negotiate are not set out in the law.
Conciliation
The conciliation mechanism is stipulated in s20. If the parties do not reach an 
agreement after 14 days’ negotiations, either party may notify the Commissioner, who 
will attempt a settlement. If after seven days he finds that the parties are unable to reach a 
settlement, the Commissioner must notify the Minister, and unless he directs otherwise, 
the Commissioner must notify the Registrar that a trade dispute exists, s21.
The IAC must certify any agreement reached by the parties. It may refuse certifi­
cation if the agreement is not in the public interest. This is at the court’s discretion, as is 
deciding what is ‘the public interest’. The IAC must refuse certification, if the agreement
8 Presumably Rajaratnam was referring to the government7 s statement at the beginning of the 
1959 PAP government, see 6.3 above and the debate of the 2nd reading of 1960 Industrial Rela­
tions Bill.
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does not comply with the provisions of the Act, for instance, if the parties failed to ap­
point referees who should function under the guidance of the IAC, or if the agreement 
contains ambiguities or uncertainties of the parties’ intention. Section 24 empowers the 
IAC to amend the collective agreement after hearing the parties. The certified agreement 
is deemed to be an award of the IAC, s26, which ensures its enforcement (s51, s55, s56). 
If the parties fail to reach a certifiable agreement or conciliation, they may resort to in­
dustrial action. Such action is regulated by the Trade Disputes Act. Alternatively, or as a 
last resort, the dispute might go to arbitration.
Arbitration
Both parties in an industrial dispute may apply jointly and in writing for arbitra­
tion to the IAC, s31. If they fail to do so, the Minister shall refer the dispute for arbitra­
tion. Alternatively, the President of the Republic may refer the dispute to the IAC by de­
claring that ‘it is essential in the public interest’. The law is silent as to what 
circumstances would be considered ‘essential in the public interest’. The distinction 
between the powers granted to the Minister and the President is also unclear. However, 
once the IAC has cognisance of a dispute, a strike is deemed illegal, unless arbitration 
has failed.
The procedure and powers of the IAC are set out in Part VI. They differ from 
those of an ordinary court of law, because the IAC is designed to be an informal forum. 
For instance, representation of the parties by advocates or solicitors is prohibited except 
in cases in which the Attorney-General intervenes, s62. For as the Prime Minister ex­
plained (PD vol 12, col 310):
I have been persuaded by my colleague, the Minister for Labour and Law, who informs me that 
far from helping to crystallise the issues at debate, they (advocates and solicitors) very often be­
fog their clients. He is firmly of the opinion that it is more likely that justice will be done if both 
employers and unions, through being naive, honest and sincere, put forward points - both good 
or otherwise - in their respective cases, and that an intervention from the sometimes skilful and 
sometimes less skilful advocate only helps to prolong and bedevil a proper and rapid conclusion 
of the hear-ing of an arbitration. Sir, I would hate to admit, that on principle we might save time 
by excluding advocates and solicitors.
During the debate of the 2nd reading of the Bill, the government also expressed the 
wish that disputes be reconciled, agreements become the rule, and awards, the excep­
tion. The IAC therefore actively seeks to encourage the parties to settle their disputes 
out of court. It has been found that in some years, the IAC resolves more cases out of 
court than in (Krislov & Leggett, 1985, 22). It is important to bear in mind that the 
IAC’s power is not absolute, for at any time the Attorney-General or the Minister may
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intervene on behalf of the government and force a ‘public interest’ settlement. An 
amendment to the Act in 1972 also allowed the IAC to have regard (cap 136, s34):
not only to the interests of the persons immediately concerned but to the interests of the commu­
nity as a whole and in particular the condition of the economy of Singapore;...
Although the IAC was empowered to have regard to the public interest in settling dis­
putes the over-riding ministerial power remained unimpaired.
6.3.3 Defeating the Radical Rivals
A new radical Trade Unions Bill was passed in 1961, but it was never brought 
into force9, perhaps because its main purpose was to appease the leftists and procom­
munist wing of the PAP. The PAP’s moderate elite seems to have lost its nerve at the 
last minute, fearing that the proposals would increase the leftists’ hold on the unions 
and, indirectly, on the Party. Some of the key, somewhat radical provisions of the Bill 
included:
1. No trade union could be registered unless it was affiliated to a federation and had at least 250 
members.
2. Easy amalgamation: existing trade unions could reregister under any one of 19 prescribed 
union categories.
3. A new condition for registration was added: a trade union’s rules and its constitution should 
be democratic and provide for representation of its members in the management of its affairs. 
Furthermore, to effect registration, at least two-thirds of the members of the executive must 
have been employed in the industry with which the union was concerned.
4. The likely use of a union for unlawful purposes would no longer be a ground upon which to 
refuse registration.
5. Unions could be affiliated to a political party and contribute donations and affiliation fees. 
They could establish a separate political fund for certain specified objectives. Political funds 
could be contributed towards the election expenses of any person seeking to enter the Legis­
lative Assembly.
6. Unfair labour practices or employer interference in trade union affairs were prohibited and 
enforceable by a penalty of not more than SD 2000.
The Bill was shelved. The leftists and pro-communists became disillusioned. It was also 
at about this time that the issue of the Malaysian Federation was brought to a head. The 
PAP’s extreme left opposed independence through merger, which had been the PAP’s 
declared policy.10 They also opposed the Citizenship Bill’s amendment, which deprived 
many unions’ left-wing leaders of their citizenship. In July 1961 the frustrated leftists
9 This section is based on Siddiqi (1967), Legislative Debates (1960) and Vasil (1988).
10 See, for instance, Central Executive Committee policy statement (1960) The Fixed Political 
Objectives of our Party, PAP 6th Anniversary Celebration Souvenir, Singapore: Petir, 6.
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resigned from the PAP and formed the Barisan Socialis party.11 The union movement 
split into the moderate Trade Union Centre (later National Trades Union Congress, 
NTUC) and the leftist Singapore Association of Trade Unions, SATU, which was regis­
tered in August 1961.
It was not until 1963 that new amendments to the Trade Union Act were tabled. 
By then the political agenda had changed significantly. The PAP government charged the 
SATU of being dominated by communists and proceeded to treat the NTUC, led by 
Devan Nair, much more favourably than SATU led by Lim Chin Siong (Fong 1979, 95- 
99). The discretionary powers wielded by the ruling elite allowed preferential treatment 
in the administration and enforcement of the labour laws, particularly in matters con­
cerning the registration and deregistration of unions.
During the early phase of the PAP government, 1959 to 1966, fourteen unions 
were refused registration while 138 were deregistered under the labour laws (Anantara- 
man 1990, 108). Of the deregistered, 77 sought voluntary dissolution, ceased to exist or 
were amalgamated. The remainder were deregistered for contravening the law in one 
way or another, including where, having regard to the existence of another union, it was 
necessary to cancel registration in the interest of the workmen. Already in 1957 the
30.000 strong Factory and Shopworkers’ Union was deregistered, with PAP approval. In 
1963, over 100 pro-communist, anti-Malaysia union leaders were detained under Opera­
tion Cold Store. The PAP also ordered deregistration of seven SATU unions with over
50.000 members, and of the Naval Base Workers’ Union and the Singapore Harbour 
Staff Association, each with 10,000 members. Thus, by the end of the period, with legal 
support, all rival unions were deregistered or dissolved. This paved the way for the 1963 
merger with Malaya. As Heyzer and Wee confirm, in 1963 the PAP government used 
(1972,4):
... its legal machinery with excessive severity against the SATU leaders and the leaders of the
Barisan Socialis. Many of them were arrested and detained without trial for allegedly taking part
11 The PAFs left-wing threatened the survival of the PAP itself. On splitting, the Barisan took 
with them 80% of the party's membership, 35 of the 51 branch executive committees, 19 of the 
23 paid organising secretaries, and 17 of 43 members of the legislative assembly. The PAP was 
forced to reconstruct itself from the grass root level. Several government institutions were duly 
arranged to assist in this work. For instance, the People's Association, a statutory body with the 
Prime Minister as chairman was set up to create and supervise a new network of committees 
and institutes. They formed the essential interface between the government and the people. The 
three national goals, stipulated by the government and the PAP, which united the constituen­
cies were (1) saving Singapore from communism, (2) building a multi-racial nation and (3) 
achieving rapid social and economic development. See Gamer (1969; Vasil (1988).
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in pro-communist activities. The government also deregistered many trade unions with left-wing 
sympathies and arrested their leaders on various charges. Chief among these were the seven un­
ions which formed the backbone of SATU. (My italics).
An observer closer to the events, Ellison Chalmers (1967, 64) noted that the PAP and 
the civil service were substantially integrated. In its control of the government, the PAP 
‘aids the unions by the very structure of Social Welfare Legislation which is on the 
books and which is being administered by the present government’ (id). Foremost 
among the social welfare legislation were labour laws such as the Industrial Relations 
and the Trade Union Ordinances, which bestowed huge discretionary powers on gov­
ernment officials.
6.3.4 The 1966 Trade Union (Amendment) Act
The government’s commitment to create a unified, non-communist trade union 
movement which would share in the party’s developmental agenda grew tremendously 
after Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965. More legal controls were called for. 
First, to regulate the qualifications of those who could be appointed as union officials; 
secondly, to curtail the rights of workers to strike.
The 1966 amendment of the Act addressed both issues. The 1940 Act had pre­
scribed that at least two-thirds of the officers of every union should be persons em­
ployed in the industry with which the union is affiliated. This provision had made al­
lowances for the need of union leadership in developing countries to recruit assistance 
from outside the union’s membership. However the government amended this provision 
to prohibit non-citizens from becoming union officials, except at the discretion of the 
Minister, who could make written exemptions as he saw fit, s32(4). Moreover, under 
s32(2), a person convicted of any criminal offence, which ‘in the opinion of the Minis­
ter renders him unfit to be employed by a trade union’ was disqualified from holding a 
trade union post, except where the Minister is satisfied that the person has reformed and 
has become fit, s32(3).
The secret ballot clause and powers to strengthen the control of strikes and in­
dustrial action were also introduced in the 1966 amendment. Under s28(l) the majority 
of the union’s members had to consent, by secret ballot, before a union could com­
mence, promote, organise or finance any strike or any form of industrial action. It be­
came an offence to instigate or incite others to strike where consent of the majority by
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secret ballot had not been obtained, s28(4). However, the new statutory definition of 
‘industrial action’ was so wide that even some PAP MPs and NTUC leaders objected. 
Under s28(8),
‘industrial action’ means the adoption of any practice, procedure or method in the performance 
of work which would result in a limitation on output or production in any occupation, service, 
trade, industry or business.
Of the many criticisms noted during the debate of the Bill, that of Ho See Beng was 
most colourful. He claimed that (PD vol 25, col 210-11):
The whole object of this amendment will restrict an employee even to take only two or three 
minutes off for the purpose of answering the calls of nature. Legally, if you read the amendment, 
it will, ridiculously enough, mean that every act which limits productivity constitutes an indus­
trial action... I cannot appreciate its anti-labour concept ... it amounts to selling the labour 
movement lock, stock and barrel to the employer.
However, on the issue of the secret ballot clause, there was agreement with the Minister. 
He argued that apart from deregistration there was no other sanction against irresponsi­
ble unions because under the Trade Disputes Ordinance it was not illegal to commence 
a strike without taking a secret ballot. The secret ballot, he said, would ‘ensure that the 
views of the rank and file members ... are respected by the union leadership [and] ... 
eliminate any undemocratic manipulation of imposing a strike from the top’ (id, 203). 
Of course, with all other decisions requiring the approval (or exemption) of the Minis­
ter, the notion of any other undemocratic manipulation from the top was never raised. 
The subsequent career of the objecting Mr Ho is unknown.
The Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) Ordinance enacted in 1955 required 
14 days’ notice before a strike in ‘essential services’ could take place. However by a 
1967 amendment, the government decreed that in the public interest, strikes were abso­
lutely prohibited in key utility industries: water, gas and electricity (cap 67, Part 111).
6.4 The Era of Modernisation 1966-72
This was the period when growth accelerated at an unprecedented rate in Singa­
pore. The period when, to borrow Rostow’s metaphor, Singapore took-off. The period 
was marked by the enactment of three laws one of which was new: the Employment Act 
(cap 91). The others were the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act (cap 136) and the 
Central Provident (Amendment) Act (cap 36). The Bills were introduced after the PAP 
government had secured trade union leadership support for its definition of the economic 
crisis facing the nation and its proposed cure. In other words, the union’s leadership
I
t
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seems to have backed the implementation of the industrialisation policy with its implicit 
need for more co-operative and less combative unions. By calling an early general elec­
tion in 1968, Prime Minister Lee also sought the nation’s support.
When the PAP was returned as the sole political party in parliament, Lee reiter­
ated the government’s agenda. During the July 1968 debate of the Employment Bill he 
pointed out that Singapore’s survival as a nation was at stake as a result of the British 
government’s decision in 1968 to withdraw all military forces from Singapore by 1971 
(PD vol 27, col 633). The goals as well as the means of achieving them were clear in 
Lee’s mind. At col 633-34, he stressed the need to attract expertise, know-how, enter­
prise and capital, to use Singapore’s domestic capital and her workers to greater advan­
tage in the manufacturing, assembling and service sectors, ...with the accent on export. 
He pointed to the need for training and education of young Singaporeans, so that they 
would be ‘skilled in the techniques of modem industry’. As Lee saw it {id 636),
The first major task of this new Parliament is to take through this series of legislative amend­
ments that will put our working population into better trim. This is a package, which is both fair 
and attractive. These amendments are designed to make everyone put in a greater effort for 
higher performance to bring higher rewards. This, coupled with the home-ownership plan for the 
mass of our workers and not just the higher salaried groups, will enable more and more of our 
working population to have a growing personal stake in the continuing prosperity and stability 
for our society.
From the Parliamentary debate it is clear that the Bills’ declared purpose was to im­
prove productivity and efficiency by making employees’ entitlement to benefits contin­
gent upon disciplined behaviour in the work-place {id vol 27, col 632-42; 733-40; 761- 
90). Some of the provisions of these Acts are examined in the sections below.
6.4.1 The Employment Act 1968
The Act is divided into sixteen parts, and represents the most comprehensive 
attempt to consolidate and amend employment law in Singapore. The most controver­
sial sections are contained in Part IV, which relates to rest days, hours of work, holidays 
and other conditions of service. The law was designed for ‘workmen and other employ­
ees who are in receipt of salary not exceeding seven hundred and fifty dollars a month 
or such other amount as may be fixed from time to time by the Minister’ - s35. Despite 
the controversy and lively debate, the Bill’s passage was easy as there was no parlia­
mentary opposition to the PAP government.
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Under s36 an employee shall have one rest day per week, but may be required to 
work on rest days or public holidays if he is paid double the ordinary rate, s37(3). Sub­
section (3) does not apply to those employed by government or a statutory body con­
ducting any essential service as defined by Part III of the Criminal Law (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, cap 112, and the Trade Disputes Act.
Section 38 stipulated working hours as 44 hours per week, comprising a maxi­
mum of six consecutive hours without a period of leisure, and no more than eight hours 
per day including rest period(s) of not less than 45 minutes. Section 38(2) outlined lib­
eral exemptions to this rule.
Every employee is entitled to paid holiday subject to the schedule to the Holiday 
Act, cap 307. However, an employee becomes ineligible for such if he absents himself 
from work without prior consent of the employer or without reasonable excuse on any 
working day immediately preceding or succeeding the public holiday, s40(2).
An employee is entitled to paid annual leave, in addition to rest days, holidays 
and sick leave under s36, s41, s43, unless he absents himself without permission or rea­
sonable excuse for more than 20% of the working days in a year, s42. Under s42(l) the 
paid annual leave is seven days for every 12 months’ continuous service with the same 
employer if employed by that employer for less than ten years. After ten years’ service 
with the same employer, the employee becomes eligible for 14 days’ holidays, s42(2).
After one year of service with the same employer, an employee is eligible for 14 
days paid sick leave and 46 days of hospitalisation in a year, s43. Eligibility is subject to 
a medical certificate from a doctor appointed by the company or the state.
Only an employee who has been in continuous service with the same employer 
for three years or more is entitled to retrenchment benefit on termination due to redun­
dancy or reorganisation, s44. An employee is eligible for maternity benefit if she has 
worked with the same employer for 180 days.
Under s45, only an employee who has been in service for five years with the 
same employer is entitled to retirement benefit other than benefits payable under the 
Central Provident Fund, cap 121.
It is clear that some of these provisions were so wide that they were open to 
abuse by employers. For instance, it is plausible that an employer could terminate an 
employee just before the deadline for reaching entitlement to, e.g., retirement or re­
trenchment benefits. However, the Prime Minister acknowledged that ‘bad employers’
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will have to be educated and taught the facts of present-day industrial life so that they 
do not abuse their powers, but instead help government put ‘capital and labour to 
greater use’ {id, 639).
6.4.2 The Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 1968
According to Labour Minister, Rajaratnam, {id 733), the Employment and the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Bills (IRA) sought ‘to rationalise employer-employee 
relationship with a view to attracting new investments and increasing efficiency o f ... 
trading and industrial enterprises’. In introducing the second reading of the IRA Bill, he 
said that like the main 1960 Act, the purpose of this Bill was to give expression to the 
government’s policy of industrial peace with justice. It was also to create the conditions 
necessary to attract foreign investments, encourage industrial development, and generate 
much-needed employment opportunities {id 735).
It is debatable whether the policy of industrial peace with justice was paid more 
than lip service, for the 1968 amendments duly removed six areas of personnel man­
agement from collective bargaining. Under s i7 six key areas prohibited from forming 
the basis of future trade disputes:
(1) Transfer of employee within an organisation without detriment to her terms of employment.
(2) Promotion of an employee from a lower to a higher grade.
(3) Recruitment of employees to fill vacancies arising in the organisation.
(4) Dismissal of an employee for misconduct and her reinstatement.
(5) Termination of the services of an employee due to redundancy or reorganisation; and
(6) Assignment or allocation of duties and specific tasks to the employee.
In addition, neither the IAC nor the government could intervene even if management 
blatantly abused its powers in these areas (except in the case of wrongful dismissal). In 
seeking to justify the amendments, the Labour Minister pointed to statistics for work 
stoppages from 1960-67. He said (PD vol 27, col 735):
The total number of stoppages during this period... was 389, involving a loss in man-days {sic) of 
1,284,029; the peak years were ... 1961, 1962 and 1963 ... What is even more interesting is a 
study of the causes of these disputes. Of the total 389 disputes 106 or about 27% arose out of 
dismissals while another 120 or about 30% were due to a number of other reasons which in­
cluded demotion, discontinuation of life insurance schemes, discrimination in filling vacancy, 
grading of staff, recruitment of workers, transfer of company doctor and dismissal of an em­
ployee demanded by a union. One can seriously ask whether in such a state of affairs any new 
employer would set up factories in Singapore.
Thus the amendments would make it illegal to strike in about 57% of the cases cited. In 
the Minister’s opinion, certain fundamental management functions should not be nego­
tiable (id, col 737). He called these functions (see list above) ‘common law rights’ of
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employers, declaring that legislation was only necessary because these rights had be­
come blurred in the process of heated negotiations. It was now necessary to redefine 
management’s rights, functions and duties (id).
A lengthy discussion of the provisions of the Act is unnecessary at this juncture. 
The important points to note are that the Act reduced the level of working conditions, 
restricted trade union power in collective bargaining and dispute resolution and created 
longer working hours. All this was done in the name of creating ‘the necessary climate 
of stability for investors to come in’. As the Minister said (id, col 740):
In order to provide added inducement for new investors to come to Singapore, clause 7 of the 
Bill provides that all industrial and other approved undertakings, including pioneer industries, 
which commenced operation on or after the 1st day of January 1968, shall comply wholly with 
the provisions of Part IV of the Employment Act, 1968. In other words, all the terms and condi­
tions of employment, including sick leave and annual leave, of these new industrial undertakings 
will constitute the maximum terms of service for a period o f five years from the date such un­
dertakings commence operation in Singapore. The Minister, however, may extend the period at 
his discretion, (my italics)
As statistics abundantly show, not only did the number of strikes and lockouts decrease, 
foreign investors also flocked to Singapore (Huff 1997, 295). In 1968 there were only 
four work stoppages and in 1969 there were none. The period 1948-58 is usually called 
the decade of industrial unrest. However, statistics show that until the 1969 legislation, 
the decade from 1959 was hardly any better as the battle between the political left and 
right, especially from 1959 to 1965, was fought in the workplace. The PAP’s victory in 
gaining control of the trade union movement was consummated in 1969 at the moderni­
sation seminar (see 6.4.4).
6.4.3 The Central Provident Fund (Amendment) Act 1968
According to Labour Minister Rajaratnam, this Central Provident Fund Bill (PD 
vol 27, col 792):
... is the third of three Bills which are designed to meet the challenging economic problems that 
loom ahead. Whilst the purpose of the Employment Bill and the Industrial Relations (Amend­
ment) Bill is to have more realistic terms and conditions of service and employer-employee rela­
tions consonant with the need to induce greater investment, generate higher productivity and em­
ployment, this Bill deals with another inter-related problem - the marshalling o f domestic 
savings for the economic and social benefit o f our people, (my italics)
Free-marketers claim that high levels o f domestic savings are crucial for economic devel­
opment. However, they do not approve o f forced savings. But that is exacdy what Singa­
pore’s Central Provident Fund Act (cap 36) permits. The original law is a colonial enact­
ment from 1955. The idea, then as now, is for employers and employees to contribute
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towards savings for pensions and other social welfare costs. The law compels participation 
and the government sets the appropriate contribution rate for each party, usually annually. 
Labour Minister Rajaratnam pointed to three principal purposes o f the 1968 amendment 
{id, col 791-2):
(i) to increase the contributions payable to the Central Provident Fund by employers and em­
ployees;
(ii) to enable arrangements to be made for members of the Fund to use their savings in the Fund 
for the purchase of houses or flats for their own occupation; and
(iii) to enable the provisions ... to be extended to cover persons who are self-employed and who 
do not at present contribute to the Fund.
In 1968, the then current rate of contribution was 5% each by the employer and em­
ployee. The Minister proposed a three-year, three-stage increase whereby the rate for 
each party would rise to 6-1/2%, then 8%, then 10%, or a total saving of 20% of salary 
each month (id col 792). This increase would not apply to the United Kingdom Gov­
ernment and its employees who were leaving Singapore. Other exemptions were made 
for those employees who earn less than SD200 per month. The Minister hoped that this 
considerable increase in savings would help employees build reserves in the Fund and 
help them to accumulate sufficient money to purchase houses or flats.
The latter was the most significant departure from the existing CPF law. It was 
the first time that savers would be allowed to use money in the Fund to purchase their 
own accommodation. Those who already had sufficiently large balances would be al­
lowed to buy flats outright, while those who already had used loans to purchase flats 
would be allowed to use their monthly contributions to pay mortgage instalments (see 
chapter 7).
The other major change, extending coverage to include self-employed persons, 
was limited to those persons under the age of 55 years who derive their income from 
any trade, profession or vocation.
The Minister’s claim that he was ‘marshalling domestic savings for the economic 
and social welfare’ of Singaporeans needs to be clarified. It is commonly accepted 
among economists that Singapore has the highest savings rate in the world. Indeed the 
trend in high savings and high investment rates has characterised Singapore society from 
the 1960s. For instance, savings ratio was 16% in 1966, moving to 42% in 1985, while 
in 1966 investment ratio was 22%, moving to 43% in 1985 (Kok Ai Tee 1987, 99). 
These high savings and investment rates could be considered significant factors in ex­
plaining Singapore’s high growth rate during the decades. However, paradoxically, the
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evidence suggests that although Singapore’s gross domestic capital formation can in 
principle be financed domestically from gross national savings, in practice this is not the 
case. For instance, from 1970-1985, the private sector (local and foreign) was responsi­
ble for three-quarters of Singapore’s gross fixed capital formation while the public sector 
accounted for only one-quarter of capital formation (id, 82). But the money was not 
squandered: it financed infrastructure and public merit goods, such as housing (low 
1998). Every year a significant portion of the national savings is invested overseas; in 
recent years through the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation. High savings 
rate allowed the new nation to steer clear of debt or at least balance the foreign debt, 
which would otherwise become an everyday part of life in the developing country.
The crux is that throughout the decades the government played the crucial role of 
intermediary between savers and investors, by directing the accumulation and the use of 
the rapidly increasing share of private-sector savings. In case investors were not moti­
vated to reinvest some of their profits in Singapore, firms were compelled to add to 
workers’ savings through contributions to the CPF. And as seen in the 1968 CPF 
amendment, the Housing and Development Board gained additional sums to finance 
public housing when the government permitted CPF savers to invest their savings in 
HDB flats or houses.
If the CPF was used to marshal private savings, the union movement was har­
nessed to enter the world of business and commerce on behalf of workers and their 
families. This point of departure was witnessed at a seminar in 1969.
6.4.4 The 1969 Modernisation Seminar
The Prime Minister, other senior ministers, union leaders and delegates attended 
the seminar, which was called the ‘modernisation of the labour movement’. Dr Goh, the 
then Finance Minister, urged unions to revitalise themselves by becoming actively in­
volved in establishing worker co-operatives and social services for the welfare of work­
ers and their families. The government was not prepared to pour additional money into 
such investments.12 However it did the next best: It changed the law and allowed unions 
to use internal funds to finance co-operative ventures. Under s47 (now s48) of the Trade
12 It should be recalled that the PAP helped to create the NTUC as a pro-government alterna­
tive to the left-wing SATU. It has been said that, until the early 1970s, the NTUC was financially
i
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Unions Act the Minister may declare by notification in the Gazette any other object to 
be an object for which union funds may be expended. This was duly done in form of the 
Trade Unions (Expenditure of Funds) Notification 1970 (GN S 143/70). Dr Goh out­
lined the strategy and its underlying principles. To succeed (Goh 1972, 105):
(1) Cooperatives must be fully competitive with private enterprise.
(2) Labour movement should engage in cooperative enterprises in those fields in which it has a
natural built-in advantage.
(3) Highest standard of integrity must be established and maintained.
(4) Cooperatives must have effective management.
Dr Goh suggested that the financial basis could be built upon a life insurance co­
operative, adding that ‘[Jjust as we have to develop industries in a hurry, so must we 
achieve, in co-operative development, in years what took others decades.’ Here he was 
probably referring to the Scandinavian co-operative movement, upon which the Singa­
pore model was built. To implement the strategy, the government also organised a sys­
tem whereby by civil servants and Members of Parliament (all PAP members) were co­
opted into advisory positions in the unions or became directors on some of the co­
operative enterprise boards. In this way, there grew a substantial overlap between NTUC 
and PAP personnel, not only at the Party level but also in the government and civil serv­
ice. The government provided training in professional skills for union officials, and sec­
onded civil servants to assist. Subsequently, the Singapore clone grew into a massively 
successful institution, which owns and operates supermarkets, dental, health care and 
travel services, public transport and taxis, finance and insurance, and book and stationery 
retailing.
In conclusion of this section, it can be said that four or five labour laws were piv­
otal during the decade 1959 to 1969. In particular, the Industrial Relations, the Employ­
ment, the Trade Unions and the Central Provident Fund Acts were used specifically to 
engineer the labour conditions and climate which the PAP government perceived would 
be conducive to attracting foreign investment as required by its industrialisation policy. 
These effected the government’s policy for rapid economic development. The centre­
piece emphasised the need for stabilisation of labour costs (at a low level), increased 
productivity, labour discipline and industrial peace.
dependent upon the government (Gan 1977). Its headquarters and the convention hall in which 
the Modernisation Seminar was held, were built with government funds.
190
It is clear that by 1971-72 the industrialisation policy had proved successful. There
was full employment, and relative to its base-point, the population was well-housed, well-
fed and relatively well-educated. The government’s goals had been achieved. Thus, there
does seem to be positive correlation between labour laws and economic development. As
the Labour Minister put it (PD vol 32, col 1172):
Suffice it to say, as a result o f the passing o f the Employment Act in 1968, there has been rapid 
economic development as we have been able to attract investments to this country and to solve 
what was ... regarded as the insoluble problem of unemployment in Singapore. (My italics)
However, despite the rhetoric and some evidence, it is difficult to show causation. Fac­
tors other than law cannot be isolated and their effects evaluated separately. For instance, 
as has been made clear in this discussion, the government constantly encouraged people 
to put the ‘national interest’ above their own. Ministers used every opportunity to remind 
them of this. For instance, in Rajaratnam’s view, ‘how far this (Employment) Bill will 
succeed in its purpose will depend upon both workers and employers placing national 
interest before sectional interests.
Particularly after 1965, the government encouraged the public to view demands 
from labour and other special interest groups as serious threats to the survival of the 
small, vulnerable nation. Unions were not expected to play their traditional role of 
speaking up for labour interests. They were required to show ‘greater awareness of the 
social responsibility ... in the larger framework of the national interest’ (Goh 1972, 103).
In light of the foregoing, I cannot agree with Phang’s thesis (1990, 310-330) that 
‘the success of (labour) legislation ... had much to do with a coincidence o f interests 
between the people and the government in any event’ (id, 310). There was a coincidence 
of interests in so far as people would clearly, naturally prefer to have shelter, food and 
other material benefits that jobs would provide, as opposed to not having them. But the 
deferred gratification, constant sacrifices and solidarity which unionists and workers 
demonstrated during the key decade owe much more to PAP government intervention 
and direction (expressed through top-down legislation) than to natural coincidence of 
interests. Later on people seem to have been lulled into passivity by the fact that the gov­
ernment was seen to be delivering on its promise of material prosperity. The hardships 
and sacrifice were paying off in jobs, political stability and economic wealth (chapter 7).
For the next 25 years, the government would make adjustments to labour laws in 
order to increase, maintain and distribute the nation’s wealth. But the basic recipe of how 
to nurture growth and redistribute wealth had been worked out during the formative
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years when the unions were united, co-opted, then neutered, and its membership disci­
plined. This was done in the public interest, in order to achieve the government’s de­
clared goals, which as time went by, became synonymous with the aspirations of the na­
tion. The next section therefore focuses on tweaking mechanisms, for in reality the 
nature of the labour laws did not change significantly after 1968.
6.5 Tripartite Partnership 1972-1999
To my mind, Deyo’s description of the role of unions in developing countries 
matches Singapore’s situation during the formative period (Deyo 1981, 4):
In particular, unions are often asked to educate, train, or discipline members; raise productivity; 
discourage labor-management conflict; restrain wage demands; engage in savings programs; and 
make whatever other sacrifices are necessary in the national development effort.
However as the issue of whether Singapore is a corporatist state remains controversial 
(see, e.g. Phang 1990, 319-321) I shall refer to the state of affairs as tripartite partner­
ship. Tripartism refers to joint decision-making on economic matters between employ­
ers, unions and government at national and enterprise levels (Deyo 1981, 104). It seems 
to have become part of Singapore’s economic development equation by 1968.13 The 
most explicit evidence is probably the modernisation seminar (6.3.4 supra). There is 
also evidence of its rhetoric being used by PAP members during parliamentary debates 
to justify curtailing workers’ rights and cutting fringe benefits. For instance, while de­
bating the Employment Bill, Mr Ng Yeow Chong said (PD vol 27, col 632):
If Singapore is to survive and progress as an industrialised nation, there must be concerted effort 
by labour, management and the Government to steer the country through the crucial years. A na­
tion’s advancement depends on the determination and the will of its people to live as a nation.
As discussed at 6.4.4 supra by 1971-72 Singapore seems to have moved from labour
surplus to labour scarcity.14 Full employment in a free labour market would otherwise
13 Tripartism probably has its roots in the 1965 Charter for Industrial Progress, a government- 
sponsored agreement under which labour agreed to work jointly with management toward the 
shared goals of increased productivity and industrial peace. The Charter was ratified by the 
NTUC, the Singapore Manufacturers' Association and the Singapore Federation. On a less for­
mal but more pragmatic level, tripartite partnership is also visible in 1960 when labour, man­
agement and the government were represented on the Economic Development Board, the 
Housing and Development Board and the Industrial Arbitration Court, as provided for under 
their respective 1960 Acts.
14 Some economists, eg, Huff (1997,326) put the turning point from labour surplus to labour 
scarcity as late as 1973. This seems unlikely. For instance, the Prime Minister, addressing the 
NTUC Delegates' Conference in 1972, said: 'the end of 1971 marked the close of an era in our 
economic history. From chronic unemployment, we entered a period of full employment.' 
Straits Times, 6 March 1972,6. However, the crux is that by the early 1970s, the government's
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result in the market automatically balancing the scarcity of labour by causing a rise in 
the cost of labour. However, here too the government intervened to prevent this sce­
nario. Two actions were taken: One, the government established a tripartite system for 
controlling a national wage policy. Two, it manipulated the size of the labour market in 
several ways. E.g. it relaxed the hitherto tightly controlled immigration law concerning 
foreign workers and allowed a surge of temporary ‘guest-workers’ into the labour mar­
ket. It also gave incentives to attract women and older workers into the labour market. 
Aspects of the operation of these policies and the law are discussed below.
6.5.1 Wage Regulation: the National Wages Council
Having established a legal framework for labour relations which restricted the 
unions’ rights to collective bargaining and institutionalised a dispute settlement mecha­
nism, the PAP government’s next step was to impose a system of wage controls on the 
labour market. The tripartite National Wages Council (NWC) was established in Febru­
ary 1972, as a non-statutory, advisory body charged with three objectives: One, to for­
mulate annual wage guidelines. Two, to recommend a wage adjustment policy. Three, to 
advise on suitable incentives. It is important to note that the NWC is a non-statutory 
body and that its recommendations are not mandatory. Despite this, union leaders greeted 
its establishment with fury and disappointment, while leaders of trade and industry fa­
voured it. Devan Nair, the NTUC Secretary General complained that (Straits Times 12 
February 1972, 2):
... the NTUC responded magnificently when the political leadership called for wage restraint, 
patient hard-work and greater productivity. Between the government’s policies and the discipline 
and co-operation of the working population, a flourishing economy has been built. The workers’ 
right to an equitable share of that prosperity must be respected and satisfied.
However the then Labour Minister, Ong Pang Boon, countered the criticism by urging 
that (Straits Times 4 March 1972, 10):
unionists should remember that disputes over the share of the national cake, without full recog­
nition of the impact such disputes [can have] over the size of the cake, can be short sighted and 
damaging. Excessive preoccupation by workers with mainly their portion of the cake can destroy 
the confidence of the investors in our favourable industrial relations climate and the intrinsic rea­
sonableness of our workers.
industrialisation policy, in particular its commitment to promoting labour-intensive manufac­
turing in order to solve joblessness, had worked; there was full employment. Mass housing was 
the other objective. For a discussion, see chapter 7.
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This was essentially the same ‘social responsibility to the nation’ argument. However 
the Minister also conceded that it would be naive to expect workers to continue being 
productive without any prospect of benefiting fairly from higher productivity. The 
Minister hoped that the compromise needed by all should ultimately prove ‘non­
damaging to labour, management and society at large’.
The NWC was charged with finding that compromise. Its membership com­
prised three representatives from labour, three from management, three from government 
and a neutral academic ‘without any functional identification’.15 In later years the com­
position was retained but by 1981, the number of representatives from each party in­
creased to five.
The Employment Act (cap 91) and especially s34 of the Industrial Relations Act 
(cap 136) were amended in 1972 to give effect to the NWC mechanism. The Industrial 
Arbitration Court was enjoined to take cognisance of NWC recommendations in their 
dispute and award considerations (s34).
Although the NWC comprise representatives who are accorded equal status, 
those from the government have played a dominant role, if only because of their access 
to superior statistical information and immense persuasive power. Indeed, Dr Tony Tan, 
Ministry for Industry, admitted as much when he observed that (Straits Times 19 June 
1982,1):
since its formation in 1972, the Government has gradually become more equal than the unions 
and employers in the tripartite council. The result is that both employers and employees now re­
gard the NWC guidelines [as] mandatory.
On at least two occasions in later years, namely during the 1985/86 recession and the 
1997/98 regional economic crisis, the government took the decision-making lead. On 
the latter occasion, Manpower Minister, Dr Lee Boon Yang revealed that {Straits Times,
5 September 1998, 45):
[T]he National Wages Council would be reconvened soon to update its wages guidelines, and ‘in 
a nutshell’, a cut in the rate of employers’ contribution to the Central Provident Fund was likely.
His prophecy was fulfilled in the November 1998 economic package, which cut busi­
ness costs significantly in order ‘to strengthen Singapore’s competitiveness’.
15 Lim Chong Yah, Professor of Economics at National University of Singapore was appointed 
chairman.
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From 1972 to 1978, the NWC operated a wage restraint policy, despite full em­
ployment in Singapore. As Dr Winsemius, one of Singapore’s economic architects (see 
4.2), said in an article ‘The One Mistake I Made’ (Straits Times 10 March 1984, 19): ‘It 
was my theory that after full employment, we should increase wages’. Instead ‘we com­
promised like cattle traders’. Dr Winsemius seemed to forget that compromise is what 
the tripartite NWC is all about. His point is taken, however, the ‘mistake’ lies in the gov­
ernment’s decision to delay until 1979 the so-called ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ -  
that is, its plan to restructure the economy and move out of labour-intensive industries 
into higher value-added, high-wage manufacturing. This was probably due to timorous­
ness in the face of the 1973 oil-induced world recession. One consequence of the delay 
was the upward pressure on wages, as demand exceeded supply in labour-intensive in­
dustries. From 1972 to 1974, average hourly wages rose 14% per year, or 3% faster than 
the NWC recommended guidelines. By 1975-78 annual average hourly wage increase 
was 1% below the average recommended wage guidelines (Pang Eng Fong, 1988, 209). 
A second consequence is that industry had to recruit foreign workers (see 6.5.2).
The NWC recommended incentive schemes to promote productivity and opera­
tional efficiency, and disincentives such as the denial of NWC wage increases, based on 
demerit points for absenteeism, unpunctuality, non-observance of safety rules, unsatis­
factory performance and conduct, and excessive job-hopping (Ministry of Labour, An­
nual Report 1977, 18).
However, in 1979 a corrective wage policy was deemed necessary to support the 
government’s long-awaited restructuring policy (see 4.3). With full employment, and 
Singapore’s growing dependence on immigrant labour, the NWC recommended higher 
wages across the board. This was in harmony with the government’s plan to use the 
high cost of labour as an incentive to encourage investors to move from labour- 
intensive to capital-intensive production. Employers were encouraged to increase pro­
ductivity by introducing computerisation, robotisation and other automatisation in their 
production lines. Accordingly, the NWC’s wage guidelines called for increases of 20% 
in 1979, 19% in 1980 and 14-19% in 1981.
The government also reorganised the basic structure of the union movement in 
1979. From cross-industry general unions they were forced into smaller industry-based 
unions. The rationale for restructuring was that smaller unions would acquire more 
knowledge of their industries and develop closer ties with their employers. However the
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move served to weaken the unions’ bargaining power even further (Rodan 1989, 157). 
In 1980 the Pioneer Industries Employees’ Union and Singapore Industrial Labour Or­
ganisation, representing over 90,000 workers or about 40% of NTUC membership, were 
split into nine industry-based unions (id). The 1982 Trade Union (Amendment) Act 
consolidated the restructuring policies and strengthened deregistration clauses for those 
unwilling to form ‘enterprise unions’. Needless to say, no ballots were held to ratify the 
restructuring into enterprise unions so rank and file members could register neither dis­
content nor approval.
At the same time, the government sought to upgrade the skills of workers. The 
Skills Development Levy Act (cap 306) came into force on 1 October 1979. It imposed a 
levy on employers and established a Fund for financing worker-related training. This in­
cluded the BEST programme (Basic Education for Skills and Training) designed to im­
prove literacy and numeracy skills of workers with little formal education. Initially, the 
levy was 2% per month of each employee’s monthly remuneration, s3. The Minister 
may, by order, reduce or increase the rate as deemed necessary, s3(3). Accordingly, it 
was increased to 4% in 1980, but cut to 1% during the 1985/86 recession. It is difficult to 
assess the effect of this law as the government had also embarked on other training pro­
grammes (see 4.2.6). Overall it is fair to conclude that the government wage correction 
policy led to increased labour costs. CPF contributions reached 50% of employees’ 
monthly salary (25% from each side). But productivity fell and competitiveness suffered. 
By the onset of the 1985 recession, it was decided that the NWC guidelines were too 
rigid, and reform followed in 1987. Before then, employers’ CPF contributions were cut 
by 12%. A more flexible two-tier wage system was introduced, comprising a basic wage 
and a bonus. It is still the basis for NWC recommendations and industry/company-wide 
negotiations.
6.5.2 Regulating the Labour Market Size: Women and Foreign Workers
Besides influencing wage formation in the labour market through tripartite col­
laboration, from the 1960s the Singapore government also controlled the composition 
and size of the labour market through its policies concerning the participation of women 
and foreign workers. Perhaps the most important statute in this area is the Women’s 
Charter of 1961 (cap 353, 1997 ed). It is the legislative backbone of modem family law 
in Singapore but it also had untold consequences for the labour market. First, it intro-
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duced monogamy for all except Muslims. Thus, at a stroke it abolished polygamy for the 
Chinese and Indian population, although it had been recognised in case law (Freedman 
1968). Secondly, ‘modem’ grounds based on English law replaced customary forms of 
divorce. The government’s purposes were ‘to emancipate women from the bonds of feu­
dalism and conservatism’ (LD vol 12, col 469) and to allow ‘our women [to] achieve the 
economic independence to make their lives secure’ (id col 470). However, beneath its 
altruism lay the determination to activate ‘women who form nearly half of our popula­
tion ... to play [a part] in our national construction,’ (id).
During the years, tax and other incentives have been used to entice women to 
enter, remain or return to the labour market and to encourage older workers to remain in 
the workplace. Various family planning and population control techniques were also 
employed.16 The results have been satisfactory. In 1970 only 29% of women of working 
age participated in the labour market. By 1980 the number had risen to 44%, and in 1990 
to 53%, since when female participation has stabilised at about 51% (Department o f 
Statistics 1998). According to the 1990 census (Statistical release 2, 15) in 1990, 40% of 
married couples had both husband and wife in the workplace. Nevertheless foreign 
workers are required to supplement Singapore’s workforce of about 1.9 million. Regula­
tion of their entry is discussed below after a few remarks about retirement age.
The Retirement Age Act (cap 274A) came into force on 1 July 1993. It stipulates 
a retirement age of 60 years (previously 55 years) for employees under a contract of 
service, including those employed by the government and statutory boards. The Labour 
Minister can increase the retirement age to 67 years at any time. He raised it to 62 years 
in 1996. Any contract providing for retirement before 60 years is deemed null and void.
There are two main categories of foreign non-resident workers in Singapore. 
One group comprises skilled workers and professionals who enter the country on em­
ployment passes. The second group, the majority, comprises unskilled work permit 
holders. These can enter and work only if their prospective employers secure work per­
mits for them. It is mainly to this category that the Employment of Foreign Workers Act 
(cap 91 A) applies and it is with this that we are concerned.17
Already in 1968, the government relaxed the tight immigration rules and allowed 
Malaysian workers into Singapore. In 1970, 3% of the workforce were foreign workers.
16 A discussion is beyond the scope of this study, but see Phang (1990) 288-310.
17 For a rewarding insight, see Pang Eng Fong and Lim L (1982).
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According to Pang and Lim (1982) at the peak of the economic boom, work permit 
holders accounted for one-eight of the total workforce. By this time, and especially when 
the labour market in Malaysia also became tight, unskilled workers had to be recruited 
from further afield: Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh and Philippines.
1 RIn 1980, the last date for which figures are published, foreign workers com­
prised 7% of the workforce. By the mid-1980s, new sources of foreign workers were 
mined: South Korea, Macau and Taiwan. The government hoped that these new foreign 
workers would ‘fit in better’ as they were of Chinese descent.
The Employment of Foreign Workers Act, cap 91 A, 1997 ed., defines foreign 
workers as all non-citizens, who are seeking work and who earn not more than SD1500 
per month. A work permit is necessary, and it is a serious offence for a foreign worker 
to work or for an employer to employ a foreign worker without a permit.
A work permit is issued by the Controller of Work Permits and is valid only for 
the specified person for the stated period and in the stated occupation or employer. A 
foreign worker must produce the permit for inspection whenever necessary, and must 
return it to the Controller within seven days of stopping work, si 3. Under s i4 a lost, de­
faced or destroyed permit must be reported to the Controller within 14 days. This was 
reduced to 7 days in the 1999 Amendment of s i4. A lost or damaged permit can be re­
placed on payment of a fee. A permit holder must give an undertaking that s/he will not 
marry a Singapore citizen without the Controller’s approval, if the permit holder intends 
to reside in Singapore. In 1999 the Act was amended (No 4 of 1999) to allow the taking 
and recording of fingerprints of any person who applies for or has been issued a work 
permit (s29).
In 1982 a foreign worker levy was introduced in an attempt to dampen the de­
mand for unskilled foreign labour. It is payable by the employer, who is also obliged to 
keep a register of all foreign workers and allow inspection of records and workplace at 
any time.
Foreign workers who can be repatriated at the stroke of a pen have underwritten 
the job security of Singaporeans. They therefore bear the brunt of the jobless risk in the
18 In his 1982 New Year Message, Lee determined that Singapore should stop depending on 
foreign workers by 1990. He was concerned about the import of workers from 'non-traditional 
sources' and the impact that cultural diversity might have on Singapore's multi-racial mix. 
Lee's decree was ignored by the labour market. However it is impossible to quantify the role of 
foreign workers as statistics have not been published since 1980. See 1980 Census, Release 4.
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event of an economic downturn. This was the case in the 1985 recession when of the
96,000 workers who were made redundant, over three-fifths were foreigners. That was 
the equivalent of about 5% of the labour force (Lee Tsao Yuan, 1987, 211).
During the 1997-99 regional downturn the Manpower Ministry implemented a 
similar retrenchment policy, though the numbers then were fewer than during the 
1985/86 recession. In 1997 Singapore enjoyed full employment: unemployment rate 
was only 1.8% (PD vol 68, col 452). But in June 1998, for the first time since 1985, the 
workforce shrank by 0.3%. The number of unemployed rose from 45,500 in June 1997 
to 62,100 in June 1998 (id). As in 1985 manufacturing in the electronics industry was 
hardest hit in 1998.
The 1980 census shows that nearly half of all foreign workers (46%) were em­
ployed in manufacturing, followed by 20% in construction. There is no reason to think 
that this profile has changed significantly. Permit holder workers are usually imported 
to alleviate difficulties in recruiting domestic labour for unpleasant jobs in manufactur­
ing and construction. Non-citizen, non-resident foreign workers are probably still over­
represented at the top and bottom end of Singapore’s skills hierarchy, despite the gov­
ernment’s three-decade long struggle to improve education at all levels. Foreign work­
ers are still more likely than Singaporeans to be employed in top-level professional, 
managerial, technical and financial jobs and as unskilled in labour-intensive manufac­
turing, service and construction jobs. The nature of the 1997-99 downturn suggests that 
both highly skilled professionals and some unskilled foreign workers lost their jobs.
6.6 Conclusion
Controlling trade unions and disabling their most potent tools were the two ob­
jectives of early labour laws, both under the post-war colonial administration and under 
the PAP government, which was formed when Singapore won self-governance in 1959. 
In the early period, the agenda was to contain the communist threat, for both the colonial 
and the PAP administrations perceived communist infiltration as the major enemy of the 
establishment and the labour movement. The elaborate registration and deregistration 
provisions of the Trade Union legislation were effective in achieving these goals. Com­
munist-sponsored unions were denied registration, and registration could be cancelled if 
it seemed likely that unions would abuse their powers. The PAP’s 1959 landslide victory
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was due partly to left-wing support, but once in government, the PAP decided to purge 
left-wing and communist-supported unions from the labour movement and the Party.
The struggle opened the way for unifying the moderate unions into the National 
Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and nurturing the unique symbiotic relationship between 
the NTUC and the PAP, which became the hallmark of Singapore’s labour market. Pro­
visions of the Industrial Relations Act and the Trade Disputes Act replaced the unions’ 
rights to collective bargaining and strike action with government-sponsored dispute set­
tlement procedures. Labour laws gave huge discretionary powers to the PAP-friendly 
elite civil service, and statutory as well as non-statutory bodies were charged with ad­
ministering and enforcing the laws leniently in favour of the government’s development 
agenda. For having rendered the unified moderate unions prime supporters of govern­
ment, the next step was to secure a ‘productionist role’ for their members in the cause of 
national development.
Apart from the pragmatism and instrumentality of the law, to achieve its goals 
the government also appealed to the social responsibility and communitarian instincts of 
the workers. The survival of the nation, or the public interest, it said, should take priority 
over individual or narrow sectoral interests. Particularly after the failure of the Malaysian 
Federation, the government never ceased to point out that Singapore could not survive 
economically or politically, unless or until there was unity and labour discipline. Both of 
these, it claimed, could be achieved if people were prepared to sacrifice and work hard. It 
was on this basis that the workforce accepted the stringent, late-1960s Acts. Key among 
them were the Industrial Relations Act 1968, the Employment Act 1968 and the 1966 
Trade Unions Act. In 1969 the need for unions to take on ‘a greater awareness of their 
social responsibilities to the nation’ (Goh Keng Swee 1972) was emphasised and con­
cretised at the modernisation seminar. Such responsibilities included wage restraint, in­
creased productivity, industrial discipline, prudence and a duty to provide welfare bene­
fits for workers and their families.
What was not implemented through new, appropriately amended laws was 
achieved by the work of non-statutory tripartite bodies. The most important of these is 
the National Wages Council (NWC). The co-opting of unions into the commercial world 
through worker co-operatives and constant official appeals to the people’s communi­
tarian instincts achieved the rest.
But Singapore’s economic growth ambitions far outweigh the size of its own 
workforce, even with a large female participation. Foreign workers are required to fill 
the gap, despite government misgivings about the growth of a culturally diverse foreign 
population. The law therefore controls closely the size of the intake of foreign workers. 
However statistics of their participation have been a closely guarded secret since 1980.
The legal framework for Singapore’s labour market was set in the 1960s, and 
apart from minor adjustments, forty years on it remains essentially the same. Its nature is 
situational, directive, regulatory and westemistic. Its purpose is to orchestrate economic 
development, compel social cohesion and secure the most rational fulfilment of the un­
ions’ productionist role in the nation’s economy.
It is fair to say that there is positive correlation between labour laws and eco­
nomic development in Singapore from 1959 to 1999. However it is difficult to show di­
rect causation, mainly because of the difficulty of isolating the effects of law from the 
effects of other equally potent extra-legal factors, among them the survivalist strategy 
embedded in Singapore’s brand of pragmatism and communitarianism. One thing seems 
quite clear, Singapore’s labour laws are not converging with labour laws of the West. 
Even the direct transplants of the Trade Unions and the Industrial Relations Acts from 
England and Australia respectively, have developed lives of their own, as they were 
used to implement PAP policies and underpin the special conditions, which successive 
PAP governments perceived were conducive to economic development.
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CHAPTER 7 LAND LAW AND PUBLIC HOUSING
The principal Ordinance which provided fo r  the acquisition o f  land fo r  
public purposes has been redrafted to define specifically and enlarge the 
meaning o f  ‘public purposes The redraft is considered desirable in view 
o f  the increasing tempo o f  public developments and the need to acquire 
land fo r  a variety ofpublic purposes, including residential development by 
the Housing Development Board, industrial development by the Economic 
Development Board as well as urban renewal o f  the City ....
Lee Kuan Yew, Parliamentary Debates, vol 23, col 26.
The Government is the proper authority fo r  deciding what a public pur­
pose is. When the Government declares that a purpose is a public purpose 
it must be presumed that the Government is in possession o f  facts which 
induce the Government to declare that the purpose is a public purpose.
C hua  J in Galstaun v Attorney-General [1981] 1 MLJ 9
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7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was revealed how during the period 1959 to 1999, the 
PAP government consistently took legislative action to create and maintain the labour 
market conditions which it felt were conducive to attracting [foreign] investment and 
producing rapid economic growth. Steps included regulation of the nature of the 
workforce [non-communist, PAP loyalist, collaborative unions], manipulation of its 
size [female and foreign worker participation], its skill levels, wage policy, dispute 
resolution mechanism, creation of worker co-operatives, and so on. Very little was left 
to the vagaries of the ‘free market’. Laws that constantly changed in order to regulate 
labour and industrial relations do correlate with the nation’s economic development 
and may well have had a causative link. However, contrary to law and development 
theory, such laws did not and are not converging with labour laws of the West.
Clearly, labour operated under the ‘governed market’ principle (see 1.5; 3.8) 
and was mediated through legislation. The issue to be considered in this chapter is 
whether the regulation of the second factor of production, land, fared any differently.
7.2 English Land Law Legacy
As discussed in chapter 2, English legislation, as it existed on 26 November 
1826, was received into Singapore, subject to suitability and modifications regarding 
local conditions. However, there was no similar cut-off date for the reception of Eng­
lish case law and equity. English case law concerning, e.g. easements, covenants, 
landlord and tenants and contractual and estoppel licenses flourished in Singapore. 
Landmark cases such as Austerberry v Oldham Corporation [1885] 29 ChD 750, Hal- 
sall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169, Tulk v Moxhay [1848] 2 Ch 774 and even Street v 
Mountford [1985] AC 809, have all been applied in Singapore. But the quest here is 
for changes in legislation, for this is the PAP government’s preferred tool.
Apart from the cut-off date, it will be recalled that by virtue of the 1878 Civil 
Law Ordinance of the Straits Settlements, in force in Singapore as the Civil Law Act 
(cap 43), post-1826 English real property legislation was not received in Singapore. 
The Civil Law Act provided for the continuing reception of English ‘mercantile law’
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and generated enormous confusion until repealed by the Application of English Law 
Act (cap 7A) in 1993. However, s6(2), later s5, (see 2.4.3) provided that:
Nothing herein shall be taken to introduce into Singapore any part of the law of England relating 
to tenure or conveyance or assurance of or succession to, any immovable property, or any estate, 
right or interest therein.
In other words, key English property legislation was excluded from reception. Par­
ticularly conspicuous for its absence is the 1925 Law of Property Act. However, other 
provisions were made for Singapore. For instance, when the colony was administered 
as part of British India, ‘Indian Acts’ were applied (Bartholomew 1985, 5-11). And 
from 1867, when the Straits Settlements were governed direct from London, selected 
English statutes were applied (Ricquier 1987, 315). Most of the successful English
transplants were the result of imported Victorian Acts of the 1870s and 1880s^. The 
Registration of Deeds Act (cap 269) is based on the 1886 Registration of Deeds Ordi­
nance, which was itself based on the Yorkshire Registries Act 1884 (note 1). The Set­
tled Estates Act (cap 293) is modelled on its English counterpart, though initially the 
local enactment appeared as Part IV Civil Law Ordinance 1878. The origin of the 
Conveyancing and Law of Property Ordinance 1886 is quintessential^ English and ac­
cording to Ricquier (id), the conveyancing provisions of the Singapore Acts do not dif­
fer drastically in their substantive details from the provisions of their counterparts in 
the English property legislation of 1925.
The State Lands Act (cap 314)2 originated in England as the Crown Lands Or­
dinances of 1883 and 1886. This important piece of legislation, whose purpose is ‘to 
regulate the alienation and occupation of State land’ (short title, cap 314), was unlike 
any contemporaneous English provision (Ricquier id). It had a specific colonial agenda 
(Sheridan 1961). It recognised and legitimised a system of grants of land to individuals 
ranging from verbal licences, through leases for periods of up to 999 years, to grants in 
fee simple. Initially it was a system of ‘wild confusion’ as far as establishing title and 
more particularly, of raising revenue from land were concerned (Braddell 1932, 3rd ed,
1 The English models include the Vendors and Purchasers Act of 1874 (37 & 38, Viet c 78); the 
Conveyancing Acts of 1881 (44 & 45 Viet c 41) and 1882 (44 & 45 Viet c 39). The Yorkshire 
Registries Act of 1884 (47 & 48 Viet c 54) was the model for Singapore's Registration of Deeds 
Act (cap 269).
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54). However, under the application of the English doctrine of land tenure all land in 
Singapore is subject to this statute and the rules notified subsequently.3
Originally, land in Singapore was vested in the East India Company, later in the 
British Crown, and currently in the State by virtue of article 160 of the Constitution, as 
amended. This means that the ‘allodial’ system of land-holding, by which, in theory, 
no individual can actually ‘own’ land, was planted in Singapore (Ricquier 1985, 233). 
In 1956, the Land Titles Act established land registration based on the Australian Tor­
rens sy stem ^ , although the proposal had been made as early as in the 1880s (id 239). In 
1967 the Land Titles (Strata) Act (cap 158), another Australian import, extended the 
benefits of the Torrens system to flats.
Consequently, whether by legislation, common law or equity, the important 
established doctrines of English land law were received into Singapore from an early 
date. In particular, the doctrines of land tenure and estates are the legacies that provide 
the essential platform for modem Singapore land law. However, as the ensuing discus­
sion shows, Singapore has moved on and developed a system to suit its own needs 
based on imports from England, Australia and America. More significantly, the PAP 
government enacted innovative legislation of its own to implement its national devel­
opment agenda. Thus, the alienation of state land is linked inextricably with the devel­
opment of Singapore according to the Master Plan^, Development Guide Plans^, the
2 As amended by the Land Titles Act 1993.
3 See, for instance, the State Lands Rules 1968, sl74/68. Under the Act and these rules, the 
state can alienate land to private individuals in four ways: (1) the fee simple (very rarely used: 
ss 14-18 of the Act); (2) the estate in perpetuity; (3) the lease; and (4) the temporary licence.
4 Named after Robert Torrens, an Australian Customs Collector at Port Adelaide. See Baal- 
man 1961; Chua 1959.
5 See the Planning Act 1960, cap 279,1970 rev ed; now cap 232,1990 ed. The Master Plan is 
not a PAP invention. It originated under the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) in the 1950s 
and was incorporated into the Planning Ordinance 1959 (in force 1960) when the functions of 
the SIT were split into the Housing and Development Board and Planning. The Master Plan 
comprises detailed maps, a written statement of intent and a report of survey. Together they 
indicate existing and proposed zoning plans, current and proposed development intensities 
and background analyses of the proposals. In 1989, the Planning Act was amended so as to in­
clude provisions for conservation areas alongside proposals for roads, drainage, and so on. 
The Master Plan is reviewed every five years.
6 These are non-statutory and purely advisory, unlike the statutory boards, which can acquire 
land compulsorily and alienate it according to their own approved plans, see below.
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Concept Plan? and the intervention of a network of statutory bodies and corporations,
o
each of which is established and regulated by its own Act. Pivotal roles are played by 
the Housing and Development Board^, the Economic Development Board 10, the Ju- 
rong Town Corporation! 1, and the Urban Renewal Authority 1?. Land is acquired, al­
located and released for specific development purposes as stipulated by the govern­
ment. In the sections below some of the unique features of the ‘enabling’ Acts are 
examined in light of the government’s economic development goals13.
7.3 The PAP Government’s Approach to Land Law
The received western wisdom about real property is that private ‘ownership’ is 
inviolable. But the approach of the PAP government has been largely to disregard such 
conventional wisdom. It has focused on the ‘public interest’ rather than the interests of 
private landowners. As shown below, the primary objective of all laws that regulate 
planning and land use is to ensure the best use of land for the common good - even at 
the expense of the rights of the individual private landowner. As discussed at 7.4 infra, 
what is ‘in the public interest’ is defined exclusively by the government, which makes
7 The Concept Plan is the result of work which lasted from 1967 to 1971, assisted by a UN 
Development Programme, in which the government laid down an overall project plan for de­
velopment of the country into the 21st century. It is monitored and reviewed periodically, 
most recently in 1990. It provides the basic plan for integrating land use, transportation and 
other infrastructure. It informs the Master Plan, which is reviewed every five years.
8 Since 1990 government policy has been to curtail the power of individual statutory bodies 
in respect of compulsory acquisition of land. Under the current policy such bodies may initiate 
acquisition but all compulsory acquisition is channelled through the Commissioner of Lands, 
under the Ministry of Law. The relevant Acts have been amended to reflect the new policy. 
The Planning Department and the Urban Redevelopment Authority of the Ministry of Devel­
opment were merged to facilitate better co-ordination of the Master Plan.
9 Housing & Development Ordinance 1959, cap 271,1970 rev ed; now cap 129,1997 ed.
10 Economic Development Board Ordinance 1960, cap 189,1970 rev ed; now cap 85,1992 ed.
11 See Jurong Town Corporation Act cap 209,1970 rev ed; now cap 150,1998 ed.
12 This statutory body was set up in 1973 and is now governed by the Urban Redevelopment 
Authority Act, cap 340,1990 ed.
13 For a coherent picture of Singapore land law, see Ricquier 1995, 2nd ed., Tan 1994, and bibli­
ography references therein.
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statutory provisions that go far beyond the usual concern for health, safety^ and the 
need to have roads, airports and drains. 15 Similarly, the government’s effective de­
commodification of land necessary for public housing and of public housing itself 
(7.5) disproves the western theories regarding the need for market-led, property- 
protecting laws.
The government justifies this pragmatic, communitarian approach by the scar­
city of land in Singapore. Because there is so little of it, what there is must be shared 
and controlled from the top down in an orderly fashion. Of course, Singapore’s land- 
mass was also a limited commodity during the colonial era. In fact, thanks to aggres­
sive land reclamation strategies, the island has ‘grown’ since independence. 16 Thus 
land scarcity cannot be the sole explanation for the PAP’s strident ‘public interest’ ap­
proach. Indeed, despite increased landmass, the need for more stringent land-use 
regulation seems to have increased, not decreased, during the years. This is witnessed 
by growth in the number of land-related statutes and amendments enacted during the 
period. A remarkable feature of modem land law in Singapore is the government’s 
willingness to use law to decommodify land, provide affordable housing for all and 
suitable properties for industrial development and urban renewal.
The main assumption is that ‘[I]n Singapore, all land ultimately belongs to the 
state’ per Yong Pung How J in Development Bank o f Singapore Ltd v Eng Keong Re­
alty Pte Ltd [1990] 3 MLJ 89, 92. All dealings with state land are controlled by the 
State Lands Act (cap 314), as amended by the Land Titles Act 1993. The state may 
make four types of grants of land: estates in fee simple, estates in perpetuity, leases and 
temporary occupation licences. In practice, the first two grants are rarely made, while 
the term of leases are usually 99 years in the case of residential property and about 30 
years for commercial property. However, leases granted to statutory boards and gov-
14 See inter alia, Building Act (cap 29); Environmental Public Health Act (cap 95) as amended, 
Planning Act (cap 232), and Clean Air Act (cap 45) repealed by the Environmental Pollution 
Control Act 1999 (No 9 of 1999).
15 See, e.g., Local Government Integration Act (cap 166); Land Improvement Act (cap 153) re­
pealed by the Building and Construction Authority Act 1999 (No 4 of 1999).
16 Land area in 1997 was 647.8 sq km. From 1980 to 1997, 30 sq km of land were reclaimed 
from the sea: Singapore Dept of Statistics, Data Sheet 1998. The Housing and Development 
Board alone reclaimed 2,660 heactars between 1964 and 1995: Tan 1998,10.
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emment-linked bodies are usually for 999 years. These bodies then orchestrate the al­
location of land to individual ‘tenants’, whether private residential or commercial. Di­
rect non-govemment-linked holders of land from the state are therefore few.
Land in private ownership is in decline. For instance, in 1949 Crown land ac­
counted for 31% of the landmass of the main island of Singapore. Twenty years later, 
the proportion had risen to 49.2% - including the British military land, which reverted 
to the state. By 1975, the proportion of state land had risen to 65% (Motha 1982, 2nd 
ed, 7-13). In 1996 it was 84% (PD vol 65, col 1449).
The trend of increasing state ownership of land is set to continue, for six rea­
sons. First, the Foreshores Act (cap 173) empowers the government to alienate and 
control the foreshore for dredging and land reclamation purposes. All reclaimed land 
becomes state land by virtue of s5. Secondly, under s8 of the State Lands Act the rem­
edy for breach of most of the covenants and conditions that run with the land in state 
grants and leases is re-entry and forfeiture of the individual’s interest. Thirdly, the 
State Lands Encroachments Act (cap 315) provides that land, which has been aban­
doned for three years by the person to whom it was alienated becomes forfeited to the 
state (ss9-ll). Fourthly, by virtue of the Intestate Succession Act (cap 146) s7 and the 
Civil Law Act (cap 43) s i6, land belonging to a person who dies intestate with no one 
entitled to her estate reverts to the state. Fifthly, under the State Lands Encroachment 
Act, s i2, it was never possible to acquire state land by adverse possession, but the 
provisions of si 77 of the Land Titles Act 1993 seem to abolish adverse possession as a 
means of acquiring title to any land in Singapore. Such land as would have been avail­
able to claimants under the previous rules would presumably now revert to the state.
The sixth and most productive way of increasing the proportion of state land in 
relation to private land is compulsory acquisition. The PAP government’s unique ap­
proach to land law rests in its power to acquire land compulsorily for its own singularly 
defined ‘public purpose’.
Compulsory acquisition is key to substantiating my claim that the predominant 
liberal assumption of government’s non-intervention or free-market allocation has not 
been borne out in Singapore in relation to this second factor of production. Indeed, in­
stead of a laissez-faire policy, the principles of a governed market in relation to land 
have been implemented right from the early 1960s and throughout the period.
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In other words, just as the PAP government intervened decisively in the labour 
market and took whatever steps it deemed necessary to ensure the presence of condi­
tions conducive to rapid economic growth, so too in the land and land use area, it in­
tervened consistently to secure its development goals. The goals were affordable 
housing for the workforce, and efficient, productive infrastructure in the form of trans­
portation, factories, offices, telecom systems, schools, hospitals, hotels, tertiary educa­
tional institutions and so on. The key to enabling the acquisition and allocation of land 
for these projects was legislation. The need became particularly pressing after Singa­
pore left the Malaysian Federation in 1965. This is the period when Singapore em­
barked upon land law innovation to suit its own requirements.
7.4 ‘Real’ Land Law of Singapore
It will be recalled that from 1963 to 1965 Singapore was part of the Malaysian 
Federation (4.3.1; 5.2). During those years, the Westminster-bequeathed written Con­
stitution of Malaysia governed the Federation. Article 13 of the Malaysian Constitution 
provides that:
(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without ade­
quate compensation.
When Singapore left the Federation and became an independent nation, the issue of 
whether such constitutional guarantee of the rights of landowners should be preserved 
was resolved by section 6 of the Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965. It pro­
vides that ‘article 13 shall cease to have effect’ in Singapore.
The Prime Minister and the Minister for Law expressed the motivation for this 
stance in parliamentary debates (PD vol 25, col 1051 et seq.). Both were concerned 
about the unwanted rise in litigation which would undoubtedly occur as landowners 
pursued their right to ‘adequate compensation’ through the courts. It was acknowl­
edged that very often the value of land adjacent to areas where the government was 
carrying out development work would rise significantly, because of appreciation due to 
the government’s land improvement activities. Private landowners would then expect 
that compensation would reflect the increased value of their properties. However, the
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government felt that as the benefits arising from such appreciation owed nothing to the 
owners’ efforts, such benefits should be shared by all and not merely the fortunate few 
(id). The government rejected the 1966 Constitutional Commission’s recommenda­
tions and declined to reintroduce a modified version of (the Malaysian) article 13. In­
stead, the Land Acquisition Bill 1966 (cap 152) became law. It came into effect in 
1967. The main provisions of this landmark Act are examined below.
7.4.1 Compulsory Land Acquisition
The key provision of the Land Acquisition Act 1966 (cap 152) resides in s5 
which is worth quoting in part, if only to marvel at its far-reaching powers:
5(1) Whenever any particular land is needed:
(a) for any public purpose;
(b) by any person, corporation or statutory board, for any work or an undertaking which, in the 
opinion of the Minister, is of public benefit or of public utility, or in the public interest; or
(c) for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes;
the President may by notification published in the Gazette, declare the land to be required for the 
purpose specified in the notification. ...
5(3) The declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for the purpose 
specified therein....
Clearly, this breath of governmental power of acquisition is unique in a declared capi­
talist state, especially one which also subscribes to democratic government. However, 
this approach blends well with the PAP’s commitment to principles of the governed 
market and its all-embracing objective of economic development and nation-building. 
The ends apparently do justify the means. Besides, the pragmatic ideology and siege 
mentality that were being nurtured after Singapore’s exit from the Federation ensured 
that the individual (whether as a member of a union or a landowner) would defer his 
rights for the benefit of ‘national survival’ and the public interest17. If such deference 
were not forthcoming voluntarily, then the law was the sure tool of coercion.
Indeed so effective was the coercive power that the President’s ‘declaration’ 
(by notification in the government Gazette) was deemed to be ‘conclusive evidence’
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that the land in question is needed for the specified purpose. As one of the very few re­
ported cases illustrate, it was pointless to attempt opposition via the courts {Lim Kim 
Som v Sheriffa Taibah bte Abdul Rahman [1994] 1 SLR 393 at 408):
The owner of land has no right to object to the acquisition ... There is no way an owner of the 
subject land can object to the acquisition and there is no way he can take steps to prevent the 
progress of the machinery of acquisition. His only interest... is how much he would get as com­
pensation for the acquisition of his land.
This case bears witness to the potency of the law and the government’s approach 
nearly 30 years after the Land Acquisition Act came into force, and decades after Sin­
gaporeans might reasonably be expected to be required to make personal sacrifices on 
behalf of the nation’s survival. 18 But as Chua J reminded us in Galstaun v Attorney- 
General [1981] 1 MLJ 9, the
Government is the proper authority for deciding what a public purpose is. When the Government 
declares that a purpose is a public purpose it must be presumed that the Government is in posses­
sion of facts which induce the Government to declare that the purpose is a public purpose.
Judicial review is not encouraged in land acquisitions. The government alone decides 
‘what a public purpose is’ and it does so in the name of the public interest paying re­
gard to the overall development of the nation ‘whenever it appears to the President that 
land in any locality is likely to be needed for any purpose specified in section 5(1)’: 
(s3(l)). It is also worth emphasising that there is no procedure for a public inquiry or 
other public participation to help determine whether the land in a particular locality 
should in fact be used for the government’s intended public purpose. Indeed as article 
13 of the Malaysian Constitution was never re-enacted or any other provision made, 
Singaporeans have no constitutional ‘right’ to real property. However, the ‘privilege’ is 
safeguarded by the PAP government. It is the most potent tool through which the gov­
ernment secures political legitimacy (Chua 1997).
17 For a cogent development of this theme, see Chua Beng-Huat (1997).
18 In Lim Kim Som [1994], the Court of Appeal held that the Frustrated Contracts Act (cap 115) 
applied to frustrate a lease of premises because notification of the State's intention to acquire 
the premises appeared after the contract for the sale of land had been entered into. It had pre­
viously been thought that the doctrine of frustration did not apply to leases, but here the fact 
that the parties to the contract could be discharged from their obligations and bring the whole 
contract to an end testifies to the overriding power of the state's compulsory acquisition.
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Of course, the Act allows ‘persons interested’ (s8) to claim ‘compensation for 
all interests in the land’ (s8(l)(b)). Such compensation is to be decided by the Collec­
tor under procedures stipulated in s i0 to s i5. Furthermore, s33 lists the ‘matters to be 
considered in determining compensation’. From time to time, s33 has been amended to 
reflect increases in the market value of land.
For many years, the Act stipulated that in determining the amount of compen­
sation to be awarded for land acquired, the Collector (or in the case of an appeal, the 
Board) shall take ... into consideration (inter alia) the market value of the land as at 30 
November 1973 ... or the market value at the date of publication of the s5 declaration, 
whichever is the lowest: (s33(l)(a)). In this way, the government initially acquired land 
for redevelopment at below market values. It also effectively curbed land speculation. 
As discussed below, it was not until 1987 that the government allowed price increases.
However, so enormous had been the rise in the value of real estate in Singapore 
that in the real world, Collectors and Appeal Boards found themselves implementing a 
system of ex gratia payments to owners of properties, on a case by case basis (Khublall 
1984, 177). The policy of placing discretionary powers in the hands of these extra-legal 
bodies is in line with the government’s preferred way of resolving disputes. It also ful­
fils its initial objective of minimising the number of litigation about ‘what is or is not 
to be adequate compensation’.
Amendments in 1988 (Act No 2 of 1988) and 1993 (Act No 9 of 1993) stipu­
lated that market value shall be considered as at 1 January 1986 in respect of land ac­
quired after 30 November 1987, and 1 January 1992 for land acquired after 18 January 
1993, respectively. However, the discretionary system to make ex gratia payments still 
operated in some cases. After representations, in 1995 the government decided to start 
paying the market value for land acquisitions (Chua 1997, 21). An amendment to the 
Land Acquisition Act (No 38 of 1995) sanctioned this policy decision.
The Act also prescribes ‘Matters to be disregarded in determining compensation’ (s34) 
- ju s t in case s33, ‘Matters to be considered in determining compensation’ should fail.
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7.4.2 Acquisition by Statutory Bodies
The impact of the statutory boards and government-linked companies (GLCs) 
on Singapore’s economic development from 1959 to 1999 cannot be overstated19. They 
were and still are the prime tools through which the government implements its devel­
opment policies. The individual Acts that established each statutory board bestow 
enormous powers on them. Not surprisingly, among these is the power to acquire land 
compulsorily with the assistance of the Land Acquisition Act.
There are 15 Boards whose enabling Acts specifically empowered them to ac-
90quire land through the compulsory procedure . They range from the Air Navigation 
Act (cap 87, 1970 rev ed) to the Urban Redevelopment Authority Act 1973, as 
amended. The next section considers the activities of the Housing and Development 
Board (HDB), which was the primary tool for ensuring that the workforce was suitably 
housed and able to participate in productive nation-building. It is clear that responsi­
bility for developing commercial land fell more to the Economic Development Board 
and the Jurong Town Corporation rather than to the HDB. However, the legal con­
structs that enabled their activities are similar to those that enabled the HDB’s activi­
ties. In addition, as housing was one of the main issues on which the PAP government 
won the 1959 election and subsequent victories, an analysis of the HDB should reveal 
the PAP government using law to implement one of its core policies: housing for all. 
Since 1982, the HDB has been the sole public housing authority in Singapore as it as­
sumed responsibility for housing previously constructed by the Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation and the Jurong Town Corporation21.
7.5 Decommodification of Public Housing
In 1959 one of the government’s most pressing goals was housing for all. In­
deed the PAP manifesto had declared as much (The Tasks Ahead, Part 2,29).
19 For a discussion, see Pillai (1985).
20 For a list of legislation under which land could be acquired compulsorily, see (1986) Hand­
book of Singapore Land Law, Singapore: Butterworths, 684.
21 Sections 33-36, Housing and Development Act.
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From 1947-1959, the Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT), established in 1927, 
built 20,907 units of housing (Tan 1998, 10). However during the same period Singa­
pore’s population had increased from 0.938 million in 1947 to 1.579 million in 1959 
(id). In contrast, between 1960 and 1995, the Housing and Development Board (HDB), 
which replaced the SIT, managed to build 772,495 units of residential housing, 15,639 
shops, 154 markets and food centres, and 11,383 industrial units (Tan 1998, 10). Some 
86% of Singapore’s 2.986 million people live in HDB accommodation (HDB Annual 
Report 1995/96). Twenty-three new towns incorporating recreation facilities as well as 
‘town gardens’ and parks have been constructed.
The government’s public housing policy also reshaped, some would say so­
cially engineered, the lives of the occupants of the housing estates (Tai 1989, Hassan 
1977, Wong & Yeh 1985). Public housing success is the result of the more pragmatic, 
activist approach employed by the PAP government. Chua (1997, 14) called it ‘the 
middle path’ in that it lies between the ffee-market strategy of the USA and the no­
market mode of socialist Russia and Eastern Europe. As Chua explains (id 13-14):
At one end is the United States, characterised by dominance of the market, with little govern­
ment intervention (Hartman, 1983:4) and government provision restricted to specific groups that 
are not adequately served by the market itself. At the other end is the ex-socialist nations, where 
the market mechanism was eliminated in principle, housing was ideologically instituted as a 
natural right -  ‘not a market commodity: and its production and distribution should not be a 
means of unearned income’ (Szelenyi, 1983:28) -  and the state was ideologically committed to 
universal provision. Between these two ends is the credible notion of a mode of provision that 
reduces the role of the market without eliminating it and which aims at universal provision with­
out raising it to the level of rights or entitlement. Such is the public-housing policy of the Singa­
pore government’.
The next section explores the law and this ‘middle way’. Particular attention is paid to 
how public housing is financed and individual property rights are protected.
7.5.1 Housing and Development Act
To implement its housing policy, the PAP parliament passed the 1959 Housing 
and Development Ordinance (now cap 129,1997 ed) which came into force on 1st Feb­
ruary 1960. This established the Housing and Development Board (HDB).
The HDB was given wide powers and made responsible for all housing devel­
opment work, including land acquisition, slum clearance, resettlement, town planning, 
engineering and architecture and even the production of building materials (si 3). The
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physical construction of the units was undertaken by private entrepreneurs22, which 
contributed hugely to solving the unemployment problem (Tai 1989, 94-100).
Financing Singapore’s universal housing scheme is one of the factors that dif­
ferentiate the Singapore model from the free-market and the no-market models.
Section 66(l)-(3) of the 1959 Ordinance (as amended) provided that the HDB 
‘may, from time to time, for the purposes of this Act, raise loans from the Govern­
ment. .. ’ or by mortgage, legal or equitable charge on any property vested in the Board, 
or on any revenues receivable, or by the creation and issue of debenture stock.
In the event, financing was arranged through below-rate government loans, 
subsidies, and revenue derived from HDB operations such as sales and rental of flats, 
mortgages, rental and sales of industrial and commercial properties, rent of land, car 
parks, markets and hawker centres (HDB Facts 1995, 4). From 1960 to 1994, the 
HDB’s total capital expenditure increased from SD10 million to SD6.6 billion, while 
revenue expenditure rose from SD15 million to SD1.8 billion during the same period 
(id). Between 1992 and 1994 the HDB operated a net deficit in housing operations, 
which was offset by surplus from non-housing operations (id). In 1994 the deficit in 
housing operations was SD737 million while non-housing operations generated profits 
of SD510 million. From 1975 to 1994, government loans to the HDB accounted for 
20% to 40% of total government capital expenditure, while government subsidies rep­
resented between 1% to 2% of total government expenditure (id). In 1993, for exam­
ple, government loans to the HDB were 24% of total government expenditure (id, 5).
In other words, the government’s commitment to universal provision of hous­
ing was more than ideological or visionary. It was supported by the financial and legal 
means with which to achieve its objective. First, as discussed at 7.4.1 supra, land was 
acquired compulsorily for any purpose declared by the government as being in the 
public interest. Moreover, acquisitions were made at below market rates. During the 
first development phases, 1960 to 1973, land prices were pegged at the same low, pre­
22 However, throughout the period, these were nearly all government-linked companies 
(GLCs). Even in 1996, all companies appointed under the Executive Condo Housing Scheme 
(Appointment of Developers) Notification were GLCs.
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market rates. It was not until 1995 that the government began to pay market rates for 
land acquisition. By then, sufficient cheap land had been acquired, for by 1995 over 
86% of Singaporeans lived in HDB accommodation.
Another novel way of financing universal housing is the use of compulsory 
savings. As explained at 6.4, the Central Provident Fund (CPF), a mandatory tax-free 
social security labour market contribution, provides the bulk of Singapore’s huge na­
tional capital formation. CPF membership rose from 180,000 in 1959 to 1,847,000 in 
1984 {HDB Facts 1995, 22). Mandatory contributions in equal share from employers 
and employees increased from 5% in 1955 to 25% in 1984. In 1971, the contribution 
ceiling per employee was SD300 per month. By 1984 it had reached SD2,500 per 
month, making total receipts of SD9 million in 1955, and SD5,386 million in 1984. 
Foreign reserves of over SD100 billion by the mid-1990s provide the government with 
funds for public housing and other infrastructure investments. The Government In­
vestment Corporation invests the remainder in government securities that are used to 
capitalise government-linked companies in strategic industries and equity holdings 
abroad. Importantly, CPF moneys are harnessed directly by the government and used 
to finance public housing construction at below market-rate loans and subsidies. This 
system avoids competition with other project financing and commercial loans that 
charge high interest rates. But there is another important way in which the CPF fi­
nances public housing.
In 1964, the Central Provident Fund Act was amended to allow Singapore em­
ployees to use their CPF savings to purchase HDB flats under the Home Ownership 
Scheme. Until this move, most HDB flats were rental properties. For instance, in 1964 
only 1500 households out of about 11,000 public-housing tenants opted for ownership 
(Chua, 23). The CPF-supported scheme developed into a mechanism for financing 99- 
year leasehold mortgages for defined categories of people. The 1968 amendment of the 
Act allowed savers to draw a 20% down-payment from their accumulated funds and 
deduct monthly mortgage payments from their CPF contributions. This made it possi­
ble for ordinary families to own their homes without suffering any reduction in 
monthly disposable income.
In this way, public housing moved into the realms of private ownership rather 
than remaining rental property. In 1968, 44% of all public housing applicants chose to
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buy their flats. By 1970, 63% of applicants wanted to buy and in 1986 the figure 
reached about 90% (Chua 23). The actual ownership rate in 1996 was 81% of those 
living in HDB flats (HDB Annual Report 1995/96). The government’s objective for 
home ownership is 95% of the population (Tan 1998, 13). For as the Minister for Na­
tional Development explained at a press conference (Straits Times, 22 April 1992), 
with home ownership assisted by heavy subsidies, Singaporeans will be ‘buffered 
against increasing housing costs’. To subsidise low-income families’ flat ownership, 
the government has budgeted SD 160 million, or SD 40,000 per household. Section 66 
of the Housing and Development Act (cap 129) was amended in 1998 (No 41 of 1998) 
to allow the HDB to raise loans, foreign or domestic, as an alternative way of funding 
its projects. Surprisingly, s22 was amended to allow the Board, with ministerial ap­
proval, to carry out agency work which does not necessarily relate to housing. As yet, 
it is unclear what such work might entail.
The Housing and Development Act has always severely restricted the rights 
normally associated with private ownership of property23. For instance, s47 prohibited 
ownership of HDB flats for appreciation or rental income. A person could not buy a 
flat if she or her spouse owned ‘any other flat, house, building or land or has an estate 
or interest therein; or has at any time within 30 months immediately prior to the date of 
making an application ... sold any flat, house, building or land’ which she owned.
Owners were required to obtain prior written consent from the Board before 
transferring any property interest (s49-52). Prior to March 1971, owners’ rights to sell 
were restricted. Flats could only be ‘sold’ back to the HDB, and then only at the origi­
nal price, minus depreciation. No owner was allowed to realise profits from the flat. 
After 1971, sale restrictions were relaxed somewhat. Permission to sell on the open 
market depended upon occupancy of minimum three years (from 1973, five years). In 
1979, a 5% levy was imposed on the resale price. The levy has been retained ever since 
although it has been varied according to the size and type of flat. It is intended to help 
curtail the vendors’ profit margin. A flat owner who wants to sell before the minimum 
occupancy period has lapsed must sell to the HDB: in effect, she must voluntarily sur­
render the lease and accept the cost of the flat minus depreciation.
23 See Tan 1998, chapter 4.
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The Board was vested with wide powers of eviction and could re-enter or com­
pulsorily acquire the flat for breach of lease conditions. For instance, under s56 a per­
son may not use a flat or common areas of a building for any purpose which may be 
illegal or immoral or which may cause a nuisance, annoyance or disturbance. Breach 
could result in forfeiture. The HDB could repossess the flat under any of the following 
conditions. First, if the lessee had a legal interest in another flat, house, building or 
land. Secondly, if the flat was being used for any purpose other than that provided for 
by the lease. Thirdly, if the lessee permitted any person other than an authorised occu­
pier to reside in the flat. Fourthly, if the lessee failed to perform any condition in the 
lease. Fifthly, if the lessee made a misrepresentation of a material fact ‘whether inno­
cently or otherwise’ relating to the purchase of the flat. Sixthly, if the lessee sublet or 
transferred the property without obtaining prior consent form the HDB. Seventhly, if 
the minimum number of persons stipulated in the lease was not occupying the flat. Re­
entry would also apply if the lessee ceased to be a citizen of Singapore, ceased to oc­
cupy the flat, was three months in rent arrears, was convicted of an offence related to 
destroying HDB property, or an offence related to immigration (sheltering, feeding or 
assisting an illegal alien). Forfeiture and the right to re-entry and repossession are the 
penalties for breach, but in practice less harsh remedies are used, the Board often im­
poses financial penalties (Tan 82).
Flats are allocated on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. The HDB devises 
guidelines of eligibility24 for the various kinds of flats produced. They range from one- 
, two, three-, four- to five-room apartments and, recently, 5-room split-level executive 
maisonettes. One- and two-room flats are used for rental, while the others are for sale.
The market does not determine the price of flats, the government does. Prices 
are based on the general state of the economy and levels of affordability for different 
types of flats (Chua 21). As National Development Minister said (Straits Times 12 July 
1996):
When we price our flats, we don’t just price them based on our costs. We price them with an 
eye on the affordability for those who are purchasing them, and we try to keep that level of af­
fordability the same over the years.
24 For a discussion, see Tan 1998, chapter 3.
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In 1989 the National Development Minister announced a 20-year upgrading pro­
gramme for old HDB estates (PD vol 62, col 1308-10). Since then, most of the build­
ings with one- and two-room flats have been demolished and replaced by three- and 
four-room flats. Part IVA of the Housing and Development Act makes provisions for 
the regulation of upgrading work. Many schemes have been introduced to support the 
upgrading project, including the Selective En-Bloc Renewal Scheme, which aims to 
improve the flats without the residents having to move out. However, in 1998, s65J 
was amended (Act No 41 of 1998) to empower the HDB to acquire, by compulsion, 
any flat which, in its opinion, requires upgrading. The section sets out procedures for 
acquisition and compensation payment.
Steps have also been taken to adjust the eligibility income ceilings for owner­
ship of HDB flats. The eligibility guidelines will not be explored here. Suffice it to say 
that ‘income level’ and Singapore citizenship are basic criteria. The citizenship crite­
rion has been relaxed but there is still some discrimination. For instance, s51 was 
amended in 1998 (Act No 41 of 1998) to remove the protection available to HDB flats 
from bankruptcy proceedings and attachment in execution of court orders where the 
flat is owned, solely or wholly, by non-citizens. Protection is still available to citizens. 
Some 90% of the population are ‘eligible4 for public housing and relevant subsidies. 
Chua argues that in principle there is no reason why income ceilings should not be 
abolished (168, note 8). He speculates that the reasons for not doing so may include 
protecting the private market and keeping ‘private housing as a socially differentiated 
class so that it may act as a ‘prize’ for those who have become financially successful’ 
(id). Other factors may be at play for in 1996 the Minister expressed the government’s 
wish to increase the percentage of private property from 16% to 25% by 2010 (PD vol 
65, col 1449). This will be achieved through privatisation of some existing stock. 
Amendments to the Act (No 7 of 1997 and No 3 of 1998 - respectively) implemented 
these policies. In addition, the planned new model towns like Punggol 21 will offer 
40% private and 60% public housing.
7.6 Residential Property Act 1976
Having alluded to private residential property above, it is apt to consider briefly 
how this operates in the public housing Mecca. The private alternatives to public
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housing flats are first, the 99-year leasehold flats built by private entrepreneurs, regu­
lated by the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act, cap 130. Secondly, 
HUDC flats, built by the private Housing and Urban Development Corporation Pte Ltd 
and regulated by the HUDC Housing Estates Act, cap 131. In 1982 HUDC flats be­
came subject to the Housing and Development Act. The HDB assumed responsibility 
and treated them as HDB flats on 99-year leases. However, by 1995, the government 
started to privatise HUDC flats. Thirdly, Executive Condominium Housing, regulated 
by the 1997 Act of the same name, cap 99A. After 10 years’ occupation, the owners of 
these types of flats obtain the same rights as those of private units registered under the 
Land Titles (Strata) Act, cap 158 (Tan 1994, 455-78). There are also few fee simple 
residential properties, which were granted prior to 1903 when the Crown Lands Ordi­
nance was amended to prevent the grant of any more state land in fee simple.
There are substantial differences between property rights in private and public 
housing. At the outset all have the right to exclusive possession25. However there are 
three limitations of property rights in public housing, which are not witnessed in pri­
vate property. One, limitation on occupancy: the HDB alone determines who may oc­
cupy the HDB flat with the owner. Failure to observe the conditions of the lease on 
this matter may result in forfeiture. Two, the owner of an HDB flat may not use it as 
security without the HDB’s consent. In case of bankruptcy, the flat does not vest in the 
Official Assignee (s51 (2)) neither can it be attached in execution of a court order 
(s52(3)). Similar provisions in grants of private property would probably be struck 
down as being against public policy (Re Machu (1882) 21 Ch D 838). Three, private 
property ownership gives the right to unrestricted alienation. However it was not until 
1971 that the owners of HDB flats were allowed to sell their flats in the open market. 
Before then, an owner could only surrender her lease to the HDB and receive the cost 
of the flat less depreciation. Although the resale rules were relaxed from 1979, the 
HDB’s consent is still necessary and there are rules about minimum years of occupa­
tion. HUDC and executive condominium flats have some resale restrictions though not 
as rigid as HDB flats. Alienation for consideration has always been possible for private 
property. Consequently there was always a free market in private residential property.
25 That is what distinguishes a property right from a personal right.
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However, on 10 September 1973, the PAP government issued a declaration on 
‘Future Restriction of Ownership of Residential Properties’, whereby only Singapore 
citizens and authorised persons may purchase land and residential property. The ra­
tionale was the need to stop property speculation and prevent price hikes. The move 
aimed to provide foreign companies with reasonably priced housing for their senior 
staff and stop them from seeking to invest elsewhere. The Residential Property Act 
(cap 274) was enacted in 1976 with retroactive effect from 11 September 1973.
The Act required non-citizens of Singapore, including permanent residents and 
corporations, to obtain government approval prior to purchasing residential property. 
Purchases made by a citizen on trust for a non-citizen shall be void. No interest in resi­
dential property could pass to a foreigner by will or intestacy or by virtue of an interest 
in a mortgage. Foreign beneficiaries are required to sell their interests to a citizen or an 
approved purchaser. Residential property owned prior to 11 September 1973 by non­
citizens who are natural persons may be retained by them. However, non-Singapore 
companies owning such properties must dispose of them by 11 September 1983 unless 
the Minister permitted otherwise. Failure to dispose of the property or receive ministe­
rial approval could result in attachment and sale by the Controller. Section 16(5) pro­
vides three criteria for approval of non-citizens’ purchases. One, applicants must dem­
onstrate an ability to make adequate contribution to Singapore’s economy or have 
special professional qualifications and experience. Two, applicants who are permanent 
residents will be considered favourably. Three, as a rule, permission will be withheld 
for properties over 15 000 sq ft as these can be developed into several units.
The Minister may, at his discretion, exempt any foreigner or company from the 
provisions of the Act. This enables such persons or companies to purchase residential 
property at will without seeking permission in individual cases.
Other moves to curb speculation and price fluctuations in the residential prop­
erty market have been tried. For instance, in March 1974, the Property Tax (Surcharge) 
Act (cap 255) was passed. It imposed on foreign-owned, private residential property a 
surcharge of property tax equivalent to 10% of the annual value of the property levied 
whenever property tax is collected under si 7 or si 9 of the Property Tax Act (cap 254). 
However, in January 1995, the restrictions were removed for flats in buildings over six 
floors high, allowing non-citizens to purchase them in the same way as commercial
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properties. The 10% surcharge was cancelled also for non-citizen absentee owners of 
such properties. The motivation seems to have been foreign investor considerations.
7.7 Conclusion
Singapore started its independent life with a species of English land law in 
which the state was the residual owner of all land. This vestige of feudalism was im­
ported with the 1826 Second Charter of Justice and reaffirmed by s3 of the Application 
of English Law Act (cap 7A, 1994 ed). However, in the intervening years the govern­
ment has adapted foreign land law and innovated laws of its own to suit its develop­
ment objectives. In short, land laws were used to provide land suitable for manufac­
turing and commercial buildings as well as housing estates to secure a stable, effective, 
suitably housed workforce and social equity.
From providing basic shelter for the new industrial workforce, the housing 
policy evolved into home ownership for all. The innovative 1959 Housing and Devel­
opment law was designed to provide basic housing rapidly. The Act gave the Housing 
and Development Board (HDB) wide powers to receive government loans and subsi­
dies, clear slums, acquire land, build and finance flats and other properties for residen­
tial and commercial use. It also provided for the control of alienation of land and cur­
tailed the growth of a resale property market. The Acquisition of Land Act made 
provisions for the compulsory acquisition of land cheaply for any purpose specified by 
the government. The Central Provident Fund Act enabled families to purchase HDB 
flats without suffering a reduction in their monthly disposable income. The Residential 
Property Act ensured that prices were kept low by excluding foreigners from holding 
any interest in specified residential property. Exemptions could be and often were 
made by the Minister.
These statutes were instrumental in making public housing the primary mode 
of housing consumption in Singapore. They effectively decommodified public housing 
and land. There was a limited role for the market (HDB flats could be sold on the open 
market from 1971 and other state-subsidised housing projects are being privatised). 
But the government retained control, particularly by restricting alienation rights and 
manipulating price and capital formation. For instance, a new section s49A of the
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Housing and Development Act (No 41 of 1998) declares null and void any contract or 
agreement for sale in which the flat either is not sold to the HDB or, prior to sale, does 
not fulfil HDB prescriptions regarding minimum period of occupation. Currently, 86% 
of all Singaporeans live in HDB flats, 81% as owners. Thus the nation’s wealth is 
shared more equitably and property ownership is democratised rather than restricted to 
a small privileged group.
Singapore land laws have been courageous and innovative. A common law 
lawyer may wonder whether the restraints on alienation are such as would make them 
repugnant to the very idea of property ownership. For then they could surely be struck 
down as invalid under the common law. However, in Singapore such restraints are pre­
scribed by statute. Doing the will of Parliament therefore makes them valid. The 
‘global’ English idea that the owner of an interest in land must be able to dispose of it 
freely is overridden by the local developmental necessity of providing universal hous­
ing at affordable prices. As Tan (1998,145) explains:
The notion of property or ownership is not immutable. Not only does it change with the times 
and societies, but, as evidenced in the ownership of the different kinds of public housing avail­
able in Singapore ... variations of the concept may exist at the same time in the same society. It 
underscores the point that property is a man-made institution and is made to serve the purposes 
or needs of society. In Singapore, national interest defines the scope of ownership of land.
Clearly, Singapore land laws have diverged from their foreign transplants to form a 
home-grown body of rules which is more regulatory, situational, pragmatic and holistic 
in nature than their predecessors, which are supported by a more rights-based, indi­
vidualistic philosophy. Changes in land laws do correlate with changes in Singapore’s 
economy during the period. They may well have caused some economic development, 
but it is impossible to determine the extent of such causative link, given the many 
other extra-legal factors that were also at play.
CHAPTER 8 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
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The whole o f  human development is derivative. We stand on the shoulders 
o f  scientists, artists and craftsmen who preceded us. We borrow and de­
velop what they have done; not necessarily as parasites but simply as the 
next generation. It is at the heart o f  what we know as progress. When we 
are asked to remember the 8th Commandment, thou shalt not steal, bear in 
mind that borrowing and developing has (sic) always been acceptable.
S ir H ugh L addie J, T he S tephen  S tew art M em orial L ecture:
C o p y rig h t - O ver strength , O v er regulated , O ver rated?
L ondon: In te llec tual P roperty  Institu te  (n .d .), 17.
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8.1 Introduction
It has been argued that the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) leads 
to economic development because protection encourages foreign direct investment, sup­
ports the technology transfer necessary for industrialisation, and stimulates indigenous 
creative research and development work necessary to maintain technological growth.1 
Indeed the establishment of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in 
1970 as a specialised agency within the United Nations organisation is probably prem­
ised on the perceived potency of IPRs’ role in economic development.2 Despite the re­
ceived wisdom, until forced by TRIPS,3 most developing countries had shown scant in­
terest in enacting or enforcing laws for protecting IPRs. This, for three reasons (Siebeck 
1990, 1): one, developing countries perceive IP protection as a matter that is relevant 
primarily for advanced economies. Two, they view IP protection as the developed coun­
tries’ way of depriving the developing world of the benefits of advanced technology.4 
Three, they see the mechanism for administering and enforcing IP laws as an unneces­
sary expense to be bome by the developing world for the benefit of the developed.
In the case of Singapore, which was named a ‘newly industrialised country’ by 
the Reagan administration in 1988 and a ‘developed country’ by the OECD in 1995, it is 
difficult to say in which camp the country sees itself. Under the TRIPS Agreement, Sin­
gapore is regarded as a developing country. Government rhetoric professes the need for
1 Academic work supporting this is scant. But see Eberschlag 1994. See also UNCTAD 1975; 
UNCTAD 1981. See Brown 1991, who attempts to show a link between underdevelopment and 
lack of IP protection. See Beier 1980. Giants such as Bentham (1795), Say (1803), Mill (1848), 
Clark (1907), Schumpeter (1942) Arrow (1962), Schmookler (1966), Romer (1991) suggest that 
patents are key to nurturing inventions. However, Prof Ricketson reiterates that 'it is difficult to 
point to any clear evidence that the patent system was successful in promoting its prime objec­
tive of fostering industrial development. It was already 200 years old [in the UK] by the time the 
Industrial Revolution got under way7: cited in Laddie 1999.
2 For instance, the preamble to WIPO's Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions (1977, 
Geneva: WIPO, vol 1) asserts the importance of (foreign) technology for economic development 
and industrialisation, and the necessity of protection.
3 TRIPS is the multilateral Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
which was adopted as Annex lc  of the 1994 Final Act of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO): [1994] 33 ILM 1197-1225. Membership of WTO compels 
compliance with TRIPS, see 8.2 infra. A timetable for compliance was established for developed, 
developing and least developed countries. As a developing country, Singapore must comply by 
1st January 2000.
4 Critics who question the relevance of IP systems, in particular of patents, for developing
countries include: Oddi 1987, and Kunz-Hallstein 1975, who argues that many developing
countries condemn transfer of technology as a 'subtle means of domination, a new form of
predatory capitalism and slave trade'.
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IP laws.5 Key IP laws have been in force since the colonial era for instance in the case of 
patents, since 1871.6 However, whereas there is abundant evidence to show that the PAP 
government constantly changed the statutes to help secure an attractive infrastructure 
(housing, transport, telecom, education, health); a skilled and flexible labour force; high 
savings rate; tax breaks and other incentives; and broadly predictable macro-economic 
conditions, which it considered conducive to economic growth (chapters 4 to 7), there is 
little or no evidence of government efforts to secure higher standards of IP protection.7 
In other words, IP protection was not given high priority from 1959 to the early 1990s. 
This suggests that the government did not support the view that the protection of intel­
lectual property rights leads to economic development. This is also in line with findings 
which suggest that there is no direct relationship between, e.g., patent protection and in­
creased FDI inflows (Penrose 1973, 768-785; Firestone 1971). More recent studies sug­
gest that evidence of the degree to which the level of IPR protection affects the volume 
and composition of FDI has been ambiguous (Frischtak 1989, 17). Indeed a UN Report 
(1993, 3) on the relationship between IP protection and FDI confirms that the effect of 
higher IP protection is infinitesimal when compared with the effect of the overall eco­
nomic climate prevailing in a particular country - i.e. factors such as those upon which 
Singapore focused.
However, this does not mean that Singapore ignored the legal protection of in­
tellectual property. Because of its commitment to foreign trade, the Singapore govern­
ment has been obsessed with being perceived by developed countries as ‘doing the right 
thing’. Lall and Streeten (1977, 68) argue that the existence of patent protection does not 
of itself attract foreign capital, but may indirectly be regarded as a sign of goodwill to­
wards private enterprise. To my mind, this is the key to understanding Singapore’s early 
relationship with IP laws.
In a survey of 94 major US firms in six industries, Mansfield (1994) found that 
the perceived effects of IPRs on FDI depended on the type of investment and industry 
involved. Thus for capital investments in research and development facilities and in fa­
cilities for manufacturing high-tech equipment and components, computer software, bio­
5 See, for instance, PD vol 68, col 311, et seq.
6 As part of the Straits Settlement, in November 1871, Singapore received its patent law, which 
follows the Indian system. See Nijar 1986.
7 An exception is Singapore's willingness to amend its Copyright Act in 1987 after bilateral ne­
gotiations with the USA (see 8.2 infra).
226
technology and pharmaceuticals, the perception of potential investors was that IP protec­
tion is important (OECD 1989; Mansfield 1994). Consequently, the PAP government 
would undoubtedly regard it as crucial for Singapore to be perceived by foreign investors 
as a country that protects intellectual property - especially in key new industries. These 
are knowledge-based industries upon which Singapore sought to base its economic 
growth from about 1979 (see chapters 4 and 5). This ambition accelerated after the 1985- 
86 recession when business services and niche high-tech industries were considered the 
vehicles for recovery and prosperity.
Thus, from about 1987, and definitely by the early 1990s, Singapore seemed mo­
tivated to protect IPRs out of self-interest.8 This move coincided with a radical transfor­
mation of the purposes of copyright law in the USA (Jaszi 1996); a change which was to 
be globalised under TRIPS (8.2 infra). This was a move away from the ‘cultural bargain’ 
theory9 that had previously justified copyright protection, to the new, trade-driven focus 
of copyright law, which seeks to ‘enhance ... the wealth and overall financial well-being 
of companies which invest in the production and distribution of copyrighted works’ 
(Jaszi 1996, 599). As Singapore’s Minister for Law explained in 1998 during the second 
reading of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill (PD vol 68, col 310-11):
... Intellectual capital, not merely physical assets or financial capital, will be the key factor. ... 
Where a company’s value is based less on its factories, plant and equipment but more on ideas 
and technical innovations, effective protection of its intellectual property will become increas­
ingly central to its strategic plans and operations....
Knowledge-based industries will be attracted to invest in Singapore if they are confident that their 
intellectual property will be given sufficient protection here. ... A good IPR infrastructure is also 
important to the success of our own home-grown knowledge-based industries.
Singapore’s need ‘to give effect to [its] obligations under TRIPS’ (id) was the second 
reason for building a better IPR infrastructure in the late 1990s. An inter-Ministry com­
mittee was charged with the task. Work on patents was completed first. The new Patents
8 Prof Cornish argues that when countries are on the verge of industrialisation, they accept in­
tellectual property as a legal underpinning of that process; see Cornish 1993. In Singapore in­
dustrial take-off occurred in the early 1970s. It is perhaps more apt to suggest that acceptance of 
IP coincides with the move away from an industrial-based to a knowledge-based society. Alter­
natively, that acceptance is the mark of a mature industrial society.
9 The 'cultural bargain' theory as a justification for copyright protection is explained thus by 
Prof Reichman: '[i]n the past, US legal theory justified copyright protection only to the extent 
that it stimulated progress in the arts and sciences by enriching the store of literary and artistic 
works that would enter the public domain and thereby become freely available to users of the 
copyrighted culture': Reichman 1996. For a discussion of theories that seek to justify protection 
of IPRs, see Oddi 1996.
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Act (cap 221, 1995 ed) has been in effect since 1995. Other IP amendments were in 
place by January 1999, a year before the TRIPS-stipulated deadline.
Consistent with the theme of this study, one objective of this chapter is to dis­
cover whether Singapore’s economic development was caused by laws for the protection 
of IP. However, such an analysis would be tilling infertile soil. A brief historical survey 
of Singapore’s IP laws shows no correlation between changes in laws for protecting IPRs 
and changes in Singapore’s economy. It is not inappropriate to conclude that until 
spurred by its TRIPS commitment and the possibility of Singaporeans owning globally 
marketable intellectual property in the era of information technology and knowledge- 
based industries, the government did not give high priority to IP protection.10 For as dis­
cussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, until about 1979, Singapore’s main focus was on labour- 
intensive manufacturing. IP protection did not become an issue until Singapore began to 
move into high technology industries whose products and services contained larger 
amounts of R&D work. Specifically, copyright protection became an issue from 1985-87 
when a US study identified Singapore’s copyright law as inadequate and the US gov­
ernment demanded a remedy, see 8.2 infra.
For these reasons I focus on the second objective of this chapter. That is, to dis­
cover whether and, if so, to what extent, Singapore’s IP laws are converging or have 
converged with those of the West. In effect this means examining the extent to which 
Singapore’s IP laws comply with the requirements of TRIPS. The exercise also gives an 
opportunity to analyse this new species of supranational laws. As they were devised by 
the major producers of internationally marketable intellectual property, i.e., the USA and 
European Union (EU) member states, a high degree of compliance would be prima facie 
evidence that Singapore IP laws are converging with those of the West.
The following sections therefore examine the origin of the TRIPS Agreement in 
order to underline its Euro-American heritage (8.2). Next the scope and general provi­
sions of TRIPS (8.3) and the conventions co-opted into TRIPS (8.4) are discussed. These 
are followed by brief definitions of the areas for which TRIPS requires protection (8.5). 
Section 8.6 considers TRIPS enforcement standards. Having laid the foundation, the next 
section reviews, in table form, Singapore’s compliance with TRIPS (8.7). The chapter
10 Cheong & Mirandah 1992 support this in their study.
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concludes with some thoughts about convergence of laws in an economy where intangi­
ble goods and services may soon account for the lion’s share of its global trade (8.8).
8.2 TRIPS: The Making of a Global Accord
The TRIPS Agreement ((1994) 33 IL M 1197-1225) represents the culmination of 
some twelve years of activism by the United States government and intense negotiations 
in international fora. Already in the late 1970s the USA raised the issue of international 
copyright theft and counterfeiting of trade marked products, which it claimed was cost­
ing US companies billions of dollars in lost revenues. By 1979 the US and the European 
Community (EC) had agreed a draft Agreement on Measures to Discourage the Impor­
tation o f Counterfeit Goods (GATT Doc. L/4817, July 31, 1979). This draft metamor­
phosed into an Anti-counterfeiting Code in 1982 (GATT Doc. L/5382), which was sup­
ported by Japan, Canada and Switzerland.
In 1982 the US-sponsored draft Code was put on the agenda of the impending 
GATT Round (Bradley 1987, 57). This move was vehemently opposed by developing 
countries. India and Brazil insisted that GATT was concerned with trade in tangible 
goods and had no jurisdiction over trade marks, which was the sole responsibility of 
WIPO, the UN body established in 1970 (id, 66). The debate continued into the 1980s, 
aided by expert reports from Congressional hearings11 and US trade associations. In 
1985, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) presented a study12 on be­
half of its members. The IIPA represented seven trade associations with particular inter­
est in copyright-related industries: the American Film Marketing Association, the Asso­
ciation of American Publishers, the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers 
Association, the Computer Software and Service Industry, the National Music Publishers 
Association and the Recording Industry Association of America. The IIPA study (1985, 
7) blamed inadequate copyright laws in ten countries (including Singapore) for annual 
losses of USD 1.3 billion in these American copyright-related industries. The study con-
11 For instance, in 1983, the US Committee on Ways and Means was informed that the US 
video industry lost about USD 6 billion annually: Possible Renewal of the Generalized System of 
Preferences - Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the US House of Rep. Comm, on Ways and 
Means, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 1983, 57. Similarly, in 1984 the Automotive Parts and Accessories 
Association informed the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations that its mem­
bers lost about USD 12 billion to sale of counterfeited spare parts: Unfair Foreign Trade Practices, 
Stealing American Intellectual Property: Imitation is Not Flattery, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1984,1-3.
12 IIPA (1985) US Government Trade Policy: Views of the Copyright Industries, Washington.
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eluded that the US government’s goal must be ‘to establish an international trading cli­
mate in which intellectual property is respected and protected’. So said, so done. Or 
more precisely, so attempted. For it is unclear whether the resulting TRIPS Agreement 
has gained ‘respect’ or ‘protection’ among traders, consumers or even legal institutions 
in developing countries.
To achieve its goal, the US government proposed that all IPR issues be tabled at 
the then forth-coming GATT Round. It ignored WIPO and affirmed that the GATT 
should assume jurisdiction over IP matters.13 Subsequently, the Ministerial Declaration 
of September 20, 1986, which launched the Uruguay Round of the GATT (reproduced in 
Stewart 1993, vol 111, 7-8) held that:
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and disciplines 
dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account work already undertaken 
in the GATT.
It was decided to aim for legally binding provisions dealing with counterfeit goods, pat­
terned on the previously agreed US-EC Anti-counterfeit Code. Furthermore, the 1987 
Negotiating Plan, called the Trade-Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Rights, In­
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods (id, 11-25), invited member states to submit pro­
posals. In October 1987 the US Trade Representative’s proposal called for Customs 
controls and substantive laws to protect IPRs.14 In November 1987 the EC submitted far- 
reaching proposals requiring inter alia, that the Agreement adheres to basic GATT prin­
ciples of national treatment, non-discrimination, reciprocity and transparency, and makes 
provisions for new categories of IPRs such as plant varieties, semiconductor designs, 
utility models and appellations of origin.15 Meanwhile developing countries, led by In­
dia and Brazil, opposed the inclusion of IP in the GATT (Beier and Schricker 1989).
If the US government was the progenitor of the TRIPS negotiations, its unilateral 
actions also created the impetus for finalising the accord. In 1984, even before the 
TRIPS negotiations got off the ground, the US government responded to powerful lob­
byists,16 by amending section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, which empowers the President
13 For an account of the negotiations of the Round, see Stewart 1993.
14 Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the Negotiating Objective, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14, October 20,1987.
15 Guidelines Proposed by the European Community for the Negotiations on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, GATT Doc MTN.GNG/NGU/W/17, November 201987.
16 Like the IIPA, see notes 11 and 12 above.
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to order the elimination of ‘unjustifiable or unreasonable’ trade practices. The 1984 Act 
made failure to protect American intellectual property actionable under s301.
The new s301 was used unilaterally against South Korea in 1985 (demanding 
wider scope in Korea’s patent, trademark and copyright laws), against Brazil in 1985 
(demanding better protection of computer software) and against Indonesian copyright in­
fringement in 1986-87. All countries acquiesced and changed their IP laws as required,
A similar situation occurred in Singapore. The IIPA 1985 study (id) had identi­
fied Singapore as the world’s largest producer of pirated records and tapes. Bilateral ne­
gotiations resulted in Singapore’s enactment of the Copyright Act 1987 (cap 63, 1988 
ed) and a promise to accede to the WIPO treaty (PD vol 50, col 590-592).
Dissatisfied with the slow progress of the TRIPS negotiations, and emboldened 
by success of its s301 actions, the US government introduced the ‘Special 301’. Under 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988,17 Special 301 requires the US Trade 
Representative to conduct an annual review of the IP practices of all US trading partners, 
identifying priority countries, which deny ‘adequate and effective protection of IPRs’ or 
which ‘deny fair and equitable market access’ to US traders. Offending countries are 
placed on a watch list or a priority watch list, pending investigation. This is usually fol­
lowed by unilateral US trade sanctions until the offending country enacts the required 
laws and amends its ways (Bello and Holmer, 1989-90,259).
The legality of s301 and Special 301 has been questioned in international fora, 
including in the GATT (Evans 1994, 153-4). But no amount of questioning stopped the 
US government from threatening and imposing unilateral trade sanctions. No doubt justi­
fication lies in the USA’s perception of itself as the world’s importer of first resort.18
Countries that experienced the wrath of Special 301 in the 1990s include India 
and Thailand (for inadequate pharmaceutical patent protection, piracy of books, sound 
recordings and videos), and the People’s Republic of China for inadequate protection of 
patented, copyrighted and trade marked products (Alford 1995; Carter 1996).
17 See 19 USC section 2242,1990.
18 The origin of the phrase is unknown. However it is used frequently in trade-related debates. 
For instance, in February 1999, then US Treasury secretary Rubin warned G7 nations that 
Europe and Japan needed to absorb more of the trade surpluses being generated by emerging 
markets since the US could not continue as the world's importer of first resort. See Beattie & 
Chote, US steps up pressure on Euro-zone, Financial Times, 20/21 February 1999,1.
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In 1991, the US also placed the EC, Canada and Australia on the priority watch 
list along with 22 other countries. Action against the EC stemmed from disapproval of its 
policy regarding European content in broadcast works. There was an outcry when the US 
tariff exemptions granted to Indian pharmaceutical products under the Generalised Sys­
tem of Preferences were revoked in 1992. There was similar public concern when prefer­
ences were removed on goods from Singapore,19 Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea.
The US sanctions seemed to focus the minds of their negotiating partners at the 
GATT. The final draft of TRIPS was adopted in Marrakech in April 1994. The predomi­
nantly Euro-American TRIPS agenda gained legitimacy as one of the 12 substantive 
agreements annexed to the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi­
sation (WTO Agreement).20 The WTO Agreement is a ‘particular’ international conven­
tion within the meaning of article 38(l)(a) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and is therefore accepted as international law. The WTO and its appended 
Agreements came into force on 1 January 1995, with varying compliance dates depend­
ing on the category of country in question. For Singapore this meant 1 January 2000.
8.3 Scope and General Provisions of TRIPS
To date, TRIPS is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual 
property. It establishes minimum standards of protection for specified areas of intellec­
tual property, enforcement rules and a dispute resolution mechanism between WTO 
member states. Part II of TRIPS sets out seven areas to which the term intellectual prop­
erty refers (art 1(2)) and for which protection is required:
1. Copyright and related rights
2. Trade marks, including service marks
3. Geographical indications, including appellations of origins
4. Industrial designs
5. Patents, including the protection of new varieties of plants
6. Layout designs (Topographies) of integrated circuits
7. Undisclosed information including trade secrets.
Each area is defined at 8.5 infra, after a discussion of the principles underlying TRIPS.
19 The Straits Times commented on the move nearly every day following the announcement, see 
2,4, 5,6,8,12,13,15 and 26 February 1988. See also PD, vol 50, col 590 et seq.
20 For background, see Jackson (1997,2nd ed).
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Minimum Standards
Members are obliged to implement only the minimum legal protection required 
by the TRIPS Agreement (art 1.1). Members may confer more extensive protection, as 
long as such provisions do not contravene TRIPS. Article 1 also provides that members 
are free to determine the appropriate means by which the provisions of TRIPS are im­
plemented in their own legal system and practice. This has been held to document that 
‘the Agreement is not a harmonization agreement’ (Otten & Wager 1996, 394). How­
ever, in practice, the use of WIPO model laws suggests otherwise.
Nationals and National Treatment Principle
‘Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the na­
tionals of other Members’ (art 1.3). Furthermore such treatment shall be no less favour­
able than that accorded to its own nationals (art 3). The Agreement specifically adopts 
the approach taken by existing IP conventions of WIPO in its definition of the term ‘na­
tionals’.21 ‘Nationals’ are therefore persons, natural or legal, who are domiciled or who 
have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in a customs territory.
Article 2.2 provides that nothing in Parts I-IV of TRIPS shall derogate from obli­
gations that Members owe to each other under the treaties in article 1.3 (see note 21).
Articles 3, 4, and 5 confirm the long established principles of national treatment 
and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment of foreign nationals. But article 3 also ex­
tends this and protection conferred under existing IP Conventions to performers, produc­
ers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations. The exceptions to the national treat­
ment principle which are recognised in the four treaties are also imported under article 
3(1) but they are qualified in article 3(2). This makes it clear that exceptions are applica­
ble only where they are ‘necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement and where such practices are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on trade’. Just 
how ‘disguised restriction on trade’ will be interpreted remains to be tested.
Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
This is the first time that the MFN-concept has been used in an IP convention. It 
obviously reflects the close ties between TRIPS and the WTO. Article 4 provides that:
21 Article 1(3) co-opts the Paris (1967), Berne (1971), and Rome (1961) Conventions, and the 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC Treaty). See 8.4.
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With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immu­
nity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.
Four exceptions to this obligation are listed in article 4(a) to 4(d).
Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights
The TRIPS Agreement left the issue of exhaustion unresolved. The issue is 
whether IPRs are exhausted after the first sale of a product to which IPRs attach. Some 
copyright laws allow a copyright owner to control the importation of a legally protected 
work. However, the weight of trademark practice has held that the rights of a trade mark 
owner are exhausted by the first sale of a legitimately trademarked product. This effec­
tively opens up markets for parallel imports of such products. Unable to prevent the un­
authorised importation of their products from one market to the next, trademark owners 
are thus unable to practise successful price differentiation and selective distribution. 
This, it is claimed, is beneficial to consumers. However, as the Silhouette case shows 
this open market is restricted to the European Union {Financial Times July 17, 1998, 1). 
TRIPS simply states that (article 6):
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 
3 and 4 above, nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.
Technology Transfer
In a garbled article 7, entitled Objectives, TRIPS seems to cite technological in­
novation and technology transfer as reasons for protecting intellectual property rights:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion 
of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual ad­
vantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
But as one IP expert points out (Blakeney 1996, 43): ‘The generality of Article 7 con­
trasts [starkly] with the specificity of the articles dealing with each of the categories of 
intellectual property right’. This is an over-generous comment, considering the deliberate 
weight demonstrated in the Agreement of providing ‘advantage’ for the ‘producers of 
technical knowledge’ often at the expense of users. This theme is further illustrated in 
article 8, the public interest article, discussed below.
Public Interest
Article 8, entitled Principles, seems to attempt public policy guidelines in areas 
of health and nutrition, and protection of countries’ efforts to effect development. How­
234
ever, instead of being specific about preventing abuse by IP right-holders the article is 
general and hesitant. The use of the word may and the catch-all compliance phase sug­
gest not choice but vacuity, especially in light of the on-march of global bio-engineered 
agri-business. Article 8 states:
(1) Members may, in formulating or amending their national laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
(2) Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, 
may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to 
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the ... transfer of technology.
In conclusion, TRIPS makes it clear that only minimum standards of protection, mainly 
those already existing in international IP conventions, are required of WTO members. It 
reaffirms the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions and the IPIC Treaty. It provides that 
nothing in TRIPS shall derogate from existing obligations that members may owe to 
each other under these treaties (art 2.2). It adds new areas of IP and does not prohibit fu­
ture additions of sui generis rights. The Accord fails to address the important issues of 
exhaustion of IP rights, technology transfer and public policy guidelines to prevent abuse 
of power by powerful right-holders. Arguably, the TRIPS principles succeed in co­
ordinating IPRs and compelling global protection (on paper) of right-holders without 
doing much to address the needs of IP users.
8.4 IP Conventions Co-opted into TRIPS
Below are brief summaries of the main principles of the conventions, which 
have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. They are administered by WIPO, 
World Intellectual Property Organisation, under the auspices of the United Nations.
Berne Convention
The Berne Copyright Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works22 was established in 1886 (revised 1971). The main principles of Berne are na­
tional treatment; minimum protection of 50 years, starting from the end of the year in 
which the author dies or the year in which the work was first published, and the protec­
tion of the moral rights of authors. Berne confers copyright protection, without the for­
mality of registration (art 5(1), 7(1) and 6bis (1)). By January 1994, 105 nations had ac­
ceded to Berne (Copyright, January 1994, 7-9). The USA did not join until 1989,
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preferring instead to be a member of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), the 
multilateral accord, established under the United Nations in 1952. In 1994, 94 nations 
were members of the UCC (id, 16). Even before the US joined Berne, many US works 
benefited from protection under Berne because they were published simultaneously in 
Berne member countries, e.g., Canada and the UK.
Paris Convention
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was established in 
1883 (revised 1967). It was the first multilateral treaty for protecting industrial property. It 
offers protection o f trademarks, patents and designs, and the right o f priority to foreigners 
from member states who have applied for registration o f their rights in another member 
state. The two main principles are: one, reciprocal protection based on national treatment. 
Two, a convention priority system, which means that the same priority date given to the 
first [patent, TM, design] application filed in one convention country is granted to subse­
quent applications filed in other convention countries within 12 months o f the first filing. 
This means that first disclosure o f the invention will not prejudice subsequent applications 
made within 12 months. Singapore joined in 1995.
Rome Convention
The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono­
grams and Broadcasting Organizations was formed in 1961. Membership is open to 
states that are parties to the Berne or the Universal Copyright Convention. Performers 
include actors, singers, dancers, musicians, and others who perform literary or artistic 
works. Performers’ consent is required for the broadcast and communication, to the 
public, of their live performances; the fixation of their live performances; reproducing 
such fixation if the original fixation was made without consent, or if the reproduction is 
made for purposes other than those for which they consented. (Popularly called the 
‘bootleg’ prevention.)
Under the Rome Convention, phonograms mean any exclusively aural fixation 
of sounds of a performance or of others sounds. Producers of phonograms have the right 
to authorise or prohibit the reproduction of their phonograms. Similarly, broadcasting 
organisations may authorise or prohibit the re-broadcasting or fixation of their broad­
casts, the reproduction of such fixations; and the showing of their television broadcasts
22 See Ricketson 1987.
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to a paying public. The Convention allows member states to make provisions in their 
national laws for exceptions regarding private use of copyright works.
The Patent Co-operation Treaty
The Patent Co-operation Treaty (PCT) 1978 eases the drudgery of making mul­
tiple patent applications among member states. An inventor, who is a national of a PCT 
country need only file one international patent application at any ‘official receiving of­
fice’ of the PCT and designate all the member states in which s/he wishes to seek patent 
protection. Singapore joined the PCT in 1995.
The Budapest Treaty
The Budapest Treaty concerns the deposit of micro-organisms, which may form 
part of a patent applicant’s disclosure information. Patent laws require a patent appli­
cant to provide for scrutiny her invention in sufficient detail so that a person skilled in 
the relevant art may perform the invention (e.g. s25(4) in Singapore’s Patent Act). In 
some cases where the invention involves micro-organisms, it might be easier to provide 
samples rather than written instructions. The Budapest Treaty establishes suitable Inter­
national Depositories for receiving such deposits. Singapore joined the Treaty in 1995. 
IPIC Treaty
The Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits was agreed 
in 1989. It originated in the 1984 American Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (# 906) 
as a sui generis intellectual property right. It is sometimes called the Washington Treaty 
as the agreement was completed in that city on May 26, 1989. Prior to this, it was 
thought that layout designs were protected under copyright law. At that time, the US was 
the world leader in integrated circuit technology. There was a concern among American 
companies that copyright law might not afford adequate protection. The US insisted that 
it would enter mutual relations with other countries only if they adopted legislation, 
similar to its own, stipulating the extent and limitation of the new rights that were to be 
protected. See 8.5.6 and 8.7.
8.5 Definition of Rights to be Protected
This section provides a general background and definition of the seven main areas 
of intellectual property, for which TRIPS requires protection in domestic law. There is a 
brief status of Singapore’s position regarding each area prior to 1999. It should be noted 
that TRIPS does not prohibit new areas of property rights. Section 27(3) allows for the
237
establishment of a sui generis system to protect plant varieties. Other areas, for instance 
indigenous cultural rights, could be contemplated.
8.5.1 Copyright and Related Rights
Copyright is concerned with the right to prevent the unauthorised use and ex­
ploitation of authors’ works. Both authors and works are defined widely.23 The right 
subsists for a clearly defined number of years; under TRIPS this is the life of the author 
plus 50 years. The law protects the economic interests of authors by giving them the ex­
clusive right to exploit their works and to control their use. It also protects the authors’ 
moral rights, that is, the authors’ right to be identified with their works and to object to 
various kinds of derogatory treatment of them. Thus, one can regard copyright as a bun­
dle of property rights in relation to the authors’ works. Under the Berne Convention, the 
creators of original works obtain five exclusive rights to (1) reproduce or make copies of 
the work), (2) adapt, (3) distribute (sell, rent, lease or lend), (4) display publicly, and (5) 
perform publicly.
Historically, in England, copyright was used not to protect authors’ works, but to 
control the use of the new printing technology which was introduced in the 1470s (see 
Comish 1996). The Crown felt threatened by the potentially easy dissemination of social, 
political and religious ideas. To control printed works, it instituted a complex licensing 
system, which lasted until 1709 when the Statute of Anne was enacted. At the end of the 
Civil War, the Crown lost to parliament its prerogative powers to grant monopolies. 
From 10 April 1710, the 1709 statute protected the rights of authors for 21 years from 
the date of publication. Since then copyright law has developed into a powerful tool for 
protecting the rights of authors, while extending the nature, duration and scope of their 
monopoly. Naturally the development of copyright law in Singapore is closely linked 
with development in the UK.
With effect from 1912, Singapore received the [English] Copyright Act 1911 (see 
chapter 2). The provisions of the Act extended reciprocally within the Empire.24 Thus 
was established the connecting factor, so that works first published anywhere in the Em­
pire to which the 1911 Act extends, enjoyed copyright protection in Singapore.
23 Works include original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, sound recordings, films, 
broadcasts or cable programmes and typographic arrangements of publications: [English] 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, sl(l).
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From 1912 until 1987 (with a brief interregnum) the protection of the works of 
authors in Singapore was governed by the Copyright Act 1911 and enforced in a similar 
way to the English law.25 During the 75 years, the 1911 Act was amended only three 
times. One amendment made provisions for a Copyright (Gramophone Records and 
Government Broadcasting) Act (cap 64). Another amendment concerned s38 of the Sin­
gapore Broadcasting Corporation Act (cap 297). None of the amendments aimed to en­
courage foreign direct investment or economic growth.
Singapore’s 1987 Copyright Act (cap 63) repealed the 1911 Act and its amend­
ments. It was based on the Australian Copyright Act 1968, as amended in 1980 and 
1984. The new Act came into force on 10 April 1987. From then, the 1987 Act and the 
(English) Designs Protection Act (cap 339) provided statutory protection of authors’ 
works in Singapore until the TRIPS-induced laws of the 1990s (see 8.7 infra).
Of the many reasons for enacting a new Copyright Act in 1987, three were par­
ticularly noteworthy. First, the developed countries, especially the USA exerted great 
pressure on Singapore. As discussed at 8.2 supra, the Reagan administration acquiesced 
to demands of various American trade associations’ lobbyists. These were led by the 
sound recording industry whose 1985 report had held that Singapore was the largest 
counterfeiter of tapes and records in the world. The USA demanded that Singapore 
should either join the Universal Copyright Convention (of which America was a mem­
ber) or enter into a bilateral treaty, whereby all US copyright materials would gain auto­
matic protection in Singapore. The USA also demanded that Singapore changed its copy­
right law to ensure the protection of computer software. In return, the USA would extend 
to Singapore, GSP (Generalised System of Preferences) benefits by allowing more duty­
free import of specified Singapore-manufactured goods into the US. In January 1987, the 
Singapore parliament duly enacted the Bill to meet America’s demands. The US gov­
ernment affirmed Singapore’s GSP status and announced a lucrative duty-free package 
with effect from 1 July 1987. However GSP status was revoked with effect from 2 Janu­
ary 1989, when the US announced that Singapore and the three tigers would henceforth 
be regarded as newly industrialised countries and were ineligible for developing coun­
tries’ benefits granted under the GSP scheme.26
24 See Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd v Ng Sui Nam [1985] 1 MLJ196; [1987] 1987 2 MLJ 5.
25 See Wei 1989. For development in the 1990s, see Wei 1996.
26 See 8.2 and note 19 supra.
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The second reason for passing a new Copyright Act in 1987 is linked with the 
need to update the law in light of advances in technology. Under the Copyright Act 1911 
authors’ works included original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works (sl(l)). 
Artistic works were defined as photographs, sculptures, drawings, engravings and so on 
(s 35(1)). Musical works included sound recordings such as records and tapes (si9(1)). 
Dramatic works could include cinematograph films (s35(l)). However Singapore’s law 
had not moved in concert with English Copyright Act amendments, which in 1956 ex­
tended the range of works protected to include entrepreneurial rights in sound record­
ings (sl2 of the 1956 Act), cine films (si3), broadcasts (sl4) and publishers' rights in 
the typographic format of published editions of works (si5). Besides with the decades’ 
long advent of computer software, Singapore had yet to offer protection in this field. All 
these ‘wrongs’ were righted in the 1987 Act.
The decision in Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd v Ng Sui Nam [1987] 2 MLJ 
5 presented a third reason for change. In this case the Appeal Court affirming Thean J’s 
decision held that Singapore’s obligations under the Imperial Copyright Act 1911 were 
still in force, despite changes in Singapore’s constitutional status from colony to self- 
governing country (1959) and sovereign state (1965). In effect, the 1911 Act had sur­
vived the dismantling of the Empire. Therefore works first published in the UK would 
enjoy copyright in Singapore if published between 1 July 1912 (when the 1911 Act had 
come into force in Singapore) and 10 April 1987 (when the 1911 Act was repealed in 
Singapore), with one exception (Wei 1996,449). Enactment of the 1987 Act thus enabled 
the government of the Republic of Singapore to assert its independence, even though the 
transitional provisions under Part XI allowed works which enjoyed copyright under the 
1911 Act to continue to enjoy protection under the 1987 Act (Wei 1996, 1989).
Of course, as the 1911 Act did not extend to the USA, the ‘connecting factor’ re­
quirement had to be dealt with differently. Under the 1987 Act (s 27) the two criteria for 
establishing a ‘connecting factor’ were: (1) first publication in Singapore; or (2) the 
author is a qualified person, i.e., a Singapore citizen or resident. If neither criteria is ful­
filled, the work is regarded as foreign, and, as such, under the 1987 Act it would not en­
joy protection in Singapore. However, si 84 of the Act empowered the Minister to extend 
copyright to suitable material originating in foreign countries. Thus, following bilateral 
agreement with the USA, the Copyright (International Protection) Regulations 1987 ex­
tended copyright protection to authors’ works first published in the USA. The regula-
iI
i
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tions were also extended to a number of other countries,27 and, surprisingly, in PP v Teo 
Ai Nee [1994] 1SLR 452 at 461, the Chief Justice remarked obiter, that the regulations 
extend retrospectively to the USA and Australia. In other words, even works first pub­
lished in these countries prior to the coming into force of the 1987 Act enjoyed copyright 
protection in Singapore. However it appears that only works first published in Singapore 
on or after the 1987 bilateral agreement enjoyed protection in the USA.
To promote the development of a film industry in Singapore, the 1987 Act al­
lowed sound recordings and films to acquire copyright in Singapore by virtue of their 
being ‘made in Singapore’. There is no evidence of the effect of this move. However 
there was more activity after section 8 of the 1994 Amendment of the 1987 Act clarified 
that it was within the Minister’s power under s i84(1) to extend similar rights to sound 
recordings and films that were made in Australia, USA and the UK.
Applying the concept of connecting factors to foreign countries was one of the 
most important compromises the Singapore government had to reach in its bilateral 
agreements. Naturally, such would be made redundant by the national treatment princi­
ple, which is the crux of IP Conventions and the TRIPS global regime.
In line with Singapore’s promise to the USA, s239 of the 1987 Act provided that 
computer programs shall be protected as literary works. The section extended protection 
to programs made before the coming into force of the 1987 Act. However, s239(2) pro­
vided that no infringement of a computer program prior to 10 April 1987 would be ac­
tionable criminally or civilly. In other words, whereas copyright protection would be 
available for all suitable pre-existing computer programs, actionable infringement claims 
would only be entertained from 10 April 1987. The effect of s239(2) was to wipe the 
slate clean.28
8.5.2 Trademarks
Trademarks have long been used by craftspeople and traders to identify the ori­
gin of their goods and to distinguish them from goods made or sold by others. The first 
known trademarks are probably Greek, from about 600 BC. Proud potters put their 
marks on their work, probably to declare them good. Later, graphic devices indicated
27 Regulation S110/87 covered the USA, while S120/87 covered the UK and Northern Ireland. 
Australia was added to the long list of countries in 1990 under S430/90.
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the kiln in which the items were burnt. From being anonymous pieces of pottery, such 
commodities with marks became ‘branded goods’, though the idea of a brand29 was an­
other civilisation away. The mark became a symbol of the marker’s reputation. It was a 
reputation in the quality and uniqueness of the goods, or in their origin and customers’ 
expectations to the goods, or in a combination of these. The industrial revolution 
spurred growth in the use of names and marks, and the modem trademark was bom.
As with copyright, Singapore’s mechanism for protecting trademarks originated 
in England. The statutory system for registration of trademarks exists alongside the 
common law tort of passing off. The Trade Marks Act (cap 332) is rooted in the Trade 
Marks Ordinance 1938. Important amendments30 were made only in 1991 and 1997. 
The 1991 amendment redefined the term ‘trade mark’ so as to include service marks 
(s2(l), extended the term of protection to 10 years and clarified the notion of ‘use of a 
trade mark in relation to goods’. The 1991 amendment removed the provisions that al­
lowed marks registered as distinctive in Part A and Part B of the register in the UK to be 
recognised as being distinctive for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act in Singapore. 
Penalties for a number of offences were increased (s69 to s73). Other changes are clari­
fied in the table below (see 8.6). A new Trade Mark Act (No 46 of 1998), repealed the 
old and made provisions for compliance with TRIPS.
8.5.3 Geographical Indications
TRIPS identified geographic indications as a new property right. These indica­
tions identify goods as originating in a specific territory, region or locality, where a 
given quality, reputation or characteristic of the good is attributable to its geographic 
origin. Eg, Parma ham and Feta cheese. Prior to Singapore’s compliance with TRIPS 
(8.7) geographic indications could probably be protected by ‘certification’ trade marks 
or passing off actions. Now a new Act of the same name, No 44 of 1998, applies.
8.5.4 Industrial Designs
In Singapore, industrial designs can be protected in one of two ways: Either un­
der the United Kingdom Designs (Protection) Act (cap 339) by which rights and privi­
28 See Lai Kew Chai J in Federal Computer Services Sdn Bhd v Ang Jee Hai Eric [1993] 3SLR 388. 
See also Novell Inc v Ong Seow Pheng & Ors [1993] 3 SLR 700.
29 But see Landes & Posner (1988), who claim that the terms are 'rough synonyms'.
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leges conferred under the Registered Designs Act (UK) become applicable in Singa­
pore. Or by relying on artistic copyright in drawings (Copyright Act, cap 63, Pt 111). 
However, Singapore’s Copyright Act 1987 denied copyright protection to registrable 
(but unregistered) designs which have been industrially applied (s74(2)). This is still the 
case, but section 6 of the Copyright (Amendment) Act clarified that ‘industrial applica­
tion’ meant application in Singapore or elsewhere.
8.5.5 Patents
A patent is a property right in a new, useful device, design or process. It is a right 
granted to an inventor by the government to exclude others from engaging in activities 
such as making, using, importing, selling or offering to sell the patented invention dur­
ing the term of the patent. The crux of a patent right is exclusion. There is no affirmative 
right to use the patented invention for any purpose. In fact, production, use or sale of a 
patented invention may conflict with existing laws or even other patents. Consider, for 
instance, the status of genetically modified (GM) foods in the UK in 1999. The public 
debate concerned inter alia whether such foods should be permitted to be grown (even 
for experimental purposes) in the English countryside, and whether imported GM foods
O |
should be offered for sale in supermarkets without additional testing. The existence of 
patents for GM food processes or products did not and could not legitimise their use, 
production or sale in England.
The main justification for granting patents is to compensate inventors for their 
work and effort. Compensation, it is said, will encourage more inventions. Patent law 
also seeks to balance the inventors’ interests with those of competitors, who desire to 
use previous inventions in their own inventions. The public interest is borne in mind, at 
least theoretically, when balancing the interests of inventors and competitors.
Singapore’s first Patent Act dates only from 1994. The Act (cap 221) came into 
force in February 1995, except for Part XIX on Patent Agents (see S486/94). It repealed 
the re-registration system provided under the Registration of United Kingdom Patents 
Act (cap 271) and the licensing provisions set out under the Patents (Compulsory Li­
censing) Act (cap 196, 1970 ed). In 1994 Singapore also acceded to the patent-related
30 For a brief history of the Trade Marks Act, see Mahal's Digest, Trade Marks Section, 12th ed.
31 See, e.g., Flynn and Gillard: Revealed: Lord Sainsbury's interest in key gene patent, The 
Guardian, 16 February 1999,1, col 1-8.
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treaties: The Paris Convention, The Patent Co-operation Treaty 1978 and the Budapest 
Treaty 1977. Since 1995 applications for patents can be made direct to a Singapore reg­
istry instead of importing patents from the UK registry. The 1995 amendment addressed 
TRIPS demands (see 8.7 infra).
8.5.6 Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits
Layout designs or topographies of integrated circuits were recognised in TRIPS 
as a universal property right. The substantive provisions are set out in the Washington 
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC). Until its move to 
comply with TRIPS (see 8.7 infra), Singapore did not have provisions to safeguard the 
rights of owners of these topographies, except in so far as they were covered in the Pat­
ents Act (cap 221, 1995 ed), as amended. However, the new Layout-Designs of Inte­
grated Circuit Act (No 3 of 1999) complies with TRIPS (see 8.7 infra).
8.5.7 Undisclosed Information and Trade Secrets
TRIPS imports as a property right the protection of confidential information in 
order to prevent unfair competition in accordance with article lObis of the Paris Con­
vention. It also extends the area, as described at 8.7 infra. Prior to TRIPS, the common 
law, equity and the Official Secrets Act (cap 213) protected trade secrets in Singapore. 
However, protection is available under a number of related legislation, including the 
Medicines Act, cap 176, amended in 1998, which protects confidential information con­
cerning registration procedures and the Electronic Transactions Act 1998, Pt XII.
8.6 Acquisition and Enforcement
High written substantive standards for protection of intellectual property are 
useless without strong mechanisms for enforcing the rights conferred. Parts III to VII of 
TRIPS contain comprehensive obligations requiring Members to provide domestic pro­
cedures, institutions and remedies, which allow right holders to acquire, maintain and 
enforce protection of their rights effectively. Owing to a lack of space, these will be dis­
cussed only in sufficient detail to give a flavour of what is required and a preliminary 
evaluation of Singapore’s compliance capability.
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All intellectual property rights, except copyright and trade secrets, require compli­
ance with some sort of registration system in order to acquire protection of the law. 
TRIPS art 62(1) allows Members to require ‘reasonable compliance with procedures and 
formalities’ as a prerequisite for obtaining rights and protection. Article 62(2) stipulates 
a short registration procedure to ensure that the procedure itself is not used as an im­
pediment to free trade. Article 62(4) provides for publication, opposition, revocation and 
cancellation. These procedures shall progress without undue delay and all administrative 
decisions shall be subject to judicial or quasi-judicial review (art 62(5)).
Article 41 compels Members to provide the enforcement procedures listed in Part 
III in ‘their national laws so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement 
of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement...’. The procedures shall be 
‘fair and equitable’ and shall ‘not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unrea­
sonable time-limits or unwarranted delays (art 41(2)). Decisions on the merits of a case 
shall be reasoned, made available at least to the parties, and preferably in writing without 
undue delay (art 41(3)).
Article 41(5) states that Part III does not create any obligations that Members shall 
provide ‘a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct 
from that of enforcement of laws in general.. Nevertheless, the rest of the Part sets out 
detailed provisions and procedures, including injunctions and orders similar in nature if 
not in words to Anton Piller32 and Mareva33. For instance, art 50(2) requires judicial 
authorities to ‘adopt provisional measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate, in 
particular where any delay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or 
where there is demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.’ It is difficult to accept 
that these procedures are already freely available in any but the most developed or ad­
vanced developing countries. By requiring developing countries to implement them 
within their existing enforcement structures, TRIPS is calling for ‘modernisation’ of 
their entire legal systems.
Article 45 requires Members to permit judicial authorities to order the payment 
of damages ‘to compensate for the injury ... suffered because of an infringement ... by 
an infringer who knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing 
activity’. The complex matter of quantifying damages suffered is not dealt with in
32 Anton Piller v Mfg Processes Ltd (1976) Ch 55. See Wei 1996,470-476.
33 Mareva Compania Naviera SA of Panama v International Bulk Carriers SA (1975) 119 SJ 660.
245
TRIPS. Article 61 requires ‘criminal procedures and penalties for cases of wilful trade­
mark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale’. Remedies shall include 
imprisonment and fines sufficient to act as a deterrent.
Section 4 of Part III introduces a system of border controls, which suspends the re­
lease into circulation of suspected counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods upon 
the application of a right holder or action by customs’ officers (arts 51 to 60). In 1995 the 
Customs Coordination Council (CCC), an inter-agency forum, was reinvented as the 
World Customs Organisation (WCO). WCO established an IP division which was an ob­
server at the inaugural meeting of the TRIPS Council (Blakeney 1996,134).
Finally, art 64(1) subjects disputes between Members about compliance with TRIPS 
standards or domestic enforcement to the WTO’s dispute settlement system. The first 
such dispute to be settled by the Appellate Body is India, Patent Protection for Pharma­
ceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products 1997 (WTO Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS50/AB/R).
In general, Singapore laws and legal system substantially comply with TRIPS en­
forcement requirements. Court procedures and awards follow the practice in common 
law jurisdictions. Criminal procedure and severe penalties for exploiting counterfeit 
goods have been the norm since the mid-1990s.34 Direct domestic registration proce­
dures for patents and trademarks were put in place in 1995 and in 1998/99 for the re­
maining property rights. However, conclusive evidence of Singapore’s compliance must 
await the monitoring report of the Council for TRIPS, in accordance with art 68.
8.7 TRIPS’ Standards and Singapore’s Compliance
The following pages, 246-251, set out in broad terms, TRIPS required minimum 
standards of protection against a brief analysis of how and the extent to which Singapore 
laws comply with these requirements.
34 E.g. s70 of the Trade Marks Act (cap 332) stipulates a fine of up to SD 100,000 or five years' 
imprisonment or both for counterfeiting. See also s72, s73, 73A, which provide similar penalties 
for other offences. These have been reenacted as Part IX, s81 to slOO, of the new 1998 Act.
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TRIPS STANDARDS
Copyright & Related Rights (arts 9-14)
• Members shall comply with arts 1-21 of the 
Berne Convention 1971 (except 6bis on moral 
rights) - art 9.
• Computer programs, in source or object code, 
shall be protected as literary works: art 10(1).
• Database or other data compilation or material 
shall be protected under copyright... provided 
that, by reason of the selection or arrangement 
of its contents, the material constitutes an intel­
lectual creation: art 10(2).
• Exclusive rental rights shall be provided for 
authors of computer programs and some cine­
matographic works: art 11.
• Performers, producers of phonograms and 
broadcasting organisations shall have the right 
to prohibit the following acts when done with­
out authorisation: fixation, broadcast or re­
broadcast by wireless and other communica­
tion to the public of their work and reproduc­
tion of fixations: arts 14(2)-(4).
• Performers shall have the right to prohibit un­
authorised broadcast ... of their live perfor­
mances: art 14(1).
• The term of protection must be at least 50 years 
art 12, or 20 years for broadcasts: art 14(5).
• The 'fair practice' rule from Berne is co-opted 
to TRIPS by art 13: confers legislative power 
to permit reproduction of works in ’special cas­
es’, which do not conflict with normal exploita­
tion of the work and do not unreasonably preju­
dice the legitimate interests of right-holders.
• Part III stipulates enforcement procedures. 
See 8.6 infra.
Section 4 of Part III introduces border controls 
to prevent the release into circulation of 
suspected counterfeit trademark or pirated 
copyright goods.
SINGAPORE'S COMPLIANCE
Copyright Act (cap 63) (No 6 of 1998)
• Joined in 1995. Copyright (Amendment) Act, 
No 6 of 1998.
• Section 26 recognises computer programs as 
subject-matter for copyright protection.
• Section 26 complies.
Section 25A provides for 'commercial rental 
arrangement' in relation to sound recordings 
and computer programs. Also s26(l)(c).
Part XII, s246-257, deal with Performers' Pro­
tection: compliance. Section 68 strengthened 
to deal with TV and cable broadcasts.
Part XII, s246-257, deal with Performers' Pro­
tection: compliance.
S28: protection for 50 years after end of calen­
dar year in which author died. S92-96 for copy­
right duration in s82-91 subject-matter.
Sections 35-40: fair dealing for research, stu­
dy, review, reporting current events,judicial 
process or professional advice.
Sections 41-43: reproduction for broadcas­
ting.
Sections 44-50: works in libraries.
Section 50A: copying works for education. 
Section 54A: statutory licence by institution 
assisting intellectually handicapped readers. 
Sections 109-116: fair dealing in subject-mat­
ter other than 'works'.
• Section 140 A to R deals with restriction of im­
portation of copies of works, etc.
It provides powers of search and seizure at 
ports, in vessels, vehicles, aircraft, packages 
and persons and their baggage. Provides rules 
for secure storage of seized goods, notice and 
inspection procedures, etc.
• Under s32 of the Layout-Design of Integrated 
Circuit Act 1999, s7(l) of the Copyright Act is 
amended so that it no longer includes layout- 
designs or integrated circuits within the mean­
ing of s2 of the new Act.
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Tradem arks (art 15-21)
•Members shall comply with the Paris Con­
vention (1967).
• Protection shall be for marks that distinguish 
services and goods, art 15(4).
• Registrable: 'any sign or combination of 
signs'... 'words including personal names, let­
ters, numerals, figurative elements and com­
binations of colours as well as combination 
of such signs', capable of distinguishing the 
goods and services of one undertaking from 
those of other undertakings, art 15.
• Members may make registrability depend on 
use (art 15(3), and that signs are visually per­
ceptible (art 15(1)).
• Section 16(1) defines minimum rights that 
must be conferred. Fair use of descriptive 
terms may be excepted (art 17).
• Well-known marks shall be protected under 
the Paris Convention art 6bis(l) for goods 
and services (art 16(2)). Well-known is de­
fined by knowledge in the relevant sector of 
the public gained through use or promotion 
of the TM.
• Initial registration and each renewal shall be 
for no less than 7 years. TMs shall be renew­
able indefinitely (art 18).
• Cancellation due to non-use can occur after 3 
years of uninterrupted non-use, unless the 
TM owner shows valid reasons for non-use 
(art 19(1)).
• Controlled use by a third party circumvents 
non-use (art 19(2). Controlled use can be li­
censing which is permitted under art 21.
• Compulsory licensing is prohibited. A TM 
may be assigned with or without transfer of 
the business which owns the mark (art 21).
• Use of a TM in the course of trade shall not 
be unjustifiably encumbered by special re­
quirements such as use with another TM, use 
in a special form, use in a manner detrimental 
to its capability to distinguish goods or ser­
vices (art 20).
Trade M ark Act 1998 (No 46 of 1998) 
(Repealed Trade Mark Act, cap 332).
• Singapore acceded in 1995. Pt V I1.
Madrid Protocol dealt with: Pt V I1
• S2 defines 'trade mark' as a visually perceptible 
sign... capable of distinguishing goods and ser­
vices...'.
• S2: A sign includes any letter, word, name, 
sign, numeral, device, brand, heading, label, 
ticket, shape, colour, aspect of packaging, or 
combination thereof.
• Registration: P t l l ,  Pt IX, Pt XI compliance.
• Rights of proprietor: s26-30. Compliance. 
Section 29 deals with exhaustion of rights.
• Section 55: compliance. Well-known in the re­
levant sector in Singapore.
• Section 18(1) registration for 10 years. 
Section 18(2) renewal: 10 years. 
Renewable: Compliance: Pt 11.
• Section 22: registration may be revoked after 5 
years uninterrupted non-use.
The Minister may make rules to provide for the 
manner and effect of cancellation and to protect 
the interests of other persons having a right in 
the registered TM: s21.
• Sections 42-45 deal with licensing: complian­
ce. Exclusive licences and sub-licences are 
provided for.
• Part IV deals with registered TM as an object of 
property, ie co-ownership, assignment, gran­
ting security interest over application, etc.
• Compliance. No requirements.
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Geographical Indications (arts 22-24)
Art 22: geographic indications are 'indications 
that identify a good as originating in the territo­
ry of a Member, or a region or locality in that 
territory, where a given quality, reputation or 
other characteristic of the good is essentially at­
tributable to its geographic origin'.
Members shall protect these against uses that 
would mislead the public or constitute acts of 
unfair competition: art 22(2).
Art 23 provides additional protection for wines 
and spirits.
Art 24 provides for exceptions, eg where a geo­
graphic indication has become a generic term. 
Where members make use of exceptions they 
must agree to negotiate, bilaterally or multilat- 
erally, to increase protection of individual geo­
graphic indication: art 24(9).
Industrial Designs (arts 25,26)
• Members shall provide for the protection of in­
dependently created industrial designs that are 
new or original.
• Protection need not be extended to designs dic­
tated essentially be technical or functional con­
siderations: art 25(1).
• Members shall take short life cycle and number 
of new textile designs into account and ensure 
that registration costs do not unreasonably im­
pair the opportunity to seek and obtain protec­
tion: art 25(2).
• Minimum term of protection shall be 10 years: 
art 26(3).
• Rights-owner shall have the right to prevent 
unauthorised parties from 'making, selling or 
importing articles bearing or embodying a de­
sign which is a copy, or substantially a copy, of 
the protected design, when such acts are under­
taken for commercial purposes': art 26(1).
• Members may provide limited exceptions to 
protection, provided that such exceptions do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate in­
terests of the owner, taking account of the legit­
imate interests of third parties: art 26(2).
Geographical Indications Act 1998
(No 44 of 1998)
The Act was passed on 26 November 1998 and 
specifically complies with TRIPS require­
ments.
Section 3(1) to (4) makes provision.
Section 3(2)(c) makes special provisions. 
Section 5 deals with 'Homonymous geographic 
indications for wines'.
Section 6: geographic indication is excepted if 
(a) contrary to public policy and morality, (b) is 
not or has ceased to be protected in its country 
of origin, or fallen into disuse, (c) has become 
common name of good or service in Singapore.
Industrial Designs
Industrial designs are protected EITHER 
under Pt XI of the Copyright Act 1998 (cap 63) 
as amended by Act No 6 of 1998;
OR
under the UK Design (Protection) Act (cap 339) 
There is compliance in all essential matters.
Patents (arts 27-34)
• Members shall comply with provisions of the 
Paris Convention 1967.
• Term of protection: 20 years from filing: art 
33.
• Protection shall be available 'for any inven­
tions... in all fields of technology', subject to 
exceptions: art 27(1).
• Art 27(3): Members may exclude from pat­
entability: '(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans 
and animals; (b) plants and animals other 
than microorganisms, and essential biological 
processes for the production of plants or ani­
mals other than non-biological and microbio­
logical processes'. However, Members shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties 
either by patents or by an effective sui gene­
ris system.
• Members may require that an applicant 'shall 
disclose the invention in a manner sufficient­
ly clear and complete for the invention to be 
carried out by a person skilled in the art and 
may require the applicant to indicate the best 
mode for carrying out the invention... at the 
filing... or the priority date': art 29.
• Art 28 gives the patent owner the exclusive 
right to use, make, sell or import the (patent­
ed) product.
• Where the patent is a process, art 28 gives 
the owner the exclusive right to prevent un­
authorised third parties from using, offering 
for sale, selling or importing products 'ob­
tained directly by that process'.
• Patent owners have the right to assign, 
license or transfer patents: art 28(2).
• Compulsory licensing is permitted in excep­
tional cases. Art 31 outlines some grounds. 
Art 8(2) permits Members to take 'appropri­
ate measures' to prevent the 'abuse of intel­
lectual property rights by rights holders...'.
• There should be an opportunity for judicial 
review of any decision to revoke or forfeit a 
patent: art 32.
• The burden of proof is reversed in civil liti­
gation involving the infringement of process 
or product patents: art 34.
Patents Act cap 221,1995 ed.
(Amended by Act 40 of 1995).
• Singapore acceded in 1995. Provides recipro­
cal protection on basis of national treatment & 
priority system based on 'first to file system'.
• Section 36(1) complies.
• S13 complies. Criteria for patentabiligy are: 
novelty, inventive step or non-obviousness, in­
dustrial utility.
• Singapore does not bar patentability of animal 
or plant varieties or processes for their produc­
tion as is possible under art 27. However, these 
may be excluded under the ordre public provi­
sions of s i3(3).
• Section 25(4) makes this requirement at the 
date of filing, which is effectively the priority 
date. Singapore acceded to the Budapest Treaty 
in 1995. Micro-organism deposits for an inven­
tion seeking a patent are dealt with under this 
Treaty.
• Section 66 complies except that S66(29(g) al­
lows for the 'exhaustion of rights' principle. 
Thus parallel imports are legal in Singapore.
• The scope of an invention is determined by the 
patent specifications: s i 13(1). Thus there 
might be 'wiggle room' for an alleged infringer 
claiming to have have 'invented around' the 
patented invention.
• Under s41 patents can be assigned, licensed, 
mortgaged and transferred by law as in the case 
of any other personal property.
• Section 46 allows for licences of right. Sections 
55 to 60 provides for compulsory licences. 
Grounds are set out in s55(2). In general they 
concern protecting the public interest in Singa­
pore and seem to be wider than art 31.
• Under s80(l) and s91 the Registrar’s decisions 
may be appealed to the court.
• S68 complies, although the wording of s68(l) 
is confusing.
Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits 
(arts 35-38).
• Members shall comply with noted parts of arts 
2-7,12 and 16 of the Washington Treaty on In­
tellectual Property in Respect of Integrated 
Circuits (IPIC): art 35.
• IPIC art 2(i) defines 'integrated circuit' while 
art 2(ii) defines 'layout design (topography)'.
• Members need not protect a layout design 'until 
it has been ordinarily commercially exploit­
ed..., IPIC art 7(1).
Registration as in IPIC art 7(2) may be a condi­
tion for protection.
• Topographies that are 'original in the sense that 
they are the result of their creators' intellectual 
effort' shall be protected: IPIC art 3(2).
• Parties must confer national treatment: IPIC art 
5, and Most Favoured Nation treatment: TRIPS 
art 4.
• IPIC art 6 sets out acts considered unlawful 
when performed without consent of the right 
holder.
• To the unlawful list TRIPS art 36 adds: 'import­
ing, selling or otherwise distributing for com­
mercial purposes a protected layout design, an 
integrated circuit in which a protected layout 
design is incorporated, or an article incorporat­
ing such an integrated circuit only so far as it 
continues to contain an unlawfully reproduced 
layout design'.
• Unauthorised reproduction of layout designs 
for 'private purposes or for the sole purpose of 
evaluation, analysis, research or teaching' is 
permitted. So is 'reverse engineering': IPIC art 
6(2)(a), (b).
• Innocent infringement is a defence where the 
person performing or ordering such acts did not 
know and no reasonable ground to know, when 
acquiring (an integrated circuit) that it incorpo­
rates an unlawfully reproduced layout design: 
TRIPS art 37.
• Term of protection: no less than 10 years from 
filing or from 1 st commercial exploitation any­
where. Protection may lapse 15 years after the 
layout design's creation: TRIPS art 38.
Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits Act 
1999 (No 3 of 1999)
• Ownership is defined in s6. Subject to any 
agreement to the contrary, the owner is the 
creator unless the layout-design is created in 
the pursuance of a commission or employment 
in which case the owner is the commissioner or 
the employer.
• s2(l) complies with definitions.
• S2(2) defines commercial exploitation. S5(4) 
stipulates: A layout-design shall be deemed not 
to have been created until it has been recorded 
in documentary form or incorporated into an 
integrated circuit, whichever is earlier.
• S5 complies, but s5(3) does not protect a lay­
out-design that is created before the com­
mencement of this Act.
• Compliance under s2 definitions of 'qualifying 
person' and 'qualifying country', which states 
WTO members.
• S8 sets out the rights of a qualified owner.
S9 makes it an infringement to do any of the 
acts stipulated in s8 without consent.
• Compliance under s2 interpretation of 'com­
mercially exploit', 'protected layout-design', 
and s5 stipulations.
• S 10 defines non-infringing acts.
S23 allows government use for public non­
commercial purpose.
• S11 defines innocent infringement. S11(2) pro­
vides that where the innocent infringer be­
comes aware under s 1(1), the defence applies 
to subsequent commercial exploitation 'if he 
pays a remuneration' as agreed, or as deter­
mined by a mutually agreed method, or in de­
fault of an agreement, then by the Court.
• S7(l) A layout-design ceases to be protected at 
the end of 10 years after its creation if it is first 
commercially exploited within 5 years after its 
creation. In any other case, protection ceases 15 
years after the calendar year in which it was 
created: s7(2).
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Protection of Undisclosed Information
(art 39)
• Members shall protect undisclosed informa­
tion: art 39(1) as defined in art 39(2): general 
trade secrets; and (3): trade secrets in the hands 
of state authorities, and 'in the course of ensuing 
effective protection against unfair competition 
.. in art 10bis of the Paris Convention.'.
• To be protected is information which is (a) se­
cret, 'in the sense that it i s not, as a body or in the 
precise configuration and assembly of its com­
ponents, generally known or accessible to per­
sons within the circles that normally deal with 
the kind of information...'; (b) has commercial 
value because it is secret; (c) has been subject to 
reasonable steps under the circumstance, by the 
person lawfully in control of the information, 
to keep it secret: art 39(2).
• Members shall protect, against unfair commer­
cial use and unnecessary disclosure, test or oth­
er data submitted to state authorities to facili­
tate approval of pharmaceutical or agricultural 
chemical products: art 39(3).
Control of Anti-Competitive Practices
• Art 40 allows Members to adopt 'appropriate 
measures' to control anti-competitive licensing 
practices. Members must seek to secure com­
pliance with each other's competition laws.
Medicines Act (cap 176)
Amendment - Act No 7 of 1998.
Two new sections, 19A and 19B, incorporate 
'Protection of confidential supporting informa­
tion about innovative medicinal products'.
Under S19A(2) 'confidential information' in­
cludes '(a) trade secrets, (b) information that 
has commercial value that would be, or would 
be likely to be, diminished by disclosure'.
The sections cover the treatment of such infor­
mation received by 'licensing authorities' not 
more than 5 years before commencement of the 
1998 Amendment.
The licensing authorities will take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the information is kept con­
fidential (19A(l)(a), and shallnotuse the infor­
mation to determine 'whether to grant any other 
application' (19A(l)(b).
S19B stipulates circumstances under which 
sl9A  protection does not apply. These include 
where disclosure is necessary to protect the 
health or safety of the public: sl9B(a)(ii) and 
where necessary to international or national 
regulatory agencies, e.g. WTO, FAO, WHO.
The Control of Plants (Amendment) Act
(Act No 32 of 1998) makes similar provisions 
for the protection of confidential information 
relating to the registration of pesticides: sl5A 
and 15B.
'Appropriate measures' seem too imprecise to 
warrant a search. It would seem that any action 
to limit the potential abuse of IP rights will be 
dealt with on a case by case basis.
However, under, e.g. the Patent Act the govern­
ment allows parallel imports, compulsory li­
censing and other use of patented products for 
government services. (See above).
Other measures include, e.g., s 186 of the Copy­
right Act 1998 which empowers the Ministerto 
deny copyright protection to works of any 
country which does not adequately protect 
works from Singapore.
As yet, Singapore has no Competition Act.
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8.8 Conclusion
This chapter briefly examined the plausibility of the claim that protection of in­
tellectual property leads to greater foreign direct investment and encourages indigenous 
innovations. It found that the conflicting arguments and evidence are ambiguous. In any 
event the effect of higher IP protection on economic development is minimal when com­
pared with the effect of the overall economic climate prevailing in a country. In Singa­
pore’s case, the inherited colonial IP laws (copyright, trademarks and patents) were not 
amended substantially until 1987, 1991 and 1994 respectively. This suggests that the 
PAP government did not prioritise this area of law until after Singapore had achieved a 
high degree of economic development. Changes in IP laws do not therefore exhibit a 
positive correlation with changes in Singapore’s economy. But other external forces 
were determinative.
As the industrialised nations saw it, one weakness of the existing international 
laws that regulate intellectual property was that there was no remedy for trade in counter­
feit goods and services, which had a distorting effect on trade in legitimate goods. Con­
sequently the US government, urged by industrial lobbyists, and the EU nations insisted 
on including minimum standards of intellectual property protection in the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT negotiations on world trade in the 1980s. The result is the Agree­
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Much of the chapter therefore focused on the genesis, underlying principles and 
standards of TRIPS and the extent to which Singapore laws are in compliance. As could 
be expected from a country, whose very existence is premised on export trade, Singapore 
moved quickly to make its laws comply with the required standards. The deadline was 
set at 1st January 2000. Singapore was substantially in compliance in 1999.
The simple facts are these: to participate in global trade, states must be members 
of the WTO. WTO Members must comply with TRIPS. However, under GATT (WTO’s 
predecessor), free trade principles underpinned inter-governmental law concerning tar­
iffs, customs, quotas and subsidies. Now, under the WTO, these free trade principles are 
being used to support the globalisation of private law. TRIPS’ preamble recognises ‘that 
intellectual property rights are private rights'. This and the inclusion of the MFN treat­
ment relating to the nationals of member states (art 1(3)) import TRIPS private law into 
what used to be a purely inter-governmental sphere. Thus, at one stroke, private eco­
nomic and financial interests have expanded WTO lawmaking into areas of private law.
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The rationale is the advance of technology, through which trade in services and intangi­
bles will overtake trade in physical goods. The legal infrastructure for protecting the 
owners’ rights to such intangibles is intellectual property law.
TRIPS directs nations to implement minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection domestically among their nationals and the nationals of all member states. It 
therefore limits the capacity of every nation’s legislature to respond to local socio­
political or cultural needs and preferences. But it satisfies the need of trans-national 
businesses to protect their property rights and conduct global free trade.
It might well be the legal paradigm of the 21st century. For as we enter the next 
millennium, borderless trade in intangibles and services will create competitive advan­
tage for few major players in the global market. Perhaps the change in terminology from 
‘international’ to ‘global’ signifies that 19th and 20th century trade was regulated inter­
nationally: between nations, whereas, in the borderless world of the 21st century, trade 
must be regulated globally. That is, as seamlessly, fluidly and urgently as the streams of 
digital information that enable the new instant technological transactions.
Since they comply with the TRIPS’ provisions, clearly Singapore’s IP laws have 
converged with those of the West. So what does that tell us about law and development 
theory? Clearly not that changes in Singapore’s economy were caused by changes in 
Singapore’s IP laws, or vice versa. For it is evident that major changes in the law were 
driven by pressures emanating from external forces. It was only when the US applied 
trade pressure in 1986-7, and more significantly, when Singapore joined the WTO and 
was obliged to comply with TRIPS that the PAP government’s attitude to intellectual 
property law reform began to change. This kind of convergence does not fulfil the con­
ditions upon which the law and development hypotheses are premised.
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION
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Certain liberties in a developing nation sometimes have to be sacrificed fo r  
the sake o f  economic development and security ....
L ee K uan Y ew , S ingapo re’s P rim e M in iste r 1959-1990, 
the reafte r S en ior M inister, The Times, L ondon , M ay  25, 1977
Small open economies are like rowing boats on an open sea. One cannot 
predict when they might capsize; bad steering increases the chances o f  dis­
aster and a leaky boat makes it inevitable. But their chances o f  being broad­
sided by a wave are significant no matter how well they are steered and no 
matter how seaworthy they are.
Joseph  E S tig litz, C h ie f  E conom ist a t the W orld  Bank,
B oats, p lanes and capital flow s, Financial Times, M arch 25, 1998
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9.1 Macro- and Micro-level Analyses
In its macro-level analysis (chapters 2 to 5), this study found that Singapore’s 
economic development from 1959 to 1999 was the outcome of direct government inter­
vention in markets and just about every conceivable aspect of life on the island, and that 
law as ‘mature policy’ was facilitative. There were rudimentary infrastructure and some 
favourable pre-1959 conditions upon which the PAP government built (chapter 3). Cru­
cial among these were Singapore’s large natural harbour, its geo-political location at the 
crossroads of Asia, its twelve decades of uninterrupted peace and political stability, its 
legacy of the English language and British civil service, and the population’s role as in­
termediaries and workers supplying the huge Malay hinterland. But as chapter 4 details, 
Singapore’s modem economic success is based on the work of a largely incorruptible, 
professional, bureaucratic elite1, who enticed and orchestrated foreign direct investment 
and export-led industrial growth onto the island. It did so by providing effective infra­
structure and a suitably housed, disciplined, compliant and educated workforce that 
proved attractive to foreign investors. Low wages, political stability, massive tax incen­
tives and a remarkable lack of corruption and bureaucratic red tape ensured that returns 
on foreign investors’ capital were sufficient to encourage reinvestment and prevent in­
vestors from relocating to other countries.
Most of this observation is accepted wisdom, especially among Singaporean 
academics (Lim 1983; Low 1998). Even the World Bank’s study: The East Asian Mira­
cle (1993) admitted the decisive role played by the state in Singapore’s economic devel­
opment.2 What is novel is the postulate that law as mature policy was used to facilitate 
growth. An important implication of the Bank’s East Asian study is that vulgar neo- 
classicism -  the idea that market-oriented policies alone account for the success of East 
Asian economies -  was relegated to the intellectual graveyard. In its place, it was hoped 
that a clearer, more appropriate theory about the ‘governed market’ and the develop­
mental state might be allowed to unmask the complicated relationships between states, 
markets and law in Asia. Sadly, this has not happened. In the case of Singapore, the role
1 The elite includes members of the Ministries, statutory boards and government companies.
2 But in Bureaucrats in Business, the World Bank (1995) seems to disapprove of state activism.
255
256
of law is excluded even from new-wave interdisciplinary studies.3 However, interna­
tional financial agencies like the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development 
Bank persist in reviving aspects of the 1960s’ law and development movement, albeit in 
the guise of rational choice institutionalism.4
As chapter 1 shows, the 1960s’ law and development movement and its reincar­
nation as the 1990s’ law and economics movement share several key hypotheses: First, 
that the inexorable logic of economic development will bring in its wake a modem legal 
system, which equates with the rule of law. In modem implementation, this hypothesis 
has been reversed: transplantation of a ‘modem legal system’ will bring in its wake the 
realisation of economic growth. Secondly, that development of the market will lead to 
the emergence of a strong middle class or private commercial interests which will accel­
erate the development of representative institutions and the rule of law. Thus institu­
tional change will be the result of pressure from below, not deliberations from above. 
Thirdly, acceptance of the rule of law will bring a package of liberal institutions that 
transforms relationships between the state and society, and result in democracy. Finally, 
developing countries’ laws and legal institutions will converge with, and become like, 
those of the industrialised West as a result of economic development.
Singapore’s experience does not support these postulated causal links between 
economic development and the emergence of laws and liberal institutions. In particular, 
the government does not seem to have succumbed to, neither have institutional changes 
arisen from, pressures on the state generated by internal social and economic forces un­
leashed by the development of a free market. Indeed, despite a full-grown market econ­
omy and acceptance and practise of a version of the rule of law, by and large, many Sin­
gaporean laws and institutions have not converged with those of the industrialised West. 
Some reasons for this are summarised below in a discussion of the nature of the rela­
tionship between law and economic development in Singapore (see 9.2).
However, as chapter 4’s macro-level analysis revealed, there is a positive corre­
lation between the enactment and operation of certain laws and the development of the
3 See, Low 1999. This collection of essays considers everything except the role of law. The so- 
called Murdoch School, exemplified by Jayasuriya 1999, is a welcome exception.
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economy. This correlation was confirmed in the micro-level analysis (chapters 5, 6 and 
7) even though it was not possible to show direct causation, owing to the difficulty of 
isolating the effect of law among the complexities of the different forces at work. As 
parliamentary debates of many Bills witness, laws and amendments were designed to 
achieve specific goals, and with hindsight did in fact achieve those goals -  or were 
amended strategically until they did. For instance, a summary of the most frequently 
amended statutes shows that the highest number of amendments occurred among la­
bour-related laws during two key formative periods: First, when the government sought 
to curb and depoliticise the trade unions prior to joining the Malaysian Federation, from 
1959 to 1963. Secondly, after leaving the Federation, when the government rejected im­
port-substituting industrialisation in favour of export-led industrialisation policies, from 
1965 to 1968. It was thought that implementation of these policies required a more dis­
ciplined, better-trained, compliant workforce. This seems to have been achieved by en­
acting laws designed to reduce workers’ and unions’ rights, while enacting others de­
signed to empower workers and make them fit for industrial work through education 
and skills development schemes. It is here that it is most obvious that policies very often 
metamorphosed into laws. Indeed there seem to have been but few short steps from 
policy-ideas to the statute books, which is why I have described Singapore’s economic 
development laws as ‘mature policies’.
Although the idea of co-opting the unions into tripartite collaboration with cor­
porate management and government in the 1960s resulted in key laws and amendments 
(see chapter 6), the important tripartite 1970s wages policy was not itself transformed 
into law and remained technically ‘voluntary’ guidelines. However important laws were 
amended to give effect to the recommendations of the National Wages Council. Other 
key late 1970s and 1980s laws were the result of government policies to move the econ­
omy from low-wage, low-skill, labour-intensive production to higher skilled, capital- 
intensive manufacturing, while laws of the late 1980s and 1990s facilitated the trans­
formation to service industries, privatisation and regionalisation.
4 See, e.g., Pistor & Wellons 1999, a study funded by the Asian Development Bank, in which 
Singapore was not included.
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9.2 The Nature of the Relationship between Law and Economic Development
Because ‘law’ in this context is synonymous with the rule of law, it is worth reit­
erating the four key assumptions of the liberal paradigm concerning the rule of law in 
law and development theory (chapter 1). First, that society is composed of individuals 
and voluntary organisations. Secondly, that the purpose of law is to adjudicate between 
private conflicts among individuals, in particular for protecting individual property 
rights. Thirdly, that public officials are guided by law and not by personal whim or other 
extra-legal considerations. Therefore law protects individuals against the arbitrariness of 
a government, state or private interest. Fourthly, that law has inherent legitimacy and is 
widely understood and obeyed. At the heart of these assumptions is the notion that the 
development of the rule of law can occur only at the expense of subordination to law of 
government and state power.
Contrary to these assumptions, Singapore’s experience shows that the rule of law 
can and does serve to entrench and consolidate the power of the state, and that it does 
not always exalt the protection of individual rights above the state and public interest.
This is not unique to modern Singapore. Indeed, as chapter 2 related, the English 
law that had taken root in colonial Singapore was not necessarily Lord Ellenborough’s 
Taw of liberty’, of respect for the dignity of the individual, her entitlement to life, liberty 
and property, that had been transplanted from England. Arguably what had taken root 
was a particular species of English law designed primarily to enable the smooth running 
of a profitable colonial economic regime. Law became a set of rules and practices that 
underpinned the predominantly economic goals of the colonial state. This means that 
both Singapore’s colonial and post-colonial experiences of law coincide with Dam- 
aska’s proposition (Damaska 1986) that the nature of a state’s ideology and its political 
organisation plays a crucial role in shaping the development of its legal institutions.
Singapore’s experience of law and economic development mirrors relationships 
that Oakeshott (1975) recognised in the distinction between rules in civic and those in 
enterprise associations. According to Oakeshott, the rules of a civic association derive 
their authority from the association itself and not from any goal outside of the associa­
tion or their use to create desirable outcomes. In contrast, the rules of an enterprise asso­
ciation [such as Singapore Inc] gain their validity not from the association itself but
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from its goals or purposes [self-reliance and profitability]. Clearly, post-colonial Singa­
porean law reflected the PAP’s stated objectives of a developmental enterprise rather 
than the inherent nature of an inherited civic association. The PAP government continu­
ally stated that its objective was to achieve economic development and nationhood for 
Singapore. The nature of Singapore’s ‘modem law’ derived from these objectives (or 
policies), just as colonial law had reflected the goals of colonial entrepreneurism.
The nature of the relationship between law and economic development in Singa­
pore is further marked by the fact that the colonial stress on economic gain was sup­
ported by laissez faire attitudes of unrestricted freedom in commerce. This stance served 
to compromise the mle of law’s original agenda of freedom and liberty, turning the 
rights-based, contractual, individualistic philosophy of English law into a tool that 
commodified individuals and relationships among them. These factors facilitated the 
growth of a new species of law in which respect for the dignity and liberty of individuals 
was undermined and made subservient to economic-related agenda. Thus, to my mind, it 
is clear that right from the start, the liberal mle of law that was transplanted to Singa­
pore atrophied. In line with its colonial agenda, the transplant grew into something sub­
stantially different from its domestic root.
This aberrant growth thrived after the PAP government took charge. As dis­
cussed above, the early agenda of the mle of law was driven by the laissez faire doc­
trine, which dictated state indifference or minimum interference in the affairs of others. 
The PAP government found that by changing this supporting ideology, the mle of law 
could be adapted to serve an approximation to and, in some cases, even the opposite of 
its original agenda. Instead of liberal notions of respect for the dignity and liberty of the 
individual and of exalting protection of individual property rights over the good of soci­
ety as a whole, the PAP government cultivated its own mix of communitarian ideology, 
which exalted the national interest over the interests of individuals. In the event, it was a 
careful balancing of interests, but as Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew put it baldly (The 
Times, London, May 25 1977):
Certain liberties in a developing nation sometimes have to be sacrificed for the sake of 
economic development and security....
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From the 1960s, the PAP government began to redefine the liberal notion that society is 
composed of individuals and voluntary organisations. Instead it emphasised the associa­
tive and communitarian aspects of Asian society, and government-initiated rather than 
voluntary organisations, where these were necessary to achieve its developmental goals. 
In addition, it co-opted existing voluntary organisations and used them for its purposes. 
(For examples, see the micro-level analysis of labour and housing laws in chapters 6 and 
7). For instance, in labour, the government dictated unified, PAP-ffiendly, national un­
ions in the 1960s. But from 1979, it opportunistically dictated smaller, decentralised, in­
dustry-linked unions. Tripartite associations were dictated between government, enter­
prise management and labour, in which individuals and their interests were subsumed 
and made subservient to the needs of society as a whole. Similarly, the government, 
through the Housing and Development Board, forced people to live in extended family 
groups and special ethnic mixes in order to promote social cohesion and racial harmony 
(chapter 7). In the 1980s the government prompted and supported ethnic-based, self- 
help groups and in the 1990s established residents’ councils (Community Development 
Councils) to solicit loyalty and force participation in the management of public housing 
estates. It decommodified public housing so as to put ownership within the reach of 
about 90% of all Singaporean families.5 In this way housing ownership served as a mo­
tivating factor for the entire society and not just an elite group. In effect, it became the 
socio-economic glue, binding workers, families and the nation together by providing a 
realistic goal to which all could aspire. Private educational institutions were also ‘na­
tionalised’ and forced to support the state’s developmental goals.
It can be argued that for decades the PAP government embraced the mid-1990s’ 
neo-liberal parlance of ‘good governance’. But whereas neo-liberals translate this to 
mean keeping the government from interfering with the market, in Singapore, the con­
cept supplies the justification for state intervention. In this sense the rule of law in Sin­
gapore has become rule by law -  a trusted pragmatic tool. It is a tool wielded by the 
government to effect policies and guide actions and behaviour. Its value is measured by 
its success in achieving the pragmatic goals of the enterprise, Singapore Inc. Indeed ac­
cording to Prime Minster Goh, Singapore’s reliable legal system is one of the reasons
5 Of the remainder, most live in private housing. A few live in HDB rental property.
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why the island-state emerged relatively unscathed from the 1997-99 regional economic 
setback.6
Thus the nature of law in Singapore exhibits more holistic or integrated, com­
munitarian, duty-based and regulatory tendencies than rights-based, individualistic 
western law (see Appendix 1). Chapters 6 and 7 provide evidence of statutes that exhibit 
these characteristics, i.e. laws that regulate labour relations, land use and real property 
ownership in Singapore. I have dubbed Singapore’s species of laws ‘Westemistic’.7 By 
this I mean laws that have the appearance of those of the West, in that they ensure cer­
tainty and predictability, but that they do not exalt private individual property and con­
tractual rights over the good of society as a whole. By focusing on the ‘national good’, 
Singapore laws are more communitarian and holistic than western laws which focus 
more on individual rights. But Singapore laws are also syncretistic, in that they attempt 
to combine the characteristic practices of different systems of laws to form a system of 
their own. This is evidenced, for instance, in the raft of laws and amendments designed 
to regulate financial services. These draw on American, English and Australian laws, 
while including regulatory measures that serve purely domestic needs.
Chapter 8 analysed the emergence of another species of law in Singapore: su­
pra-national laws that regulate intellectual property rights. These were enacted primarily 
to fulfil Singapore’s WTO (World Trade Organisation) treaty obligations under the 
Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). These 
laws are virtual clones of their western counterparts. Little effort has been made to com­
bine external practices with any pre-existing internal practices. This is because, as 
chapter 8 shows, the PAP government did not include intellectual property (IP) law re­
form among the elements that it considered conducive to economic growth. On the con­
trary, it was only when external forces dictated change, from 1987 onwards, that Singa­
pore enacted new IP laws or amended its inherited colonial ones. According to speeches 
in parliament (PD vol 68, col 310-16), the PAP government now seems to feel that as a 
mature industrial economy, Singapore needs IP laws to help propel it into the next 
growth phase of the information society. This society is knowledge-based and IP laws
6 See Straits Times, Overseas Edition, 16 May 1998.
7 The concept is borrowed from Buzan and Segal 1998.
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are designed to protect the right to own and use knowledge. But as chapter 8 reveals, IP 
laws were also meant to spur industrial economic growth, a prediction that Singapore’s 
experience contradicts.
Singapore’s IP laws of the late 1990s are converging with IP laws of the West. 
However, they are not doing so as a result of economic development or internal pressure 
from a newly empowered commercial middle class, as law and development theory re­
quires. As Microsoft’s legal counsel pointed out approvingly8: ‘In 1998 [the] Singapore 
[government] initiated a campaign to raise public awareness of the ways that intellectual 
piracy can damage a nation’. This top-down imposition of IP laws and the awareness 
campaign were driven by external, not internal pressure. To trade globally, nations 
should be members of the WTO free-trade club. One of the club’s rules is enactment 
and enforcement of minimum standards of IP laws as stipulated under TRIPS.
9.3 What Might Late-industrialising Nations Learn from Singapore’s Experience?
Wade (1990) is not the only scholar who has dismissed Singapore as a ‘minnow’ 
state, whose experience of economic development is thought to be too ‘special’ to merit 
serious consideration (see 1.1 supra). However, as discussed in chapter 1, in January 
1999, 87 of the world’s 193 nation-states had populations of fewer than 5 million each, 
and of these 58 had fewer than 2.5 million each. Besides, small states seem to be in the 
ascendancy as old political or ethnic ties loosen or are forced apart, freeing new would- 
be nations. The tendency is apparent all over Europe, Asia and Africa. With its current 
population of about 3 million and a population of between 1.5 and 2.5 million during its 
formative years, Singapore’s experience is eminently suitable for consideration by other 
‘minnow’ states, which also lack the advantages of scale and domestic markets made 
attractive by sheer size. It also seems to be common sense to hold that the experiences of 
a nation with a 3-million population would be more relevant to other small nations than 
the experiences of the USA with 267 million or even the UK with 60 million.
This is not to say that late-industrialising small nations should emulate Singa­
pore’s experience of economic development. On the contrary, this study suggests only 
that several lessons are worthy of consideration, and that these lessons are potentially
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more relevant for late-industrialising nations than the experiences of early industrialis- 
ers, whose development spanned centuries rather than decades. Indeed, it is my thesis 
that Singapore’s experience exhibits systems for coping with rapid technological 
change. The pace at which such change occurred a century or two ago bears no rele­
vance to the pace and nature of change today.
From the point of view of ‘technology-coping skills’, Singapore’s experience 
might be useful also to large late-industrialising nations such as China and India. This is 
most relevant in the context of ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs). Indeed, a core idea of 
the China-Singapore joint venture called the Suzhou Industrial Park (see 4.2.6, 5.7, and 
Carter 2000), was that if Suzhou could be made to function like Jurong [the Singapore 
model town], then the Chinese authorities would seek to replicate it as special economic 
zones in other parts of China. In countries the size of China, perhaps Singapore itself 
could be treated as an SEZ. 
t The first lesson to be considered is the pervasiveness of the government’s strate-
t
gic intent; i.e., its determination and utter commitment to economic development. It was
I not a hope or a wish; from self-rule in 1959, all PAP policies worked towards one goal.
|
The only other goal was nation-building which was probably a sub-set of economic de­
velopment. From 1965, after ‘expulsion’ from Malaysia, economic development became 
! an obsession. Secondly, late developers must prioritise education and disciplining of the
| national workforce, ensure political stability, provide affordable universal housing, effi-
| cient infrastructure, and an incorruptible, well-functioning bureaucracy. These elements
I
overlap and interact promiscuously, sometimes acting as catalysts, at other times as 
strengthening pillars for each other. Together with tax incentives these attributes will 
attract foreign investors and provide sufficient returns on the invested capital so that in­
vestors will reinvest and remain in the country. At every stage, law is the enabler. It is 
the tool by which government legitimises and implements its policies. In a way eco­
nomic development law is merely mature policy.
Despite the straightforward recipe, for a host of disparate reasons, late- 
industrialising countries will find it difficult, if not impossible, to benefit from these les­
sons. First and foremost, industrialised countries’ protectionism might block the import
8 Interview at IP Law Conference, Fordham University School of Law, New York, 9 April 1999.
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of goods and services from late-industrialising countries. Without free market access, 
the export-oriented trade equation is unworkable. Secondly, supra-national laws like 
those dictated by TRIPS (and the temporarily shelved Multilateral Agreement on In­
vestments) will prevent late-industrialising countries from exalting their domestically 
dictated ‘public good’ above the private property rights and interests of individuals and 
foreign-owned companies. Thirdly, the competitive advantage of cheap labour, which is 
enjoyed by most late-industrialising countries, will be rendered less advantageous as su­
pra-national labour laws will dictate minimum standards, ostensibly to secure human 
rights, but in reality to protect blue-collar jobs in the industrialised countries. These will 
probably be effected through the WTO, which seems determined to link trade to labour 
standards in the so-called Millennium Round negotiations, or, perhaps less offensively, 
through the International Labour Organisation (ILO).
It is clear that the economic and political climate of 30-40 years ago during 
which Singapore ‘took-off and stayed airborne has changed significantly. Ironically, the 
shift is mirrored in the difference between the ideologies expressed by US Supreme 
Court Judge Douglas in 1962 and by the US Congress in 1994.9 While the former waxed 
warmly with philanthropy to help new countries develop as ‘free nations’, the latter fo­
cused on developing ‘free markets’. The goals have changed. With the end of the Cold 
War, there is no longer a need for the USA to contain communism. Thus the 1990s 
agenda of the American-driven law and development movement has shifted to focus on 
creating or enlarging free-market democracies for the goods and services of American 
and other trans-national corporations. Inadvertent or not, one result of this shift is to in­
crease the power of global business corporations while diminishing the power of gov­
ernments in the new market democracies. Instead of the notion of ‘bureaucrats in busi­
ness’, the reverse paradigm is fast becoming the reality. The dilemma is that the global 
‘business bureaucracy’ is accountable primarily to its shareholders often to the detriment 
of the interests of the small free-market democracies in which the new species of busi­
ness bureaucrats operate.
However, to end on a positive note, it should be remembered that Singapore’s 
economic growth is a by-product of the acceleration in the 1960s of the post-World War
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2 global restructuring of capitalism. This structural change was itself driven by the cul­
mination of the transformation of western economies from the agricultural to the indus­
trial age.10 The definitive change involved the creation and reordering of industrial la­
bour in response to dramatically increased demand for low-cost, machine-produced, 
mass-manufactured consumer goods as opposed to hand-crafted goods and unprocessed, 
agricultural products. It seems likely that the new millennium will usher in an accelera­
tion of another global restructuring of capitalism, namely the paradigm shift from the 
predominantly industrial-based society to an information, knowledge-based society 
(Toffler 1980). Opportunities may yet reveal themselves in the interstices of this new 
economic world structure. For instance, some developing countries are eyeing the possi­
bility of branding their agricultural produce. Others investigate how to protect their in­
digenous knowledge and farmers’ rights to flora and fauna, which contain industrially 
useful and therefore commercially profitable genetic characteristics.11 However to be of 
any utility value to late-industrialising nations, this restructuring will require major 
changes in policies, institutions and international laws regarding the use and protection 
of biodiversity (Shiva 1993).
Clearly, law and legal institutions, though essential, are by no means sufficient to 
bring about economic development. Despite abundant free-market rhetoric, Singapore’s 
experience shows that a strong, politically stable state, not the market, is better at or­
dering and allocating scant resources, especially during the early phases of development, 
when it is conducive to sustainable economic growth to place the national good above 
the interests of individuals. However, an important prerequisite is the political will and 
ability to control corruption, whether it emanates from need or greed. Indeed one of Sin­
gapore’s enduring legacies is its ability to foster and maintain a virtually incorruptible 
bureaucracy throughout its development.12 This topic requires further investigation for it
1 3seems to be the Achilles’ heel of late-industrialising nations everywhere.
9 See quotations at the beginning of chapter 1 of this study.
10 For a discussion, see Toffler 1980.
11 See, e.g. Swaminathan 1996.
12 See Quah 1978 and 1988.
13 For instance, nothing like the notorious klepto-patrimonial regimes of Africa, like Nigeria and 
Zaire, and of Asia, like Suharto's Indonesia, or even milder forms of cronyism like in Malaysia, 
were ever tolerated in modem Singapore.
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As for the theory of law and development, it is a truism that bad theories lead to 
bad policies, which, if implemented, lead to bad results. The consequences are less clear 
for a theory whose predictions appear to be inconsistent with, or contradicted by, prac­
tice. Nevertheless the results of my research strongly suggest that the theory of law and 
[economic] development is in need of re-conceptualisation. For Singapore’s practice of 
law and development and its experience of economic success and social equity do not 
support the theory’s key predictions, whether in its original 1960s’ version or its 1990s’ 
reincarnation. That Singapore’s practice appears to have been almost the antithesis of 
some Western liberal notions should strengthen our resolve to seek answers and incor­
porate them into the theory’s re-conceptualisation rather than be allowed to cloud the 
main issue. The flight of the bumblebee too seems to have confounded key predictions 
of aerodynamics theory.
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Appendix 1: Two Ideal Types of Legal Systems
TYPOLOGY OF LAW MODERN 'WESTERN' LAW 'W ESTERNISTIC' LAW
Prim ary features Rule-based. Rights-based. 
Individualistic. Regulatory.
Rule-based. Duty-based. Directive. 
Communitarian. Regulatory. 
Situational.
Functional Purpose 
Driving Ideology
Safeguard free market idea. 
Ensure contractual freedom. 
Commoditise relationships. 
Liberty, individual free-will. 
Calculable rationality. Atomistic.
Orchestrate development.
Ensure social equality.
Compel social cohesion. 
Redistribute nation's wealth (merit) 
Holistic rationality. Communitarian.
Core state model/ 
Values informing 
model
Capitalist. Democratic pluralist or 
corporatist. Free market ideology. 
Market allocative.
Society as a civic association.
Capitalist. Developmental. Mixed 
or governed market. Authoritarian 
corporatist. State allocative.
Society as an enterprise association.
Core values affecting 
settlement
Sense of justice, legality. 
Conflict resolving.
Solidarity, fairness. Equity.
Policy implementing. Goal-focused.
Settlement agent Courts & tribunals Courts, tribunals & bureaucratic 
committees.
Enforcement Courts; agents who may use force 
and penalties on behalf of state.
Courts; agents who may use force 
and penalties on behalf of state. 
Administrative sanctions.
Process for legal 
change
Change statutes or case law.
Immediate effect,
subject to dissemination & rules.
Change statutes or case law 
and bureaucratic practice. 
Immediate effect, 
subject to dissemination & rules.
Sources of Law Statutes &  regulations.
Case-law from impartial judiciary. 
International treaties.
Statutes & regulations. 
State-authorised policy. 
Bureaucratic practice. 
State-endorsed judicial decisions. 
International treaties.
Aimed at Individuals & bureaucrats. Bureaucrats &individuals, depends 
on specific intent or goal.
Dissemination Written rules & cases. Written rules & cases. Discretionary 
power in public interest.
Dispute settlement Adjudication via experts. 
Often adversarial.
Mediation, adjudication via experts. 
Bureaucratic decisions based on 
public interest.
Note: No country has the perfect 'ideal type' of legal system; rather a mix of 'types' is likely. 
Adapted from: Trubek 1972; Yasuda 1998.
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Appendix 2: Typology & Relational Links of Singapore Statutes 
in the Database
LAWS - STATUTES
Law Id
Name: Short-title
Year Enacted
Chapter No: cap xx
Period Identity
Category Identity i
AMENDMENTS 
Amendment Id 
Law Id
Year Amended 
Period Id 
Description 
Legal System Id
hr
TYPE OF LEGAL SYSTEM
(overall tendencies/characteristics)
Legal System Id
Western Law 
Westernistic Law
PERIODS
Period Id 
Start Year 
End Year 
Description
ISI: Import-substituting Industrialisa­
tion -1959 -1965
EOI: Export-oriented Industrialisation 
1966 -1973
BB: Broader-based industries 
1974 -1978
VA: Higher Value-Added manufac­
turing -1979 -1984 
REC: Recession -1985 -1986 
SER: Service, Regionalisation 1987-97 
CRI: Regional Crisis -1997 -1999 
OUT: Not within period 1959-1999
CATEGORIES OF LAW
Category Id 
Description
1 Labour Relations
2 Property
3 Capital Formation
4 Revenue
5 Market Access
6 Sectoral (Infrastructure)
7 Government
8 Criminal
9 Family
10 Out (Outside of categories)
(See Typology/Characteristics in 
Appendix 1).
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1959
1960
i
1961
1962
1963
Appendix 3: Chronology of Events 1959 to 1999
Singapore gains internal self-rule from the British. PAP wins 
43 of 51 seats and takes power with 35-yr Lee Kuan Yew as PM. 
Lyle Report concludes that 'the unrestricted  Free Port Era 
appears to be ended '. It recom m ends the creation of the 
Malaysian Federation, reiterating the 1955 W orld Bank Report. 
Staple port enjoys bouyant trade: Tables A2&A3&A4 Huff 1997. 
S ingapore introduces fiscal incentives to m atch 'p ioneer' 
im port substitution incentives offered to companies in Malaya. 
Major sm elting w ork closes as Straits Trading Com pany 
transfers to Butterw orth (Penang).1 Textiles are Singapore's 
single largest manufactured export. The first yarn-spinning 
mill built in 1953 exports all its 2.5 million lbs annual output. 
GDP is SD 1968 million.
Entrepot provides 20% of GDP which is now SD 2149.6 million. 
Gross national saving/G N P is -2.4%. U nem ploym ent rate is 
4.9%. Population 1.6 million. Oil refinery starts at the port2. 
Singapore is the w orld 's largest prim ary rubber market: sales 
are about 37% of world production. Indonesian barter trade 
accounts for lion 's share, especially in rubber and pepper 
m arkets. M anufacturing is 16.6% of GDP3 and 10.7% of 
exports.4 People's Association form ed to m obilise grassroot 
support against communists. Feby: H ousing & Development 
Board (HDB) replaces SIT and begins massive housing project.
First Development Plan; UN Report of W insemius mission:
'A Proposed Industrial Programme for the State of Singapore'. 
The Economic D evelopm ent Board (EDB) replaces the 1957 
Industrial Promotion Board. The EDB gets SD 100 million and 
w ide pow ers 'to participate in industry  and build necessary 
infrastructure'.5 The Malayan stock exchange, w ith Singapore at 
the centre, takes off - slowly. 13 pro-com m unist PAP Assembly 
members leave to form Barisan Sosialis.
EDB reorganises: sets up Technical Consultancy Division; splits 
Industrial Division into Civil Engineering & Lands, and Survey 
& Planning. EDB accelerates infrastructure work. By December: 
1100 acres prepared in Jurong. Yes vote for Malaysian merger.
Feby: Operation Coldstore. Sept: Malaysian Federation formed. 
All former British territories in the region (except Brunei) win 
independence. Rueff Report estim ates that the Federation 
w ould create a SD2 billion im port substitution market. Tariffs 
and im port quotas set up  to protect 'p ioneer' firms. EDB 
receives trade missions from Tasmania, Japan, USA, Taiwan 
and Italy. From 1963-1973 the volum e of w orld m anufactured 
exports grew at an annual average rate of 11.5%.6 By December
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1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1800 acres of land had been prepared in Jurong. Indonesian 
Confrontation in protest against the M alaysian Federation.
The Confrontation causes economic dow nturn. EDB sets up 
Productivity and Training Unit. 9 PAP members seek election 
in Malaysia; won one seat. Racial/religious riots: July & Sept.
August: Singapore leaves Malaysian Federation after difficulties 
w ith federal government.
9 August: Republic of Singapore form ed. EDB sets up Export 
Promotion Centre and Product & Design Centre.
Singapore joins IMF and IBRD. Malaysia and Singapore decide 
to split currency - see 1967. Trade with Indonesia resumes.
EDB sets up investm ent prom otion centre in New York. US 
puts quota on cotton textiles.
Sterling devalues. Malayan dollar (MD), sole legal tender since 
1952, remains MD60 = GB 7 until Singapore-Malaysian currency 
split in June. Board of Commissioners of Currency set up.
New incentives Act. ASEAN formed, Singapore key player.
Singapore abolishes withholding tax on interest payable to non­
residents. Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) incorporated 
with 49% state share. Asian Dollar Market starts7. Jurong Town 
Corporation (JTC, an EDB spin-off) set up as a statutory board to 
develop industrial estates. Strict labour laws enacted.
School system restructured for technical & vocational training. 
English language in all schools. British military withdrawal.
M anufacturing is a 'leading sector'. 1st foreign bank, Bank of 
America, approved to operate ACU. 1st m erchant bank set up.
M onetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) as de facto central 
bank, supervises m onetary and banking regulation. Serves as 
an agent in transactions w ith IMF, W orld Bank and Asian 
D evelopm ent Bank.
Tripartite National Wages Council set up. Sets guidelines for 
wage increases in public and private sectors annually.
Economic turning point: m anufacturing ends surplus labour. 
MAS formalises offshore banking; appoves m any international 
banks to conduct offshore business from Singapore. Singapore 
pulls out of joint stock exchange w ith Malaysia; ends currency 
in terchangeability  agreem ent. Sets up Stock Exchange of 
Singapore (SES). Port renovation.
1974 OPEC hikes oil prices. Capital assistance scheme introduced.
W orld recession. Singapore increases tax incentives.
Small Industries Finance Scheme. GSP schemes set up.
Infrastructure improvement: state supervises bus services. 
Exchange control liberalised: no restrictions on m ovem ent of 
funds. H uge p roduct developm en t/investm en t allowances; 
Servicing & W arehousing; Consultancy services prom oted.
Government launches 'Second Industrial Revolution' - aims 
to upgrade m anufacturing sector: move from labour-intensive 
activities to high-tech, high-skill, high-incom e, high-produc- 
tivity activities. M inistry of Finance passes reponsibility for 
development policies to Ministry of Trade & Industry. EDB and 
JTC retain own specialised areas. Skills Developm ent Fund 
(SDF) set up under EDB. NWC 3-yr w age correction. OPEC 
increases oil prices.
German-Singapore Institute (GSI) MOU on technical/financial 
assistance. Capital allowances revised. SDF schemes increased.
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) set up 
to m anage and control investm ent of official foreign exchange 
reserves, instead of MAS.
Japanese-Singapore Institute of Software Technology (JSIST) and 
GSI start operation. Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme 
initiated for key supporting industries.
Trade Development Board to develop 'global trading hub' idea 
and increase international trade. State owns 490 companies, 
including subsidiaries of statu tory  boards. French-Singapore 
Institute (FSI) set up to train electro-technicians.
SDF new  technologies focus. Tax exempt SIMEX futures market 
set up.
Recession: growth -1.8%. Lee Hsien Loong conducts study. 
SDlOOm v en tu re  fund  p ro v id ed . C o n tin u a l U p g rad in g  
Program introduced.
Subsidiaries of local banks become members of SES.
Lee's Economic Committee Report launches: total business hub 
concept, SME and privatisation plans.
Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing & Autom ated Quotation 
M arket (SESDAQ) allows young com panies (w ithout track 
record required by main board) to raise funds by public listing.
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W orld recession. Singapore increases tax incentives.
Small Industries Finance Scheme. GSP schemes set up.
Infrastructure improvement: state supervises bus services. 
Exchange control liberalised: no restrictions on m ovem ent of 
funds. H uge p roduct developm en t/investm en t allowances; 
Servicing & W arehousing; Consultancy services promoted.
Governm ent launches 'Second Industrial Revolution' - aims 
to upgrade m anufacturing sector: move from labour-intensive 
activities to high-tech, high-skill, high-incom e, high-produc- 
tivity activities. M inistry of Finance passes reponsibility for 
development policies to Ministry of Trade & Industry. EDB and 
JTC retain own specialised areas. Skills D evelopm ent Fund 
(SDF) set up under EDB. NWC 3-yr wage correction. OPEC 
increases oil prices.
German-Singapore Institute (GSI) MOU on technical/financial 
assistance. Capital allowances revised. SDF schemes increased.
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) set up 
to m anage and control investm ent of official foreign exchange 
reserves, instead of MAS.
Japanese-Singapore Institute of Software Technology (JSIST) and 
GSI start operation. Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme 
initiated for key supporting industries.
Trade Development Board to develop 'global trading hub' idea 
and increase international trade. State owns 490 companies, 
including subsidiaries of statu tory  boards. French-Singapore 
Institute (FSI) set up to train electro-technicians.
SDF new technologies focus. Tax exempt SIMEX futures market 
set up.
Recession: growth -1.8%. Lee Hsien Loong conducts study. 
SDlOOm v en tu re  fund  p ro v id ed . C on tinual U p g rad in g  
Program  introduced.
Subsidiaries of local banks become members of SES.
Lee's Economic Committee Report launches: total business hub 
concept, SME and privatisation plans.
Stock Exchange of Singapore Dealing & Autom ated Quotation 
M arket (SESDAQ) allows young com panies (w ithout track 
record required by main board) to raise funds by public listing.
